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Despite its desire to achieve cognitive dominance for multi-domain operations, the Army has yet to develop fully and adopt the concept of cognitive performance enhancement. This article provides a comprehensive assessment of the Army’s efforts in this area, explores increasing demands on soldier cognition, and compares the Army’s current approach to its adversaries. Its conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners establish the culture and behaviors that promote cognitive dominance and success across multiple domains.
Keywords: resilience, cognitive performance, human performance, neuroethics, information overload
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/13/
Episode transcript: Cognitive Performance Enhancement for Multi-domain Operations
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs.
The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Dan Herlihy, author of “Cognitive Performance Enhancement for Multi -domain Operations,” which was published in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Herlihy commands the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg, NC, and has a background in airborne and Special Operations engineering. He holds master’s degrees in civil engineering and strategic studies from Missouri S&T and the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, respectively.
Welcome to Decisive Point, Dan.
Colonel Dan Herlihy
Hi Stephanie, thanks for having me.
Host
Cognitive performance enhancement for multi-domain operations—where does the army currently stand on this?
Herlihy
The army is somewhat quiet on cognitive performance, particularly cognitive performance enhancement, and does not address the topic directly in its warfighting doctrine. So, the new FM, 3-0, operations, our Army’s capstone doctrine, discusses the pursuit of decision dominance and briefly mentions cognitive effects, while describing defeat mechanisms later on in the text. But 3-0 does not touch on the cognitive domain in a deep or meaningful way.
The Army research and medical community is much more in tune with the importance of cognitive performance enhancement. In fact, Army Futures Command, TRADOC, and the Army Resilience Directorate have a number of programs and initiatives aimed at exploring this concept. Many of these stakeholders played a part in the development and publication of FM 7-22, the Army’s Health and Holistic Fitness Manual. And that does a much better job describing the cognitive domain and introducing the topic of cognitive enhancement. Even so, 7-22 describes cognitive skill as one of five factors associated with mental readiness and features a far less prominent role in the writing than physical readiness does.
Host
You say in your article that there are increasing demands on soldier cognition. Please explain.
Herlihy
As we’ve seen warfare evolve and now bringing in the space domain and cyber domain, there are clearly more cognitive demands for our soldiers than there were in the past. Warfare has always been cognitively demanding, but as we add nearly limitless streams of information and data through the cyber and space domains—all the way to the soldier and leader level—this becomes more and more prominent. On top of that, we see the speed of combat increasing, so our leaders are expected to make decisions more quickly and without hesitation to exploit brief windows of convergence against our adversaries. With that, we also see more complex war fighting systems, as our technology continues to grow and become more capable. All that combined just puts more of a cognitive load on our soldiers.
Host
How does the US’ approach compare to its adversaries?
Herlihy
I would say the US takes a less direct approach than our adversaries do. Particularly China and Russia. As we look at China, China has had several leaders in the PLA clearly described the domain of consciousness as one of the key operating spaces in the future. The Chinese, like a civil-military fusion approach towards exploiting the cognitive domain and trying to enhance the cognitive performance of their soldiers. The Chinese are not bound by ethical constraints that we in the West impose on ourselves. And what that means is the Chinese are much more willing to experiment with things such as gene editing to edit human embryos in ways that could enhance cognitive performance.
Similarly, the Russians see the information domain and the cognitive domain as key in the future of warfare. And as we’ve seen in Ukraine, Russian disinformation is ubiquitous on the battlefield, and Russian leaders attempt to saturate the information space to confuse and slow the decision-making of their adversaries, which they do so with some success, as we’ve seen.
Host
What are your recommendations for the US Army?
Herlihy
My recommendations are that we must continue to pursue revolutionary advances in neuroscience and technology that are ongoing, and we must continue to do that in an ethical manner and not be tempted to veer from that to try to keep pace with our adversaries. But at the same time, we must also capitalize on practical and near-term opportunities to improve individual soldier and cognitive performance. And that could be done through a number of ways that are outlined in the writing—indirect approaches that affect our cognition through things such as talent management, dietary intervention, sleep modification, exercise, pharmacology, and other resilience, training. Or direct approaches that more immediately target the structural and functional mechanisms underlying our perception, cognition, and emotion. So, we have to take an integrated approach to that across the .mil pf, and ultimately drive towards a culture of cognitive performance enhancement across the Army.
That means we have to leave behind some myths about multitasking, some myths about operating on little to no sleep, and really take a look at what the science says and make some simple modifications to the way we do business that can help us achieve higher potential in the cognitive domain.
Host
Give us your final thoughts on the topic before we go.
Herlihy
I would just close with, you know, while there’s a lot of exciting research and technology emerging in the cognitive domain, we all have an opportunity to educate ourselves on the basics of brain function, how we think, how we decide, and in doing so capitalize on some quick wins that are already available for us with modest investment. And we can set conditions for even greater advances in the future. And the great part about that is we can do so while keeping our values intact and not stepping into any ethical gray space—and continue to serve the way that we have—and we’ll continue to do so in the future.
Host
I’m curious. You’re an engineer. What inspired you to write about this topic?
Herlihy
That’s a great question. I think for me, I’ve just always been fascinated with the way our mind works, and I had some exposure in the special operations community with the early days of what’s now the health and holistic fitness program, and in that learned a little bit about cognitive performance. And to see the huge amount of untapped potential that’s there, as in the army, it’s easy to focus on the physical domain, and we can see results from exercise and nutrition in that domain with our very eyes. And we can see it because it’s easy to measure on PT tests and other assessments. But the cognitive domain often goes unmeasured or unnoticed. I just think there’s a lot of potential there, and I was excited to have the opportunity to do some research on that area and learn that we have a lot of really bright individuals in the army and across DoD that are taking a hard look at this for us. But in the end, it’s us as leaders that are going to have to take the next step to really change the culture of our army to embrace cognitive performance optimization in the same way we’ve embraced physical performance optimization.
Host
Well said. Thanks for taking that one on. And also, just thank you for sharing your time and your insights today on this topic.
Learn more about cognitive performance enhancement for multi-domain operations at press.armywarcollege.edu. Look for volume 52, issue 4.
If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.
Author Information:
Colonel Dan Herlihy commands the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and has a background in airborne and special operations engineering. Herlihy holds masters’ degrees in civil engineering and strategic studies from Missouri S&T and the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), respectively.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the long-term energy dependencies on Moscow that Europe will neither be able to resolve quickly nor without great sacrifice. Russia’s hybrid warfare—a combination of kinetic strikes against key infrastructure, information manipulation, malign finance, economic coercion, and cyber operations—has used Ukraine to target the heart of Europe’s energy security. This war has forced the Continent to consider how to realize its economic, environmental, and geostrategic energy goals on its own. This study found systemic dependencies and cyber vulnerabilities in critical energy infrastructure throughout the European continent could impact the Alliance’s political stability and threaten military effectiveness. Forward mobility and troop readiness are affected directly by energy shortfalls and increasing cyber vulnerabilities across NATO. The main findings related to cyber and malign influence provide a sobering view of the challenges of hybrid warfare on energy security in NATO nations.
Keywords: NATO, Russia, Ukraine, hybrid warfare, Internet of Things, critical energy infrastructure
Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/956/
Episode transcript: What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Sarah J. Lohmann, editor and author of What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare, which was published by the US Army War College Press in 2022. Lohmann is an acting assistant professor in the Henry M. Jackson School for International Studies at the University of Washington and a visiting professor at the US Army War College. Her current teaching and research focus on cyber and energy security, counterterrorism, and emerging and disruptive technology. She received her PhD from the Universitat der Bundeswehr, her masters from American University, and her bachelors from Wheaton College.
Hi Sarah, welcome to Decisive Point.
Dr. Sarah J. Lohmann
Thanks for having me.
Host
Let’s talk about What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare. How did you get involved in the research for this book?
Lohmann
Thanks for asking. That’s a great question. We, that is NPS based in Monterrey, and I, focused on this particular topic around energy security. We’ve both been doing research in our own areas. And then we went to NATO headquarters, and we launched a research map, inviting scholars from across NATO countries to brainstorm with us. This was about three years ago, and we launched it right there from NATO headquarters. NATO did bless the project, and then Army War College brought me on to work on this specific research.
