Cyber threats against the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) don't stop at the battlefield—they extend into suppliers, perimeter devices, and even hiring pipelines. Luke McNamara of Google's Threat Intelligence Group joins Frank Cilluffo to unpack Mandiant's report Beyond the Battlefield: Threats to the Defense Intelligence Base and the patterns it flags across today's threat landscape. They discuss how the war in Ukraine is shaping targeting priorities, why China's cyber espionage increasingly begins at the network edge, and how "fast follower" exploit cycles compress patch timelines. McNamara also explains the North Korean IT worker problem, where remote hiring fraud can create both revenue and potential access pathways. The takeaway for mid-sized defense suppliers is practical: harden identity, reduce perimeter exposure, and assume meaningful risk often starts outside traditional corporate visibility.

Main Topics Covered

• Why manufacturing remains a top target and a warning sign for broader supply-chain risk
• How the war in Ukraine is influencing cyber targeting tied to drones and UAS ecosystems
• China's focus on edge-device compromise (VPNs, routers, email gateways) and why it matters
• The "fast follower" dynamic that turns one vulnerability into many intrusions
• North Korean IT worker operations, remote hiring fraud, and AI-enabled deception
• The highest-leverage defensive priorities for DIB organizations, especially identity and MFA

Key Quotes

"Manufacturing is always the most targeted sector going back to 2020. And I think that's a larger canary in the coal mine." ­­— Luke McNamara

"It's not just some of these top-tier Chinese APT actors and their ability to leverage these as a zero-day, but the ability for secondary groups, once some of the details leak around a particular vulnerability, to start weaponizing it themselves." — Luke McNamara

"If I had to narrow it down to one category to put more resources to, I would say identity…hardening around the identity piece is certainly key." — Luke McNamara

"Organizations that are more aware of [the North Korean IT worker infiltration], where the security teams have met with their HR folks, their recruiters, helped inform them about the nature of these threats, I think they're a little bit better secured." — Luke McNamara

"It sounds more like a movie than reality, but it's happening." — Frank Cilluffo

Relevant Links and Resources

Mandiant report — Beyond the Battlefield: Threats to the Defense Intelligence Base

Mandiant podcast — Defenders Advantage

Guest Bio Luke McNamara is a Deputy Chief Analyst at Google Cloud's Mandiant Intelligence and part of Google's Threat Intelligence Group, focused on cyber threat trends and emerging risks.

A new wave of cyberattacks is being routed through everyday devices—and defenders can't rely on old assumptions about geography or "known bad" infrastructure. Daniel dos Santos, VP at Vedere Labs (Forescout), walks through findings from their 2025 Threat Roundup, drawn from a global network of hundreds of honeypots and decoy systems. The conversation focuses on why web-facing systems and edge devices have become prime targets, how attackers hide inside cloud and ISP-managed networks, and what defenders can do earlier in the kill chain. Dos Santos also explains why many exploited vulnerabilities never appear on CISA's KEV list—and how security teams should think about patching and risk anyway.

Main Topics

• How honeypots reveal attacker intent across IT, IoT, and OT environments.
• Why attacks increasingly come from ISP-managed networks and consumer devices.
• Cloud and "benign" services used to blend in and evade traditional filters.
• Why distributed botnets weaken country-based blocking for defenders.
• The rise of web-facing exploitation and the shift away from stolen passwords.
• Edge devices, OT exposure, and why "discovery" dominates post-breach activity.

Key Quotes

"We have hundreds [of honeypots] throughout the world. Some of them are simulations… Some of them are real devices… we expose them with the intention of seeing them attacked." — Daniel dos Santos

"Home routers, but also home IP cameras or doorbells or solar inverters or…whatever it is that you have in your house that might be exposed to the internet and might be vulnerable can be these days recruited into a botnet." — Daniel dos Santos

"Attackers…have figured out that when you find a zero-day in a popular router or a popular firewall or a popular VPN appliance, you can really go against thousands and thousands of organizations." — Daniel dos Santos

"With one zero-day or one critical exploit, you can compromise thousands of organizations today." — Daniel dos Santos

"But what we do see in the signals that we see there and what we present in the report is that there is a whole world of vulnerabilities being exploited." — Daniel dos Santos

Relevant Links and Resources

https://www.forescout.com/research-labs/2025-threat-roundup/

https://www.forescout.com/blog/anatomy-of-a-hacktivist-attack-russian-aligned-group-targets-otics/

About the Guest:

Daniel dos Santos is the VP of Research at Forescout Research — Vedere Labs, where he leads a team of researchers that identifies new vulnerabilities and monitors active threats. He holds a PhD in computer science, has published over 35 peer-reviewed papers, has found or disclosed hundreds of CVEs — and is a frequent speaker at security conferences.

