Decisive Point Podcast

Decisive Point Podcast

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Decisive Point Podcast episodes

  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-31 – Dr. Heather S. Gregg – “The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq”

    The remarkable life of early-twentieth-century British adventurer Gertrude Bell has been well documented through her numerous travel books and biographies. Bell’s role as a grand strategist for the British government in the Middle East during World War I and the postwar period, however, is surprisingly understudied. This monograph offers insights into the role women play as grand strategists. It shows how Bell helped to devise Great Britain’s military strategy in the Middle East during World War I and its creation of the modern state of Iraq. Studying Bell as both a military strategist and a grand strategist offers important insights into how she helped to devise British military strategy in the Middle East. These insights include Britain’s efforts to work through secret societies and saboteurs to undermine the Ottoman Empire during the war as part of the Arab Bureau and the country’s attempts to stabilize the region after the war through the creation of the modern state of Iraq.

    As importantly, studying Bell offers a glimpse into how this extraordinary woman was able to become one of the principal architects of British strategy and the exceptional set of skills and perspectives she brought to these efforts. Bell’s education, firsthand knowledge of the region, fascination with archaeology, and, above all, her ability to make and maintain relationships with key individuals were invaluable tools for shaping and promoting British efforts at retaining influence as a great power in the postwar era as well as Britain’s aims to secure key resources for the empire, including military bases and oil. Ultimately, Bell helped to shape British strategy in the region from 1915–26 because she was a woman, not in spite of it. She had access to both men and women within the local population, she used her social skills to connect and influence key actors in the region, and she brought decades of learning and firsthand experience traveling through the region and speaking with its people to inform and shape her grand strategy.

    Additionally, Bell’s grand strategy offers important lessons for the challenges of creating peace and stability after war. Britain’s efforts at stability operations in Iraq following World War I demonstrate the inherent tensions in balancing an intervening country’s objectives and priorities with those the intervening country is trying to stabilize—especially, the challenges of creating transitional governments and including the population in stability operations. Bell’s unique legacy offers insights into the roles women have played and continue to play as influencers of grand strategy in male-dominated contexts and the importance of including diverse perspectives in strategic thinking.

    Keyords: World War I, Mesopotamia, Middle East, military strategy, Arab Bureau, Gertrude Bell

    Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/950/

    Episode Transcript: The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq

    Stephanie Crider (Host)

    Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.

    The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

    Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Heather Gregg, author of The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq, which was published by the US Army War College Press in July 2022. Gregg is a professor at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. She’s the author of The Path to Salvation: Religious Violence from the Crusades to Jihad and Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Welcome to back to Decisive Point, Heather.

    (Heather S. Gregg)

    Great to be here. Thanks so much for having me.

    Host

    Oh, absolutely. Let’s talk about your new monograph. Strategic Studies Institute Director Dr. Carol Evans notes in her foreword to your work that “The contributions women have made in devising both military strategy and grand strategy are surprisingly understudied and in need of greater attention.

    What a treat to read about Gertrude Bell. Please give our listeners an overview. Who was she?

    (Gregg)

    Yeah, so Gertrude Bell was this fascinating woman. She was born in Britain during the Victorian era in the late 1800s. She was born to a wealthy family. She was one of the first women to go to Oxford University. She was the first to get a first class in modern history, and she was fascinated with the Middle East. She started traveling there at a relatively young age. She traveled extensively. She learned the languages. She wrote travel books. She was even an avid hiker and a mountain climber, which is fascinating to me. But it was her language and her experience in the Middle East that got the attention of the British military. And she became very useful to helping devise both British military and grand strategy in the Middle East from World War I through the end of the war to the middle war period.

    Host

    When and where did she work, and how and why were her contributions important for British strategy?

    (Gregg)

    Yeah, so she became part of a small group known as the Arab Bureau that was stood up in 1915 in Cairo. And she worked with between seven to 14 people, very small group, including T. E. Lawrence that we know as “Lawrence of Arabia.” And she helped devise an unconventional warfare strategy, which was a strategy designed to frustrate and undermine Ottoman authority in the British Empire—I’m sorry, in the Middle East—and on behalf of the British Empire. So she was very instrumental in helping to devise that strategy and work with local leaders. And Lawrence of Arabia became famous because he went out and actually executed the strategy, but she was a part of a small group that formed that strategy. And then, after that, she went to what was known as Mesopotamia at the time—what we now know as Iraq—and she helped devise the military occupation of Iraq after the British government and the British military seized it at the end of World War I. And then, she actually helped create the modern state of Iraq, and that included putting the first king in power in Iraq, who she knew personally and who T. E. Lawrence had worked with. So she had a huge influence on both what happened during the war and then what happened after the war.

    Host

    So what were some of the techniques that Bell used to operationalize her strategy?

    (Gregg)

    Yeah, so she had a really interesting tool kit that I think shows that being a woman is actually an asset in certain circumstances. So, for example, she was very, very good at building friendships, and she built friendships that lasted a lifetime, both in the Middle East, but also back in Britain. And so one example of this is there was a bit of a fight that broke out between the Cairo office and the office in Delhi about who should control the Middle East. Should it be the government of India, the British government of . . . in India, or should it be Cairo, or should it be London? And Gertrude Bell happened to be lifelong friends with the viceroy at the time, who was who was in India. And she was dispatched to go to India and to smooth over this problem, which she did. So I think that’s a fascinating example of how this relationship she had had for a long time—she was able to work quiet diplomacy, friendship diplomacy, and resolve that problem.

    She also built lifelong friendships with people in the region, and this included King Faisal (Faisal I), the first king of Iraq. She was his trusted advisor for several years, and he put her in charge of antiquities. And she helped create laws for Iraq that protected their antiquities from Western archaeologists coming in and taking antiquities. So her relationship building was just phenomenal and, I think, very important.

    The second thing she did which I thought was really interesting was she was very good at throwing parties. And this might sound very superfluous, but it actually isn’t. She threw parties in a strategic way. She would put certain people in the room together so they could talk and meet one another. She was very instrumental in throwing parties for the wives of influential men. So she knew that wives had their husband’s ears, and so she was able to build relationships with those women, and then they, in turn, would help influence their husbands. So she did a lot of very interesting things, not in spite of being a woman, but because she was a woman. And I think that’s really interesting.

    Host

    How was Bell able to have such influence and hold the positions she held as a British woman during and after World War I?

    (Gregg)

    Yeah, I think this is a really interesting question, and it’s something that I still am not entirely sure I know the answer to. But I think that one of the things that’s very interesting is that it seemed to me that the British government saw her as useful, and that was the priority—that they knew that she had on-the-ground experience. She had language experience; she understood tribal dynamics and key leaders and their relationships to one another. And they saw this as useful.

    So it’s surprising how little conversation there was about her being a woman and how much that her expertise was valued. I would also say that once again, her friendships were very important. So the fact that she knew T. E. Lawrence mattered. He was at the Arab Bureau first in Cairo. The first director of the Arab Bureau was actually not in the military. He was an academic and arc...

    11 min
  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-30 – Dr. Arthur I. Cyr – “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Miscalculation, Nuclear Risks, and the Human Element”

    Nuclear weapons have vastly raised the stakes and potential costs of crisis, making leadership and related human qualities of judgment and temperament crucial. This podcast analyzes one exceptionally dangerous US-Soviet confrontation, which barely averted war. Military and policy professionals will see how understanding the perspectives, incentives, and limitations of opponents is important in every conflict—and vital when facing crisis situations like nuclear war.