Host
What were your main takeaways on what’s defined hybrid warfare during the Ukraine War, specifically as it pertains to energy security and critical infrastructure?
Lohmann
So, there are three main landmarks. It’s targeting the emerging tech environment. It’s using cyberattacks and kinetic attacks as two sides of the same sword. And it’s leveraging information operations and malign influence to create greater impact.
So let me talk a little bit more about what that looks like in the energy security environment. What does it look like with emerging tech? Basically, this creates a lot of new vulnerabilities to the energy critical infrastructure environment during hybrid war because malicious cyber actors, whether nation states or cyber criminals, are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities created by the Internet of Things environment. When I say that I mean things like smart grids, renewable energy sources, and the IT and operational technology environment. They can be compromised remotely and that sometimes switches off the lights and the heat for an entire city or region. This landscape has been tested and attacked in the early months of the war in both the Ukraine as well as NATO member states.
We’ve seen Russian-backed hacker groups who’ve targeted everything from satellites to wind turbines and technology for distribution of coal and thermal power plants. We saw in the years and months in the lead-up to the war that the Russian FSB have actually previously carried out malicious cyber intrusions into grids in places like the US and Germany. This is publicly known information, but this was just preparation for what’s happening now. Secondly, if we look at how it is targeting energy security through cyber means in tandem with kinetic attacks, we often see the timing happening pretty simultaneously—so within a 24-to-48-hour time range. Thirdly, as we look at information operations, there’s a lot of malign influence going on, and there’s a partnership with China. China has helped to soften the impact of sanctions. They’ve also helped Russia to track technology. So, for example, in Ukraine, the Ukrainians are using drones that have parts made by China. China has given Russia the means to track those drones on the battlefield. In addition, China has laid the foundation by controlling critical infrastructure and the supply chain in many NATO countries. This, in turn, is impacting food security and the supply chain across NATO as well as transportation and logistics. And, ultimately, it affects our national security.
Host
What solutions are there for cyber secure energy independence on military installations?
Lohmann
We looked at three different solutions. One we analyzed was small modular reactors. The second we looked at was micro gridding, and the third was cyber early warning.
Small modular reactors have the ability to provide resilient, independent energy delivery to installations in the event that connections to an electrical grid are compromised. The great thing about SMRS are that they’re power plants based on these that require refueling only every three to seven years in comparison to between one and two years for conventional nuclear plants. There are some SMR’s out there that are designed to even operate for up to 30 years without refueling. But, of course, there are a lot of challenges, as well, in terms of security. You’re not going to want these anywhere close to the battlefield for obvious reasons because you’re dealing really with nuclear energy, so the transport can also be a challenge, and licensing. NATO is not super excited about this option right now just because of all the regulation and licensing that goes along with it, how long it’s going to take, and some of those security issues.
On the other hand, this could be ready for deployment on US bases by 2026. So, because of the large amount of energy it could provide, it really could be a great independent energy solution that’s not vulnerable to cyberattack. The second thing we looked at was microgrids. Now I looked at a lot of different bases in terms of how successful microgrids are in islanding, so that they are cyber secure, but also in terms of providing that energy resilience needed during blackouts. It really depends on each base and their needs in terms of how successful these microgrids have been. Right now, the aim is to use renewables to power them, but what we found is the technology isn’t there yet. Basically, they remain fully resilient on fuel, but that can be a problem in forward positions near the battlefield because of the footprint that leads, and also, is often difficult to access fuel when you’re in a battlefield era. Secondly, only with the right kind of storage and batteries can this kind of micro gridding and islanding be successful. What we found is that in some of the islanding tests, the storage of the batteries actually caught on fire because the technology is not there yet. But it’s predicted to be there technologically within several years. SMR will likely get there faster, but both of these things are a political game, as well, in terms of what will be supported by NATO, what will be supported by the different countries. And then finally we looked at cyber early warning. Now what’s out there right now in terms of cyber early warning is basically anomaly detection. They’re looking to the past at what kind of attacks have already occurred. But in terms of the future and the environment in which you have Internet of Things and emerging technology, much of that is not taken into account when it’s looking at energy critical infrastructure.
So, a colleague and I brainstormed about how we could make this better. One thing that we’re looking at is virtualization of energy critical infrastructure, for example, of a natural gas pipeline, and then combining that with machine learning to protect that critical infrastructure. The great thing is here you can also combine it with the machine learning so that it’s constantly learning from the new attacks. And it can use a sophisticated network of behavioral analysis models that can at the same time conduct network monitoring to ensure security .That then can be used to build a next-generation early warning system. So, we do believe this technology can soon be developed and soon be finished. We’re not quite there yet, but those tools will soon be available.
Host
Why is this book so important for NATO and our commands in Europe?
Lohmann
We really do believe that the information we found and the general policy recommendations that we analyze are crucial for those commands because it provides actionable information
In the fourth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, Shatzer focuses on the Taiwan/China relationship. He reviews The Trouble with Taiwan: History, the United States and a Rising China by Kerry Brown and Kalley Wu Tzu-hui and Taiwan Straits Standoff: 70 Years of PRC–Taiwan Cross-Strait Tensions by Bruce A. Elleman and shows how these books might help strategists better understand the contentious and violent history of cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China so they can deal with the problem today and in the future.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/16/
Episode Transcript: SRAD Director’s Corner: Taiwan as Strategic Imperative
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Decisive Point welcomes Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. Schatzer is the author of SRAD Directors Corner. In this issue, he focuses on preserving Taiwan as strategic imperative.
In your SRAD Directors Corner series, you review books of possible interest to contemporary military strategists—especially those serving in the US Army in joint positions. The Winter issue contains the fourth installment of this series, and the focus is on Taiwan. Thank you for joining us again.
Col. George Shatzer
Well, it’s great to be back, and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these important issues.
Host
You profiled the security challenge from China in your first review article in the series. Well, that article mentioned Taiwan. It had a broader focus. Maybe you could briefly summarize the key points from that first article and then describe why you decided to narrow in on Taiwan, this time.
Shatzer
The first article appeared in the spring edition of Parameters this year and reviewed The Long Game by Rush Doshi and The Strategy of Denial by Elbridge Colby. You are right that both books took a wider or grand strategic look at what the People’s Republic of China’s global ambitions are and what the United States should do about them.
Doshi argues that the PRC has patiently planned for decades to overtake the United States as the world’s dominant power. He describes how the PRC has first sought to blunt the US’s control of affairs, regionally, and then attempted to build its own control over the region and then how the PRC has expanded those blunting and building efforts globally. Doshi speaks to all aspects of national power when he recommends how the US should essentially follow its own blunting and building strategy to curb the PRC’s growth.
Colby, though, focuses on just military power in his book, but still from a strategic perspective, and doesn’t get deeply into any operational matters. He suggests the US overtly build an anti-hegemonic coalition to check PRC advances.
Both authors, of course, mentioned Taiwan, but their books include far more than that.
I always planned to come to Taiwan as its own topic in the article series. And with the events this past summer following US Speaker of House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the violent PRC reaction, it was clearly the right time to do that.
The potential for armed conflict between the US and the PRC might well be the highest it’s been since the Korean War era and the first Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954 to 1955. This is no theoretical or purely academic problem, either. The PRC has attacked Taiwan and held territory several times in the past. The US has intervened many times, and the PRC has been very clear and vocal about its willingness to attack again. Even though some argue the true potential for war over Taiwan is low, it would still be a war between the world’s two most powerful nuclear armed states. Such a conflict would be a catastrophe and have devastating consequences for millions of people around the world. That’s a problem set that deserves very careful study and attention.
Host
Let’s talk more about the likelihood of a war over Taiwan. I take it from the article that you believe that a war is more likely today.
Shatzer
That’s right. I’m very concerned, actually. I don’t say this explicitly in the article, but I believe the trajectory of the military situation around Taiwan has entered a dangerous new phase following what some have called the 4th Taiwan Strait crisis from this last summer. In earlier straight crises, the US took very concrete military and diplomatic steps to respond and intervene to warn off the PRC and prevent a larger conflict.
