This is your Cyber Sentinel: Beijing Watch podcast.
Listeners, it’s Ting, and Cyber Sentinel: Beijing Watch is locked in on one word this week: Brickstorm.
Over the past few days, U.S. and Canadian cyber authorities, including CISA, NSA, and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, have lit up the dashboard with joint alerts about Chinese state-backed actors quietly living inside VMware vSphere and Windows environments using a backdoor they call Brickstorm. According to reporting from outlets like CyberScoop and Nextgov, this malware has been sitting in some networks for well over a year, riding on vCenter, cloning domain controller virtual machines, siphoning credentials, and spinning up rogue VMs that wake up, steal data, then vanish back into the noise. Researchers at CrowdStrike and Google’s threat intelligence teams are tying a lot of this to a China-nexus group dubbed Warp Panda, plus related clusters like UNC5221, all tuned for long-term espionage rather than smash-and-grab mayhem.
Tactically, the playbook is pure cloud-age tradecraft. These operators start with edge devices and internet-facing appliances, where logging is weak and defenders barely look, then pivot into vCenter and hypervisors. Once they land, they grab Active Directory databases, cryptographic keys, and snapshots of virtual machines, using Brickstorm’s encrypted command-and-control and SOCKS proxying to move laterally without tripping simple alerts. On top of that, investigators are seeing complementary Golang implants, with names like Junction and GuestConduit, specifically targeting ESXi hosts and guest VMs. Think of it as a layered parasite stack: one tool to stay hidden, another to tunnel, another to harvest identities and data.
At the same time, cloud providers and threat intel teams are flagging Chinese groups rapidly weaponizing fresh vulnerabilities like the so‑called React2Shell bug in modern React and Next.js stacks. Within hours of public disclosure, multiple China-linked clusters were hammering honeypots, debugging their exploits live, and chaining new CVEs into broad scanning campaigns. The targeted industries this week span U.S. government services, legal firms, tech and SaaS providers, manufacturing, and broader critical infrastructure—essentially anywhere that identity systems, cloud control planes, and high‑value intellectual property intersect.
Strategically, this is not just about stealing files; it is about prepositioning. U.S. officials and private-sector analysts are increasingly blunt that these PRC-linked campaigns look like long-term preparation for crises, from a potential Taiwan conflict to economic coercion, by ensuring access to the networks that run communications, logistics, and government operations. Internationally, Washington, Ottawa, and allied partners are responding with joint advisories, public attribution, and calls for critical infrastructure operators to treat this as a national security problem, not just an IT headache. Beijing, for its part, continues to deny everything, framing the accusations as politically motivated.
So what should defenders actually do this week, not someday? First, treat vCenter, ESXi, and other virtualization and cloud management systems as Tier Zero assets: lock them behind strict network segmentation, enforce multifactor authentication, and brutally limit who can touch them. Second, hunt specifically for persistence around hypervisors and domain controllers: cloned VMs, odd snapshots, unusual SMB or RDP flows from web servers to identity infrastructure, and service accounts doing things they never normally do. Third, deploy and tune detection for suspicious DNS-over-HTTPS, outbound tunnels from edge devices, and rogue VMs that appear briefly and then shut down. And finally, assume that any freshly disclosed high-impact vulnerability—especially in frameworks like React, VPNs, or remote access tools—will be probed by China-linked operators within hours, so patching and virtual patching are now a race, not a chore.
That’s the state of Beijing Watch this week: China’s operators are acting less like burglars and more like long-term tenants of U.S. networks, rearranging the furniture for a future crisis. Thanks for tuning in, listeners, and don’t forget to subscribe so you don’t miss the next briefing. This has been a quiet please production, for more check out quiet please dot ai.
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