    ​Keywords: leadership, deterrence, Cuba, nuclear weapons, missile crisis

    Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/11/

    Episode Transcript: “The Cuban Missiles Crisis: Miscalculation, Nuclear Risks, and the Human Dimension”

    Stephanie Crider (Host)

    (Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.

    The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

    Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Arthur I. Cyr, author of “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Miscalculation, Nuclear Risks, and the Human Dimension,” which was featured in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Cyr has served as the vice president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and president of the Chicago World Trade Center (World Trade Center Chicago). He taught at the University of Chicago, University of Illinois, Northwestern University, and Carthage College and is the author of After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia, published by New York University Press in 2000.

    Welcome to Decisive Point, Art. I’m glad you’re here.

    (Arthur I. Cyr)

    Well, thank you for your kind invitation and for the opportunity to do the article for Parameters.

    Host

    Of course. We’re excited to have you.

    Your article talks about the Cuban missile crisis. Give us some context, please. What makes this crisis distinct from others?

    (Cyr)

    It was particularly close—a particularly close call. It was particularly increasingly evident with the passage of years after the October 1962 confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. It was geographically close. We and our allies had put lots of weapons, including nuclear missiles, in Turkey and Italy, close to the Soviet Union. But this was only 90 miles away from the US, and the communist threat 90 miles away was a major theme in the legendary presidential campaign between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon. Kennedy, in effect, outflanked Nixon on that.

    Host

    Will you please briefly walk us through the highlights of the Cuban missile crisis?

    (Cyr)

    Yes. Cuba had become an increasingly intense focus in American politics. At the very beginning of the Kennedy administration, uh, the administration stumbled badly with the disastrous and total failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion—CIA effort to land anti-Castro . . . heavily armed anti-Castro exiles at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and launch an insurgency, which they confidently told the president would be successful.

    That, it’s clear now, not only fed controversy in the US, but encouraged Nikita Khrushchev to place the missiles in Cuba following a very steady buildup of conventional forces there.

    Host

    Let’s talk about some of the lessons learned. Some of these weren’t even evident for years. Can we talk about that? What were they?

    (Cyr)

    Yes, indeed. Well, the problem of perception and, especially, misperception of the other side, always a great and perhaps principal challenge in international relations, which is why diplomas . . . diplomacy is such an important and, also, difficult occupation—Cuba, Castro, the US, Kennedy, Soviet Union—that they’re very reckless. Nikita Khrushchev had very different perceptions of what would be accepted and what was possible in international relations. The Americans, interestingly enough, were obsessed with not Cuba, but Berlin, where it was . . . anything that happened in the world, including in Laos and Vietnam—anywhere, literally, was related to Berlin. And, in fact, the evidence is clear that after the announcement of the missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev and associates hoped to use that dramatic change in the strategic landscape to apply new pressure and successfully force the Western allies out of West Berlin, which was another island, metaphorically, surrounded by East Berlin, East Germany, and the heavy and very powerful Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe.

    I hope that’s clear. But it made the stakes very high. But the basic lesson is how easy it is to misperceive what the other side is planning to do. Nobody around Kennedy, with the single exception of CIA Director John McCone—not a government professional, not an intelligence pro, but a Republican businessman—was brought in to succeed Allen Dulles (who’d been discredited), the longtime head of the CIA and was basically a fall guy for the Kennedy brothers after the Bay of Pigs disaster. With the single and very courageous exception of McCone, the Americans simply persuaded themselves the Soviets would never try to do this.

    Host

    How are some of these lessons still relevant today?

    (Cyr)

    Well, we still have a nuclear-armed world. I don’t believe. But it’s important to keep in mind what I just said about misperception. I think partly because of the lesson of the Cuban missile crisis and partly because nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the bombings which finally brought a thankful end to World War II in the Pacific and the surrender of Japan—nuclear weapons are so horrific that they continue to operate as a deterrent on the other side. But, thanks in part to the Cuban missile crisis, we’re no longer so inclined to engage in wishful thinking, I believe, collectively and assume the other side is not going to act.

    And communication: Kennedy and Khrushchev, to their great credit, established the so-called “hotline,” which was not a cell phone, it was not a landline, it wasn’t even initially a satellite phone, but it was a very complicated telecommunication system, an old-fashioned, big, clunky teletype machine. One was placed in Moscow, and one was placed in Washington. And the two sides were able to communicate much more readily than before. Today, telecom is no longer a problem, but miscommunicating, misunderstanding what the other side is going to do and wants to do is as dangerous as ever.

    Roberta Wohlstetter (W-O-H-L-S-T-E-T-T-E-R) is the single, I think, most important analyst well worth reading. She did a classic book in 1962—Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision—analyzing and explaining the US intelligence failures regarding the Japanese surprise attack on our naval base on December 7th, 1941. She also did an article for the fine journal Foreign Affairs in 1965, applying the same lessons to the Cuban missile crisis. She’s extraordinarily durable.

    Host

    Thank you. Do you have any final thoughts for us before we part ways?

    (Cyr)

    We’re very much into quantitative analysis, and hard data and hard information is important in our military (quite rightly) from the start of warfare. But, certainly, the US Army and military services today give a tremendous amount of attention to data analysis. Our military is also quite valuable and fortunate in the sense that leadership is essential in academia, but also in government circles. I do believe—and I don’t think it’s just old age—I do believe that with the end of the Cold War, we’ve become more and more obsessed with what we like to do: analyze data. You see it in all walks of American life, including business. But leadership intuition, the human dimension, has never stopped being important, and it’s more important than ever before. (John F. Kennedy or) JFK looks better all the time. Whatever shortcomings may have been—and, obviously, his ineffectiveness early in his administration—he played a singular and decisive role in holding off nuclear war. The advisers he brought together when we first learned about the missiles in Cuba uniformly wanted to attack Cuba. We know now that there was some sense, especially on the part of Defense Secretary (Robert) McNamara, that the Soviets had some sort of short-range nuclear weapons in Cuba, but they had far more than Americans estimated at the time. And in a moment of insanity, Nikita Khrushchev had quite privately given one . . . his principal commander in Cuba the OK to use nuclear weapons without asking Moscow if the Americans invaded.

    The Soviet submarine—the B-59 under command of Valentin Savitsky—harassed by US surface ships dropping hand grenades and signaling depth charges, which the Soviets assumed were lethal, trying to force them to the surface, finally did so. American aircraft were busy shooting tracer bullets around the submarine. Savitsky ordered the torpedo tubes open, including one that held an atomic torpedo. He was going to destroy the American flotilla around him. He was gonna destroy his own submarine and launch a nuclear war. Vasily Arkhipov—by good fortune, a Soviet fleet staff officer happened to be on the submarine, and he literally physically prevented Savitsky from carrying out that order. Commander William Morgan, the captain of the US destroyer USS Cory, as described in the article, went out of his way to make sure that by, uh, searchlight signaling, Ensign Gary Slaughter apologized to the Soviets, who were, by that time, standing out on the deck of the surface submarine. We apologized. Commander Morgan brilliantly kept the atmosphere down. He kept telling his men “Let’s keep t...