In this year’s crisis, three factors appeared to have changed very substantially since the last crisis in 1995 and 96. First is Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. Taiwan military capacity has decreased significantly since 1996. Taiwan’s military is much smaller. It hasn’t kept pace in key areas of modern combat systems technology, and most of its conscripted service members are required to only serve four months. Yes, that’s months. The second factor is the massive growth in PRC military power. Today, most point to the 95-96 straight crisis in which the US deployed two naval carrier strike groups in response to PRC military actions as a major driver in convincing the PRC to modernize its military because it realized it had no real means to respond to the US carrier deployments. I first became seriously involved in examining the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army, or PLA forces, in 2008. From 1996 to 2008, the growth in PLA capability was remarkable. Subsequent growth in PLA capability since 2008 has been at least as significant, if not more so. Relative to Taiwan and US military capability since 1996, the PLA is vastly more capable and dangerous today. The third differences are pure C perceptions of itself and its perceptions of the United States. This is less clear cut than the other two factors, but I think it’s very likely that the PRC is much more confident in its military capability to seize Taiwan by force today.
Additionally, the PRC has seen a much more muted response from the US to this year’s straight crisis. That might well have been a sensible way for the US to defuse tensions, but what signal did it send about US resolve to defend Taiwan? Yes, the US has made public statements reaffirming commitments to Taiwan security, but lacking a clear set of military moves, I’m concerned that the US may have fostered the PRC belief that the US might not back up its words with deeds. So, taken together, I’m generally worried that the PRC has a much greater capacity to at least isolate Taiwan by force and that the PRC believes it has much greater latitude to do so.
Host
What you’re describing, then, is a major break from past history with the Taiwan Strait crisis. This history is the focus of the first book you reviewed. What does this book offer for strategists today?
Shatzer
Bruce Elleman is one of the foremost experts on Chinese warfare, especially maritime operations. But his book, Taiwan Straits Standoff, does a great job of examining each past crisis in all dimensions. Understanding history is key to understanding PRC perspectives on warfare and on Taiwan, so Elleman’s book is mandatory reading, in my view, for anyone engaged in this problem. The book was published prior to this year’s crisis, which is actually good in that the book provides a clean perspective on everything that’s come before. The short book is stuffed full, though, of valuable strategic insight about the importance of Taiwan, the past thinking of US policymakers, patterns of PRC military behavior, and even how Russia factors into the equation. I thought the most valuable aspect of the book was the discussion of the various problems the PRC has faced in trying to act against Taiwan in the past and the range of problems the PRC faces today.
All of these are suggestive of strategic options the US could use today to frustrate PRC aims. To mention just one is the fixation that the PRC has about Taiwan, and how the US historically leveraged that, especially during the Korean War, to influence PRC behavior. Elleman also reminds us that for much of Cross Strait history, the PRC has viewed war with the United States over Taiwan as being pointless. The PRC has traditionally believed that they could gain control of Taiwan through propaganda and subversion. This “win without fighting” mindset is still fundamental to Chinese military thinking, and it holds great deterrent value. If the United States can encourage the PRC to cling to this idea, then maybe war can be avoided. Unfortunately, growth of PRC nationalism and impatience to “reunify” with Taiwan threatens to erode this barrier to conflict. It’s worth noting too, that Elleman recounts in great detail the US Army LED noncombatant evacuation operation from outlying Taiwan Islands in 1955. It was a massive operation. Eventually evacuating nearly 30,000 people, military, civilian from the threat of PRC attack. I mention this because many questioned what role the US Army could really play in a Taiwan conflict today.
Host
Speaking of nationalism in China and impatience over the Taiwan problem, the other book you reviewed brought a unique perspective to these questions. What was that?
Shatzer
Correct, The Trouble with Taiwan by Kerry Brown and Kalley Wu Tzu Hui offered a fresh, compelling take on the PRC–Taiwan problem. The authors approached the issue through the lens of identity— how history, internal p...
Now that Vladimir Putin has chosen a path of escalation in his unnecessary war of aggression against Ukraine, it is imperative Western policymakers know the consequences and how he might escalate further. This podcast examines recent events on the battlefield; the implications of the announced annexation of territory, mobilization of forces, and threats to employ “all means” to defend Russian territory; the domestic ramifications and Russian thinking on “hybrid warfare”; and the possible weaponization of food and energy as Putin determines future escalatory steps. It will assist American and European leaders in determining policies to deal with the ongoing crisis at this moment and prepare for an uncertain future.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/4/
Episode transcript: “Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options”
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs.
The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government, Decisive Point welcomes doctor Jeffrey McCausland, author of “Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options,” which was featured in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters.
McCausland is a visiting professor at Dickinson College and a retired US Army Colonel, a national security consultant for CBS Radio and television. He’s the founder and CEO of Diamond 6 leadership and strategy and the author of Battle Tested! Gettysburg Leadership Lessons for 21st-century Leaders, published by Post Hill Press in 2020.
Welcome to Decisive Point.
I’m really glad you’re here.
Dr. Jeffrey McCausland
Stephanie, it’s great to be with you.
Host
Your article, “Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options” addresses Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent escalation in his war against Ukraine. In what three ways did Putin escalate the war?
McCausland
We have to consider, Stephanie, that escalation occurs vertically as well as horizontally, and he’s actually done or threatened to do both. You know vertically it’s the use of more and more sophisticated military equipment. As the war progressed to use thermobaric weapons, he attacked civilian population as his situation on the battlefield deteriorated, he’s threatened to use nuclear weapons, and he’s mobilized additional military forces, as well as the economy. But then there’s also a horizontal explanation. Moving, if you will, in that direction, and here we see the Russians using hybrid warfare. And, therefore, using the food weapon, shutting off the export of grain to around the world.
I’m fully convinced the Russians were behind the attack on the Nord Stream pipeline and effort to intimidate Europeans about the possible use of energy and the use of overall energy as a weapon as he has done that to manipulate particularly Western Europ ean public opinion potential. Potential threats and nuclear power plants like around Zaporizhya, which he can kind of press or not as he sees fit. And if he were to cause a major disaster there, he could have similar effects to a nuclear weapon with, perhaps, not exactly as much international backlash. He could try to blame it on the Ukrainians. And recently, he’s made threats to go after US and European satellites. So he’s escalated both vertically with more weaponry as well as horizontally.
Host
So, given all this, what are his options now?
McCausland
Those options are to, again, further process horizontally or as well as vertically–the recent suspension of the food export was an example of that. It now seems to be back online. There is some suggestion he may try to expand the war to Belarus. Move Russian military forces into Belarus and use that as a geographic location to attack Ukraine. Even threatening to do that has already forced the Ukrainians to a degree to move some military forces to the north to, in fact, prepare for that. Should that aggression, in fact, occur.
Sure, he could strike NATO territory, particularly those points that are key to the importation of military hardware coming from the United States or our European Allies in an effort to restrict that. Or they can do is think as most likely right now, which is hunker down as winter progresses, hoping to stabilize the battlefield as the ground freezes as snow arrives. And by depriving Europeans of a lot of energy, hope that the European population in the West will become more and more disenchanted with the war, causing social unrest, and they’ll force their leadership to put pressure on the Ukrainians. Furthermore, of course, his ongoing campaign to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure may have a similar effect in Ukraine, forcing more refugees as people in the eastern part of the country, in particular, are now faced with a long winter with the possibility of no energy.
Host
In your opinion, what’s the probability of Putin using nuclear weapons?
McCausland
I think the probability is low, but it certainly isn’t zero, and we need to keep that in mind and be clear-eyed about it. You know it’s sort of ironic that we are experiencing what I would argue is the greatest nuclear confrontation we’ve had since the Cuban missile crisis, which was almost exactly 60 years ago this past October.
He could use a strategic nuclear weapon. He has a large arsenal. There’s no two ways about that. But obviously that would have, I don’t think it necessarily military effect. It would make him a global pariah. Make him, in essence, North Korea. Even the Chinese would not support that. He could use a tactical nuclear weapon, a smaller nuclear weapon, on the battlefield. And there are reports out even today that the Russian military has considered that. But again, I find that doubtful he would do that. Russian military doctrine has always talked about using such weapons for two reasons.
