
Sign up to save your podcasts
Or


Today's episode comes from a virtual panel discussion that CNAS held earlier this week on the collaboration between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, or what we have called the Axis of Upheaval. The event was motivated by a recent piece that Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine published in Foreign Affairs called “The Axis of Upheaval Goes to War.”
Ahead of Donald Trump's meeting with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin earlier this week, the panel convened to discuss the outlook of the Iran War for the Axis of Upheaval and how the U.S. and its allies can respond. Andrea Kendall-Taylor was joined on the panel by Richard Fontaine and Michael Singh, and the event was moderated by David McKenzie. We hope you enjoy the discussion.
This week, American, Ukrainian, and Russian officials are gathering in Abu Dhabi for the first trilateral peace talks in nine months. But the negotiations could have implications that extend well beyond the war in Ukraine. Ahead of the talks, U.S. Special Envoy Jared Kushner proposed a new European security framework, echoing President Donald Trump’s suggestion of an eminent “big, beautiful agreement” that could include all of Europe. Kushner outlined five goals for the framework, including permanent security consultations, crisis communication, greater military transparency, and measures to reduce the risk of escalation.
So, to discuss these developments and what they mean for the future of European security, we are delighted to welcome Ivo Daalder and Carl Bildt back to Brussels Sprouts.
Ivo Daalder is a senior fellow at the Belfer Center. Previously, he served as the U.S. ambassador to NATO from 2009–2013 and on the National Security Council under President Clinton.
In a stunning midterm election, Democrats have won back control of the House and Senate. Even with some races still uncalled, Democrats have secured at least 54 Senate seats and a significant majority in the House. Many of their gains came in traditionally Republican states, including Texas, South Carolina, and Ohio, and in districts redrawn at President Trump's urging.
For much of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Europe has demonstrated remarkable unity and resolve. Despite economic pressures, political disagreements, and repeated predictions that its support would falter, European governments have largely held together. But as the war heads into another winter, that unity is facing a growing test.
On October 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced he had reached a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin to produce to purchase Russian diesel ahead of next month’s midterm elections—the first in a series of overtures to Moscow. Trump also waived congressional sanctions on Russia and signaled willingness to meet with Putin and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping to discuss a peace deal on Ukraine without European involvement.
More than seven months have passed since the United States launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran. The resulting war has disrupted global energy markets, exacerbated regional instability, and increasingly drawn other countries into the conflict.
To discuss these risks, we are delighted to welcome Jonathan Panikoff and Matthew Savill to Brussels Sprouts.
A fast-approaching winter looms over Ukraine. Russia has intensified a concerted campaign against the infrastructure that keeps Ukraine’s economy running, striking railways, warehouses, steel plants, and energy facilities. The attacks threaten production and exports and further strain Kyiv’s finances just as temperatures begin to drop. Last week, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development downgraded its 2026 growth forecast for Ukraine from 2.2 percent to 1.5 percent.
Europe, meanwhile, is signaling an inability—or an unwillingness—to cover the added cost of Ukraine’s war effort. In early September, Ukrainian officials reported a $27 billion deficit in the defense budget. President Zelensky blamed part of the gap on excess spending by dismissed Defense Minister Mykhailo Federov, which Fedorov has denied. European leaders have remained noncommittal, with some proposing renewed discussion over using Russia’s frozen assets—an issue that almost derailed the European Union’s existing $105 billion loan to Ukraine.
Ukraine’s shortage of air defense interceptors makes these pressures even more acute. As Russia intensifies its attacks, Ukrainians face rolling blackouts, disrupted heating, lost jobs, and mounting economic pressure through the coldest months of the year. The challenge for Kyiv this winter is not simply keeping the lights on but keeping its economy afloat, sustaining its war effort, and maintaining the resilience of its population. So, to discuss all these issues and how Ukraine can manage these challenges, we are excited to welcome Balázs Jarábik and Kateryna Shynkaruk to Brussels Sprouts.
Europe is facing an escalation in high-profile Russian hybrid attacks. Earlier this month, Germany attributed an attempted drone attack at Leipzig Airport to Moscow, Denmark accused a Russian ship of shooting flares at one of its military helicopters, and NATO jets downed a drone carrying explosives over Lithuania. Just yesterday, more Russian drones crashed in Moldova and Romania, while Poland reported sabotage incidents on defense and logistical infrastructure.
In response, European leaders are sounding the alarm. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned last week that Russia plans to test NATO’s Article V by striking European countries with drones or missiles. Finnish President Alexander Stubb carried a similar message, and French President Emmanuel Macron briefed his country’s political leaders in an emergency meeting last Friday. Attendees included national rally leaders Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, who—despite a history of pro-Kremlin sentiment—criticized Russian “intimidation, threats, destabilization, or psychological warfare.”
Today we are taking a closer look at Germany as it returns to military power. As the United States pulls back from Europe and threats of Russian aggression are heightened, Germany has begun rearming after many decades of restraint. The country has made a constitutional change to allow debt funding for defense spending, published its first military strategy, and increased its defense budget by far higher rates than the average among other European members of NATO, hitting a 36-year high. Many argue that this is necessary to deter Russia and mitigate the risks of a U.S. retreat from European security.
But Germany’s domestic politics complicate the picture. On September 6, the far-right Alternative for Germany party took first place in state elections in eastern Germany, winning 44 percent of the vote. Germany is therefore being asked to assume a much larger role in European security while the political consensus that has underpinned its post-war foreign policy is coming under growing strain. So, what kind of military power is Germany becoming, and can Germany make the transition from decades of military restraint to becoming a country capable of leading and defending Europe?
Today we are turning to domestic Russian politics, with Russia’s State Duma elections coming up September 18th through the 20th. The elections are taking place in a more uncertain domestic environment than we have seen since the early days of the war. The Russian economy is struggling, with slowing growth, inflation, and high interest rates squeezing businesses and households, and the Kremlin is facing increasingly difficult trade-offs between sustaining the war and maintaining economic stability at home.
None of this means President Vladimir Putin is losing control. The Kremlin has spent years constructing a political system designed to prevent precisely that. But the elections come at a moment when pressures on the system are becoming harder to conceal.