    12 min
  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-29 – Dr. Roger Cliff – Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA – 2020 PLA Conference Papers

    Although the People’s Liberation Army is not yet a global expeditionary force on par with the US military, the former has nevertheless significantly expanded its ability to operate abroad. Through enhanced technological capabilities, robust relationships with foreign militaries, increased access to overseas military bases and dual-use facilities, and the implementation of major structural reforms, the People’s Liberation Army has built a more integrated joint force capable of conducting a wider and more complex array of missions. This volume advances the understanding of the People’s Liberation Army’s capability to conduct overseas missions by examining China’s military relations with Europe, Africa, and Latin America; the country’s military activities in the Indian Ocean, polar regions, and Pacific Island countries; and the emerging roles of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force. This volume finds the People’s Liberation Army is engaged in a wide range of activities throughout the world, including port calls, joint exercises, seminars, and personnel exchanges. China sells weapons to some parts of the world and seeks to acquire military and dual-use technology from others. In addition, the People’s Liberation Army seeks to increase its capability to operate in parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean, Pacific Island countries, and polar regions, where the organization has only had a minimal presence in the past

    Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/951/

    Keywords: China, People’s Liberation Army, PLA Rocket Force, Chinese expeditionary operations

    Download the full episode transcript here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/15/2003341249/-1/-1/0/DP-3-29-PODCAST-TRANSCRIPT-_CLIFF_ENABLING%20A%20MORE%20EXTERNALLY%20FOCUSED%20AND%20OPERATIONSL%20PLA.PDF

    6 min
  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-28 – COL George Shatzer – “SRAD Director’s Corner: Understanding North Korea and Key to Security in East Asia”

    In this episode, Colonel George Shatzer focuses on North Korea and the Kim family regime. He reviews Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator by Jung H. Pak and Rationality in the North Korean Regime: Understanding the Kims’ Strategy of Provocation by David W. Shin and shows how these books might help readers better understand North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-Un and the implications of his actions for US foreign and military policy in the region. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in East Asia. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/5/

    12 min
  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-27 – Dr. Zenel Garcia and Dr. Kevin D. Modlin – “Sino-Russian Relations and the War in Ukraine”

    Claims that China has taken “Russia’s side” in the Ukrainian War oversimplify Sino-Russian relations. Garcia and Modlin contend Sino-Russian relations are a narrow partnership centered on accelerating the emergence of a multipolar order to reduce American hegemony and illustrate this point by tracing the discursive and empirical foundations of the relationship using primary and secondary materials. Furthermore, they highlight how the war has created challenges and opportunities for China’s other strategic interests, some at the expense of the United States or Russia.

    Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/4/

    Keywords: China, Russia, strategic partnership, Ukraine war, multipolarity

    Episode Transcript

    Stephanie Crider (Host)

    Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.

    The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

    Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Zenel Garcia and Dr. Kevin D. Modlin, authors of “Sino-Russian Relations and the War in Ukraine,” which was featured in the autumn 2022 demi-issue of Parameters.

    Garcia is an associate professor of security studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. His research focuses on the intersection of international relations theory, security, and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia.

    Modlin is an instructor at Western Kentucky University, where his research interests focus on security studies and international political economy. He holds a PhD in international relations from Florida International University and a master’s degree in economics from Western Kentucky University. He also served as a senior legislative aid for retired congressman Ron Lewis.

    Welcome to Decisive Point, Zenel and Kevin. I’m really glad you’re here. “Sino-Russian Relations and the War in Ukraine”—please give us some background on this. Where does China weigh in so far?

    (Zenel Garcia)

    Thank you, Stephanie, for having us.

    There’s a couple of things in the background that are important to know. Right now, China’s position towards the conflict in Ukraine, the war in Ukraine is complicated by the fact that it simultaneously wants to maintain a stable relation with the Russian Federation. It sees the Russian Federation as a key partner in a possible, emerging, multipolar order. And at the same time, it kind of needs Russia to continue to play a security guarantor role in Central Asia in particular.

    This is very important for China because, historically, having negative relations with Russia would usually undermine stability along China’s frontiers. So, on that side, right, it has every incentive in the world for the moment to not place itself diametrically opposed to Russia. At the same time, China’s trying to portray an image of being a responsible stakeholder in the international system, being a champion of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the international system, and it’s basically avoiding having to call Russia’s actions an act of aggression. So you can see that this connect there kind of places China in a very difficult position.

    Host

    Thank you, Zenel. Kevin?

    (Kevin D. Modlin)

    As part of this emphasis on the multipolar order, what we’re seeing is that it includes elements of agreement and disagreement throughout all that. That’s not uncommon in any state relation dynamic. But it seems that their articulation of multipolar orders emphasizes their autonomy in operations, that there’s not as much coordination behind that.

    Host

    Your article talks about Sino-Russian relations and promoting a multipolar order, as you just mentioned. Can you expand on that piece for us a bit?

    (Garcia)

    Sure. China and Russia have had a pretty rough relationship throughout the twentieth century. They went from the Russian Empire having been one of the countries that the Chinese government . . . the Republic of China before the (People’s Republic of China or) PRC was founded had identified the Russian Empire as one of the culprits of unequal treaties that had basically carved up Chinese territory during the nineteenth century. You fast forward and the Russian Revolution, you know, creates a (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or) USSR.

    But the Republic of China then begins to try to negotiate some of these treaties over time. Most of this goes into the sidelines as China’s kind of falling apart through civil war. But once you have the PRC formed, one of the things that was supposed to be a very positive development for the PRC was that it had established a close relationship with Russia, the Soviet Union, and that this actually translated into one of the largest technological transfers of the twenty-first century from the Soviet Union to China. And it doesn’t even last a decade before the two countries end up in a Sino-Soviet split, fighting skirmishes along the borders. All of this results in thousands of incursions, according to Chinese sources, by Russian-backed militias into Chinese western frontiers. And so, they don’t have a very positive relationship.

    Most of this gets settled, however, through a rapprochement of sort during the late 1980s. And by the 1990s, they were able to solve the majority of their territorial disputes. And it is here . . . that relatively positive process of settling the border, where you have the Chinese and the Russian leaders articulate that their aims are to play a role in the emergence of a new, multipolar order.

    Why do they want this? Because from their perspective, the unipolar moment is inherently detrimental to their interests. In other words, the United States can act as it wishes without necessarily having to take their interest into account. And if you’re sitting in Beijing and Moscow, of course, this is not a positive development.

    (Modlin)

    Going forward from that point, these relations continue. So they’re articulating a similar sense of an order. In contesting that sense, they’ve built somewhat of a foundation. We see this through the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and their interactions. So it has some substance to it at this point—that this is both the path they’re choosing and accepting with each other. But it involves this flexibility as well. So it’s a very different framework from us in the US when we think about relations and agreements—that they seem to usually embed some type of obligations to each other, and these are much more restrained. So there are agreements, but they usually entail less commitments to each other.

    Host

    What challenges and opportunities does the Russian-Ukrainian war pose for China?

    (Garcia)

    I think the biggest problem that China’s facing right now is that the Russians committed themselves to a conflict, and nobody expected them to perform this poorly.