Grid resilience has become a test of whether the U.S. can keep essential systems running through disruption—and recover fast when they don't. In this episode, Frank Cilluffo talks with Scott Aaronson about how the electric power sector plans for and responds to an "all-hazards" landscape, from major storms to cyber and physical attacks. Aaronson explains why the grid is a "network of networks" with a huge attack surface but few true single points of failure, and how mutual assistance became a national-scale capability. They also dig into interdependencies across "lifeline" sectors, the practical reality of IT/OT differences, and why surging demand—from AI and data centers to EVs and reshoring—raises urgent reliability and supply chain questions.

Main Topics Covered

• Why electricity is consumed the moment it's produced—and why balance matters.
• How mutual assistance evolved from bilateral help to national-scale response.
• Lessons from severe weather events, including what makes ice storms uniquely hard.
• The IT vs. OT gap, and why operational tech changes the cyber playbook.
• Interdependencies: why adversaries can hit electricity by targeting other sectors.
• Rising demand and the push to rebuild domestic manufacturing capacity for grid equipment.

Key Quotes

"Electricity is the only commodity that is consumed at the moment it is produced." – Scott Aaronson

"[Power companies] are competitive in some ways, but we are completely non-competitive when it comes to security, when it comes to resilience, when it comes to response and recovery." – Scott Aaronson

"I don't really care if it is a storm or a pandemic or a cyber or physical attack or the zombie apocalypse… The impact is what matters." – Scott Aaronson

"The adversary is not attacking the electric sector. They are attacking the United States." – Scott Aaronson

"The first 72 are on you… Have food, have water, have a plan, be prepared. The cavalry is coming." – Scott Aaronson

"Regulations are great, but they are a foundational level of security… if you mandate… a 10-foot fence… the adversary brings a 12-foot ladder." – Scott Aaronson

Relevant Links and Resources

• Edison Electric Institute (EEI)
• Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC)
• CRISP (Cyber Risk Information Sharing Program)
• STEP (Spare Transformer Equipment Program)
• ESF-12 (Emergency Support Function 12 – Energy)

About the Guest

Scott Aaronson is Senior Vice President for Energy Security and Industry Operations at Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and Secretary of the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC), serving as a key industry-government liaison on power-sector security and preparedness.

Supply chains are essential infrastructure—and the iPhone's supply chain sits at the center of U.S.–China competition. As Washington reassesses economic security, this episode explores what it looks like when market incentives collide with geopolitical reality. Frank Cilluffo speaks with Patrick McGee, author of Apple in China, about his reporting on Apple's deep manufacturing reliance on China—and what that reveals about leverage, resilience, and risk. They explore how industrial capacity is built through repetition, why diversification is harder than headlines suggest, and how concentrated production creates choke points that can ripple far beyond consumer tech. The result is a clear, practical case study in why supply chains matter for critical infrastructure, national security, and long-term competition.

Main Topics Covered

• How "learning by doing" powered China's rise in high-end electronics manufacturing
• The "epic transfer of technology" behind Apple's scale and China's supply-chain competence
• Xi Jinping's post-2013 pressure campaign and Apple's strategic recalibration in China
• Why supply-chain diversification is slower than headlines suggest, especially in India
• The "red supply chain" and how Apple suppliers became capability multipliers
• Taiwan/TSMC as a single-point-of-failure risk—and the AI chip-export debate it echoes

Key Quotes

"China isn't dependent on Apple in the way that Apple is inarguably dependent on China. My big worry in a certain sense is that the student has become the master." — Patrick McGee

"If you just take the $55 billion that they invested in 2015 alone, which was 22% of revenue … and just go from let's say the birth of the iPhone 2007–2025, you're talking about a trillion dollars that Apple's invested in China." — Patrick McGee

"None of those phones are really being made in India, they're just being assembled there. The joke that one manufacturing design engineer told me was that the phones are assembled in China, disassembled in China and sent to India for reassembly." — Patrick McGee

"Our narrative is essentially that Apple exploits Chinese workers. In a certain sense, that's the only narrative about Apple in China we've had in the past two decades. And I flip that on its head…[China is] getting more out of the relationship. It's a story about China exploiting Apple. — Patrick McGee

"I think there still is a mindset that China is an imitator, not an innovator. I think we should recognize that… is not the case." — Frank Cilluffo

Relevant Links and Resources

Apple in China (Patrick McGee's book)

McCrary Institute' Code Red report on "Typhoon" threat actors (Vault/Salt/Flax)

Anthropic's Dario Amodei's essay: "The Adolescence of Technology"

Guest Bio Patrick McGee is a Financial Times journalist and the author of Apple in China, covering geopolitics, technology, and global supply chains.