Reason number one. In an effort to break through a stalemate on the battlefield and then exploit those opportunities with large scale mechanized advance. He doesn’t have the mechanized forces left to do that. And #2, if in fact, the very existence of the Russian Federation was at risk. That’s certainly not the case right now, though he could say the territories he had next, which are Russia are, in fact, being invaded by the Ukrainians now, which is sort of an odd turn of events. But I think he would, again, lose a lot of international support. He would not have the battlefield effect, and he also has to understand, of course, that nuclear weapons, once used, raise the possibility of escalation with the United States, which he doesn’t want either. And finally, of course, even localized effects like radiation affects his forces as well. As it turns out, most wind in that particular portion of eastern Ukraine blows from west to east, so the large-scale radiation patterns would endanger not only his own forces, but perhaps even Russian territory.
Host
You note that it’s critical the West adopt policies to deter or respond to potential future escalation by Moscow. What would that look like?
McCausland
Well, it looks like is unity of effort, of course is key and this year Putin made the assumption of the very onset of this war that two things would happen.
One, the war would be over quickly, the Ukrainians would collapse. That didn’t happen. Second of all, the West, NATO, and the United States would not get their act together. They would be complaints, but we would basically accept this like we did in 2014. That has been untrue. And NATO is a lot more powerful today than, I would argue, it was back in February. As somebody pointed out, you know in a matter of a couple of weeks, Mr. Putin managed to undermine about two centuries of Swedish neutrality and about four decades of German pacifism in one fell swoop. So that unity of effort in the West is key. Now Putin has got to be comforted by social unrest he see sees in France, a new government in the United Kingdom, a new government in Italy, perceived as quiet even in Germany on the nature of this war going for a long period of time. And even recent comments here in the United States by senior Republicans about, we can’t give retrain a blank check and progressive Democrats sending a letter to Mr. Biden urging negotiation, which they subsequently, by the way withdrew.
I think the second thing we gotta do is we gotta continue to emphasize that Putin is committing war crimes. The attacks on civilians, the attacks on civilian infrastructures, are by any definition, war crimes. We cannot allow him, in essence, to use the same tactics the Russians and the Syrians did against Syrian civilians in the Ukraine. We’ve got to continue not only to provide military assistance, which will change and has evolved from stingers and javelins to longer range artillery to high Mars and now more sophisticated air defense, as this relentless attack by the Russians continues. But we also have to provide humanitarian assistance and economic assistance to the Ukrainians. And I fear this winter may see a second refugee crisis.
And last but not least, I say we need to continue to tailor our military assistance and coordinate it with our European Allies to make sure we have maximum effect and consider, I think doing things much more bold. For example, I think we need to consider, if not direct military assistance in Ukraine, at least contractor support in Ukraine to train Ukrainian forces on their territory and repair equipment on their territory that can more quickly then be returned to the battlefield.
Host
Unfortun...
To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete.
This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran.
Keywords: Iran, China, Russia, international competition, game theory, coercion theory
Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/952/
Episode Transcript: Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-First Century
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, author of Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-First Century, which was published by the US Army War College Press in August 2022. Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. A retired Army foreign area officer for the Middle East and North Africa, he has a doctorate in philosophy from Georgetown University.
Welcome back to Decisive Point, Tony.
(C. Anthony Pfaff)
Hey, thanks. Very happy to be here.
Host
Why did you take on this topic?
(Pfaff)
It had been kind of, I think, boiling for a little while. In fact, one of the topics of the year, when we started it about two years ago, was, you know, rethinking coercion and competition. And that, I think, came from a strong sense of frustration over the way the United States was competing globally at the time. China was not only asserting itself in the South China Sea and getting more aggressive over Taiwan, as it is still doing now, but it was also building relations globally—particularly, in continents like Africa—that was threatening to displace US influence. And then you had Russia. You know, you got the invasion of Ukraine, which is a very obvious failure of deterrence. But even before the invasion, Russia was a . . . very much a destabilizing influence—particularly, in Europe—already having seized Crimea, supporting Ukrainian separatists, while at the same time using sort of gray zone means, like social media and others, to sow domestic instability or uncertainty within United States and, uh, its European allies.
Then you always have Iran. Iran’s really good at this, you know, using . . .
Host
Yes.
(Pfaff)
Their proxies. They were pretty much able to attack US forces—especially, in Iraq, but, also, elsewhere—with relative impunity. And whenever we struck back, we always found ourselves in a worse position than if we hadn’t struck back. And that kind of quagmire is very frustrating. And what was really frustrating, from a lot of the practitioners that we talked to, is there was no theory of the case on what to do about it. We study war. We know how to use and apply military forces in war, and so our deterrence thinking is often shaped by the idea that as long as we have the right kinds of capabilities, we’ll get the right kinds of deterrence. That’s part of the equation, but it’s not the whole thing. And that’s why I kind of started looking at grammar as a way of thinking about this. You know, (Carl von) Clausewitz famously said, you know, “Apply the idea of grammar to war,” saying war has a grammar of its own, but its logic is peculiar to itself. So if war has a grammar of its own, why wouldn’t coercion have a grammar of its own?
Host
In your work, you talk about compellence, deterrence, and coercion. What are the differences between the three?
(Pfaff)
Very little, actually. Well, so, compellence and deterrence are forms of coercion. As the theory goes, coercion is about getting somebody to do something that you want them to do (compellence) or getting them not to do something you don’t want them to do (deterrence). I like doing . . . calling them, you know, they’re two sides of the same coin. As (Thomas C.) Schelling argues, you can see the difference between deterrence (and) compellence kind of lies in the timing and initiative, determined by who makes the first move and whose initiative is tested. But there are differences where deterrence is obviously kind of more of a passive activity. You could draw a line, and you tell people, “Don’t cross the line. If you do cross the line, I’m gonna do this.” Whereas compellence is a lot more active, “Stop this now. Uh, you have exactly five minutes.” So, you have to specify time and space where, you know, the compellent threat will be enacted. And so, it’s kind of got a timer on it. Where deterrence is open ended, compellence is a lot more limited.
Host
Game theory and coercion: How are they related?
(Pfaff)
Trying to figure out, given the problem, how do you compel and deter—particularly, against adversaries who seem to be, you know, doing a little bit better than we are. What’s the method by which we sort of analyze these things? Basically, we’re talking about an interaction, and that’s kind of what game theory does. It’s probably more accurate to say that we’re using sort of the structure of the game theory to kind of help understand the interactions under the specific conditions of international competition. You know, having said that, even though we . . . you know, this project doesn’t have quite the mathematical rigor you normally associate with a lot of game theoretic analysis, it gives us a way to discipline and structure our thinking about a problem so we can increase our understanding of it. So whether they’re looking at any kind of predictive or even descriptive reliability, it’s kind of trying to look at those interactions, pull out the logic of them, and discern, “What are some rules of thumb that follow from, uh, these interactions, you know, in the real world, can apply when engaged in a competitive interaction?”
Host
How would that work?
(Pfaff)
You have to identify who the relevant actors are; what their interests and goals are; what they can do in pursuit of those interests and goals; and, just as importantly, what they know and believe about other actors—particularly, how they might respond. And these factors boil down to preferences actors have for cooperation, concession, or conflict because that’s basically the . . . you know, that’s basically the shape of the choices that both or however many actors are in play are making.
And so, when we’re looking at these interactions, we’re looking for equilibrium. What do we learn from studying these kinds of interactions? So now we’re thinking putting yourself not in the shoes of the other person in a way. You understand the credibility’s less about how they perceive your resolve as much as how they perceive what’s your interest in doing something?
If the Russians, for example, believe that we would be worse off if we intervened on behalf of the Ukrainians, they would not take our deterrence, our deterrent threat, as credible because we would be worse off if we applied it. It also has to be capable. But here, capability isn’t measured in terms of balance of power necessarily. It’s more measured in terms of if the deterrent or compellent threat is triggered. If they don’t comply, if they don’t cooperate, are they going to be worse off if you apply that threat? Russia, believing that yes, it might be subjected to sanctions and, perhaps, you know, trade restrictions and things like that, felt that no, given the deterrent threat, as they understood it, they would not be worse off if they had invaded Ukraine. I think we’re seeing they were wrong about that.
And a lot of times, in game theory, you talk about rational actors. We talk about rationality. But rationality in this sense just really means knowing what you want and how to get it. Couple of other things fall out, particularly regarding compellence and deterrence. Compellence may not always work out quite the way you think it would in real life—in particular, because the possibility of future interactions and iterations impacts how other actors are going to respond. First, for the one who’s ...
After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large, operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This podcast analyzes these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Keywords: radiation, nuclear reactors, Zaporizhzhya, Law of War Manual, Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/3/
Episode Transcript: “Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War”
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs.