    My guess is that if the Russians have been successful in all of their original aims, even if the Chinese would have had some trepidations about the spillover second- and third-order effects across the world, at bare minimum, the Russians can at least be seen as having played a key role in demonstrating their capability as a capable pole in the international order. Their poor performance here kind of makes it difficult for the Chinese because they can’t see Russia unilaterally fail because, if it fails, then who else is left to play this other role in a multipolar order?

    India could potentially fill that role. But the Chinese and Indians don’t necessarily get along. They have their own territorial disputes to deal with. The EU is certainly a big actor for the Chinese, mainly as a trade partner, but they’re dedicating a lot of resources to try to make sure that the EU is autonomous from American foreign policy because it . . . fundamentally, they don’t think it is, in a sense that the United States and its NATO allies, they don’t necessarily see everything eye to eye. But when push comes to shove, in this case of Ukraine, there’s a sense of greater unity.

    And so if Russia’s not playing this role of a pole, then that’s a significant challenge. They cannot see Russia inherently lose everything in this conflict. That’s probably the number-one challenge that they have along with, of course, that this conflict is a very clear act of aggression. There’s no way that you could paint this in any other way. And the Chinese are refusing to make the argument that this is in fact an act of aggression. They’re basically calling on all sides to kind of play a constructive role in settling the disputes. We clearly know who started this conflict. And so that kind of undermines China’s long-standing position of being a champion of sovereignty and territorial integrity. That’s not a good look because this is something they’ve tried to promote. As far back as Mao (Zedong), this is one of the key foreign policy principles.

    Host

    Conclusions and implications. What do we need to know?

    (Modlin)

    Building from this point, I think it presents an opportunity for us to think about a framework of relations among states that have some interactions, but not the degree of interactions that we anticipate. And by “interactions,” I’m emphasizing the aspect of commitments. Some countries are willing to incur cost to help other countries in the system, and this is a mutually beneficial aspect to an agreement. But they also involve costs, and we have not seen that element in the relations between Russia ...

    16 min
  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-26 – Dr. John Nagl – “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars”

    Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. Through a detailed historical analysis, this article provides perspective on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. In doing so, it provides lessons for future Army engagements and argues that until America becomes proficient in irregular warfare, our enemies will continue to fight us at the lower levels of the spectrum of conflict, where they have a good chance of exhausting our will to fight.

    Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/3/

    Keywords: irregular warfare, Vietnam, victory, Afghanistan, Iraq, landpower

    Episode Transcript: “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars”

    Stephanie Crider (Host)

    Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.

    The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

    Decisive Point welcomes Dr. John Nagl, author of “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” which was featured in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Nagl is an associate professor of warfighting studies at the US Army War College. He is author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice.

    Welcome to Decisive Point, John. Thank you for being here.

    (John Nagl)

    It’s terrific to be here, Stephanie. Thanks for having me.

    Host

    Let’s talk about “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars.” You note in your article that since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less-than-enviable combat record. Ouch. Give us a brief overview of where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat.

    (Nagl)

    Yeah, I think “ouch” is the right word. And, of course, I love the Army dearly and care about the well-being of the nation. I’ve seen what happens when wars go badly. It’s very painful to write that, but it’s intended to be tough love for an organization that really matters. And for the most important country in the world, I might add.

    What I argue in the article is that the United States government is one, three, and one in our nation’s wars, and I’ll go through them quickly. Korea (the Korean War), the first war after World War II, where the United States was decisive and won decisively: Korea ended in an armistice. The important lesson for that, I think, is the United States was unprepared for conventional combat in Korea. It was unprepared to be the global hegemon that the international order yearns for and so desperately needs.

    And we learned from that. We created a state of readiness. The 2nd Infantry Division in Korea’s motto is “Fight tonight,” and they’re ready. And that readiness for combat—for conventional combat—is something that the American Army, I think, can be enormously proud of.

    But, since Korea, with Vietnam (the Vietnam War); the first Iraq war (the Persian Gulf War); Afghanistan (the Afghanistan War); and the second Iraq war (the Iraq War), Operation Iraqi Freedom, our record is decidedly not as good. We are, I would argue, one and three in those wars, with (Operation) Desert Storm being a clear win, but Vietnam and Afghanistan being decisive losses, and the second Iraq war, the current Iraq war—it’s still too soon to tell, but it’s hard to put it in the win column. So I looked for—as I thought about the combat record of the United States military since World War II, I tried hard to isolate what it was that led to that less-than-enviable combat record. That’s really the point of the article. Is there something in common with the wars that we don’t do well in that provides lessons for the Army as it thinks to the future?

    Host

    Let’s unpack that a little bit. What, in your opinion, was the biggest misstep?

    (Nagl)

    After the Korean War misstep of being unprepared for combat full stop, the United States decided to focus on a particular kind of war. And this argument draws very heavily from the late Russell Weigley. He wrote a book called The American Way of War (The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy), which argues that since the United States became capable of conventional combat—conventional great-power war, according to the standards of the day—that is the kind of war for which it has chosen to prepare. And that worked well for the United States—and the United States Army, in particular—in the First World War, in World War II, after initial readiness problems in the Korean War and in (Operation) Desert Storm.

    But there is another kind of war: irregular war—an ironic name because the world has seen much more irregular war than it has seen so-called regular war over the course of human history. Irregular war is called the war of the weak, war of the flea. It’s a war in which the opponents of a great power choose to fight in ways that minimize the advantages of the great power and maximize the advantages of the lesser power in particular—generally, greater staying power for the lesser power. And the United States has chosen not to prepare for that kind of war. I give the Army in particular something of a break on that prior to Vietnam (the Vietnam War). And I argue in my doctoral dissertation—became the book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife—that the Army learned and got better over the course of the Vietnam War at counterinsurgency, a particular type of irregular war. So I give the Army sort of half marks for that.

    But in the wake of the Vietnam War, the United States turned away from irregular war, decided those were bad wars, wars that we weren’t gonna fight anymore. And, unfortunately, the enemy gets a vote. And the real crux of my argument is that no sane opponent of the United States, having seen the extraordinary conventional capability of the United States military, would choose to fight that tooth to tooth, nail to nail. Our enemies are going to choose ways to try to achieve their political objectives without confronting the full might of the American military. That’s what the Viet Cong and, largely, the North Vietnamese did during the Vietnam War to our dismay.

    It’s also the path that . . . after the initial reasonably successful invasions, efforts to topple the government of Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after those conflicts, our opponents chose to fight us in an irregular manner. And that presents a whole series of challenges for the United States military for which we are not optimized. And that may be okay because the cost of losing one of those wars is far, far less than losing a conventional, great-power-versus-great-power war. But it’s still not good.

    And so I argue, certainly with passion, and I hope with some degree of resonance that the United States military—an enormous organization, the most powerful organization on the face of the Earth—ought to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time, ought to be able to deter conventional war and, at the same time, increase its ability for irregular wars’ capability, its capacity, its understanding of irregular war so that we present our enemies with no chinks in our armors, no Achilles’ heel, and no place to take us on where their chances of success are any kind of good at all.

    Host

    Where could we have succeeded if given more time, or maybe if things were executed differently?

    (Nagl)

    Counterfactuals are always difficult, of course. I’m a big fan of a man named Lewis Sorley who goes by Bob, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, student of the Vietnam War, and biographer of Creighton Abrams, who believes that a choice as simple as one that the President Lyndon Johnson confronted when he was choosing the commander in Vietnam as that war heated up, as we moved toward full engagement in the Vietnam War, when he chose General (William) Westmoreland rather than General Abrams as the commander—Bob argues that a choice as simple as that might have made a difference in the Vietnam War, in an extraordinarily costly war.

    Bob has studied Vietnam (the Vietnam War) more extensively than I have. He served in it. I’m not willing to argue with him. I do think there are a number of points during the Vietnam War which we could have made choices that would have rendered that campaign more successful. The bitter irony is that by the end of the war, under Creighton Abrams, we had achieved what looked like success in these irregular wars—that is, a host-nation security force that is able to confront the forces that oppose it with some degree of American support—in particular, American airpower—and that combining and Joint force of host-nation security forces, American airpower, American advisers on the ground can guarantee the survival of the government against any conceivable enemy. We had actually reached that point by the end of the Vietnam War. But it didn’t matter. The American people had lost faith in the war. For some reason, it’s connected to the war; for other reasons, connected to the Nixon administration.

    And so we ended that advisory effort, and unbelievable suffering resulted in Vietnam, but also in Cambodia next door, as a result of our failures to learn and adapt rapidly enough to the demands of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Therefore, recent counterinsurgency campaigns—there’s a whole lot we could have done. We could have prepared better for that part of the spectrum of conflict, we could have created host-nation security advisory forces earlier ...

    15 min
  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-25 – Dr. Richard A. Lacquement and Dr. Thomas P. Galvin – Framing the Future of the US Military Profession

    The military profession needs to be redefined by examination of its expertise and jurisdictions of practice, whereas previously the focus was on securing its professional identity. Twenty years ago, the original Future of the Army Profession research project responded to growing concerns among officers that the Army was no longer a profession in light of the post–Cold War drawdown and the onset of global operations including Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the profession faces recurrent challenges raised by the changing character of war, the renewal of great-power competition, crises surrounding issues of sexual harassment and assault, the effects of a major global pandemic and associated social and political unrest, and the growing societal distrust toward professions in general. Richard Lacquement and Thomas Galvin propose that the questions of professional identity, while still important, are now less salient than those about the professions’ jurisdictions of practice and domains of expert knowledge. Clarifying them will help better prepare US military professionals to exercise discretionary judgment effectively. They also propose a new Future of the US Military Profession research effort that addresses these jurisdictions across service, joint, and defense enterprises to clarify the divisions of professional work and responsibilities. This is a must-read for any steward of the military profession.

    Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/945/

    Keywords: leadership, character, effectiveness, self-awareness

    Episode Transcript: “Framing the Future of the US Military Profession”

    Stephanie Crider (Host)

    Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.

    The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

    Decisive Point welcomes, Dr. Richard Lacquement and Dr. Thomas P. Galvin, authors of Framing the Future of the US Military Profession, published by the US Army War College Press in January 2022. Lacquement is a research professor at the (US Army) War College Strategic Studies Institute, and Galvin is an associate professor at the (US) Army War College.

    Welcome to Decisive Point, Richard and Tom. I hear your piece won the Madigan award at the (US) Army War College. Congratulations! That’s really exciting.

    (Richard Lacquement)

    Thank you.

    (Thomas Galvin)

    Thank you.

    Host

    I’m really glad to have you here today. Let’s talk about your monograph. This piece builds on previous work. Give our listeners some background and tell us about the original project from 2002 and 2005, please.

    (Lacquement)

    Sure. I want to shout out to one of our former professors here at the (US) Army War College, Dr. Don Snider, who had also worked at West Point (Academy) for many years, who was the lead of what was called the “Future of the Army Profession project.” It ended up with two edited volumes that came out in 2002 (first edition) and then in 2005. And I had been fortunate to join a group: probably about two to three dozen scholars who all worked on different elements of what is the US Army profession, partly dealing with the post-Cold War challenges coming out of the 90s and right about the time we went into what became the Global War on Terror (war on terrorism).

    And I had been part of that project, and, looking back on it with Don Snider a few years ago, we thought it could use an update based on . . . it’s been over 15 years, and—oh, by the way though, the project was focused on the US Army—our sense was that it really applied to the entire US military; we wanted to broaden the scope to do that.

    So, once I got the chance to go on sabbatical, I sort of took that as my sabbatical project to help build it out and recruited Tom. I’m a political scientist, and then Tom worked in our Department of Command, Leadership, and Management and studied the sociology more. And I really needed that perspective on how to understand the evolution and how professions are understood and studied to help flesh out how we would apply that going on 15 to 20 years after the Future Army Profession project, which had used a cortex by Andrew Abbott out of the University of Chicago. That’s very solid but couldn’t do everything we would like it to do as we thought about the whole profession.

    Host

    Thanks, Richard. Tom?

    (Galvin)

    I came into the project at Richard’s invitation because I had done some work in studying Abbott and also other related works in organization theory, management science. So that’s the lens that I’m coming into this. There were some . . . what I had always felt were some gaps in the previous work. The previous work is absolutely fantastic in terms of laying out a way of thinking about expert knowledge and how the professions compete, but there were some other things that were not as robustly represented, such as how do the various parts of the military collaborate? Because, at the same time we’re competing, we’re also collaborating. And there was, uh, opportunities to bring in a wider sociological framework to think about the totality of how the military serves as a profession, serves as an organization, and help address some of the emerging problems and challenges that the military faces today.

    Host

    What gaps does your work seek to fill?

    (Lacquement)

    So I wanted to identify a few things that we were trying to get at. Tom just talked about some of the literature and how to frame it. But, more importantly, I think in terms of what are the challenges to the US military profession in the United States today? Part of it was the evolution of things that had happened over the last 15 to 20 years—particularly, some of the technological changes bringing in domains of cyberspace and sort of maturity or for the way our understanding of how space affects military operations—how that’s matured. Challenges in terms of actual strategic performance. Looking at events in Afghanistan and Iraq, Syria and Libya, and unsatisfying strategic outcomes to say the least in what we could do to better articulate what the military should have known better. What should we learn from that, and how do we understand what the expertise of the military is and how that’s evolved because of the changing character of war and the changing international environment? And how to do a better job at sort of, again, expanding from just the Army to the entire US military, but looking at those particularly daunting challenges in the changing character of war, changing strategic context, and also some of the societal demands—diversity, equity, inclusion, gender roles, for example—and how those have evolved. And what does that mean for the military profession going forward?

    (Galvin)

    I would add that a gap is that the previous work had focused heavily on the operational aspects of the military profession—you know, the expertise in fighting and winning wars—much less on the institutional side. And there’s a lot of important professional work that’s done in terms of running and resourcing the military that hasn’t been as appreciated. There’s also some elements from the research agenda that the 2005 project left, such as, “Should there be a joint profession?” Well, I think, 15 years later, we’re in a better position to answer those kinds of questions. And so, we want to look at not just the services, but also what is the role and function of the Joint layer? What about defense agencies? How does the existence, the growth of those entities put pressure on the services? On the Army as a profession?

    And I also believe an important gap, getting back to the point about collaboration, is about how professions . . . we do a lot of boundary spanning. So, we have the Army as a profession, but we also have different communities of practice, which handles certain requirements that the military needs to be able to sustain itself or to be able to perform its mission that cross professional boundaries, such as resource management; such as the special operations community; such as the special professions of military doctors, military lawyers, military chaplains. Those, I think, deserve a treatment because they are a very, very important part of the profession, but their role has not really been explored as much as it could be.