Madison Horn joins host Frank Cilluffo to explain why AI-driven cyber risk may be quieter, faster, and harder to spot in 2026. She breaks down "cascading failures" in critical infrastructure—and how a disruption in one sector can quickly ripple into others.

The conversation zeroes in on AI agents, especially their ability to create new user accounts, get access to systems, and hide inside everyday routine activity. Horn also warns that AI supply chain weaknesses could spread faster than traditional zero-days.

Main Topics Covered

• Why AI-enabled attacks may look like normal business activity.
• Cascading failures across water, power, telecom, and healthcare systems.
• AI agents creating identities and operating with "human-like" access.
• Why "AI supply chain" risk could eclipse zero-day exploits.
• "Slow and steady" AI adoption for critical infrastructure operators.
• Why quantum planning should happen alongside today's AI rollouts.

Key Quotes

"Within critical infrastructure… water needs electricity, electricity needs telcos, and healthcare needs all three." —Madison Horn

"Hackers are lazy. And I mean that not to be offensive, but if you can reach your objective, reaching the lowest hanging fruit, then you're going to." —Madison Horn

"Attacks are not going to look as restricting and as loud. I think it's going to look just like business as normal until we see [impacts] in the physical world." — Madison Horn

"What I worry about is people assuming and trusting that an AI tool is doing what it's supposed to and not necessarily understanding or being able to detect that it's doing something malicious." — Madison Horn

"I just don't want quantum to get lost into the AI conversation." — Madison Horn

Relevant Links and Resources

Madison Horn's 2026 predictions (Nextgov)

About the Guest

Madison Horn is the national security and critical infrastructure chief advisor at World Wide Technology, with 15+ years leading cyber strategy and incident response in high-consequence, regulated environments. She previously held senior roles at Siemens Energy, PwC, and Accenture Security, and founded Roserock Advisory Group focused on cybersecurity and geopolitics.

CISA leadership, NSA/Cyber Command staffing, and offensive cyber operations are colliding early in 2026. Frank Cilluffo and reporter David DiMolfetta unpack Sean Plankey's renomination for CISA Director, and what a prolonged leadership vacuum can mean for agency direction and momentum. They then turn to Lt. Gen. Rudd's confirmation hearing and the evolving debate over the Title 10/Title 50 "dual hat." The conversation also examines morale and workforce pressures inside NSA, including reported staffing reductions. It closes with "Absolute Resolve," what public discussion of cyber "effects" might signal for deterrence, and a China-linked House staff email breach that frames what Molfetta is watching next.

Main Topics Covered

• What Sean Plankey's CISA renomination signals about cyber leadership priorities.
• Why "core mission" talk at CISA still depends on who's in charge.
• Lt. Gen. Rudd's hearing, and how the dual-hat debate is evolving.
• NSA morale and workforce cuts, and what that means for capability.
• "Absolute Resolve," cyber effects, and the deterrence value of public signaling.
• House staff email targeting, Salt Typhoon questions, and the midterms-AI threat mix.

Key Quotes

"Cisa's work does not stop. That said, if you don't have a permanent leader in place, you don't have a guy to set direction, and things can't really go anywhere." — David DiMolfetta

"When you don't have people at their desks [because of workforce reductions], that means they may not be tracking adversaries, they may not be doing that work to cultivate relationships with sources on a kind of human intelligence style level. — David DiMolfetta

"[In Venezuela] lights went off, but they also went back on." — David DiMolfetta

"Authority, accountability, and resources — I found those to be the three criteria to get things done in D.C." — Frank Cilluffo

Relevant Links and Resources

David DiMolfetta's stories at Nextgov.com

Guest Bio: David DiMolfetta covers cybersecurity for Nextgov. Previously, he researched The Cybersecurity 202 and The Technology 202 newsletters at The Washington Post and covered AI, cybersecurity and technology policy for S&P Global Market Intelligence. He holds a BBA from The George Washington University and an MS from Georgetown University.

