Hi! And Welcome to Beautiful Losers Episode 14: Fascism!
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And now: Fascism!
We offer this as a more relaxed and extemporaneous episode. We wanted to bring to the pod some of our regular, off-mic conversations.
In this episode we try to answer the time-honored question, “why should you punch a Nazi?” In typical Beautiful Losers fashion, we approach the question circuitously. Our question is not so much about the efficacy of punching Nazis, but instead we interrogate the foundational concepts of self, other, and community that would even allow one to answer the question as such. In other words: What is fascism, why should one resist it, and how should one resist it?
Helping us throughout this episode is Umberto Eco’s 1995 essay “Ur-Fascism” and selections from Hannah Arendt’s 1951 classic The Origins of Totalitarianism. Eco and Arendt are interested in the cultural and philosophical ground that allows for something like fascism to emerge.
We frame their inquiries by considering the current state of masculine-oriented media, namely the constellation of podcasts that include figures like Joe Rogan and Aubrey Marcus. This media figures market themselves toward 18-35 year old males and although they are not fascists as such, we consider how the cultural values they uphold - self-discipline, personal optimization, and individualism - fit within an ethos of loneliness and isolation. Are they making the best of a lonely world, or is their worldview in some way responsible for the loneliness that pervades modernity? The truth, it seems to us, is a mix of the two. But what is really pernicious is the way that the very values the celebrate are defense-mechanisms for accommodating a lonely form of machismo.
Arendt’s words on the relationship between loneliness and political terror speak to this complexity:
“It has frequently been observed that terror can rule absolutely only over men who are isolated against each other and that, therefore, one of the primary concerns of all tyrannical government is to bring this isolation about. Isolation may be the beginning of terror; it certainly is its most fertile ground; it always is its result. This isolation is, as it were, pretotalitarian; its hallmark is impotence insofar as power always comes from men acting together, “acting in concert” (Burke); isolated men are powerless by definition.
Isolation and impotence, that is the fundamental inability to act at all, have always been characteristic of tyrannies. Political contacts between men are severed in tyrannical government and the human capacities for action and power are frustrated. But not all contacts between men are broken and not all human capacities destroyed. The whole sphere of private life with the capacities for experience, fabrication and thought are left intact. We know that the iron band of total terror leaves no space for such private life and that the self-coercion of totalitarian logic destroys man’s capacity for experience and thought just as certainly as his capacity for action.”
Arendt’s evocation of impotence is all the more intriguing when placed within this specific, male-oriented media landscape. For us the important distinction concerns types of power (and types of impotence). So much self-help discourse is built around a logic of empowerment; it follows that empowerment emerges as a cross-cultural contemporary value. But what is the whence and whither of empowerment? Arendt might frame the question like this: can one achieve empowerment when once exists in a state of isolation?
Arendt, the political philosopher and professor, takes time in her study to think through the life of the mind. Academics often live lonely lives, but she is quick to point out that this form of solitude is a solitude-with ideas, people, community, shared values. One might say a similar operation is at work in the self-help community, where there is a general and unfocused pursuit toward being at one with the universe. It certainly seems rhetorically strategic for self-help discourse to rely on a language of new-age metaphysics in order to ground its truth claims: an ahistoric re-grounding of metaphysics.
The difference in telos between the kind of discourse that Arendt’s “thinker in solitude” practices and the gig-worker on a mindfulness retreat may reveal the fundamental distinction. For Arendt, the good is measured through public works and community development. For the self-help guru, success is measured through the ability to market and sell products and lifestyle to a private community. Philosopher’s aren’t influencers; they’re architects of public works.
That’s all well and good, but is it fascist? In true Beautiful Loser fashion we have left our original premise behind. Arendt and Eco provide ways of understanding violent and oppressive political formations. Their analysis is welcome because it shows what these formations look like, rather than simply telling readers what they are. The terms we use to describe these formations often distract from actual engagement with the formation itself. Eco describes the relationship between the discourse of the ideology and the practice of the politics in an almost psychoanalytic frame: “ideologies can be criticized and disowned, behind a regime and its ideology there is always a way of thinking and feeling, a group of cultural habits, of obscure instincts and unfathomable drives.”
As a means of providing some conclusion, the last part of our discussion considers the role of morality, norms, and values. How should one ground one’s case against a violent or oppressive political formation? Arendt’s historical analysis is stirring because she demonstrates how two antagonistic conservative traditions (the petit bourgeois and the imperial) dissolve their differences and emerge in the German context as a totalitarian state. But in order to make the case for her moral political philosophy, she must appeal to an idea of the individual that is oppressed and diminished as a result of this strategic alignment.
Similarly, Eco invokes the spirit of 1776 and 1789 — an appeal to the enlightenment — to ground his normative critique of ur-fascism. Both authors are keenly aware of the dangers, risks, and violence produced by the enlightenment and modernity, but both rely on that intellectual tradition in order to ground their ethical arguments.
A bad-faith beautiful loser would point to this apparent inconsistency as a reason to dismiss the entire argument and it holds critical thinking and inquiry to an impossible standard. This is the kind of purity discourse that we strongly reject. The question of how to redeem and build upon the legacy of the enlightenment is critical and it ought to be done carefully and with an acute understanding of its wrecks and errors; those wrecks and errors don’t mean that the entire project is doomed or a necessary failure.
As thinkers committed to the project of understanding the relationship between thinking and feeling (what we call the beautiful loser), we arrive at the rather emotionally unsatisfying conclusion that resisting fascism is good, but doing so in a way that merely satisfies a fleeting emotional desire (punching) is counter-productive. The difficult work of study, analysis, engagement, and non-violent action provides the only rational and efficacious path forward.
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