Rick Gunnell and Colonel Michael Long discuss the latest National Security Strategy and its implications for the US posture toward the Indo-Pacific.

Mr. Rick Gunnell

Welcome to CLSC Dialogues. Production of the China Landpower Studies Center at the Army War College. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and not necessarily those of the Department of Army, US Army War College, or the US government. I'm Rick Gunnell, research professor of China military studies here at the China Landpower Studies Center. And today, I'm talking to the director of the Army's China Center, Colonel Mike Long, about America's newly published National Security Strategy.

COL Mike Long

Thank you so much, Rick, for hosting this. And for those who aren't as familiar. The China Landpower Studies Center, as CLSC as we like to call it. I just wanted to first off, kind of make sure everybody knew who you were as one of the subject matter experts, chief researcher and experts on China, especially the PLA and its leadership. Rick is a Chinese speaker and an expert in the region, so we're very lucky to have him here hosting today's podcast. So, we're not just going to talk about the National Security Strategy. We're going to talk about its implications to the region as well as China specifically. So let me go to answer your question. And your question was on a little bit of background.

So first let's kind of think about what the National Security Strategy is. And it is that it's America's grand strategy. It's our highest-level strategy. It's mandated for the White House to produce this. So in 1986, a Congressional mandate called the Goldwater-Nichols Act came out. Most of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is focused on what the US military needs to do, but there are some portions for what the executive branch has to do, and one of them is publishing a National Security Strategy.

Gunnell

What is the goal of the National Security Strategy and who is the audience?

Long

The goal is to ensure that the executive branch is aligned around a singular strategy in all of its policies, and then what Congress is looking for is a rationale behind the budget. And so Congress controls the purse. And what they want to understand is what is the strategy that needs to be funded by Congress.

When you talk about the audience, which I thought was a great question, the audience is, of course, the rest of the executive branch to ensure that all of the service secretaries and those who work for them are aligned in policy and strategy. But it's also, like we said, Congress to say what the budget needs to be. It's also the American people.

You know, you can see when you read this document that a lot of this document is talking directly to the American people. In addition to that, it's our allies and our partners around the world as well as our adversaries. I think this has a wide audience after the National Security Strategy.

Gunnell

Are there other documents that will follow that will help kind of support or play out what is in the security strategy?

Long

The term we like to use is they nest. So from this document, the National Security Strategy, from the military's perspective, we have a series of other strategies now. This document, the National Security Strategy tends to be the most political. This one is no exception. It’s a very political document as you read into it. But when you look at these subordinate documents that the military produces, first is by the Secretary of War will develop a National Defense Strategy, then the chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will develop a National Military Strategy.

From that, each one of the service secretaries will develop their own service strategies, and you'll see the combat commands make theater or more functional strategies for their areas as well. And so this is the overall document from which all that is aligned diving into the 2025 National Security Strategy, the NSS.

Gunnell

What would you say is the focus of the new NSS?

Long

I think when you look at it, I kind of like to look at it in a few pieces. One is to talk about how different it is than previous strategies. So the first is it's much shorter. It's about half the length of the previous strategies. We see this strategy, a lot is cut out because of its length. And one of those things that is cut out is a current state or an overall breakdown of the environment.

Because of that, there are elements that are different in this strategy than others. Additionally, this strategy tends to be much less antagonistic towards large scale powers like China and Russia than we've seen in the past. But you asked what the focus was, and I would say the focus is a few things. Right? So really when you look at it, it comes from an overall, it's a mostly a realist perspective.

If we're looking at international relations theory or political science, it really values hard power, military power, as well as economic power. It doesn't focus on great power competition in the way that we've seen in the past. And then I think the biggest aspect, and this is what we're going to talk about a lot, is this multipolar world view.

Gunnell

Why don't you think the US calls China or Russia threats? This is about accepting a new multipolar world order. Is it about trying to be as neutral as possible while also stating where our red lines are? How would you analyze that?

Long

I think it's a couple things. One is we don't have this sort of background of the environment that sort of lays out where everything is that you would see in the past, right. So you don't have this what we strategist call a current state of the environment articulated. So I think that's one reason why we don't see that. Another is exactly like you articulated, right, this multipolar world. We've heard Secretary Rubio talk a couple times about describing the world as multipolar. And this is the new position for the United States, at least recently. Right. So following the fall of the Soviet Union, we really went into a pretty unipolar world and most of the national security strategies since then, up until this, when really focused on a unipolar world with the United States as the lead. This one really looks at the world as potentially multipolar. And I would describe that as having spheres of influence.

And I know we're going to get into that a little bit when it comes to Western Hemisphere as well as Asia-Pacific.

Gunnell

Let's actually just go right into that then, because as I read through it, I think like many, we saw the biggest change as a focus more towards the Western Hemisphere. Over the past decade or so, we've been trying to balance or maybe pivot to Asia.

And I think that this puts the Western Hemisphere in a place that it hasn't been before. And why would you think there's such a focus on that? And can we kind of walk and chew gum at the same time, per the NSS, can we both focus on the Western Hemisphere but also counter Chinese influence, adversarial influences in the Asia-Pacific?

Long

I think one, that's an astute observation of the document. You know, it clearly articulates the Western Hemisphere as the priority theater. You know, it calls out the Monroe Doctrine, specifically stating that there's a Trump Corollary to this doctrine. I think the belief amongst the administration for this is that, you know, the real value in protecting our own backyard, for lack of a better term, small yard, big fence concept, vice giving up on some other area.

Also, if you accept that there is a multipolar world, you have to accept the other powers had some sort of regional hegemonic capabilities in them. I think that's one aspect of it. When you look at the document, what it talks about, the Western Hemisphere, it really articulates three specific threats that we've seen. The first is migration. The second is drugs and crime. Third is foreign power intervention. And I think we've seen all the military used to counter all three of those threats.

Gunnell

So, speaking of the Western Hemisphere, we can't ignore the most recent events in Venezuela. Do you see these events as something that is adhering to national security strategy? Is a nested within is it slightly different? How would you interpret the actual actions we've seen over the past week with what we saw in the strategy in December?

Long

I think that when you look at what we saw in Venezuela, and to be specific, I would describe that as a raid on the capital of Venezuela when military operation called snatch and grab for the president, his wife, and brought them back for them to face trial. I think you see a couple aspects of that. One part of the Monroe Doctrine, you know, when you look at it, a lot of presidents have viewed the Monroe Doctrine in different ways.

But the basic understanding of the Monroe Doctrine, it's that foreign powers don't have control over the Western Hemisphere. Now, there's this kind of famous Roosevelt Corollary to that, the Theodore Roosevelt Corollary to that, where you see Theodore Roosevelt really looking at having much more control inside of the countries of the Western Hemisphere. And this is where we get into the Panama Canal, the transition to Panama, becoming a country, [seceding from] Colombia.

I think this Trump Corollary is more similar to a Roosevelt Corollary. So if you look at, you know, each one of those specific threats, you know, one was drugs and crime. The indictment under President Maduro is about drugs and crime. Another concern is about foreign powers. You know, the vast majority of the military equipment inside of Venezuela that was used to protec

In this episode of CLSC Dialogues, Major Brennan Deveraux welcomes Colonel Michael Long, the new Director of the China Landpower Studies Center. After discussing COL Long’s thoughts on the new assignment, the conversation shifts to his recent experiences in Korea, offering listeners unique insights from the former Eighth Army G-5 Assistant Chief of Staff for Policy, Planning, and Strategy.

Brennan Deveraux

Hello. You’re listening to CLSC Dialogues, a China Landpower Studies Center (CLSC) production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking today to the new director of the China Landpower Study Center, Colonel Mike Long. Colonel Long. Welcome.

Michael Long

Hey, thank you Brennan. I appreciate you hosting this for the team, and it really means a lot.

Deveraux

So, Colonel Long, you’re coming from Korea as the Eighth Army G5. If I could just have you real quick introduce yourself [provide] a little bit about you, and kind of, how you’re coming into CLSC and what that means for the organization.

Long

Hey. Perfect. Yeah, I’m coming from the Pacific. Which makes sense why I’m here at CLSC, the China Landpower Studies Center. And, I’m a functional area 59, just like yourself, so [I’m] focused on strategy and policy, planning. I’m coming here from Eighth Army, I was the G5 there. So, assistant chief of staff for policy, planning, strategy, [and] also worked force management.

So it’s a great opportunity, and I learned a ton in the job.

Deveraux

Great. Well, welcome. I know you’ve already jumped in. So we got you here a couple of months ago. Finally getting you in to talk. Can you talk real quick just to make sure our listeners are caught up? CLSC. What it is and kind of your perspective on what your mission is going forward with the research organization.

Long

Yeah, absolutely. So, we’re a team of, there’s a total of six of us. There’s myself as the director. I’m more focused on blue. Blue across the Pacific. Heavy focus on Korea and Japan. We also have three civilians.

Deveraux

Just to clarify. When you say blue, you mean friendly forces?

Long

I sure do. Yeah. Great. Great point. So that’s really my understanding. My focus here is, you know, when you think of blue and, especially in the landpower perspective, we’re thinking of the Marines out there in mainly Japan and Hawaii. We’re thinking of USARPAC (US Army Pacific Command) and then all the supporting organizations as well as Eighth Army, USFK (US Forces-Korea) it’s portion as well as USFJ (US Forces-Japan) in Japan.

But our CLSC team, back to that, is myself as a director. And we have three civilians who are Chinese subject matter experts. So they have a detailed understanding of what I would call the red perspective, the China perspective. Across really at the strategic level, down to the operational and even the tactical level of understanding of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) specifically.

And our focus overall is really landpower. We are also lucky enough to have another colonel, Colonel Kyle Markram, who did a podcast with you earlier. He’s a foreign area officer. He served in China. He is also a [Chinese] speaker. And he just got to us from Taiwan. And then we have a visiting professor, also, Doctor Sheena Greitens, and she spends 50% of her time working with us and 50% of her time working for UT (University of Texas), where she does great work out there, has her own podcast, and is quite a prolific publisher.

Deveraux

Yeah, thanks. And I think it’s worth noting that while all of those researchers are looking at China, they all kind of have a little bit of a different lens. So I’ve worked with Brian Carlson, who I know looks at that China-Russia relationship, which is important. And then Jake Rinaldi, who recently went off to Rand, he looked a lot at that, China-North Korea relationship and North Korea’s impact in the region as well.

So when we say, “China experts,” it really goes beyond just, you know, the line I could draw around the country, it’s a regional problem, or a regional challenge, depending on how you view the world.

Long

Yeah, that’s a great point. And you know, our real focus is China and the landpower aspect. But we try to look at the entire INDO-PACOM AOR (US Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility) and we have a focus across the board. But like you’re saying, all of our experts, they’re all you know, we have five Chinese speakers on the team. They really are looking at original source products from China and doing great work for us.

Deveraux

One of the things I heard in a brief one time is you can’t look at China without also looking at Korea. I’d be curious, since we have you coming directly from Eighth Army and looking at the Korea problem, if you’d be open to talk a little bit about the Korea problem set, some of the challenges, and just kind of what’s going [on] out there on the peninsula.

Long

Absolutely. So I served in Korea, in Eighth Army under two CG (commanding generals). The most recent one was Lieutenant General Chris LaNeve, who, his hats in the ring to take on as the vice chief of staff. So he was a great leader to work with, and he really described Korea as the strategic high ground. And I think that’s a good way to kind of think about where Korea is and what it’s what exist. You know, it sits next to a, it’s really in a dangerous neighborhood.

