Choshen Mishpat - Daily Recordings

The Right to Receive a Copy of the Document

Summary: This recording discusses whether a defendant against whom a שטר has been presented is entitled to receive a copy of it in order to examine the document and prepare his response, and concludes that the accepted practice is to provide such a copy.

Compelling Production of a Document Containing Evidence for Another Litigant

Summary: This recording discusses when a person can be compelled to produce a שטר in his possession because another litigant claims that it contains evidence in his favor, and distinguishes between a vague assertion and a sufficiently substantiated claim.

When a Litigant Knows Evidence Exists but Cannot Locate It

Summary: This recording discusses a litigant who knows that evidence exists in his favor but does not know who possesses it, and the power of בית דין to impose a חרם requiring anyone with relevant evidence—even the opposing litigant—to disclose it.

The Shulchan Aruch on Granting Time

Summary: This recording examines סעיפים א–ב of the שולחן ערוך, which establish thirty days as the standard period for producing evidence while allowing בית דין to shorten or extend that period as necessary, and also discuss when a litigant may receive time simply to formulate a response.

The Tur on Time to Bring Evidence

Summary: This recording examines the ruling of the טור that a litigant is ordinarily given thirty days to produce evidence, and the distinction of רבי ישעיה דטראני between a claimant who initially presented his case without evidence and one who stated from the outset that evidence exists but is not presently available.

Time to Bring Evidence

Summary: This recording introduces סימן ט״ז and establishes the general rule that a litigant may be given time to produce evidence, with thirty days emerging from the Gemara and Rishonim as the standard period granted by a בית דין.

This concluding section of סימן ט״ו examines how far a דיין may act on personal conviction or אומדנא (circumstantial inference), and presents the נתיבות המשפט’s distinction between subjective knowledge known only to the דיין and objective circumstances apparent to everyone.

This section presents the ruling of the שולחן ערוך in סעיף ה׳: although a דיין may in principle rule in monetary cases according to strong personal conviction, later בתי דין restricted this power; nevertheless, the דיין may investigate further, pursue settlement, and in exceptional cases later פוסקים allow a leading דיין to rely on a very strong אומדנא (circumstantial inference).

This section completes the רמב״ם’s discussion of non-formal evidence: although in principle a דיין may rule in דיני ממונות according to strong personal conviction and circumstantial evidence, later בתי דין accepted a limitation on this power because not every דיין possesses the wisdom and judgment necessary to use it properly.

This section presents the רמב״ם’s broad principle that in דיני ממונות (monetary cases), a דיין may sometimes rule according to what he is firmly convinced is true even without formal proof, and illustrates the principle through the cases of שבועה and a disputed שטר.