The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Decisive Point welcomes Henry D. Sokolski, author of “Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War,” which was published in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policymakers, scholars, and the media. He teaches graduate-level classes on nuclear policy in Washington, DC. He’s also a senior fellow for nuclear security studies at the University of California in San Diego’s (University of California, San Diego’s) School of Global Policy and Strategy.
Welcome back to Decisive Point, Henry. It’s great to chat with you again.
(Henry D. Sokolski)
Well, thank you for having me.
Host
Absolutely. My pleasure. In your article, you note that Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant in Zaporizhzhya should inspire the US to adjust its military planning and policies when it comes to hostile military forces and operating nuclear plants. What about this situation inspired your article?
(Sokolski)
Well, I think what got me going was something halfway around the globe in Taiwan. The election of the current president in 2016 came with a pledge to shut down their nuclear power plants. They had three and one partially constructed. And when I went and visited, it occurred to me that one of the strongest arguments in support of the government’s position was not being made, and that was that these plants were targets, and . . . uh, the more I looked into that, the more I discovered that, indeed, the Chinese were targeting those plants and planning to target them and that the radiation releases, depending on the time of the year, could be quite remarkable and devastating. And I . . . I worked that, and then I started looking around the world.
By the time Zaporizhzhya occurred, I was ready. So that was six years of research that I had been doing on this topic and . . . and problems there.
Host
So this isn’t the first nuclear plant to be attacked. How is this situation different from other attacks?
(Sokolski)
Well, it’s different in several ways. First of all, this is the first nuclear power plant to be attacked . . . uh, we have lots of history in the Middle East of plants being attacked, but they either weren’t operating, or they weren’t power plants. Power plants are big. Power plants present radiological release dangers that are significantly higher than small research or production reactors. That’s one difference.
I think, in addition, attack was not seized by the enemy. We have Russians running . . . trying to run this plant and trying to steal it. That had never happened ever before. Also, we’ve never had strikes against plants with anything akin to drones that are precise. All the attacks before were done by, you know, gravity bombs or by planes flying over the target or inaccurate missiles. Why does that matter? With accurate strikes, you can pick specific things, rather than decimating the whole plant. And that’s exactly what’s been going on at Zaporizhzhya, and it is unprecedented. Before, it was all or nothing at all in the way of an attack.
Yet another way in which the strikes against reactors in the Middle East really don’t tell a tale similar to what’s going on at Zaporizhzhya is none of those plants in the Middle East were surrounded by cities or population. I mean, Zaporizhzhya, Oblast has 1.7 million people living there. Now, admittedly, there are far fewer now. But you’re talking about hundreds of thousands still, and the ability of a population to protect itself against radiation if one of these plants produces a massive release is pretty limited. And that’s something folks striking reactors in the Middle East really did not have to worry about or think about much.
And then, finally, none of the reactors previously targeted in the Middle East were adjacent to treaty parties to a security pact with the United States, whereas you have NATO nations—Japan, South Korea—located close to or having . . . themselves have reactors. And that’s important because in the case of, uh, Zaporizhzhya, if radiation wafts over into NATO territory, it’s not clear what that will or will not trigger in the way of a response, and that’s totally different and unprecedented as well.
Host
You had some specific recommendations for the Pentagon. Will you share those with us?
(Sokolski)
Sure. There are three. The Pentagon needs to start looking at these plants in war zones as stationary, potential, slow-burning, radiologically dispersing nuclear weapons instead of simply another portion of the civilian infrastructure. If they look at them that way, then the deterrents and security alliance implications of waging war anywhere near these plants has to be thought out. That includes in Europe, the Middle East, and in Asia. And they . . . they have to start asking what they’re going to do under different circumstances and what, if anything, they are going to plan around themselves. Are we going to strike these plants? Hope not, but, you know, right now, that’s an open question. They need to close that question in some fashion or another by doing some planning.
The second thing that they need to do is they have to take a more active role in the US nuclear export license application process. They need to be giving their view as to how vulnerable proposed plants that are going to be built by the United States, supposedly—again in Ukraine, in Poland, and in Romania, to say nothing of other places in the Middle East—how vulnerable they would be to being attacked. They have a statutory requirement to do this already. I don’t think they are doing enough to take that statutory requirement seriously. Now they have cause to. I think in addition, they have their own military reactor program that they claim they’re going to base overseas, so they have a real stake in trying to be clear about what their thinking is.
And then, finally, the department needs to clarify and strengthen its current guidance with regard to targeting nuclear plants in a war. We are signatories to a protocol in the Geneva Convention (Geneva Conventions) that strongly discourages targeting electrical power-generating plants. And when you take a look at how the military interprets this obligation, the Pentagon ultimately comes down on the side of freedom of action, such that if a commander in the field thinks it’s important to hit a nuclear power plant, he’s given authority to do it. I think that may need to be reexamined.
And then, the presumption against hitting these things is much stronger in the protocol that we’ve signed than what the guidance and interpretation of that protocol says. I think that that is an invitation for mischief. We are the . . . perhaps amongst the only country other than Russia that hasn’t ratified this agreement. Now, Russia pulled out of it, but even China and North Korea have ratified the darned thing. All of our allies have, so we need to consider how we interpret this. I’m not saying we need to ratify it, but I think we need to come to terms that it’s time to take another look after Zaporizhzhya on how we view that obligation.
Host
I so wish we had more time. There’s so much to unpack here. I just want to thank you, though, for sharing your time and for sharing your insight. It’s always a treat when I get to talk with you. Thanks, Henry.
(Sokolski)
Well, thank you.
Host
To read more about nuclear power plants and more, visit press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue four.
If you enjoyed this episode and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.
Author information:
Henry D. Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policymakers, scholars, and the media. He teaches graduate-level classes on nuclear...
The US military must create standing, numbered, and regionally aligned Joint warfighting headquarters— American Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)—around a command council and a staff organized into Joint centers and cells. Calls for standing Joint force headquarters are not new, but the demonstrated military effectiveness of the Joint Task Force (JTF) model coupled with increasing service-specific resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints have resulted in little evolution in joint force headquarters construction since the end of World War II.
Analysis of the historical record has shown that joint warfighting is best conducted with a Joint warfighting command subordinate to the geographic combatant commands. However, the Joint Task Force model is problematic because the ad-hoc, post-crisis activation of JTFs, along with their antiquated command and control structure, inherently puts the United States at a strategic and operational disadvantage. In the future, the US military will primarily maintain its competitive advantage, especially in great-power competition, by being a superior and sustainable joint force sooner than its adversaries. The proposed AEFs draw on generations of hard-earned experience to maintain and grow American supremacy in Joint warfighting in an increasingly dangerous world
Keywords: Joint warfighting, Joint Task Forces, operations process, American Expeditionary Forces, functional staffs, Command Councils
Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/953/
Episode Transcript: The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Thomas Bruscino and Louis Yuengert, coauthors of The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force, with Colonels Eric Bissonette, Kelvin Mote, Marc J. Sanborn, James Watts, and Commander Matthew B. Powell. Bruscino is an associate professor of history in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He holds a PhD in military history from Ohio University. Yuengert is a retired Army colonel and an associate professor of practice in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the US Army War College. He holds a master’s degree in operations research from the Georgia Institute of Technology and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the US Army War College.
Welcome to Decisive Point, gentlemen.
(Thomas Bruscino)
Happy to be here.
(Louis Yuengert)
Yeah, it’s great to be here.
Host
Great. Let’s just jump right in here. Your work offers an alternative approach to the Joint Task Force for Joint warfighting headquarters. Give our listeners some background. Why the need for change?
(Yuengert)
So Stephanie, Tom and I were teaching—this was two years ago—in the Carlisle Scholars Program. And in the scholars program, there’s a requirement that the students do two additional research projects. The reason we have the program is so that they have the space to do that. And in this case, one of the student committees for the Military Strategy and Campaigning course that Tom teaches identified that how we are organized for Joint warfighting was a vulnerability—and, especially, in near-peer competition. And so they asked Tom if they could explore this further after they had given their presentation as part of their research. And this paper was the result of that research effort. So, Tom, if you could talk about the need for change?