It’s got three authoritarian neighbors, with China, North Korea, and Russia. It also is right next to a key ally, Japan. And then not too far away from Taiwan. So regionally, it’s located in a unique position. And the Army’s very lucky to have that, to be positioned on that strategic key terrain.

Deveraux

I think two things are really interesting about that, that a lot of people don’t think about. First, Russia, a lot of us, when we think about Russia, we very much look at Western Europe, Russia and NATO. But to your point, Russia, not only extends all the way out there, but [it] has been very involved in Asian politics, Asian conflict, for a long time, historically.

And the second point, you say Japan as the ally and yes, it is, but, Korea and Japan actually have a pretty unique historical relationship that I know kind of creates an interesting challenge when we talk about working with Korea and Japan as kind of a, a trilateral relationship.

Long

You’re 100% right. You know, there still are some historic issues from that time. You know, I think it was about 1910 until the end of, until the end of World War II, where Korea was essentially colonized by the Japanese Empire. And there was atrocities committed. Absolutely. And so, there are people who are still alive today who were part of that.

And so, for good reason, there’s some concerns there. But since 2014, you know, the dates we, where we see this, large air defense weapon system called the THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense) come in and massive overreaction by China, that was, that really hit South Korea hard. You really see across the South Korean population, the population turn and really, you know, go from a population that has a lot of animosity towards Japan to a lot of animosity towards China.

So if you look at it today, you know, it’s something like 80% of the people still have negative feelings about China. And almost all of the young people today are actually very pro Japan. They like anime. They like, all of the Japanese aspects.

Deveraux

Everyone likes anime. No, that’s real interesting. So I had a chance to go to Korea a handful years ago. Definitely not as long or as important of a task. I more helped move some cargo. But I was there long enough to get my cool little ribbon. And I couldn’t help but think, I was up fairly north and South Korea, up at Camp Casey, and I couldn’t help but think about the historical aspect of actually fighting on the peninsula and looking at the terrain and the mountains and just imagining what it would be to actually have a big land conflict, on the peninsula [of] Korea.

Could you talk a little bit about how you guys think about or how, when you were there, you thought about the terrain and what that really means for a potential conflict in that area?

Long

Absolutely. And, you know, in the Korean War, the terrain and the climate was really an adversary. The coldest battle Americans ever fought was their Chosin, you know, their reports that the temperature dropped to -30, -40 degrees. Absolutely brutal. But it’s a very mountainous terrain, both North and South Korea. And when we think mountainous, we got to think Afghanistan, West Virginia, super-duper mountains everywhere.

It also has a very cold temperatures. It’s a peninsula. But in reality, at least while the armistice is going on, which is the stalemate from the Korean War that we have now, South Korea really is a lot more like an island. And it has a lot of the same obstacles that an island nation like Japan does.

Really. The only way to get in and out of South Korea right now is by airplane or by sea. So SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication), SPODs (Seaport of Debarkation), APODs (Aerial Port of Debarkation). These are incredibly important when we think about it.

Deveraux

Can you, real quick, for the listeners who aren’t as familiar with the language that is the Army, just break down those acronyms real quick you just dropped on us.

Long

Yeah. Thanks for catching me on that, I appreciate that. So we talk about SLOCs, Sea Lines o...

[Rick Gunnell] You're listening to CLSC Dialogues, landpower in the Indo-Pacific, a China Landpower Studies Center production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of Army, US Army, War College, or any other agency of the US government. I'm Rick Gunnel, research professor of China military studies and today we're talking with Josh Arostegui, chair of the China Landpower Studies Center, and Brennan Devereaux, national security researcher at the Strategic Studies Institute.

Today, we'll be chatting about the recently published monograph More Than a Numbers Game: Comparing US and Chinese Landpower in the Pacific Requires Context. I'll start with an opening question. How did you become interested in this topic, and how did it evolve over time?

[Joshua Arostegui] Well, I'll jump on this one first. So, this was essentially a direct result of a visit from senior leaders from the US Army Pacific. When our center first stood up. It was more of an ask for us to get after, you know, assessing or analyzing, you know, how US Army campaigning in the Indo-Pacific was working? Maybe describe a little bit more in detail and potentially look at measures of effectiveness, you know, against adversaries.

I'm a China guy, you know, I like to research China stuff. While I worked for the Army for many years, it was one of those topics that I said, well, I'll give it a shot. And, as I did it, I realized I knew a lot more about China than I knew about the US Army. And so, after I wrote my first couple drafts, I was a little disappointed with how they turned out. And I went to the office next door and talked to Brennan and say, “Hey, Brennan, what do you think?” And he gave me some great ideas about potentially creating a more of a comparative analysis with how the PLA and its army, in the Indo-Pacific, was posturing and modernizing and use that as essentially a foundation to compare both sides.

And as I started to write this, I said, wow, this is a really great idea. I also realized I still don't know as much about the US Army as I should. “Hey, Brennan, do you want to help out with this one?” And, honestly, him coming on board the project, you know, me co-opting his assistance made this really, a far better project. Brennan?

[Brennan Deveraux] Yeah. So, I took from where Josh chose, and we kind of looked at this big restructure with the comparison between the forces. And one thing that drove that is there's this old Navy PowerPoint slide that both of us had seen - a lot of people who have looked at future war have seen - where it's, it pretty much that the bottom line in it is look how many ships China has. Isn't that terrifying? Which “yes…but” was always kind of the conversation. And as we transition that to landpower, it's really important because these systems, while still very important, are less the foundation of what that power is. So, it's important to know how many tanks someone has. But there's more to how tanks are employed than just how many ships someone has.

And so we use that kind of as their foundation to say, don't do that. Don't just compare like items and say, “oh my gosh, we're doomed because they have more people.” Because they do. They have more people. They'll continue to have more people. And if they want, they'll continue to have a bigger army. And what we did is we started with kind of this shorter commentary piece, that really argued more of that, which was, you know, we got to make sure as we're doing these assessments that we don't fall into that trap because it's such an easy trap for analysis.

But that really also, similar to the first draft Josh did, it really didn't pan out. Because that foundational knowledge wasn't really there. So, we switched from commentary to actual hard analysis to kind of provide some of that framework that says, you know, there is context between and here are some of the things we need to measure. And as we started getting into those things that we thought we needed to identify, you know, those big picture things, the length really got away from us. And we turned it from, you know, what was initially asked, hey, can you help us with a short commentary piece to a medium commentary piece to medium analysis and what it ended up with is the standalone monograph I think we're happy with. I don't think we could have went shorter and got the analysis in. And if we want too much longer, I think we would have deterred some readers with a little too long, don't read.

[Rick Gunnell] Great. So, let's dive into it. Tell me about the five features of landpower you chose to assess. How did you pick them and was anything left out you wish you could have added?

[Brennan Deveraux] So, I'll go first on this one. So, we started really big picture. Like what are the defining categories that is landpower? And so, there's a ton of options with this. But our initial like I said, when we were just doing that commentary, we just picked three and we said, what? What does each nation think about when they say landpower? What are the definitions of landpower? Right. We can hopefully find those in a book and pull them out, compare and contrast and find those little differences, because that's the foundation of what we're talking about.

The second, really fit into kind of how they each nation understands warfare. When we talk about how landpower is used as a tool to build relationships, and that's very easy in the blue hat. And that's where we expect to find the most differences between red and blue.

And then that third one was how are they simulating warfare? Right. How are the nations looking at how landpower is actually going to be used in a conflict? Because that's what that simulation of warfare is.

As the product developed, as I said, we really wanted to get deeper into the analysis. We added two more, that, again, were very big picture. They were foundational to what we think landpower is, what we think landpower is going to do and how we want to shape it. Which was the next two underlying warfare concepts, you know, what do they think about, future war will be? And then the corresponding modernization efforts, if future war is going to be X, how do I get my force to be there, you know, when that war comes?

[Joshua Arostegui] Yeah. I mean, that's spot on. You know, the first two or the two topics about, you know, campaigning in the Indo-Pacific and relationship building, you know, training, I should say, and relationship building really were kind of easy. Those were big. Those are big primary missions for US Army Pacific. You know, where, you know, the Chinese don't openly discuss a lot of these topics, you know, especially the relationship building. They're very anti-alliances. And, while they work, you know, abroad with partners are bringing partners, you know, into the country to do some training. It's not to the same extent that we do, we being the US, do with our partners and allies.

Right. So, it was easy to at least touch on those kinds of topics. But when you get into the landpower thing, that was that was a bit more problematic. Right? And, so when Brennan said, hey, we should really create this kind of defined definition, I should say of, of landpower, you know, it's a lot easier for the US Army because we publish it openly. Right? So, you read Army Doctrine and ADP 3-0, operations, and it talks about what landpower is. Guess what the PLA does not do: publish those types of things openly.

So, I had to essentially dig through years of, you know, PLA textbooks and operational art in Chinese to dig out, you know, their concepts and they don't really get after that. It's not a topic that they clearly define. Instead, they like to talk about, you know, domain control. So they'll say, you know, we control this, the land domain. And we'll control the sea domain or the maritime domain and the air domain, which is somewhat roughly equivalent. But instead they also focus on, you know, service strategies like the Army's, you know, responsibilities and their strategies are such and such and such. So what I did was I had to kind of, you know, combine all this into finding a best answer. It was not easy. And I think but I think it did provide a great foundation, you know, for the product.

But, you know, getting after the other ones, like modernization. I've written a lot of modernization over the years. It's a it's a big topic that I think people need to understand because when you see the news about Chinese, you know, military modernization, you're oftentimes seeing things like the Renhai cruiser or, you know, the fifth, potential sixth generation aircraft and that kind of stuff that are being out or, fielded to the force.

You really don't see much of the news about, you know, the large numbers of air defense or advanced air defense systems that the Army's fielding and light high mobility systems that are, you know, enable power projection. You don't see that in the news as often, despite the fact that they come out just as regularly as other new systems. So, I thought that was a really a fun way to go about that one.

But the operational concept one, I'll just touch on this briefly, was a topic that I've been kind of tracking, all domain operations, and we'll probably get in this a little later, most likely. But, you know, it was neat to see the comparison between the two because, you know, the Army was tasked with developing this all-domains operations concept by XI Jinping in 2017, which, miraculously, you know, aligns with when the US Army was tasked with developing multi-domain battle. It's, there's a lot of similarities there. So, it made it a pretty easy, set of reasons wh...

[Colonel Rich Butler] You're listening to CLSC dialogues, Landpower in the Indo-Pacific. A China Land Power Study Center production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I am Colonel Rich Butler, the Director of CLSC.

Today we are talking with Lieutenant General Matthew McFarlane, the commanding general of America's I Corps, headquartered at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Having served with distinction at all levels of the Army and Joint Force, he now leads the Army's senior tactical headquarters in the Indo-Pacific. Today we'll be chatting about his views of the operational environment and the hard work the Corps is doing across the Indo-Pacific.

Sir, welcome to the podcast. Let's begin by noting you're coming to us not from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, but from South Korea, where you are deployed supporting Exercise Freedom Shield. 

[Lieutenant General Matthew McFarlane] Thanks. It's great to be here. 

[Colonel Rich Butler] So let's start with one opening question. Can you describe I Corps and its role in the Indo-Pacific to our listeners? And how does I Corps contribute to U.S. deterrence efforts in the Indo-Pacific?

[Lieutenant General Matthew McFarlane] All right. That's, those are two big questions. I'll start with the first one here and break it down for you a little bit, and then, and then hit the second one because we certainly, do a lot of the deterrence, as we operate across the Pacific. 

First, U.S. Army I Corps consists of three, divisions. We have the 7th Infantry Division. That's it with the corps headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state. It's got two Stryker brigade combat teams. And then we have the 11th Airborne Division located in Alaska between Joint Base Elmendorf, Richardson, and Fort Wainwright, Alaska. 11th Airborne Division has an airborne brigade and an air assault brigade, and then the 25th Infantry Division located at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. It has two infantry brigade combat teams, which are in the process of transforming now and I know we'll talk more about that throughout the podcast here. But they are our army's jungle experts. They operate and train, certify themselves in the jungle environment. And then obviously operate across the Pacific in the jungle environment.

The 11th Airborne Division that I mentioned is our army's Arctic experts, operating there in Alaska, where they, they are, the subject matter experts at Arctic warfare for Army and share that with their allies and partners. But they also contribute to our efforts across the Pacific at high altitude in India, cold weather in northern Japan. And then, also in the jungle environment, with many of our other partners south of Japan, and their airborne brigade, gives, gives, the army and the joint force a lot of strategic flexibility, if you will, as they can mass combat power quickly and move it quickly across the Pacific if it's needed for crisis.

So a lot of different capabilities across I Corps' maneuver elements, the three divisions. We also have an expeditionary sustainment command that helps ensure, we can, sustain our operations, across the Pacific. Right now, they're in the Philippines, helping prepare for exercises we have, starting this month, going through June; as well as some separate brigades that, provide an enabling capability for the Corps.

We have an engineer brigade, a field artillery brigade, medical brigade, military intelligence brigade, communications brigade, and a military police brigade. So a lot of, different capability within US Army I Corps. The separate brigades are located with me in Washington state. And, we apply all of those formation I just mentioned across the Pacific.

We organize. So for, exercises or operations, we, we align different parts of, the separate brigades with the divisions or subordinates in the divisions, for whatever's needed for a certain exercise. We generate readiness, at home station. Each of the home stations. Jungle readiness in Hawaii. Arctic readiness in Alaska and in in Washington state with their Stryker brigades will train, like, right now at our Yakima training center in Washington state.

Then we'll also generate the readiness, through what we call our combat training centers for the Alaska and Hawaii team. They do that, at in their locations, in their environments, Arctic and jungle to a joint Pacific multinational readiness center, which is, transformation of our combat training centers. But now doing it in those environments. We'll bring in, our observers, coach, and trainers from the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center up to augment, a unit that we have in Hawaii that helps us certify those formations.

And then the Stryker brigades will we'll go to the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center. One of those Stryker brigades will go to the National Training Center here in September. So generating readiness is a key aspect of being ready in the Pacific. And then we'll apply that readiness across the Pacific through what we call Operation Pathways.

I Corps organize and execute some 40 plus exercises over the course of the year with 20 some different partner nations. We work closely with them and our work with them drives the deterrence. The question you mentioned before, deterrence against the PRC, deterrence against Russia and other adversaries in the area. And as we do that, we build joint interior lines, which are incredibly important in the Pacific if you look at the long lines of communication. So our ability to sustain ourselves, protect ourselves, test and prove our equipment that can operate in that environment and interoperate with our partners. So that was a long answer to your question. But I wanted to [provide] a fulsome response based on all that U.S. Army I Corps does and the important area that we do it and that's in the Pacific.

[Colonel Rich Butler] Sir, I really appreciate you making linear of what is a really complex organization for folks to understand and hopefully, you know, the Army and your website, and other things that have been written about what Corps do in the Army is important. So hopefully our listeners, if they want to do a little bit of deeper dive, can look into that and contact us through the CLSC and we can put them in touch with the right people too. Based on that, and I know you're in touch more on how the Army and the Corps, how you're transforming the Corps and the corps echelon. But we're preparing, you know, for a war fight at the you know, at the end of the day, there's a lot of missions that we do related to things that are less in war. But ultimately, the Corps is a warfighting organization. And obviously, you don't need to be living under a rock to know that we've been working to transition into the Indo-Pacific greater, into greater and greater strength over the last decade plus. So noting that China's rising, can you put things a little bit into the context of how you see is the U.S. Army being prepared for a potential conflict with China?

[Lieutenant General Matthew McFarlane] That's what we think about every day. You know, we are prepared, but we've got to be more prepared to dominate. If you think about, the evolving character of war that we're seeing around the world right now. The army's undergoing transformation, this transformation that our Chief of Staff of the Army is driving. So it's in how we operate. It's how we train, to get ready. It's how we organize our forces for large scale combat operations. In any environment, but especially in the Pacific, as we have not operated, in the Pacific, in terms of conflict, you know, since, since Vietnam. And so, we are continually looking at how we can gain technical advantage, and adjust how we operate based on lessons we're learning as we do exercises and lessons we're learning as we watch, conflict in the Ukraine, conflict in Gaza.

Lessons that I learned when I was in in charge of Operation Inherent Resolve, in terms of our forces in Iraq and Syria. And so we continue to, to drive foundational readiness, for soldiers, and then adjust how we're organizing, and operating, based on emerging technology. An example that would be we're much more distributed now. And so we know we need to, to drive, our technology to allow us to have multiple command and control nodes, command posts on the battlefield, distributed over long distances. We need our firing positions, from our artillery distributed, operating in smaller nodes, but still being connected, to understand, where we are and more importantly, understand where the enemy is so we can bring, precision effects on them, both lethal and non-lethal.

