Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney made headlines at this year's World Economic Forum in Davos with his speech in which he declared that the international system is in the midst of a rupture—not a transition—and that middle powers must reduce their dependence on great powers such as the United States. Carney called for middle powers to diversify their partnerships and cooperate among themselves to hedge against rising uncertainty, and great powers' weaponization of interdependence. Carney asserted that the middle powers must act together because “if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.”  

To help us find the answers to these questions and more, we're excited to welcome Barry Posen and Ivo Daalder to Brussels Sprouts. 

Barry Posen is professor of international relations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the former director of the MIT Security Studies Program. 

It has been a tumultuous month in the transatlantic alliance. This week, President Donald Trump’s demands to take control of Greenland reached a fever pitch. On Sunday, President Trump threatened major tariffs on Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and a host of other American allies in Europe to coerce them to accept his demands for U.S. control over Greenland. For many European allies, Trump crossed a line, and allies raised the prospect of using their anticoercion instrument against the United States. Though Trump posted on Wednesday afternoon that he had negotiated a “framework deal” to avert the crisis with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, much damage was already done. Meanwhile, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave a speech at the World Economic Forum annual meeting at Davos declaring the end of the era of decisive U.S. global leadership, Trump launched the Board of Peace for Gaza—to which he invited Russian President Vladimir Putin—and Putin ordered more missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s capital and critical infrastructure, in what has been one of the harshest winters in Ukraine in recent memory. Less than a month into the new year, it’s hard to avoid the feeling that we are in the worst period the Transatlantic Alliance has seen since World War II. 

To help us make sense of recent events and to put this crisis into historical context, we're very happy to welcome Jim Goldgeier and Charles Kupchan to Brussels Sprouts. 

Since the invasion of Ukraine, European states have taken major steps to rebuild their defense industrial bases, both to supply Ukraine and to rebuild their own militaries. Europe has been spending heavily on defense since 2022, but the Trump administration’s demand for European NATO members to take responsibility for the conventional defense of the continent has spurred further investments. Add in the Trump administration’s bellicose rhetoric around Greenland and public doubts about the reliability of America in NATO, plus the dual challenges of a resurgent Russia and a wavering United States, and the push for European officials to integrate their defenses further only grows. As European states continue to rearm in 2026, they face the prospect of rebuilding their militaries, supporting Ukraine, and deterring Russia with less U.S. support.  

Christian Mölling is the director of European Defense in a New Age, a Berlin-based think tank, and is a senior advisor at the European Policy Centre. 

On January 3, the United States apprehended the sitting president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, and brought him to the United States to face trial for drug trafficking. In the aftermath of the operation, President Trump and other senior officials in his administration have threatened similar aggression against Mexico and Cuba and revived rhetoric about the United States “needing” Greenland. The operation and Washington’s posture have sent shockwaves through the international system, as concerns rise about the resilience of international law and the risk that the world is moving toward a global order based on spheres of influence, where might makes right and authoritarian states like Russia and China sense a freer hand within their respective regions. The Trump administration’s comments about Greenland are putting additional stress on transatlantic relations, with the Danish prime minister making clear that any U.S. attack on Greenland would end the NATO alliance. To help make sense of the geopolitical implications of Maduro’s capture and more, Brussels Sprouts is pleased to welcome back to the podcast Lawrence Freedman and Shashank Joshi.

This week Brussels Sprouts breaks down the latest negotiations on Ukraine. American officials told reporters that they had resolved or closed gaps around 90 percent of their differences with Ukraine on a draft agreement to end the war. Territory and security guarantees remain the key sticking points. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said it would be impossible for Ukraine to give up territory that Russia has not taken on the battlefield, while Russia has not dropped its demands to control the territories it illegally annexed.

On December 4th, the Trump administration released its long-awaited national security strategy, sending another round of shock waves through the transatlantic community. The national security strategy acknowledges that Europe remains strategically vital to the United States and doubles down on the need for Europe to take more responsibility for its defense, but the strategy is unique in its condemnation of allies, focus on “civilizational erasure”, and promise to intervene to “help Europe correct its current trajectory.”

While the 2017 National Security Strategy explicitly laid out several threats Russia poses to American interests, this one makes little mention of Russia except for calls to restore strategic stability. Many of America's European allies are feeling unsettled and concerned about the national security strategy and what it means for transatlantic relations. So, to help us understand the new national security strategy, it differs from Trump's first strategy and where the through lines are, we're excited to welcome Nadia Shadlow and Rebecca Heinrich to Brussels Sprouts.

It has been almost a year since Russia and Iran signed their comprehensive strategic partnership. That deal established a 20-year partnership between the two countries covering the full spectrum of their relationship from military to economic to cyber ties. Though the two countries have cooperated deeply, from mass production of military drones to smuggling millions of barrels of oil, Russia did not come to Iran's aid when Iran endured 12 days of punishing war at the hands of Israel and the United States. Despite this, cooperation between Russia and Iran has continued. In November, Financial Times reported that Iranian scientists and nuclear experts made a second covert visit to Russia last year in what the United States claims has been a push to obtain sensitive technologies with potential nuclear weapon applications. Cooperation between the two remains a significant challenge for the United States and its allies.  

Hanna Notte is the director for Eurasia at the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies and a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Nicole Grajewski is a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an associate researcher at Harvard’s Belfer Center, and the author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine. 

Over the last month, nuclear tensions have been heating up. In late October, Vladimir Putin claimed two achievements: the successful test of a nuclear-powered missile known as Burevestnik and the initial test of an unmanned nuclear-powered submarine known as Poseidon. Both systems theoretically have unlimited range, and both are capable of hosting nuclear warheads. Shortly thereafter, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would resume nuclear testing on an equal basis with Russia and China.

America’s allies are cooperating in a growing variety of domains. In their recent Foreign Affairs piece, former NATO Ambassador Julie Smith and former National Security Council Senior Director Lindsey Ford argue that the United States should support and facilitate cooperation among America’s European and Indo-Pacific allies. In a world where U.S. adversaries are deepening their cooperation, it is no longer sufficient to ask allies to just focus on their own respective geographic corners of the world. Smith and Ford argue that cooperation between American allies stands to benefit American grand strategy.  

Julie Smith is president and cofounder of Clarion Strategies and former U.S. permanent representative to NATO from 2021 to 2024. 

Lindsey Ford is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a former senior director for South Asia at the National Security Council from 2024 to 2025. She served as U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia from 2021 to 2024. 

President Donald Trump’s meeting with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on October 30, 2025, ended with a temporary truce between the two leaders. While this may be good news for the U.S.-China relationship in the short term, no formal comprehensive trade agreement followed, and any number of issues could derail the delicate truce. Europe has long sought to balance its ideological opposition to China with the desire for pragmatic trade and diplomatic relations. 

This week on Brussels Sprouts, while European nations have largely aligned with the United States in restricting trade with China, could the recent U.S.-China trade thaw lead Brussels to pursue a similar rapprochement? 

To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Liz Economy and Mikko Huotari to Brussels Sprouts.

Liz Economy is a principal with WestExec Advisors and a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution

Mikko Huotari is the executive director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies