BlueDot Narrated

BlueDot Narrated

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BlueDot Narrated episodes

  • Deceptively Aligned Mesa-Optimizers: It’s Not Funny if I Have to Explain It

    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    Our goal here is to popularize obscure and hard-to-understand areas of AI alignment.

    So let’s try to understand the incomprehensible meme! 

    Our main source will be Hubinger et al 2019, Risks From Learned Optimization In Advanced Machine Learning Systems.

    Mesa- is a Greek prefix which means the opposite of meta-. To “go meta” is to go one level up; to “go mesa” is to go one level down (nobody has ever actually used this expression, sorry). So a mesa-optimizer is an optimizer one level down from you.

    Consider evolution, optimizing the fitness of animals. For a long time, it did so very mechanically, inserting behaviors like “use this cell to detect light, then grow toward the light” or “if something has a red dot on its back, it might be a female of your species, you should mate with it”. As animals became more complicated, they started to do some of the work themselves. Evolution gave them drives, like hunger and lust, and the animals figured out ways to achieve those drives in their current situation. Evolution didn’t mechanically instill the behavior of opening my fridge and eating a Swiss Cheese slice. It instilled the hunger drive, and I figured out that the best way to satisfy it was to open my fridge and eat cheese.

    Source:

    https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/deceptively-aligned-mesa-optimizers

    Crossposted from the Astral Codex Ten podcast.

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    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    27 min
  • What Failure Looks Like

    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    Crossposted from the AI Alignment Forum. May contain more technical jargon than usual.

    The stereotyped image of AI catastrophe is a powerful, malicious AI system that takes its creators by surprise and quickly achieves a decisive advantage over the rest of humanity.

    I think this is probably not what failure will look like, and I want to try to paint a more realistic picture. I’ll tell the story in two parts:

    Part I: machine learning will increase our ability to “get what we can measure,” which could cause a slow-rolling catastrophe. ("Going out with a whimper.")

    Part II: ML training, like competitive economies or natural ecosystems, can give rise to “greedy” patterns that try to expand their own influence. Such patterns can ultimately dominate the behavior of a system and cause sudden breakdowns. ("Going out with a bang," an instance of optimization daemons.) I think these are the most important problems if we fail to solve intent alignment.

    In practice these problems will interact with each other, and with other disruptions/instability caused by rapid progress. These problems are worse in worlds where progress is relatively fast, and fast takeoff can be a key risk factor, but I’m scared even if we have several years.

    Crossposted from the LessWrong Curated Podcast by TYPE III AUDIO.

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    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    19 min
  • Learning From Human Preferences

    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    One step towards building safe AI systems is to remove the need for humans to write goal functions, since using a simple proxy for a complex goal, or getting the complex goal a bit wrong, can lead to undesirable and even dangerous behavior. In collaboration with DeepMind’s safety team, we’ve developed an algorithm which can infer what humans want by being told which of two proposed behaviors is better.

    Original article:
    https://openai.com/research/learning-from-human-preferences

    Authors:
    Dario Amodei, Paul Christiano, Alex Ray

    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    7 min
  • Superintelligence: Instrumental Convergence

    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    According to the orthogonality thesis, intelligent agents may have an enormous range of possible final goals. Nevertheless, according to what we may term the “instrumental convergence” thesis, there are some instrumental goals likely to be pursued by almost any intelligent agent, because there are some objectives that are useful intermediaries to the achievement of almost any final goal. We can formulate this thesis as follows:

    The instrumental convergence thesis:
    "Several instrumental values can be identified which are convergent in the sense that their attainment would increase the chances of the agent’s goal being realized for a wide range of final goals and a wide range of situations, implying that these instrumental values are likely to be pursued by a broad spectrum of situated intelligent agents."

    Original article:
    https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KewDov1taegTzrqJ4uurmJ2CJ0Y72EU3/view

    Author:
    Nick Bostrom

    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    18 min
  • The Easy Goal Inference Problem Is Still Hard

    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    One approach to the AI control problem goes like this:

    • Observe what the user of the system says and does.
    • Infer the user’s preferences.
    • Try to make the world better according to the user’s preference, perhaps while working alongside the user and asking clarifying questions.

    This approach has the major advantage that we can begin empirical work today — we can actually build systems which observe user behavior, try to figure out what the user wants, and then help with that. There are many applications that people care about already, and we can set to work on making rich toy models.

    It seems great to develop these capabilities in parallel with other AI progress, and to address whatever difficulties actually arise, as they arise. That is, in each domain where AI can act effectively, we’d like to ensure that AI can also act effectively in the service of goals inferred from users (and that this inference is good enough to support foreseeable applications).

    This approach gives us a nice, concrete model of each difficulty we are trying to address. It also provides a relatively clear indicator of whether our ability to control AI lags behind our ability to build it. And by being technically interesting and economically meaningful now, it can help actually integrate AI control with AI practice.

    Overall I think that this is a particularly promising angle on the AI safety problem.