And, we are, continuing to drive this effort along with the rest of the army, to share lessons with what we're calling transformation in contact. We have a brigade, the second Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. That is one of these transformation and contact brigades for the army. There's one in the 101st, one in 10th mountain and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment... and we're starting a second iteration of that. But these brigades are spearheading experimentation with technology and organization to help us see and understand the best way to operate, optimizing the technology that's available to match and dominate against threat capabilities that we are watching very closely. And so we leverage our Operations Pathways to make sure we can not only transform, but when we apply it in the Pacific, we are doing it in a way that we are testing our way of war and our technology to ensure it can work.

You're listening to CLSC Dialogues, a China Landpower Studies Center production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Army War College, or any other agency of the U.S. government. I’m Jake Rinaldi, a defense analyst at the China Landpower Studies Center.

Jake Rinaldi:

In this episode, we’ll be discussing how Chinese leaders conceptualize protracted war.

Joining us is Dan Rice, the China political and military subject matter expert at Marine Corps University. He’s also the CEO of the geopolitical analysis firm Foreign Brief and president of Dongfeng LLC, his consulting company. Dan has published on Chinese strategy and the PLA with various think tanks, academic institutions, and U.S. Department of Defense China centers.

00:00:57:18 – 00:01:25:15

Rinaldi:

He recently published an article—completely in Chinese—with Taiwan’s National Defense University on countering dual-front threats in the maritime domain. We’ll be talking with Dan about research he presented at the 2024 Carlisle Conference on the PLA. His paper explored how the concept of protracted war—a war lasting months or years, consuming vast quantities of munitions, equipment, and lives—appears in Chinese publications from party, state, and military institutions.

00:01:25:18 – 00:01:30:00

Rinaldi:

Dan, welcome, and thank you for being here. Excited to see this paper published.

00:01:30:02 – 00:01:34:17

Dan Rice

Jake, thank you very much for having me. It’s always a pleasure talking with you—really looking forward to this.

00:01:34:19 – 00:01:46:28

Rinaldi:

Let’s start with a quick overview of the paper you wrote for our conference. What’s your central argument or the most interesting or surprising conclusion you reached?

00:01:47:00 – 00:02:13:26

Rice:

Yeah, absolutely. There’s a lot to unpack, but I think the big takeaway is that the way China officially discusses protracted war is slightly different from how we’ve been approaching it.

At the conference, we tried to define what protracted war is and where it fits in our framework. But the way they approach it—across the institutions you mentioned—looks more like a grand strategic framework than a purely military one.

00:02:13:26 – 00:02:54:29

Rice:

So instead of viewing it solely as a military concept, they’re incorporating Mao Zedong’s ideas about protracted war into various aspects of grand strategy.

It’s a bit of a conceptual tangle at first, but it offers insight into trends we see in the news or broader CCP strategic behavior.

00:02:55:02 – 00:03:22:14

Rice:

This is really a whole-of-government, whole-of-civilization type of fight. That was probably the biggest takeaway.

And then, of course, we focus a lot on the PLA—you at CLSC and me at MCU.

For the PLA specifically, one of the most interesting ideas came from a PLA-affiliated author who discussed not a protracted battle per se, but a protracted process of war—emphasizing preparation, technology development, and gaining small edges in military-adjacent areas to build power.

00:04:24:15 – 00:04:49:06

Rice:

Those were some of the more interesting insights. Personally, I learned a lot from the research and appreciate CLSC for the opportunity to be part of the conference and dig into this topic.

00:04:49:08 – 00:05:12:27

Rinaldi:

Absolutely—a really interesting and well-written paper. Your use of the term "military tangential" really highlights a core theme: the idea of protracted war often appears in economic or national policy discussions rather than strictly military ones.

00:05:12:28 – 00:05:38:13

Rinaldi:

You did find some PLA Daily articles and other military writings, but why do you think the Chinese shy away from discussing protracted war in a military context?

Does it reflect confidence in their ability to win a quick, decisive war—or is it more about political constraints on media and scholarship?

00:05:38:15 – 00:05:42:18

Rinaldi:

That seems like a really important question.

00:05:42:21 – 00:06:21:25

Rice:

Yeah, and it’s a really interesting one. You kind of have to read the tea leaves, because they don’t say it explicitly.

But I’d guess it’s not about confidence in winning a short, sharp war.

In fact, in talking with colleagues, we’re still trying to figure out if China has ever used the term “short and sharp war” to describe a conflict with the U.S.—and the answer is probably no.

00:06:21:25 – 00:07:01:14

Rice:

Many Chinese sources suggest the opposite: that a war with the U.S. wouldn’t be short. They often avoid the term “protracted,” but the implication is that it would be long.

That likely connects to history. Under Xi Jinping, there’s been a significant emphasis on studying party history and strategic thought. The CCP and PLA share very similar strategic roots.

00:07:01:14 – 00:07:27:00

Rice:

So it’s partly about using party history—particularly Mao Zedong Thought—to frame modern challenges. There are probably a number of reasons for this approach.

00:07:27:02 – 00:08:06:01

Rice:

One possibility is that Xi used protracted war discourse to consolidate ideological leadership before securing his third term.

A group of authors from CITIC—China International Trust Investment Corporation—even tried to redefine protracted war in economic terms.

00:08:06:07 – 00:08:49:04

Rice:

They published that book in 2016—right around the time the 14th Five-Year Plan was coming into focus.

So the concept of protracted war became a sort of thought-leadership tool aligned with Xi’s emphasis on party history and long-term planning. It helped lay the ideological groundwork for that Five-Year Plan, which coincided with Xi’s third term.

00:08:49:07 – 00:09:23:11

Rice:

So really, it’s a way of consolidating party strategy and thought under Xi.

They’re using these older, not-always-successful models to address modern challenges—and to support Xi’s vision for China’s future.

00:09:23:11 – 00:09:44:27

Rice:

That thinking also informs how they approach different domains, including the military—but always as part of a broader, more strategic framework.

00:09:44:29 – 00:10:17:11

Rinaldi:

Very interesting. At the conference, there was a lot of discussion about China’s so-called “gray zone” tactics—low-level confrontation strategies.