Chris Inglis joins Frank Cilluffo to break down what offensive cyber strategy should look like in an era of strategic competition. Drawing from the McCrary Institute's new report on U.S. cyber policy, Inglis argues that resilience and consequences are not competing theories—they have to work together. He explains why "defend forward" and persistent engagement reshaped authorities and expectations after 2018, including how NSPM-13 changed delegation for operations. The conversation also tackles the messy seam between Title 10 and Title 50 in cyberspace, and why integration—not exquisite tools—will decide whether cyber power is truly strategic.

Main Topics Covered

• Why offense and resilience must operate as one integrated cyber strategy
• Cyber deterrence as changing an adversary's decision calculus, not perfection
• How NSPM-13 helped shift delegation and operational tempo in 2018
• What "defend forward" means in plain terms—and why it's defensive
• Blurring of Title 10 and Title 50 in cyberspace—and why that matters
• The warning: the U.S. is behind on integrating cyber with power

Key Quotes

"My view is that the discussion of whether it's going to be a focus on defense kind of inherent resilience or a focus on imposing consequences is a false choice." — Chris Inglis

"But when you get to cyberspace, it turns out that the Title 50, which is trying to get information from cyberspace, and the Title 10, which is trying to actually achieve effects in cyberspace, are about 90% the same." — Chris Inglis

"[With defend forward] We're not going to wait onshore for [malicious cyber activity] to arrive and then kind of cede the initiative to adversaries." — Chris Inglis

"What keeps me awake at night? We don't have time. We're way behind the curve." — Chris Inglis

Relevant Links and Resources

McCrary Institute report — U.S. Cyber Policy: Offense, Deterrence, and Strategic Competition

Guest Bio Chris Inglis is the former U.S. National Cyber Director and former NSA Deputy Director, with decades of experience in national security and cyber policy.

Cyber Focus kicks off 2026 (and its 100th new episode) with rapid-fire predictions from McCrary Institute senior fellows. They flag big policy inflection points—especially whether Congress can reauthorize "CISA 2015," sustain information-sharing protections, and keep state and local cybersecurity funding on track. Tech-wise, the group focuses on AI's accelerating integration, the "speed" divide between defenders and adversaries, and emerging pressures across connectivity and infrastructure. On threats, they warn about deepfake-driven social engineering, ransomware that's getting faster and more accessible, "typhoon" intrusions, and the compounding risk of encryption and security tech debt.

Main Topics Covered

• CISA 2015 reauthorization, information sharing, and state/local cyber funding priorities.
• Cyber offense and deterrence: shaping adversary behavior by imposing real costs.
• AI everywhere: faster attacks, faster defense, and higher infrastructure stakes.
• Convergence and connectivity: data centers, wireless, subsea cables, satellite, and scale.
• Deepfake social engineering and shrinking ransomware dwell times in 2026.
• "Typhoon" intrusions, critical infrastructure exposure, and major-event targeting pressure.

Key Quotes

"What I believe is going to overtake identity just in general is deep fake social engineering. And that means the calls that look like your CEO that tell you to get on an urgent call right now... I think I'd click on that if I didn't know better. And a lot of us in the security realm would." — Cynthia Kaiser

"We're actually getting the broader dividing line between haves and have nots... If you can't move fast, you're going to need to find someone who can... If you're someone that can't receive new information and immediately improve your defensive posture, you're probably a have not." — Matt Hayden

"We're seeing and hearing that the US government is interested in taking the fight to the adversaries... shaping the adversary's behavior is important because it slows them down, it imposes costs on them, and perhaps it could lead to deterrence." — Christopher Roberti

"I started with China and I'm going to end with China... making sure again, we don't take our eye off the ball that wow, there may be reasons to make deals economically with China. We have to treat them as a potential adversary." — Bob Kolasky

"At the end of the day, I look at as the typhoon epidemic—Salt, Vault... What is the next typhoon we're going to uncover in 2026 that's going to be driving our cybersecurity defense measures?" — Bill Evanina

Relevant Links and Resources

https://mccraryinstitute.com/directory/senior-fellows/

AI is speeding up cyber operations and shrinking the window for defenders to respond. Nick Andersen, who leads CISA's Cybersecurity Division, explains why Anthropic's recent report caught attention: it described what Anthropic called the first publicly reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign, in which threat actors misused its Claude models to automate and scale parts of an intrusion. Andersen and Frank Cilluffo unpack what that signal means for resilience, from model safeguards to the infrastructure and people surrounding them. They apply secure-by-design thinking to frontier AI, stress risk ownership for adopters—especially in OT—and warn against silver-bullet claims. The conversation closes on what it takes to build capacity, including KEV-driven prioritization and CISA's Scholarship for Service pipeline.

