Over the last several weeks, European allies have been trying to interpret a steady stream of signals from Washington about the future of the U.S. military role in Europe, discussions we've covered on the last two episodes of Brussels Sprouts. Beyond the headlines about troop levels, the broader concern is that the United States may be preparing to scale back some of the critical capabilities that have long formed the backbone of NATO’s deterrence posture, including the forces and enablers needed to rapidly reinforce Europe in a crisis. The uncertainty has exposed deeper questions about how decisions on U.S. force posture are made, how allies should prepare for a potentially smaller American role, and whether Europe is moving fast enough to adapt to a more demanding security environment. These debates are particularly acute in Germany, where questions about deterrence, defense spending, and Europe’s long-term security architecture are increasingly central to the political conversation.

In the last episode of Brussels Sprouts, we looked at the dizzying series of U.S. announcements about America’s military posture in Europe. Since then, new reporting has emerged. The Wall Street Journal reports that the Pentagon is preparing allies for a much larger reduction in the U.S. forces earmarked to reinforce Europe in a crisis—including reductions in bombers, naval assets, and refueling tinkers. In other words, this is not just about troop numbers on the continent today. It’s about whether the United States will still provide the critical enablers that have long underpinned NATO’s ability to deter and, if necessary, fight a major war in Europe. Moscow is watching all of this closely, and the timing matters. As Washington signals that it intends to do less, Russia is increasing pressure on NATO’s eastern flank.  

In recent weeks, Moscow has threatened Latvia over false claims that it is allowing Ukraine to use its territory or airspace to launch drone attacks against Russia. Baltic officials have rejected those claims, but the pattern is familiar: Manufacture a grievance, amplify it, and use it to build the foundation to justify future aggression. At the same time, Russia is facing growing domestic strain, which we’ve talked about here on Brussels Sprouts as well, raising questions about whether Putin needs a permanent state of confrontation with the West to sustain his hold on power. So, with all of this, today we are asking a central question: Does Russia see opportunity in this moment, one in which the United States may be pulling back faster than Europe can fill the gap? 

To help us understand the view from Moscow, we’re very pleased to welcome back to Brussels Sprouts a series of former intelligence officials: Nate Reynolds, Pete Schroeder, and Jeff Edmonds. 

Over the last several weeks, U.S. allies have been trying to make sense of a dizzying series of announcements about America’s military posture and broader role in Europe. First came reports that the Trump administration planned to withdraw roughly 5,000 troops from Germany following a public dispute with Chancellor Friedrich Merz over the war with Iran. Shortly thereafter, the Pentagon paused the deployment of thousands of U.S. troops to Poland—a move that blindsided officials in Warsaw, particularly because Poland has consistently positioned itself as a model ally. Then, in another abrupt reversal, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would instead send an additional 5,000 troops to Poland, though it remains unclear whether these are new forces, previously paused deployments, or units being shifted from elsewhere in Europe.

As conversations about the status of the liberal world order swirl in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic, many are realizing that old ways of thinking about the rules-based order, power, and international cooperation may no longer hold. Mark Leonard’s new book, Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail, argues that we need a fundamentally different way of thinking about the future. The current moment may not be a world between orders, but a new state of durable “unorder,” defined by four big structural forces—climate, chips, capital, and civilizations—along with the biggest source of the chaos behind them: China. Chaos has become the system, Leonard argues, and rather than looking for order, Europeans should figure out how to have agency.

Surviving Chaos is especially relevant given the U.S. war with Iran, demonstrating how today’s crises overlap and reinforce one another. Energy shortfalls, food insecurity, nuclear proliferation, and global economic shocks all occur simultaneously. Do today’s crises signal a deeper shift toward unorder? Are shared rules and assumptions still relevant? And what does this mean for Europe and how can it adapt?

Over the last several weeks, strain within Russia's domestic political system has become increasingly apparent. The Kremlin has intensified digital controls, intermittently disrupting mobile internet access and placing growing pressure on foreign platforms, including the widely used Telegram messaging service. Authorities have also expanded efforts to restrict VPN use. While the government frames these measures as necessary to guard against Ukrainian drone attacks, public frustration appears to be mounting. Russians have attempted to hold protests and are voicing complaints on social media, with one video expressing grievances by an influencer and former reality TV star going viral.

Individually, neither tightening information controls nor economic strain is likely to drive political change. But taken together, do these pressures point to something more consequential? And what do they mean for Russia's future?

Doubts about U.S. reliability and the future of NATO are top of mind for most in the transatlantic community. The concerns that spiked after President Donald Trump’s threats to seize Greenland have gained new urgency amid the standoff over Europe’s position on America’s war in Iran. The tensions in U.S. relations with Europe were on full display earlier this month during President Trump’s meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Washington and afterward when Trump berated NATO allies online, calling the alliance a paper tiger.  

In the context of these criticisms and threats, European officials are reportedly working on fallback plans to ensure Europe can maintain deterrence against Russia, preserve command and control, and replace military assets if the United States departs the alliance. All of this raises fundamental questions about the future of the NATO alliance. How can Europe maintain credible deterrence with less U.S. involvement? And what is the latest thinking on how the alliance needs to adapt? 

To tackle these questions and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome back Ivo Daalder and Camille Grand to this week’s edition of the podcast. 

On April 12, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban conceded defeat in the country’s general elections, which ousted his party Fidesz and ended his rule of 16 years. The election was widely seen as a referendum on Orban’s self-described “illiberal democracy,” and his loss is a blow to the global nationalist movement promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump. Peter Magyar, a former ally of Orban and the founder of Tisza, the main opposition party, will take over as prime minister once the new parliament convenes.

On April 7, after more than five weeks of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 14-day ceasefire, provided Iran allows passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The following day, the leaders of seven European states—plus Canada, the European Commission, and the European Council—released a joint statement welcoming the ceasefire, encouraging a negotiated settlement, and announcing that their governments “will contribute to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.”

While the world's attention has turned to the war with Iran, the war in Ukraine continues. Russia has seemingly kicked off its spring offensive, but a meaningful breakthrough remains unlikely. Moscow has increased the tempo of its operations, relying more heavily on mechanized and motorized assaults, an approach that is typical for this time of year. Yet last year's experience suggests limited prospects for success. Despite a similar surge last year, Russian forces achieved only marginal gains while incurring significant equipment losses, ultimately forcing Russian forces to relatively quickly return to smaller scale infiltration tactics.

Ambassador Bill Taylor is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine.

On March 14, in the wake of a global energy shock triggered by the United States military campaign against Iran, President Donald Trump called on allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian attacks on commercial shipping have disrupted oil flows. European leaders responded cautiously, and in many cases negatively, as they tried to balance concerns about the conflict with the need to preserve relations with Washington. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius was blunt, saying, “This is not our war.” United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer struck a more measured tone, pledging to work with allies to restore freedom of navigation, but emphasizing that the UK would “not be drawn into the wider war.” The following day, Trump raised the stakes, warning that NATO faces a “very bad” future if allies fail to act. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte expressed confidence that members would ultimately come together to secure the strait. But the incident has already exposed deep unease in Europe, both about the trajectory of the conflict and on the future of the transatlantic alliance.