Some participants even argued that we’re already in a protracted competition with China.

Do you think that’s a useful analytical lens?

Rice:

Yeah, fantastic. I think “protracted competition” is actually a pretty apt way to describe it. And I incorporated this into the paper that you guys are publishing. I did the due diligence of buying that CITIC Press book and reading through it—though it’s not from the PLA; it’s more of an economic strategy book. But what I found fascinating was its descriptions of globalization and, in particular, its take on the Thucydides Trap with the U.S., framed under protracted war theory. It emphasized the need to avoid an existential battle with the U.S.

And that’s a core idea of protracted war: many small, decisive engagements instead of one large, existential battle. The way to avoid that kind of decisive conflict is through gray zone or coercive activities that fall below the threshold of open war. If the strategy is to gradually accumulate favorable, small-scale victories to shift the balance of power, then these quasi-war operations—what I’d call coercive activities or PLA operations—are key tools.

That’s how you start to shift the balance without engaging in a full-scale, existential fight—or what some might call the Thucydides Trap: a large-scale war with the current hegemon. So when we say “protracted competition,” I think that’s a fair description. Their writings reflect that, across different levers of comprehensive national power.

They also talk more broadly—not always directly tied to protracted war—about using coercion to gain advantage. And, quick plug: we’re standing up a Journal of PLA Studies at MQ. One of the first articles will be a comprehensive look at operationalizing PLA coercive activities.

There’s a broad spectrum across PLA services and fields where they envision applying pressure—whether it’s to deter or compel adversaries—to shape international conditions for China’s rise. So stay tuned for that.

Rinaldi:

That sounds very, very interesting. Important work. A lot of what we’re discussing is how Mao’s writings are being resurrected—whether for political mobilization or analytical framing of U.S.-China competition, or even just China’s broader regional goals. So I wonder: to what extent does this modern framing signal a shift in how China approaches global competition or national security?

And how much of it is really a departure from historical PRC policies and rhetoric in these areas?

Rice:

Yeah, excellent questions. And I think there are a couple layers to each of them.

First, I wouldn’t necessarily say it’s a shift. Earlier we talked about the political backdrop to this resurgence in discussion of protracted war. I’d say it’s more of a refocus—or maybe a doubling down—on how China has traditionally approached both grand strategy and military conflict.

Mao’s On Protracted War came out of the Chinese Civil War and the Second Sino-Japanese War—what we’d call the beginning of WWII. But it was also invoked during the Korean War, though not as successfully. At one point, someone in the CCP even asked Mao to write an update—On Protracted War 2.0, so to speak.

So it’s...

In this episode of CLSC Dialogues, Brian Carlson interviews David Stone, a Russia expert from the U.S. Naval War College, about potential forms of support that Russia might or might not provide to China in the event of a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. They discuss the likelihood of direct Russian military intervention in support of China, possible ways that Russia might create distractions for the United States and its allies and partners, and Russia’s ability to support China by providing additional weapons, ammunition, or energy supplies. They conclude with a discussion of the likely future trajectory of the China-Russia relationship.

Keywords: China, Russia, protracted war, defense cooperation, energy supplies

Episode Transcript

You're listening to CLSC Dialogues, land power in the Indo Pacific, a China land power studies production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, U.S. Army War college, or any other agency of the U.S. government.

I'm Brian Carlson (USAWC/SSI), research professor of Indo Pacific security studies at the China Land Power Studies Center at the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College.

HOST (Brian Carlson)

Joining me today is David Stone of the William E Odom professor of Russia studies in the Strategy and Policy department at the US Naval War College. He has published extensively on Russian military history and foreign policy.

Thank you for joining us today, David.

STONE (David Stone)

My pleasure to be here.

HOST

David and I were on a panel together back in October at the PLA conference sponsored by the China Land Power Studies Center and the topic of our panel was China's cooperation with strategic partners in the event of protracted war.

David's paper focus on likely assistance that Russia could provide to China in that kind of eventuality.

My paper attempted to look at how China views strategic partnerships in that kind of situation, and I also focused primarily on Russia.

That will be the main topic of our podcast today.

We'll discuss potential Russian support for China in the event of protracted war, and then we'll end by talking a little bit about the likely future trajectory of the China Russia relationship.

So, in my paper, as I say, I attempted to analyze how China views strategic partnerships and the kind of support that they might expect from Russia and other partners in the event of protracted war. Now Chinese leaders don't say much about this. Perhaps not surprisingly. They might want to protect the confidentiality of discussions with their Russian counterparts.

It's possible that they also don't have a clear understanding of what kind of support Russia might provide in the event of protracted war.

The only official statement I could find on this came from last summer, when a Russian journalist at the newspaper Izvestia asked the Chinese ambassador to Russia what kind of support might China count on for Russia in the event of tensions in the Taiwan Strait?

And the ambassador essentially just reiterated the one China principle. He said that the international community recognizes this principle.

Russia has always supported China on it and we expect that that will continue in the future.

So, he didn't say anything about possible material assistance.

And some Chinese media coverage speculated on this some of the accounts said China's not showing its hand very much, or possibly the unspoken message is that China really isn't counting on Russia for much support.

And might view it as a liability and might not even want much support from Russia in that kind of case.

But there were also media accounts that said Russia could play a useful role, for example in intimidating other countries in the region that have become troublesome for China and Russia.

So, so I looked at it from that angle in the paper, and then David and I both discussed ways that Russia might possibly be of assistance to China in the event of protracted war.

So, we're going to discuss a few of those different topics today.

And so, David, the first question I'd like to ask you is if China were to find itself in a war, especially one that became protracted with a U.S. led coalition in the Pacific, how likely is it that Russia would provide any kind of direct military assistance to China?