(Bruscino)
Yeah, so the work they did was they had multiple committees. And they had worked on Joint Task Forces and the formation of one, and they sort of got into the problems that are inherent in that: extensive delays in getting our warfighting headquarters; a lot of disorganization; some off-cycle training cycles; the need for what we have in the Joint Force, called the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, which has to go and flies all over the world, filling in gaps. So they saw all this need with this.
Another committee was doing the Joint planning process, sort of looking at how we do the fighting, planning for fighting. And a lot of the Joint planning process is focused on sort of the day-to-day activities, the competition activities, campaigning activities of combatant commands and maybe doesn’t apply as well to the dilemmas of Joint Task Forces or Joint warfighting commands.
So this really kind of drove the thinking and the kind of the problem set that they were looking at, that we were looking at when we started researching and developing this monograph.
(Yuengert)
Yeah—just to add to that, we encourage the students as part of their research, if possible, to write something that could be published to have an impact. Either do it for a client—in this case, we did not enlist a client—or to do it so that it could be published and have some kind of impact. And in this case, I think it will.
Host
And what you all came up with was American Expeditionary Forces (American Expeditionary Force). What would this look like?
(Bruscino)
Yeah, so, American Expeditionary Forces: We chose that one because it has historical resonance, right? So, in World War I, it was American Expeditionary Forces (American Expeditionary Force) that General (John J.) Pershing commanded; World War II, it was Allied Expeditionary Forces (Allied Expeditionary Force). And our idea was we’re going to focus on this sort of American and Joint aspect of it, with an idea of if we can get that better, it can become combined down the road and work with allies. And then maybe it would transition to becoming an Allied Expeditionary Force. Either way, that was the idea of it. Now what distinguishes this is that there have been lots of calls for—and there used to be, and sometimes there still kind of are—standing Joint Task Forces.
But we felt like that wasn’t quite sufficient. We needed something that was a little more regionally aligned. We needed something that was more flexible and allowed to deal with the sort of the problems that have always gotten in the way of standing Joint Task Forces working. We don’t flesh out the exact examples of what these would look like in this. We talk about sort of what they would look like generally in any sort of combatant command region, the geographic regions where they’d be.
But the idea would be, sort of, we do have forces that are regionally aligned already in all of the services or literally in the regions. And the idea was that we would build the (American Expeditionary Force or) AEF headquarters out of the commanders and some key staff out of those to build these sort of standing AEF headquarters. Kind of have to read it to get into the details of what that looks like. We certainly hope people do that. But it doesn’t require as much sort of force generation as standing Joint Task Force headquarters do.
So it’s a little bit more flexible. And one of the sort of major innovations in it is kind of a callback to sort of the way we’ve often ended up doing things, which is that the AEF headquarters is run by the AEF commander but not really run by the commander with the staff, but run by the commander with the different component commanders as part of what we call a “command council.”
And so we sort of set up a whole bunch of ways that they could operate and they could do the detailed planning in each of the components and that a lot more of the conceptual ideas of how they’re going to operate as a Joint Force allow for better interoperability will happen because the conceptual stuff will be happening among these commanders who are thinking about this sort of bigger picture. And they’re really working together and knowing what their components are specifically able to do. It’s very difficult—and we say this in there—it’s very difficult for even the best, most Joint-educated Army officer or (US) Air Force officer to know how an Air Force wing operates if you’re an Army officer or how an Army corps operates if you’re an Air Force officer. And throw in fleets and (Marine Air-Ground Task Forces or) MAGTFs and all of that, and you can see how confusing it gets. And it’s only going to get more. So when we start bringing in (US) Space Force assets, cyber force assets, we need the people who do that for their business to be able to sort of talk to the commanders and think about how they’re going to work together instead of having a sort of spun-up Army staff become a Joint Staff and try to run these formations.
Host
How would this concept increase the likelihood of Joint Force interoperability and enable effective maneuver in all domains, including, like you mentioned, operating environments like space and cyberspace?
(Yuengert)
Well, Stephanie, I think some of the things that Tom talked about and the fact that the AEF would be a standing task force within each combatant command . . . so it would be regionally aligned; it would have the service component commands that are important to that combatant command. So, in (United States Indo-Pacific Command or) INDOPACOM, the (US) Navy staff of that component command is very robust because it’s mostly a Navy headquarters. So they would have those capabilities within the service component command. And the f...
This podcast argues the more trauma endured by a population, the more civil war the country will experience in the future. Drawing on mental health, trauma, and neurobiological research, it builds a new theory of civil war that fills existing gaps in current civil-war literature, and then tests the theory via statistical analysis of a large sample size (large-n statistical analysis). The conclusions will help policymakers and US military leadership better understand civil wars and the limits of American power to end them.
Keywords: violence, civil war, trauma, insurgency, mental illness
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/7/
Episode Transcript: “Linking Trauma to the Prevalence of Civil War”
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Erik W. Goepner, author of “Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War,” which appeared in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Goepner has a PhD in public policy from George Mason University. A retired US Air Force colonel, he currently works as a civil servant in the federal government.
Welcome to Decisive Point, Erik. Thank you for being here.
(Erik W. Goepner)
Hi, Stephanie. It’s nice to be with you.
Host
Let’s get started. Your article argues the more trauma endured by a population, the more civil war the country will experience in the future. Lay the groundwork for us, please.
(Goepner)
Sure. The trauma theory kind of has its origins in the experiences and observations of my Provincial Reconstruction Team. We were in southern Afghanistan in 2010—height of the surge, give or take—and the president had said words to the effect of “You have 18 months to get it done.” So we were busy iterating. If we found something that worked, we would do as much of it as we could—kind of channel your Will Ferrell, “more cowbell” here. And if we were doing things that weren’t achieving objectives, we tried to, as dispassionately and quickly as we could, jettison them and just stop doing them.
Not long into our deployment, we started to see different evidence that suggested trauma was having a huge, negative impact in Afghanistan and a significant impact on our ability to kind of achieve an enduring peace in the country. We’re in a culture—particularly, with the Pashtuns—where emotional control is like a really big deal. We’d go to shūrās, which are Afghan meetings where they have 20, 30, 40 village elders and government officials, and we’d see men going into hysterics. We would see examples of towns that were firmly under the control of insurgents rise up very briefly; push the insurgents out; and then, just as soon, kind of kowtow and capitulate to the insurgents again. But, perhaps most importantly, we’d see violence used frequently in everyday settings. You know, think of the idea of normalizing the use of violence in your everyday life.
So we’d be with a district chief. The district chief would get angry at another official in the public setting, would just smack the official in the head—like, really hard. You’d have middle-aged, field-grade officers in the Afghan police or the Afghan army. And when they would have a dispute, instead of debating it or just maybe flipping each other the bird, they would actually get into a full-blown brawl, you know, right there at the police headquarters.
And so that normalization of violence is kind of what got me thinking about this. Then, when I got back from my deployment, I had a chance to do some more focused research. And it turns out that the civil-war literature tends to ignore the threshold at which citizens will use deadly force against each other. And in the case of civil war, when they would use deadly force against their own government, it kind of gets either ignored or it gets treated as a constant, as if it doesn’t change from culture to culture or time versus other times. And despite any headlines that we’re reading, it’s really rare for one human being to take the life of another human being. The military’s done really interesting studies that show that even in combat, warfighters will go to fairly great extents at times to not kill in combat. So they’ll try to make it look like they’re participating, but they’ll take lengths to not actually discharge their weapon or discharge it in the direction of the enemy, hoping not to kill.
So if you’re a wannabe rebel leader, you’ve got a lot of problems, obviously. One of the big problems is you need recruits for your rebel movement. But, more importantly, you need recruits who are willing to kill their fellow human beings. You know, very specifically, you need people who are willing to attack their own government, to include their government security force. And that’s not an easy task. So that’s kind of the background of the “hurt people hurt people” trauma theory of civil war.
Host
You talk about three ways trauma might increase the prevalence of civil war. I’d love to hear more about this.
(Goepner)
So first and most importantly is how trauma itself may be a cause of civil war. And so the theory in a nutshell is that people become more violent as they’re exposed to severe and repeated traumatic stressors. And if listeners are wondering what a traumatic stressor is, the most notable or most severe would be things like torture or being assaulted with a weapon. Those have really profound, negative impacts on people.