    Host

    The monograph maps a way forward to three practical outcomes. Will you please briefly explain them for our listeners?

    (Lacquement)

    Sure. If I were to put a gloss on all three of them, it’s what I described sometimes being kind of an owner’s manual of how to understand the military. My sense is that the word “military” is a pretty big and amorphous one that is misunderstood by many. Either there’s an assumption about a very narrow view of maybe just battle or combat or a very broad one, which gets to that three-million-person organization, the Department of Defense, and everything it does, which goes way beyond just battle and combat. So articulating sort of what it is that the US military does do. What is its expertise? What expertise is kind of unique to the military as well as ones it shares with other professions or other segments of society? So, helping US citizens and members of the military understand what is the military and who are military professionals.

    Secondly is civilian leaders—particularly, the ones in the federal government or the government, meaning legislative as well as executive branch. And, really, at the state and national level, to sort of help them understand what t...

    13 min
  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-24 – Dr. Tami Davis Biddle – “Character Traits Strategic Leaders Need”

    Strategic leaders must possess a range of skills to work successfully in complex environments. To use those skills to best effect, they rely on character traits that enhance the likelihood of their effectiveness as leaders and maximize their success when working in teams. Certain character traits facilitate work in demanding settings that rely heavily on communication, integration, and cooperation. Programs designed to educate senior leaders must help future national security professionals identify these character traits and then practice and hone them. Highlighting individuals with challenging roles in World War II, this podcast analyzes the character traits that enabled them to succeed in their work.

    Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/14/

    Keywords: leadership, character, effectiveness, self-development, self-awareness

    Episode Transcript:

    Stephanie Crider (Host)

    Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.

    The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

    Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Tami Davis Biddle, author of “Character Traits Strategic Leaders Need,” which was featured in the Parameters summer 2022 issue. Biddle retired as the Elihu Root chair of military studies at the US Army War College, where she’s now a distinguished fellow. She’s written extensively on military history, airpower, and strategy. The author of Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (2002), she is currently writing Taking Command: The United States in the Second World War for Oxford University Press.

    Welcome to Decisive Point, Tami, I’m really glad you’re here.

    (Tami Davis Biddle)

    I’m delighted to be here, Stephanie. Thank you.

    Host

    Let’s talk about your article. You open with a statement that might not occur to many people. Security professionals engage in activities that are intensely analytical, but also intensely human. Students of strategy, therefore, must develop an understanding of decision making and its pathologies and must comprehend the role of cognitive psychology in that process. What does this look like in real life?

    (Biddle)

    This comes out of my experience and teaching for a long time and teaching war college-level students for two decades. And I realized that they have an opportunity at . . . especially at the beginning of the year to stop and really do some intentional thinking about how they process information and about how they think and how they articulate ideas. And one of the things that I think is terribly important is for them to understand the background influences on their thinking; the institutional influences on them; even the influences of other individuals, mentors, family the way that they’ve been brought up to see the world and the way that their experiences have shaped their perception of the world.

    Because if they can understand that, they’re in a much better position to think clearly, to think analytically, and to understand where their biases or their predilections or their . . . even their prejudices might be influencing the way that they think about the world and therefore interfering, potentially, with strategic thinking and strategic decisions or analytical thinking.

    So I felt it was really important to start students off with a emphasis on greater self-awareness and greater self-awareness about the process of thought and discussion. Understanding those and being able to be aware of those is super important, I think, for students and for helping them to understand how to interact with others and how to do the best possible strategic thinking that gets them sometimes out of their own heads and enables them to see the perspectives of others and develop empathy and to not simply be prisoners to their own biases or their own predilections.

    Host

    There are so many rich examples in your article. Let’s hit some of the highlights.

    (Biddle)

    Sure.

    Host

    Who’s Harry Hopkins? And what qualities did he exemplify?

    (Biddle)

    Oh, Harry Hopkins is such an interesting character. He was the leading adviser, the closest adviser, and the most trusted adviser to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). They met in 1928 during, basically, FDR’s campaign for the governor of New York, and then they worked together pretty much consistently from that time onward. And of course, when FDR became president, it was in the height of the Great Depression, and the most important thing to do, or he felt that he had to do, was to improve the lives of Americans. To help people who were destitute, who didn’t have work, to try to find useful work to restore their pride, to get the economy back up and on its feet and going again, and to help Americans just basically regain their self-confidence.

    And Harry Hopkins was, it turned out, exactly the right man to do that. He thought like the president. He had been basically a social worker. He went to Grinnell College, he came to New York City, he saw people who were struggling on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. He became committed to helping them, and then, when the financial crisis occurred, he had some experience. So he was in a perfect position to help the president understand how to move forward.

    He became head of the Works Progress Administration and was crucially important in that role, and, also, this was kind of a first for the country. Really, the idea that a state has responsibility for its citizens was still pretty new in the 1920s and 1930s, but it’s an idea that FDR promoted and believed in deeply, and Harry Hopkins shared that belief. And so, they were a great team and they worked together on the New Deal. They tried to restore American confidence and American dignity for working people. And then, when (Adolf) Hitler became the chancellor and then became increasingly powerful in Germany, and then when the Second World War began in Europe, they worked together as a team once more. And they were working in a realm that was fairly new to Hopkins. In particular, he didn’t start out as a foreign policy analyst, but one of his great strengths was to learn quickly and to know exactly what is most important. And he recognized the crisis facing the world because of Hitler and because of fascism was the most important issue.

    And he helped FDR keep that uppermost, and then he became a tremendous . . . basically, communicator for FDR. Because the president had polio and because he had limited mobility, he couldn’t often go and do the things that a modern president who has full mobility can do. So Harry Hopkins became the eyes and ears and the arms and the legs of FDR. And he went and met with very important people. He met with (Winston) Churchill early on in January of 1941. This was right after—obviously, Britain had been fighting alone in 1940, and Britain was in pretty desperate straits. The US wasn’t in the war yet, and we were trying to figure out ways—at least, FDR was—trying to figure out ways to help the British. And Hopkins ended up playing a really crucial role in that—figuring out, first of all, that Britain was in fact going to stay in the fight. Essentially, when FDR sent Hopkins over to Britain in 1941, early in ‘41, it was to find out if Britain was going to manage, if Britain was going to be able to stay in the fight, because many Americans like Joseph Kennedy were saying, “No, Britain’s gonna be overrun” or “Britain’s gonna make a deal.” And so, the first thing that Hopkins had to ascertain was is Churchill going to keep this country together? Is it going to keep it fighting? And if we send them materiel, will they be able to use it in the long run? And Hopkins determined that, in fact, Churchill was going to stay in the fight. Britain was going to stay in the fight. And yes, if we sent materiel and became essentially the arsenal of democracy, that Britain would survive. And this became kind of the keystone of this tremendous alliance between the British and the Americans in the Second World War.

    So, in a way, he was discerning, like we’ve lately been discerning if Ukraine was going to survive and stay in the fight, and whether it was worth our sending materials and support or whether it would just be taken up by the Russians after a short fight. But, in fact, Churchill and Hawkins formed a very tight bond, and one of the things that Churchill appreciated so much about Hopkins was that he stayed focused on the key issues. He knew what was salient, he knew what was most important, he didn’t waste time. He went right to the key issues, and he figured out how to move forward on those key issues.

    When I was evaluating my students, one of the things that I was often looking for was a sense of their ability to discern what is most important. Can they separate the wheat from the chaff? Can they really zero in on what’s key and what’s crucial and move forward and bring others on board and keep them focused on what is most important? And Hopkins did that in spades, and he did it over and over and over again. He traveled with FDR, he went to all the major international conferences and helped the president keep everyone on track. Even when there were huge differences, Harry Hopkins found a way to get people to agree and to simply create good outcomes through determination and through, I think, a certain optimism that he shared with the president.

    The president had a confidence that was, oh, just winning and contagious, and this is why I think he was such a successful president in t...

    16 min
  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-23 – Dr. Alexander G. Lovelace – “Tomorrow’s Wars and the Media”

    Distilling lessons from the author’s book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, this podcast provides applicable suggestions for the US military today. As in World War II, the press is both a weapon and a possible vulnerability in modern warfare.

    Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/15/

    Episode Transcript

    Stephanie Crider (Host)

    Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.

    The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

    The guests in speaking order on this episode are:

    (Guest 1: Alexander G. Lovelace)

    

    Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Alexander G. Lovelace, author of “Tomorrow’s Wars and the Media,” which was featured in the summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Lovelace is a scholar-in-residence at the Contemporary History Institute of Ohio University. His first book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, is being published by the University Press of Kansas in 2022.

    (Host)

    It’s great to have you on Decisive Point, Alex. Thanks for making time for us.

    (Lovelace)

    Thank you for having me.

    (Host)

    Let’s jump right in. Your essay offers practical suggestions for how the press can be used by public affairs officers, commanders, and policymakers to achieve victory in coming conflicts. You say these lessons are applicable for today’s wars, even when they’re fought on TikTok. So give us some historical context. How did we get here?

    (Lovelace)

    The Second World War was a media war for two big reasons. The first one is that all sides really tried to harness the media as a weapon during that conflict. This really came out of the philosophical and technological mindset of total war. There’s a real philosophical shift where warfare is suddenly not so much something you do to the enemy army, but also has to involve the enemy population.

    That grows from the French Revolution up to World War II, and it’s accompanied also by a technological shift. Warfare is becoming much more deadly, particularly for civilians. At the same time, the media is also part of this change. You have technology such as telegraphs and photography which has a military use but also has a civilian use and a media use for civilian press.

    So by World War II, which is the first total war, at least the first one that is openly fought as such, the media is going to play a big role in that. So that’s one reason.

    The second reason is even as commanders are trying to use the media as a weapon, they’re also being susceptible to it influencing their decisions on the battlefield. You have these two things: the media as a weapon and the media being used by commanders, influencing commanders’ decisions, and it creates a model of military-media relations which survives total war. We haven’t fought many total wars lately, but, in the era of limited war, the media is still a big factor. Vietnam becomes a television war, and there’s a big debate over how much that influences. But you see this throughout the war on terror (war on terrorism) and up to the current conflict in Ukraine, which some commentators have called a TikTok war because a lot of Americans and a lot of news is being shared on the latest information-sharing platform.

    (Host)

    Can you explain in a little bit more detail how the news influences commanders’ battlefield decisions?

    (Lovelace)

    The news really influences commanders’ decisions in, I would say, three big ways.

    The first one is maybe the most obvious to Hollywood. It’s the general who’s media-obsessed, wants publicity, wants to make a name for himself, and that’s probably a little less common than one would suppose, but it does happen. The second way that commanders use the press is to create political support for a policy or their theater or campaign. And the third type of influence the press can extract from a commander is more insidious, and that is the commander doesn’t really know it’s happening, or he’s letting it happen because he thinks he has to.

    (Host)

    Today’s media is different from the press of, let’s say, World War II. And you say that’s OK. How so?

    (Lovelace)

    I would say there’s two main factors. The first is methodology. The press during World War II is often seen as somewhat more subservient or respectful of authority. Many reporters and news organizations today see themselves as international companies, not necessarily American companies. Exxon’s a massive, worldwide company. CNN is too, so there’s that shift when it comes to methodology.

    The second real difference is technology. Today you have 24-hour cable news. You now have a plethora of blogs and Internet sites. The media is very different. I think one way technology really changes how news is reported was the onset of television where editors and paper owners and media company stockholders have a lot less influence when it comes to the editorial opinions of, say, anchormen. Suddenly, Walter Cronkite has a lot more editorial freedom than he might have had if he was just writing for a newspaper and having to get his stories past editors. So that’s one of the big changes. That’s even more different than today; there’s many different news sites, and they tend to be more focused towards specific audiences. There’s a very interesting study the RAND Corporation put out a couple years ago that talked about the focus of how news is becoming more focused towards select groups.

    However, one of the big things is that the problems are different, but a lot of the issues are not. One of the big myths of the Second World War is that the press was kind of a lapdog of the government or the military, America was all united, and that wasn’t true at all. There was an opposition press to the Roosevelt administration before and leading up to the entry of the United States into World War II. That doesn’t go away. A lot of military journalists were also free to question the military. I mean, there was censorship, but censorship was not used to prevent criticism.

    The press wasn’t necessarily always promilitary during the war. Another thing is that commanders during World War II were also dealing with new technology. They were dealing with radio. They were dealing with newsreels. They were dealing with magazines that dealt with photographs, and they had to learn to adapt to this kind of new technology. Likewise, the speed of news increases during the war.

    (Host)

    Talk to me about the press as a weapon and TikTok wars.

    (Lovelace)

    Well, during World War II, the US military tried to use the press as a weapon in several ways. First, they understood that a democracy at war had to have an informed public. They did a lot to encourage reporters. They have accreditation. They do have censorship, but it does tend to be of a fairly mild variety. So an informed population is one.

    An informed soldiery is another. A lot of commanders believe American soldiers fight better, particularly when it’s a draft Army, when they know what they’re fighting for. So there’s also a big effort to get news to soldiers. Some commanders, George Patton is one, also tried to get news of ordinary soldiers back to hometown papers and to praise subordinates in the press in a big way. And the Army near the end of the war eventually catches on and begins institutionalizing that.

    And there’s some attempts to use the press for deception during D-Day. It’s funny to see how the final announcement is worded: “Landing has begun on the northern coast of France.” Well, what does that mean?

    There’s another way that the press is used and that is to not necessarily always give good news. By 1943, George Marshall and others in the military are worried that the American people are going to take the war for granted—that it’s already been won and we can sort of slack off. And Marshall and the Pentagon begin trying to make sure that bad news isn’t hidden. Mid-1943, they begin releasing pictures of dead American servicemen to show that the war’s still pretty serious.

    Now, that’s World War II. Let’s talk about TikTok. TikTok is, first of all, not a social media app. There’s not a whole lot that is social about it. It’s an information-sharing platform. Now, the information might be goofy videos, but it also can be news, and some of it, I would argue, is somewhat sinister.

    And I would say that for three reasons. Last September in 2021, the schools across the United States were hit by something called a TikTok challenge called ”devious licks,” in which the challenge was to vandalize your school’s bathroom or steal something and then videotape yourself doing this on TikTok. I couldn’t find any estimates of how much damage this caused. It must have been well within the millions of dollars. There were many arrests of children.