STONE

So, that's a question that relates a lot to time horizon. I think in the near term, it's extraordinarily unlikely that Russia would participate. And part of that simply has to do with the commitments that Russia has with the war in Ukraine, there is just not a lot of resources left to give.

As we're taping this the Assad regime has just fallen in Syria, and I would note that as an intriguing example in that in Syria, Russia has a lot of very concrete interests at stake.

And appeared to have no resources available to try to prop up the Assad regime, even with an air base and a naval base in Syria.

And so, if the Russians aren't in a position to provide kinetic support to a direct ally in direct support of their own interests, at least in the near term, it's impossible to think that they'd have much to offer to the Chinese in the event of protracted war in the Pacific now, over the longer term, when the Ukraine war ends and it has to end at some point that might change, but at least in the near term I see it is highly unlikely.

I don't see it as particularly likely even in the long term, but that's a different set of constraints and a different set of reasons.

HOST

If we look at the long term and we consider the possibility of some kind of direct Russian military intervention.

What is the difference based on what kind of scenario we're talking about, for example, if it's a Taiwan scenario or a South China Sea scenario, is that a lot different from, say, a potential scenario on the Korean Peninsula?

STONE

I think it does make something of a difference, and it gets back to this question of Russian interests, Russian interests in the South China Sea are fairly marginal.

Certainly, Russia sees itself as having a cooperative relationship with the PRC and that is a Russian interest. South China Sea not particularly relevant to Russian interests. Korea, on the other hand, is right next door.

There's no direct border but very, very close; I am sorry, there is a direct border but it’s a short border. But Russia has a border with North Korea. Vladivostok is the key Russian city and port in the Far East is very close to North Korea.

And so, anything that happens in Korea matters a lot to the Russians. And so, what they might do would depend a great deal on what particular scenario we are talking about, it's easy for Korea experts to imagine bad scenarios, for example, the North Korean regime collapses and something has to be done and China, the US and South Korea have different ideas about what that might look like.

Or Kim Jong Un decides to be a little bit ambitious and attack the south. That's a very different scenario, but certainly Russia has more at stake in the game when it comes to North Korea.

HOST

We've started off by discussing possible scenarios in which Russia might or might not provide some kind of direct military assistance to China in a war, including one that became protracted.

Another possibility that we discussed during our panel was the possibility that Russia wouldn't directly intervene militarily.

But it might do certain things to create distractions for the United States and its allies and partners that could complicate the effort to fight China in a protracted war.

And it seems to me that there are , broadly speaking, at least a couple of different possibilities in this regard.

One would be in or near the actual theater of war, and another is far away from the theater.

So, on the latter point, China and Russia have built this partnership that allows them to not be worried about a threat from the other, so this has given them the opportunity to pursue their interests in their own regions.

We've seen Russia, of course, posing a dire threat to European security, while most notably with the war in Ukraine. While there are growing concerns about the potential security threat that China might pose in Asia.

So one possibility is that in a scenario of protracted war, Russia might do certain things in in Europe far away from the theatre of war in Asia that could create complications for the United States and its allies and partners.

The review Commission on the National Security Strategy, published the report last summer, saying that the US military isn't prepared for challenges, that it's likely to face in the coming years, especially from Russia and China and there's also been a lot of discussion about the fact that the US military isn't really equipped right now to fight simultaneous great power wars against Russia and China.

So, in the event of a war in Asia involving pitting China against a U.S. led coalition, if it became protracted, what do you think Russia might do? Are there certain things it might do in Europe to create distractions?

STONE

The fundamental thing I would say is that Russia will pursue Russian interests and if it can pursue Russian interests in a way that is of use to China, then that's fine.

But I don't see Russia as exerting a great deal of time, energy and risk for someone else's interests. So, the question would be, would a protracted war in Asia, which would certainly have enormous effects on American military commitments, American military resources, and the world economy would that create the for Russia to do something in Europe.

In this episode of CLSC Dialogues, COL Rich Butler interviews Dr. R. Evan Ellis on his recent article written for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs titled, “China, the Illiberal Counter-Order, and the Role of Values in the Strategic Response.” This illuminating discussion covers what China is doing differently than the Soviets during the Cold War, and how new technology is playing a role in enabling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) objectives. The conversation then turns to the importance of these Chinese activities in the context of today, relative to Free World values. Why are Chinese activities across the globe undermining the Free World and the role of US, ally, and partner militaries, related to the wider role of governments in protecting those values. The podcast closes with insights into what the US population should pay attention to, and how we should think differently about investing in the future.

Keywords: China, CCP, PLA, illiberal order, technology, military campaigning, integrated deterrence, open source analysis

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In this episode of CLSC Dialogues, Josh Arostegui interviews prominent China expert Dennis Blasko on his analysis of PLA Army and Boader Defense Unit activity along the Line of Actual Control between China and India. He describes the development of infrastructure that allows the PLA to maintain a more robust forward presence. He further describes headquarters, troop presence and rotations, and other activity that increases the preparedness of the PLA to seize and defend key and decisive terrain along the disputed border.

Keywords: China, India, PLA Army, Chinese Border Defense Force, landpower, Line of Actual Control, open source analysis

In this episode of CLSC Dialogues, COL Marco Lyons discusses how the Pacific Army sees, understands, and utilizes landpower in the region from peacetime to a potential protracted war. He further articulates how the U.S. Army, Pacific conducts campaigning, prepares for crisis, deters conflict – and prevails in a protracted war, if necessary, in this unique region. Marco discusses the impact of Army modernization, new concepts and capabilities, and working with allies and key security partners in ways that re-enables maneuver. The discussion wraps up with insights on command relationships in this vast region.

Keywords: China, U.S. Army Pacific, Indo-Pacific, operational environment, operational level of war, campaigning, planning, allies and partners, protracted war, command and control, posture, force modernization, protracted war, fires, maneuver, landpower