Main Topics Covered

• Why AI changes cyber defense through speed, scale, and attacker efficiency.
• What the "Anthropic/Claude" case signals about resilience for AI providers.
• Secure-by-design expectations for AI systems and the infrastructure around them.
• OT adoption: governance, data flows, and safety-first decision-making.
• Workforce and talent pipelines, including CISA's Scholarship for Service interns.
• Practical prioritization: vulnerabilities, KEV, and remediation at operational pace.

Key Quotes:

"If we don't engage now in having a resilience conversation around our artificial intelligence companies, we're going to see a lot more of what, what happened with Claude, in this case." – Nick Andersen

"The core principles regarding what we're focused on as cyber defenders don't necessarily change here, but the speed through which I think we can expect known vulnerabilities to be weaponized and exploited in the wild now that's going to change for us." – Nick Andersen

"There is no silver bullet. Anybody who has a sales pitch they're receiving that says that this AI solution is going to solve all of your problems... they should immediately become exceedingly skeptical and start asking an awful lot of questions." – Nick Andersen

"OT operators are going to have some really tough conversations coming up about what control are they willing to give away... We know within the OT environment safety and security has to come first." – Nick Andersen

"Our adversary has a pretty clear-eyed view of what they're trying to achieve. And it is both the opportunities for, you know, discord and societal panic." – Nick Andersen

Relevant Links and Resources

House Hearing: The Quantum, AI, and Cloud Landscape: Examining Opportunities, Vulnerabilities, and the Future of Cybersecurity

Anthropic Report: Disrupting the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign

CISA: Principles for the Secure Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Operational Technology

CISA: Scholarship for Service

Guest Bio:

Nick Andersen serves as Executive Assistant Director for CISA's Cybersecurity Division, where he leads national efforts to defend against major cyber threats and improve the resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure. He previously held senior cyber leadership roles at the White House, the Department of Energy, and in intelligence roles for the Coast Guard and Navy.

In this re-releases episode of Cyber Focus, host Frank Cilluffo sits down with Admiral Mike Rogers (Ret.), former Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency. Rogers shares insights from his leadership across two administrations, discussing offensive cyber operations, the evolution of Cyber Command, and pressing national security challenges. The conversation spans from undersea cable vulnerabilities to public-private integration, the future of quantum and AI, and the enduring need for clarity in cyber policy. A decorated Auburn alum, Rogers reflects on lessons learned, historical inflection points, and what must change for the U.S. to stay ahead in the cyber domain.

Main Topics Covered:

• Shifting to a proactive cyber posture: persistent engagement and defend forward
• The evolving role of Cyber Command and comparisons to SOCOM
• Vulnerabilities in undersea cable infrastructure and space-like situational awareness
• Lessons from Ukraine on real-time public-private integration
• Strategic implications of AI and quantum technologies

Key Quotes:

"I believe that what [offensive cyber actions] we ought to authorize is not just going after infrastructure but directly going after capability within those nations that are generating these effects against us." — Adm. Mike Rogers

"If you're going to deter an entity, they have to have some level of awareness of both [your] capability and intent." — Adm. Mike Rogers

"If you had asked me five years ago when I left Cyber Command, would a foreign entity, in this case a nation-state, upload destructive malware into critical U.S. infrastructure in a time of peace?... I would have said to you… there's a low probability. Boy, I got that wrong." — Adm. Mike Rogers

"I think it requires a little precision in how we discuss these matters. Because not all hacks are the same, not all hackers are the same, not all intentions are the same, not all capabilities are the same. [Not] everything is an 'attack'." — Frank Cilluffo

"I'm not interested in collaboration; I'm interested in integration. I'm interested in a real-time situational awareness between government and the private sector." — Adm. Mike Rogers

Relevant Links and Resources:

• U.S. Cyber Command – Mission and Vision https://www.cybercom.mil/About/Mission-and-Vision/
• NSA – About the Agency https://www.nsa.gov/about/
• Cyberspace Solarium Commission Final Report https://www.solarium.gov/report

Guest Bio: Adm. Mike Rogers (Ret.) served as the Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command from 2014 to 2018. A four-star admiral with a distinguished 37-year career in the U.S. Navy, he helped shape modern cyber strategy at the highest levels of government. Since retiring from active duty, he has advised Fortune 500 companies, startups, and global institutions on cyber, intelligence, and national security issues.