On March 2, 2026, in a speech at France’s Île Longue base, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled major changes to France’s nuclear deterrence doctrine. First, Macron announced an increase, the first since 1992, in France’s nuclear stockpile. France currently maintains 290 warheads and will increase that number to a now-undisclosed count. He also announced a new doctrine, what he called “forward deterrence.” This is a partnership with seven European countries—Germany, Poland, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden—on strategic issues. That cooperation will include partner participation in nuclear exercises and the potential for France to temporarily deploy nuclear armed fighter jets to other European countries. While France will maintain the independence of its nuclear command and control and remain outside of NATO’s nuclear mission, this extension of the French nuclear umbrella represents a significant shift in French policy in response to the new realities of the European security environment, which includes a less reliable commitment from the United States. 

To help us understand these changes and to talk through broader implications of a declining U.S. presence in Europe for European strategic deterrence, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Claudia Major and Bruno Tertrais to this week’s show. 

Claudia Major is the senior vice president of Transatlantic Security at the German Marshall Fund. 

Bruno Tertrais is the deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research and a non-resident fellow at the Institut Montaigne. 

On February 28, the United States launched Operation Epic Fury, a major military campaign against Iran carried out alongside Israeli strikes. The opening wave targeted Iranian command and control nodes, missile forces, and military infrastructure across multiple cities and included a decapitation strike that killed the supreme leader. The conflict quickly spread beyond Iran itself. Tehran has retaliated with missile and drone strikes across the Gulf, hitting U.S. and allied targets in countries including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and even striking the British military base in Cyprus.

This week marks the four-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Brussels Sprouts wanted to mark this somber milestone with a look at the conflict and the ongoing efforts to secure a durable end to the war. Even as the war in Ukraine shows no signs of an imminent end, the international community, and the allies in Europe in particular, have been working on the foundations of a credible security guarantee for Ukraine once the fighting ends. Part of this line of effort has been the proposed creation of a multinational force, which could be deployed to Ukraine once the hostilities cease to serve as a visible reassurance force. Perhaps more critically, the multinational force could help Ukraine regenerate its military forces and strengthen its own ability to deter further Russian aggression.

This week’s episode of Brussels Sprouts picks up in the aftermath of the Munich Security Conference. The U.S. tone at Munich was notably more conciliatory than last year, as U.S. officials sought to calm anxieties. Secretary of State Marco Rubio received a standing ovation as he called European allies America’s oldest friends and cited the history of mutual defense from Korea to Afghanistan. But for many Europeans, the rhetoric did little to dispel deeper doubts about the trajectory of the transatlantic relationship. 

Geopolitical currents in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific are rapidly changing, and there is no one better to talk about these developments than a former ambassador to both China and NATO: Ambassador Nick Burns. 

Nick Burns is a professor of diplomacy and international relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Previously, he was a career foreign service officer and served as U.S. ambassador to China from 2021–2025 and as ambassador to NATO from 2001–2005. 

Today’s Brussels Sprouts discussion follows on from our conversation last week on whether middle powers have the ability to chart a course more independent of the United States. Today, we delve into this question as it pertains to whether Europe can defend itself with significantly less U.S. presence in Europe—or none at all. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently addressed that question, saying that if anyone believes Europe or the European Union can defend itself without the United States, they are "dreaming.” In December, German newspaper Die Welt conducted a wargame simulating a Russian invasion of NATO, in partnership with military researchers at Helmut Schmidt University. During the exercise, Russian troops moved unchallenged through NATO territory for three days, capturing a Lithuanian city in the Suwałki Gap. The resulting analysis has cast serious doubt on whether European NATO states can defend their Baltic allies.  

We are joined today by one of the wargame participants, Franz-Stefan Gady, as well as Russian military analyst Mike Kofman, to help us delve into these critical questions on how “Europe with less U.S." would fare in a fight against Russia, and how long it might take Europe to get to a place where it can take on greater responsibility for its own defense. 

Mike Kofman is a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney made headlines at this year's World Economic Forum in Davos with his speech in which he declared that the international system is in the midst of a rupture—not a transition—and that middle powers must reduce their dependence on great powers such as the United States. Carney called for middle powers to diversify their partnerships and cooperate among themselves to hedge against rising uncertainty, and great powers' weaponization of interdependence. Carney asserted that the middle powers must act together because “if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.”  

To help us find the answers to these questions and more, we're excited to welcome Barry Posen and Ivo Daalder to Brussels Sprouts. 

Barry Posen is professor of international relations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the former director of the MIT Security Studies Program. 

It has been a tumultuous month in the transatlantic alliance. This week, President Donald Trump’s demands to take control of Greenland reached a fever pitch. On Sunday, President Trump threatened major tariffs on Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and a host of other American allies in Europe to coerce them to accept his demands for U.S. control over Greenland. For many European allies, Trump crossed a line, and allies raised the prospect of using their anticoercion instrument against the United States. Though Trump posted on Wednesday afternoon that he had negotiated a “framework deal” to avert the crisis with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, much damage was already done. Meanwhile, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave a speech at the World Economic Forum annual meeting at Davos declaring the end of the era of decisive U.S. global leadership, Trump launched the Board of Peace for Gaza—to which he invited Russian President Vladimir Putin—and Putin ordered more missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s capital and critical infrastructure, in what has been one of the harshest winters in Ukraine in recent memory. Less than a month into the new year, it’s hard to avoid the feeling that we are in the worst period the Transatlantic Alliance has seen since World War II. 

To help us make sense of recent events and to put this crisis into historical context, we're very happy to welcome Jim Goldgeier and Charles Kupchan to Brussels Sprouts. 

Since the invasion of Ukraine, European states have taken major steps to rebuild their defense industrial bases, both to supply Ukraine and to rebuild their own militaries. Europe has been spending heavily on defense since 2022, but the Trump administration’s demand for European NATO members to take responsibility for the conventional defense of the continent has spurred further investments. Add in the Trump administration’s bellicose rhetoric around Greenland and public doubts about the reliability of America in NATO, plus the dual challenges of a resurgent Russia and a wavering United States, and the push for European officials to integrate their defenses further only grows. As European states continue to rearm in 2026, they face the prospect of rebuilding their militaries, supporting Ukraine, and deterring Russia with less U.S. support.  

Christian Mölling is the director of European Defense in a New Age, a Berlin-based think tank, and is a senior advisor at the European Policy Centre. 

On January 3, the United States apprehended the sitting president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, and brought him to the United States to face trial for drug trafficking. In the aftermath of the operation, President Trump and other senior officials in his administration have threatened similar aggression against Mexico and Cuba and revived rhetoric about the United States “needing” Greenland. The operation and Washington’s posture have sent shockwaves through the international system, as concerns rise about the resilience of international law and the risk that the world is moving toward a global order based on spheres of influence, where might makes right and authoritarian states like Russia and China sense a freer hand within their respective regions. The Trump administration’s comments about Greenland are putting additional stress on transatlantic relations, with the Danish prime minister making clear that any U.S. attack on Greenland would end the NATO alliance. To help make sense of the geopolitical implications of Maduro’s capture and more, Brussels Sprouts is pleased to welcome back to the podcast Lawrence Freedman and Shashank Joshi.

This week Brussels Sprouts breaks down the latest negotiations on Ukraine. American officials told reporters that they had resolved or closed gaps around 90 percent of their differences with Ukraine on a draft agreement to end the war. Territory and security guarantees remain the key sticking points. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said it would be impossible for Ukraine to give up territory that Russia has not taken on the battlefield, while Russia has not dropped its demands to control the territories it illegally annexed.