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More than seven months have passed since the United States launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran. The resulting war has disrupted global energy markets, exacerbated regional instability, and increasingly drawn other countries into the conflict.
To discuss these risks, we are delighted to welcome Jonathan Panikoff and Matthew Savill to Brussels Sprouts.
A fast-approaching winter looms over Ukraine. Russia has intensified a concerted campaign against the infrastructure that keeps Ukraine’s economy running, striking railways, warehouses, steel plants, and energy facilities. The attacks threaten production and exports and further strain Kyiv’s finances just as temperatures begin to drop. Last week, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development downgraded its 2026 growth forecast for Ukraine from 2.2 percent to 1.5 percent.
Europe, meanwhile, is signaling an inability—or an unwillingness—to cover the added cost of Ukraine’s war effort. In early September, Ukrainian officials reported a $27 billion deficit in the defense budget. President Zelensky blamed part of the gap on excess spending by dismissed Defense Minister Mykhailo Federov, which Fedorov has denied. European leaders have remained noncommittal, with some proposing renewed discussion over using Russia’s frozen assets—an issue that almost derailed the European Union’s existing $105 billion loan to Ukraine.
Ukraine’s shortage of air defense interceptors makes these pressures even more acute. As Russia intensifies its attacks, Ukrainians face rolling blackouts, disrupted heating, lost jobs, and mounting economic pressure through the coldest months of the year. The challenge for Kyiv this winter is not simply keeping the lights on but keeping its economy afloat, sustaining its war effort, and maintaining the resilience of its population. So, to discuss all these issues and how Ukraine can manage these challenges, we are excited to welcome Balázs Jarábik and Kateryna Shynkaruk to Brussels Sprouts.
Europe is facing an escalation in high-profile Russian hybrid attacks. Earlier this month, Germany attributed an attempted drone attack at Leipzig Airport to Moscow, Denmark accused a Russian ship of shooting flares at one of its military helicopters, and NATO jets downed a drone carrying explosives over Lithuania. Just yesterday, more Russian drones crashed in Moldova and Romania, while Poland reported sabotage incidents on defense and logistical infrastructure.
In response, European leaders are sounding the alarm. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned last week that Russia plans to test NATO’s Article V by striking European countries with drones or missiles. Finnish President Alexander Stubb carried a similar message, and French President Emmanuel Macron briefed his country’s political leaders in an emergency meeting last Friday. Attendees included national rally leaders Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, who—despite a history of pro-Kremlin sentiment—criticized Russian “intimidation, threats, destabilization, or psychological warfare.”
Today we are taking a closer look at Germany as it returns to military power. As the United States pulls back from Europe and threats of Russian aggression are heightened, Germany has begun rearming after many decades of restraint. The country has made a constitutional change to allow debt funding for defense spending, published its first military strategy, and increased its defense budget by far higher rates than the average among other European members of NATO, hitting a 36-year high. Many argue that this is necessary to deter Russia and mitigate the risks of a U.S. retreat from European security.
But Germany’s domestic politics complicate the picture. On September 6, the far-right Alternative for Germany party took first place in state elections in eastern Germany, winning 44 percent of the vote. Germany is therefore being asked to assume a much larger role in European security while the political consensus that has underpinned its post-war foreign policy is coming under growing strain. So, what kind of military power is Germany becoming, and can Germany make the transition from decades of military restraint to becoming a country capable of leading and defending Europe?
Today we are turning to domestic Russian politics, with Russia’s State Duma elections coming up September 18th through the 20th. The elections are taking place in a more uncertain domestic environment than we have seen since the early days of the war. The Russian economy is struggling, with slowing growth, inflation, and high interest rates squeezing businesses and households, and the Kremlin is facing increasingly difficult trade-offs between sustaining the war and maintaining economic stability at home.
None of this means President Vladimir Putin is losing control. The Kremlin has spent years constructing a political system designed to prevent precisely that. But the elections come at a moment when pressures on the system are becoming harder to conceal.
As the war in Ukraine rages on, Ukraine has struggled this summer with a munitions shortage. With U.S. supplies strained by the war with Iran, European governments are having a hard time filling the gap, both because of concerns about ensuring their own national defense and because of NATO commitments. With northern European governments reaching the limits of what they feel they can safely donate, there is growing pressure elsewhere, including in Poland, Spain, and Greece, who still have stocks of Patriot interceptors. Meanwhile, Ukrainian defense start-up Fire Point is sprinting to develop the Freyja interceptor, but it is not yet ready for use.
Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe made a highly unusual visit to Moscow this week. Although we don’t know with certainty everything that was discussed, multiple reports now confirm that Ratcliffe went in part to warn Russia against attacking a NATO member or taking steps that could escalate tensions with the alliance.
Brussels Sprouts is back after our summer hiatus, and we’re jumping right back into Ukraine.
On July 15th, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed now–former Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, one of the architects of Ukraine’s technological transformation on the battlefield. His abrupt dismissal sparked protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, with demonstrators calling for the removal of Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, whose more traditional approach to the war had increasingly clashed with Fedorov’s vision.
Today’s episode of Brussels Sprouts comes from a virtual panel discussion that the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) held on July 14 to mark the release of a report titled Forecasting the Future of the Axis of Upheaval: The View from Moscow. The report assesses the future of the “axis of upheaval,” or the deepening relationships among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, from Moscow’s perspective.
The report is set amid growing doubts about Russia’s ability to support its partners abroad in Syria, Venezuela, and Armenia amid the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet while Russia did little to help Iran during 12 days of punishing strikes from Israel and the United States in 2025, Russia provided more tangible support for Iran this year. These incidents raise important questions. How does Russia view its relationships with China, North Korea, and Iran? How far would Russia be willing to go to support its partners? What are the factors that drive its cooperation, and what are the limits
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