    Original article:
    https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/h9DesGT3WT9u2k7Hr/the-easy-goal-inference-problem-is-still-hard

    Authors:
    Paul Christiano

    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    8 min
  • The Alignment Problem From a Deep Learning Perspective
    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    Within the coming decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities at a wide range of important tasks. We outline a case for expecting that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals which are undesirable (i.e. misaligned) from a human perspective. We argue that if AGIs are trained in ways similar to today's most capable models, they could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their training distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and briefly review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

    Original article:
    https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.00626

    Authors:
    Richard Ngo, Lawrence Chan, Sören Mindermann


    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    34 min
  • AGI Safety From First Principles

    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    This report explores the core case for why the development of artificial general intelligence (AGI) might pose an existential threat to humanity. It stems from my dissatisfaction with existing arguments on this topic: early work is less relevant in the context of modern machine learning, while more recent work is scattered and brief. This report aims to fill that gap by providing a detailed investigation into the potential risk from AGI misbehaviour, grounded by our current knowledge of machine learning, and highlighting important uncertain ties. It identifies four key premises, evaluates existing arguments about them, and outlines some novel considerations for each.

    Source:

    https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uK7NhdSKprQKZnRjU58X7NLA1auXlWHt/view

    Narrated for AI Safety Fundamentals by TYPE III AUDIO.

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    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    14 min
  • Four Background Claims

    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    MIRI’s mission is to ensure that the creation of smarter-than-human artificial intelligence has a positive impact. Why is this mission important, and why do we think that there’s work we can do today to help ensure any such thing? In this post and my next one, I’ll try to answer those questions. This post will lay out what I see as the four most important premises underlying our mission. Related posts include Eliezer Yudkowsky’s “Five Theses” and Luke Muehlhauser’s “Why MIRI?”; this is my attempt to make explicit the claims that are in the background whenever I assert that our mission is of critical importance. #### Claim #1: Humans have a very general ability to solve problems and achieve goals across diverse domains. We call this ability “intelligence,” or “general intelligence.” This isn’t a formal definition — if we knew exactly what general intelligence was, we’d be better able to program it into a computer — but we do think that there’s a real phenomenon of general intelligence that we cannot yet replicate in code. Alternative view: There is no such thing as general intelligence. Instead, humans have a collection of disparate special-purpose modules. Computers will keep getting better at narrowly defined tasks such as chess or driving, but at no point will they acquire “generality” and become significantly more useful, because there is no generality to acquire.

    Source:

    https://intelligence.org/2015/07/24/four-background-claims/

    Narrated for AI Safety Fundamentals by Perrin Walker of TYPE III AUDIO.

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    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    16 min
  • Biological Anchors: A Trick That Might Or Might Not Work

    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    I've been trying to review and summarize Eliezer Yudkowksy's recent dialogues on AI safety. Previously in sequence: Yudkowsky Contra Ngo On Agents. Now we’re up to Yudkowsky contra Cotra on biological anchors, but before we get there we need to figure out what Cotra's talking about and what's going on.

    The Open Philanthropy Project ("Open Phil") is a big effective altruist foundation interested in funding AI safety. It's got $20 billion, probably the majority of money in the field, so its decisions matter a lot and it’s very invested in getting things right. In 2020, it asked senior researcher Ajeya Cotra to produce a report on when human-level AI would arrive. It says the resulting document is "informal" - but it’s 169 pages long and likely to affect millions of dollars in funding, which some might describe as making it kind of formal. The report finds a 10% chance of “transformative AI” by 2031, a 50% chance by 2052, and an almost 80% chance by 2100.

    Eliezer rejects their methodology and expects AI earlier (he doesn’t offer many numbers, but here he gives Bryan Caplan 50-50 odds on 2030, albeit not totally seriously). He made the case in his own very long essay, Biology-Inspired AGI Timelines: The Trick That Never Works, sparking a bunch of arguments and counterarguments and even more long essays.

    Source:

    https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/biological-anchors-a-trick-that-might

    Crossposted from the Astral Codex Ten podcast.

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    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    1 hr 11 min
  • More Is Different for AI

    Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.

    Machine learning is touching increasingly many aspects of our society, and its effect will only continue to grow. Given this, I and many others care about risks from future ML systems and how to mitigate them. When thinking about safety risks from ML, there are two common approaches, which I'll call the Engineering approach and the Philosophy approach: The Engineering approach tends to be empirically-driven, drawing experience from existing or past ML systems and looking at issues that either: (1) are already major problems, or (2) are minor problems, but can be expected to get worse in the future. Engineering tends to be bottom-up and tends to be both in touch with and anchored on current state-of-the-art systems. The Philosophy approach tends to think more about the limit of very advanced systems. It is willing to entertain thought experiments that would be implausible with current state-of-the-art systems (such as Nick Bostrom's paperclip maximizer) and is open to considering abstractions without knowing many details. It often sounds more "sci-fi like" and more like philosophy than like computer science. It draws some inspiration from current ML systems, but often only in broad strokes. I'll discuss these approaches mainly in the context of ML safety, but the same distinction applies in other areas. For instance, an Engineering approach to AI + Law might focus on how to regulate self-driving cars, while Philosophy might ask whether using AI in judicial decision-making could undermine liberal democracy.

    Original text:

    https://bounded-regret.ghost.io/more-is-different-for-ai/

    Narrated for AI Safety Fundamentals by Perrin Walker of TYPE III AUDIO.

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    A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

    7 min

About BlueDot Narrated

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Audio versions of the core readings, blog posts, and papers from BlueDot courses.