    It shows just how powerful this app is, and it’s powerful for a number of reasons. How it works is it’s trying to figure out what you like so you can go on and you see these short little videos. And if you linger on one, TikTok knows it. It will try to feed you more videos like that.

    Out of professional obligation, I opened TikTok for an hour. I decided I was going to try to see how fast I could get on stuff with Ukraine. It opens up, you see a goofy video. You see another goofy video. I found something with gas prices, I lingered there. I found something else on gas pri...

    14 min
  • Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 3-22 – Zachary Kallenborn – “InfoSwarms: Drone Swarms and Information Warfare”

    This podcast discusses drone swarms, which can be used at sea, on land, in the air, and even in space, are fundamentally information-dependent weapons. No study to date has examined drone swarms in the context of information warfare writ large. This article explores the dependence of these swarms on information and the resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space, and psychological—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning. Overall, the article offers insights into how this important emerging technology fits into the broader defense ecosystem and outlines practical approaches to strengthening related information warfare capabilities.

    Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/13/

    Keywords: unmanned systems, electronic warfare, information warfare, cyberwarfare, drone swarms

    Episode Transcript

    Stephanie Crider (Host)

    Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.

    The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

    (Guest 1: Zachary Kallenborn)

    (Host)

    Decisive Point welcomes Zachary Kallenborn, author of “InfoSwarms: Drone Swarms and Information Warfare,” which was featured in the summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Kallenborn is a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a research affiliate of the Unconventional Weapons and Technology program at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), a senior consultant at ABS Group, and a self-proclaimed US Army “mad scientist.” He is the author of publications on autonomous weapons, drone swarms, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.

    Zach, I’m glad you’re here. Thanks for making time to chat with me today.

    (Kallenborn)

    Thanks for having me.

    (Host)

    Your article explores the dependence of drone swarms on information and the resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space, and psychological warfare—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning. Put this in context for us, please.

    (Kallenborn)

    The context of the discussion is looking at drone swarms—a rapidly emerging technology that numerous states are developing. Obviously got the big players—China, Russia, the United States are all developing this technology. But even smaller powers, like South Africa. And this technology is even already being used in combat. We saw just last year that Israel used a drone swarm in combat in the fight against Gaza. Now, before jumping into these sort of larger issues of information warfare, it’s important to understand briefly what we mean by “drone swarm” here.

    We’re not necessarily talking about simply large numbers of drones used en masse, which is often how the term is used within media, but really what we’re talking about is drones that have some level of communication and coordination between them so that they’re operating effectively as a singular unit instead of, say, 10, 15 individual drones.

    Now, what that means is there’s potentially a range of capability within that. Because if we’re talking about simply coordination and communication at the basic level, that’s a pretty simple thing. So in the case of like the Israel example, likely all they’re really doing is just doing some coordinated searches over an area to help identify a target. It’s not anything all that fancy or unusual, but we can imagine in the future how artificial intelligence and autonomy may make coordination communication fairly significant. You could imagine, for example, a drone swarm that’s made up of multiple different types of drones operating in different domains with different types of payloads where they’re intelligently selecting, like, “Alright, let’s use this antitank weapon against this identified tank over here, and we’re going to send our antipersonnel weapons to this infantry unit over here,” and collectively sort of adapt and engage with the reality on the ground working across multiple domains, and all autonomously.

    But the important thing, and what we’re going to get at in this article, is that regardless of that complexity, one of the key issues when it comes to drone swarms is information warfare, and, particularly, their dependence on those various subsets: electronic, cyber, space, and psychological warfare.

    (Host)

    Let’s start with electronic warfare. Electronic jamming: What do we need to know?

    (Kallenborn)

    We can start with individual drones because that’s the simple example here. One of the things that we’ve seen is that electronic jamming has been a really common form of attempting to defeat that system—namely, because drones typically rely on some sort of communication signal between the operator and the actual drone platform itself. So the idea is if you sever that communication link, then the drone may not necessarily be able to operate at all.

    And that problem scales extensively when we talk about drone swarms because, necessarily, you have that same problem. You have an operator who has to send links and information to that swarm. But it becomes more complicated because to get at that point, the key issue of swarming is that communication and coordination between the different drones, which means you have another opportunity to jam, and, particularly, that inner-swarm communication. Because if you break down that communication, the notion of a swarm stops being meaningful.

    Now one of the open questions, though, is how exactly that works in practice. Based on the way that the algorithms work from having, say, a dedicated leader—that sort of helping organize things to massively decentralized approaches—to having different communication pathways through a complex network. So how exactly jamming might work in practice may vary a lot.

    And of course, if we’re talking about multidomain swarms where you start getting undersea drones interacting with surface vehicles, that becomes more complicated. But, nonetheless, the notion of jamming signals is equally appropriate there.

    (Host)

    What about cyber? What do we need to know?

    (Kallenborn)

    There is sort of a silly depiction, but I think it has some seriousness to it, of drones as sort of flying computers. And in a sense, that’s what they are. They’re kind of onboard systems that manage all aspects of the drone’s flight from specific flight controllers that manage the propellers and the various movement and the habitation of that system.

    And when we start talking about drone swarms, that’s even more the case because you now have algorithms and systems to manage that broader communication, that coordination, the broader behavior of that swarm, so that at a very basic level, you may have—say, for example, task allocation algorithms to say, like, “OK, these drones are going over here, these drones are going over here, these drones are going to do this, those drones are going to do that.” And that’s a very cyber-based system, which of course means that it also creates vulnerabilities in the cyberspace for those systems.

    So what happens if you have cyberattacks aimed at the systems that control the flight controllers? What happens if you attempt to manipulate those? You could get all sorts of problems, from the drones not operating correctly to crashing into one another, and you can imagine other types of cyber activities.

    So, for example, if you’re using artificial intelligence-based machine vision in the swarm to help navigate the world around it, that could potentially be manipulated through cyber means by, for example, it manipulating the training data that goes into creating those machine vision systems through what are called, “(artificial intelligence or) AI poisoning attacks.” Conversely, you can also imagine using cyber to, say, again, break that link between the operator and the actual system itself. Except, rather than using . . . jamming the actual signal, you are manipulating the system that is actually responding and taking in those orders. And then, at an extreme level, you could imagine cyber being used to actively take control of and manipulate the swarm, which is perhaps the scariest, where your friendly swarm is now turned against you and destroying your own military forces, which could be quite bad.

    (Host)

    What about space warfare and the Global Navigation Satellite System? How do they relate to drone swarms?

    (Kallenborn)

    Yeah, so, there’s a couple dimensions to it. Firstly, there’s obviously the communication element. At the moment, most of the drone swarms are very sort of tactical, very short-range type operations. But as we start scaling, you could potentially look and need satellite-based communication to relay some of those signals. Likewise, we know that, at least at the moment, many of these drone swarms are heavily dependent on global position navigation, a positioning system for navigation timing. Basically, they need to understand where are they potentially located in space?

    Now that’s one place where technology is developing, and there has been work on using a more autonomous, image-based recognition to help the swarm actually navigate. But, at the moment, there’s a close dependence on (the Global Positioning System or) GPS. But how exactly that works is again going to be very dependent on the nature of the s...

    13 min

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Decisive Point, the Parameters podcast companion series, furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of the government and academia who are concerned with national security affairs.

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