So as people are exposed to repeated and severe traumatic stressors, it lowers the threshold at which they’ll use deadly force or which they use violence to kind of achieve their goals or to resolve their problems. And the pathway from the person to the trauma to the increased use of violence will typically go along three different dimensions. One, if you’re heavily traumatized, the likelihood that you’re gonna be a substance abuser increases, the likelihood that you will meet the criteria for one or more mental illnesses increases, and the likelihood that you will suffer from something called “diminished impulse control” also increases.
And diminished impulse control: easy example, you drive into work, you get cut off. Somebody with good impulse control doesn’t do anything, or they mutter under their breath. Somebody with diminished impulse control does something really unwise like chases after the person or actually sort of hits their car in response type of thing. And I’d like to share a cool example if I may.
Host
Absolutely. Please.
(Goepner)
Alright. So for Doctor Strangelove (Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb) fans, instead of the war room, think of the Afghan Operations Center. It’s the summer of 2010, and you have two Afghan colonels in a heated debate. One is the chief of police for the province, who all the Americans love. And the other is the chief of the (National Directorate of Security or) NDS, which is kind of like legacy KGB. So two Afghan colonels, both in their middle age, having a heated debate. And the colonel that we all loved—it’s worth pointing out that we also assessed that he had a substance abuse problem. He had spent all of his life in a war zone either receiving or meting out war-related trauma. And so he was like self-medicating was our interpretation. But we loved him. He was bold, daring, brave, and low on the corruption scale.
So unfortunately, in this exchange, he, the colonel that we loved, is kind of getting skewered by the other colonel. And so, there in the middle of the Afghan Operations Center, the one that we all cared for, Colonel Jelani, kind of got to the end of his rope. And so they’re in front of his subordinates. He removes his firearm, ostensibly because he’s gonna kill the other colonel. And then, thankfully, there was a American officer that was there, and he really bravely stepped in between the two of them. The officer didn’t speak much Pashto. Colonel Jelani didn’t speak much English. But the American was able to use kind of gentle hand gestures and kept repeating, “It’s OK, Colonel Jelani. It’s OK.” And Colonel Jelani eventually holstered his weapon. And so that kind of became like my North Star for the research in terms of what trauma can do to somebody and how it normalizes violence in their life for a variety of reasons.
The other two pathways: The traditional arguments for civil war have to do with grievance—like “I’m so angry with my government. I’m gonna take up arms against them.” And then, the other main theory is feasibility: “I’m gonna rebel against my government because I have the ability or the opportunity to do that.” And so trauma helps make those theories more robust. For instance, if somebody’s been heavily traumatized, it’s obvious that they have grievances. And those grievances typically can be focused at a particular person or a particular group. So that’s one argument. And then the second argument regarding feasibility or the opportunity for war is that when you think about a traumatized state like Afghanistan, and you think about how they recruit their security forces, they’re largely pulling from a really traumatized population. So the likelihood of getting an incompetent security force member’s pretty high. And so that makes civil war more feasible because it’s easier for a rebel force to fight against an incompetent security force than a competent one.
Host
Thank yo...
The skill and capacity of Army cyber forces have grown in the decade since their creation. This podcast focuses on needed structural changes to the Army’s portion of the Cyber Mission Forces that will enable their continued growth and maturity since the Army’s past organizational and structural decisions impose challenges impacting current and future efficiency and effectiveness. This assessment of the current situation highlights the areas military leadership must address to allow the Army’s cyber forces to continue evolving to meet the needs of multi-domain operations.
Keywords: Todd Arnold, unity of effort, workforce development, cyberspace, operations, task organization, unity of command
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/8/
Episode Transcript: “Assessing the Army’s Cyber Force Structure”
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the United States government.
Decisive Point welcomes from the United States Military Academy Major John Fernandes, Lieutenant Colonel Todd Arnold, and Dr. Jan Kallberg, who coauthored “Assessing the Army’s Cyber Force Structure” with Major Nicholas Starck, Captain Richard Schmel, and Major Charles Suslowics. The article was published in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters.
Welcome to Decisive Point. Your recent Parameters article discusses assessing structural divides in the Army cyberspace force for better support operations. Lay the groundwork for us here and give us some background, please.
(John C. Fernandes)
Hi, this is John. I guess I’ll get started. So the Cyber branch and the cyber units have been around for about 10 years now. And so, we thought it would be a good time to look at some of the decisions we made initially and see if the decisions were the right ones and at what challenges may have arisen and how we might need to change things as we move forward to make sure that we’re the most effective force that we could be. So that’s the basis of the article.
(Todd Arnold)
This is Todd. And to add onto what John was saying, really a good time to do that reassessment now because the entire Cyber Mission Force and the Army’s teams have all been operating for the last three years as fully mission capable. So all the teams across all of the different services are now built and working and then doing their missions fully for a few years. And it’s a good point to actually go back and reassess them with “OK, did all those decisions we were making when we were rapidly building the force—do they still make sense?”
Host
Can you briefly explain the offense/defense split and your considerations for mitigation?
(Arnold)
Yeah. I’ll start with a little bit on why there’s a split. So when we were initially building up the Cyber branch, it was built kind of piecemeal. Some of the offensive teams started getting built first. And the two previous branches that had been doing a little bit in each of the offensive and defensive work started building units separately. The Army tasked them to build those separately. And nobody was really doing it fully. (Military Intelligence or) MI was doing a little bit in the offensive side, and Signal Corps was doing a little bit in the defensive side. And the Army said, like, “Hey, start building these things up.” And so those two separate branches started building the offensive and defensive teams. And then we formed a branch because we were looking at how the other services were doing it, and we felt like building a branch was really going to get it to the point where we are moving forward, we have a full career path for people dedicated in this space because it’s not good to do it piecemeal. But, at the same time, we already had units established that were building up these teams, and so we just kept those units, one brigade for offense and one for defense, and they just kept rolling with building the teams. And so that’s how it’s played out for the last 10 years.
(Jan E. Kallberg)
Jan going to join in here, more from a broader perspective. It’s really tricky to get us doing defensive cyber operations and being siloed in that environment without, really, help. Of course, where is the threat intelligence coming from? If you always get your threat intelligence from how you get hit, it’s like a tank that doesn’t know really what’s coming except what’s already in the air. That’s not good. Of course, then, we just wait for the terminal effect.
We’re also seeing that how you bridge this overlaps to avoid that you get one-eyed or—worst-case scenario—blind and how you sort of, say, have a proper knowledge and talent management through the force.
Host
John, did you have anything to add to this one?
(Fernandes)
Yeah. So I can start talking a little bit about what some of the challenges that then arose from the split. So now that we have this legacy division, we started to form almost silos within offense and defense where people who only saw one side or only saw the other or maybe didn’t understand how the other side works. And there’s benefit in being specialized, but we also noticed that there’s some challenges that come with that: not understanding necessarily what’s feasible, what’s realistic, what the costs are for doing things. And then just, sometimes, the . . . the normal human tendency to see inequity of one side looked like it’s more interesting mission or getting better funding or things like that. We thought that those are some of the challenges we’ve seen over the last couple years with this division.
Host
Something else you mentioned: divided chains of command—another structural challenge. What are your suggestions for resolving this one?
(Arnold)
As part of that buildup, the Army deliberately said, “These organizations are gonna run and do the operations, and these organizations are gonna be in charge of just building up and creating and training up the teams.” That was good for the buildup. But now, that’s caused that rift that you mentioned that there’s a split between the people that, like, just maintain administrative and training versus the people that are doing actual operations. And that kind of really takes away from the whole point of command and the way the Army sees command. And so at whatever level the Army decides to do it at, I think we need to reassess that split. And what we should really start doing is like “OK, who is in charge of, say, a CPT or Cyber Protection Team? Who should be in charge of that? What level of command should that be?” And start actually putting those people in charge of the command, giving them a little bit of a staff to take care of some of their administrative things, and actually planning, like, this is how the Army does things. And making the officers and leaders in charge of some of those traditional Army tasks, but within the Cyber branch.
(Kallberg)
So, yes—Jan here. Now, of course, we . . . we’re talking to the war college. We can’t leave the discussion without the strategic outlook. So we’re also thinking, you know, as things may be more reactive—how we see things, the (observe-orient-decide-act or) OODA loops get shorter, and we have a more mission command driven with intent out there going. And also that we maybe see it’s better to have more cohesion to be able to steer the organization quicker.
