In this episode of CLSC Dialogues, Brian Carlson interviews David Stone, a Russia expert from the U.S. Naval War College, about potential forms of support that Russia might or might not provide to China in the event of a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. They discuss the likelihood of direct Russian military intervention in support of China, possible ways that Russia might create distractions for the United States and its allies and partners, and Russia’s ability to support China by providing additional weapons, ammunition, or energy supplies. They conclude with a discussion of the likely future trajectory of the China-Russia relationship.
Keywords: China, Russia, protracted war, defense cooperation, energy supplies
Episode Transcript
You're listening to CLSC Dialogues, land power in the Indo Pacific, a China land power studies production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, U.S. Army War college, or any other agency of the U.S. government.
I'm Brian Carlson (USAWC/SSI), research professor of Indo Pacific security studies at the China Land Power Studies Center at the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College.
HOST (Brian Carlson)
Joining me today is David Stone of the William E Odom professor of Russia studies in the Strategy and Policy department at the US Naval War College. He has published extensively on Russian military history and foreign policy.
Thank you for joining us today, David.
STONE (David Stone)
My pleasure to be here.
HOST
David and I were on a panel together back in October at the PLA conference sponsored by the China Land Power Studies Center and the topic of our panel was China's cooperation with strategic partners in the event of protracted war.
David's paper focus on likely assistance that Russia could provide to China in that kind of eventuality.
My paper attempted to look at how China views strategic partnerships in that kind of situation, and I also focused primarily on Russia.
That will be the main topic of our podcast today.
We'll discuss potential Russian support for China in the event of protracted war, and then we'll end by talking a little bit about the likely future trajectory of the China Russia relationship.
So, in my paper, as I say, I attempted to analyze how China views strategic partnerships and the kind of support that they might expect from Russia and other partners in the event of protracted war. Now Chinese leaders don't say much about this. Perhaps not surprisingly. They might want to protect the confidentiality of discussions with their Russian counterparts.
It's possible that they also don't have a clear understanding of what kind of support Russia might provide in the event of protracted war.
The only official statement I could find on this came from last summer, when a Russian journalist at the newspaper Izvestia asked the Chinese ambassador to Russia what kind of support might China count on for Russia in the event of tensions in the Taiwan Strait?
And the ambassador essentially just reiterated the one China principle. He said that the international community recognizes this principle.
Russia has always supported China on it and we expect that that will continue in the future.
So, he didn't say anything about possible material assistance.
And some Chinese media coverage speculated on this some of the accounts said China's not showing its hand very much, or possibly the unspoken message is that China really isn't counting on Russia for much support.
And might view it as a liability and might not even want much support from Russia in that kind of case.
But there were also media accounts that said Russia could play a useful role, for example in intimidating other countries in the region that have become troublesome for China and Russia.
So, so I looked at it from that angle in the paper, and then David and I both discussed ways that Russia might possibly be of assistance to China in the event of protracted war.
So, we're going to discuss a few of those different topics today.
And so, David, the first question I'd like to ask you is if China were to find itself in a war, especially one that became protracted with a U.S. led coalition in the Pacific, how likely is it that Russia would provide any kind of direct military assistance to China?
STONE
So, that's a question that relates a lot to time horizon. I think in the near term, it's extraordinarily unlikely that Russia would participate. And part of that simply has to do with the commitments that Russia has with the war in Ukraine, there is just not a lot of resources left to give.
As we're taping this the Assad regime has just fallen in Syria, and I would note that as an intriguing example in that in Syria, Russia has a lot of very concrete interests at stake.
And appeared to have no resources available to try to prop up the Assad regime, even with an air base and a naval base in Syria.
And so, if the Russians aren't in a position to provide kinetic support to a direct ally in direct support of their own interests, at least in the near term, it's impossible to think that they'd have much to offer to the Chinese in the event of protracted war in the Pacific now, over the longer term, when the Ukraine war ends and it has to end at some point that might change, but at least in the near term I see it is highly unlikely.
I don't see it as particularly likely even in the long term, but that's a different set of constraints and a different set of reasons.
HOST
If we look at the long term and we consider the possibility of some kind of direct Russian military intervention.
What is the difference based on what kind of scenario we're talking about, for example, if it's a Taiwan scenario or a South China Sea scenario, is that a lot different from, say, a potential scenario on the Korean Peninsula?
STONE
I think it does make something of a difference, and it gets back to this question of Russian interests, Russian interests in the South China Sea are fairly marginal.
Certainly, Russia sees itself as having a cooperative relationship with the PRC and that is a Russian interest. South China Sea not particularly relevant to Russian interests. Korea, on the other hand, is right next door.
There's no direct border but very, very close; I am sorry, there is a direct border but it’s a short border. But Russia has a border with North Korea. Vladivostok is the key Russian city and port in the Far East is very close to North Korea.
And so, anything that happens in Korea matters a lot to the Russians. And so, what they might do would depend a great deal on what particular scenario we are talking about, it's easy for Korea experts to imagine bad scenarios, for example, the North Korean regime collapses and something has to be done and China, the US and South Korea have different ideas about what that might look like.
Or Kim Jong Un decides to be a little bit ambitious and attack the south. That's a very different scenario, but certainly Russia has more at stake in the game when it comes to North Korea.
HOST
We've started off by discussing possible scenarios in which Russia might or might not provide some kind of direct military assistance to China in a war, including one that became protracted.
Another possibility that we discussed during our panel was the possibility that Russia wouldn't directly intervene militarily.
But it might do certain things to create distractions for the United States and its allies and partners that could complicate the effort to fight China in a protracted war.
And it seems to me that there are , broadly speaking, at least a couple of different possibilities in this regard.
One would be in or near the actual theater of war, and another is far away from the theater.
So, on the latter point, China and Russia have built this partnership that allows them to not be worried about a threat from the other, so this has given them the opportunity to pursue their interests in their own regions.
We've seen Russia, of course, posing a dire threat to European security, while most notably with the war in Ukraine. While there are growing concerns about the potential security threat that China might pose in Asia.
So one possibility is that in a scenario of protracted war, Russia might do certain things in in Europe far away from the theatre of war in Asia that could create complications for the United States and its allies and partners.
The review Commission on the National Security Strategy, published the report last summer, saying that the US military isn't prepared for challenges, that it's likely to face in the coming years, especially from Russia and China and there's also been a lot of discussion about the fact that the US military isn't really equipped right now to fight simultaneous great power wars against Russia and China.
So, in the event of a war in Asia involving pitting China against a U.S. led coalition, if it became protracted, what do you think Russia might do? Are there certain things it might do in Europe to create distractions?
STONE
The fundamental thing I would say is that Russia will pursue Russian interests and if it can pursue Russian interests in a way that is of use to China, then that's fine.
But I don't see Russia as exerting a great deal of time, energy and risk for someone else's interests. So, the question would be, would a protracted war in Asia, which would certainly have enormous effects on American military commitments, American military resources, and the world economy would that create the for Russia to do something in Europe.
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