(Fernandes)
So, ultimately, I don’t know if there’s a simple solution for this one because a lot of the things we’re talking about are normal Army principles that we should be applying. We just think that we need to make sure we’re doing it very deliberately now, now that we’ve identified it as a challenge. Making sure we’re keeping unit integrity to the greatest extent possible, that we’re clearly just delineating who has what roles as we talk support relationships, command relationships, and that we are . . . we’re looking at how we deconflict as we have competing requirements. Are we doing deconfliction by time? Are we doing a deconfliction by priority? And making sure that those are very clearly understood because as the branch has grown, we can’t solve those with only five people in a room. We have to have a little bit clearer processes moving forward.
(Kallberg)
Also, as Colonel Arnold and Major Fernandes hinted—Arnold spelled it out more—I mean, we got data. I mean, we’ve been running this machinery now for 10 years. Why not put these data to use and hone it and make it better?
Host
So, going forward—give us your recommendations.
(Arnold)
I think it’s a good time to sit back and have the Cyber branch and leadership reassess some of those previous decisions and start looking at “OK, we made those decisions up-front. Do they still make sense?” And having deliberate, well-thought-out discussions on “Where should we go from here?” For instance, do we start integrating more of the command . . . mission command stuff that the Army traditionally does into the force and how it’s supposed to be done. What is that level of specificity or focus that individuals need in their mission? Should we have people that are a little bit more general? How many people need to be more focused on, like, offensive or defensive? Or what is that right balance between specialization and generality? So we need to make some deliberate decisions here in order to keep moving things forward. Ten years of building up all these for...
The special operations community could best address the perceived ethical crisis it faces by professionalizing as an institution. While earlier assessments have attributed special operations forces’ ethical issues to a focus on mission accomplishment that led to a broken force generation process and a high operations tempo, such diagnoses obscure a more comprehensive solution. Using sociologist Andrew Abbott’s work on professions as a framework, this article explores the benefits of building the kinds of institutions that can claim a jurisdiction, develop and certify expert knowledge, and establish and apply a code of ethics that addresses special operations unique concerns so that it builds trust and better serves the American people.
Keywords: special operations, civil-military relations, military ethics, professional studies, professional expertise, professional jurisdictions
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/10/
Episode Transcript: “Professionalizing Special Operations Forces”
Stephanie Crider (Host)
(Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, author of “Professionalizing Special Operations Forces,” which appeared in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and is senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. He holds a doctorate in philosophy from Georgetown University.
Alright. It’s always nice to chat with you, Tony. Thank you for making time for this today.
(C. Anthony Pfaff)
My pleasure. Great to be back.
Host
Let’s cut to the chase. Your article opens with this sentence: “Special operations forces (SOF) appear to be experiencing an ethical crisis.” Diagnose the problem for us, please.
(Pfaff)
Yeah. This article got its start when I was asked by, actually, a couple of members of the special operations community to weigh in on what they were characterizing as a crisis. And if you recall, in 2020, they were in response to a number of very high-profile ethical failures. Congress, on two occasions, asked special operations to do an ethics review.
I’m not going to be able to tell you the extent of the crisis or what its current status is now. But I will tell you, if Congress—who’s, in some way, your client—is asking for reviews, you have a problem. It’s a professional problem because it’s saying your client—in this case, Congress—doesn’t trust you. At least a little bit. And while it’s never all or nothing, that’s just still not a good thing. So in response, in terms of the diagnosis, you know, special operations did do a comprehensive review, which was a good start. It left much of the blame to external factors like a high (operations tempo or) optempo that was leading to breakdowns in leadership.
I think it mentioned also training and so on that set conditions for ethical failure. It also pointed out interestingly that . . . and some of the services from there was an emphasis on physical fitness and, I think, specialized skills and, among other things, led to a sense of entitlement among some of the operators that also contributed to ethical failures, which I think is also something important to note.
Another part of the problem might be—they didn’t connect the dots all the way, but—special operators start off in another service. And it’s that service that trains them to be special operators. Then they move off into the special operations community and (United States) Special Operations Command, and they may or may not continue to get professionalized in their original service. Special operations just doesn’t have that. I think they’ve got some of that infrastructure, but they don’t have a professionalized career path where officers, (noncommissioned officers or) NCOs, and others get certified, you know, as they progress in the same way the other services do.
And so I thought that was kind of interesting, and it suggested to me that there’s really an opportunity here, which is what this article is really about.
The idea here is at some level, these problems arise, maybe for the reasons that you’ve said, but there’s a solution to them. If you do the kinds of things that will make special operations more of a profession than what I think it is now, where it is a group of very highly skilled people who basically worked for the other services or the Joint Staff. And so here, it’s important to understand the concept “profession” being applied here. In the vernacular, we use “professions” in a lot of different ways. It can mean I got paid. I’m not using it in that sense. It can mean I’m really good at what I’m doing.
Here I’m using the sense in which a profession involves an expertise that gives professionals this exercise over jurisdiction that gives professionals the autonomy to use that expertise.
For example, in the medical profession. In the medical professions, their jurisdiction is the health of the client. Their expertise is being able to see to the health of the client. And as a result, they have the autonomy over that jurisdiction to do things like prescribe drugs or conduct surgery that a nonprofessional would not be allowed to do. So this idea of having a jurisdiction around which you exercise your expertise, that you kind of own. You have the autonomy to decide what the right and wrong thing to do is within that jurisdiction. And another ingredient is a code of ethics that sort of governs how you go about doing that because, ultimately, it’s maintaining the trust of the client is critical for that profession’s status. If you do that, if you start building that and building the institutions that can . . . and not only just build that expertise, certify it and others as well as govern, then you’ve got a profession. And my argument would be you’ll see better results.
One reason I also thought this was kind of the right way to go was I also looked at what the special operations community themselves were saying about ethics. And that’s when I looked at things like the field guide (A Special Operations Force Ethics Field Guide: 13 Ethical Battle Drills for SOF Leaders). And that’s when I looked at some of the things that I found in blogs and quotes. And you do have a sense where seeing a profession the way I just described it would actually change the way the members would think about things. So, for instance, if you look in the field guide, they frame these dilemmas. The field guide is a set of 13 dilemmas that they navigate, and much of it is very good. Don’t get me wrong. However, from a professional perspective, framing these dilemmas as “right versus right” misses the point. So here’s a good example.
One of the dilemmas is your special operations (commanding officer or) CO sees a friend of his stealing thermal sights from the arms room, and they say he now has a dilemma. Turning in his friend will do him harm, and he owes him a special obligation because he saved his life at one point. On the other hand, he’s stealing thermal sights. And so what does he do?
This is actually not a dilemma. A pretty different professional perspective: Professions are stewards. They care for the resources that, in this case, for the military, the American people have given them. You turn in the person stealing thermal sights. As a steward of the profession, you turn them in. If that person had a shred of professional identity left, the thief would understand why.
Because as a professional, you’re obligated to do these things. So, poof, something that actually may have seemed like a real problem goes away. Now how that impacts behavior, I don’t know. But if you start conceiving yourself as a steward, you’re probably gonna make decisions, and that gets ingrained in your identity because you now have an educating, training, and certification process that builds all that into you. You’re more likely to get people who aren’t going to tolerate these kinds of activities, and that will have good effects down the lane. And the other thing that . . . the kind of thing that came out is this idea that special operators are asked to do something unethical. And then, there’s a confusion when they leave that environment.
Well, it shouldn’t be, right, because that goes against my point about the concept of professions. Professionals don’t do unethical things; they do things it would be unethical for nonprofessionals to do.
So reconceiving things that way, I think you’ve got a better way of conceiving of special operations in the community, I think you’ve got a better way of thinking about ethical problems. I’m not gonna call them “dilemmas” because a lot of them aren’t. And also, if we look at the jurisdiction piece, there’s an opportunity here. Where does special operations operate? They were designed to operate below the threshold of war. I will tell you that that is largely ungoverned space. For a lot of the things that we do, there’s not a lot of international law. And there’s not a lot of reciprocity. And, for the most part, there’s no one taking responsibility for that in the way a profession would in terms of creating and implementing a coherent way to respond to the problems within that jurisdiction. That’s not exactly an ethical thing. But, again, if you have that, all...
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