Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction sought by Revenue Management Solutions, LLC (RMS) against Commerce Bank. The court held that RMS failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of demonstrating irreparable harm, which alone is sufficient grounds to deny such equitable relief. In applying the four-factor test for preliminary injunctions established in *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.* and *Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney*, the court reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court concluded that RMS’s alleged harms were compensable through money damages or too speculative to warrant equitable intervention. Specifically, the court found that potential financial losses, including price erosion and loss of market share, were not irreparable because they were calculable based on the contract’s price schedule and could be regained through competition. Furthermore, claims regarding reputational harm and customer confusion were deemed speculative due to the white-label nature of the original agreement and a lack of corroboration. Although RMS argued that the misappropriation of trade secrets inherently constituted irreparable harm, the court noted that RMS framed its argument primarily in terms of lost profits rather than the loss of secrecy itself; consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by treating the claim as one for compensable damages. The court also rejected RMS’s arguments that a contractual Injunctive Relief Clause mandated the grant of an injunction or that a limitation-of-liability clause created irreparable harm, citing precedent that federal courts cannot be contractually bound to grant equitable relief and that agreed-upon damage limits do not transform economic loss into irreparable injury. As a result of this decision, the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction remains in effect, allowing Commerce Bank to continue its development and use of RemitConnect 2.0 without an immediate court order restricting its operations pending the outcome of the underlying litigation.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming the Immigration Judge’s finding of removability and denial of the petitioner’s applications for withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, cancellation of removal, and adjustment of status. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the BIA’s legal conclusions regarding the applicable federal statutes. Regarding the claim for cancellation of removal, the court held that the petitioner’s conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.160(1)(a), (3)(c) constitutes “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Relying on the precedent set in *Diaz-Boyzo v. Blanche*, the court determined that the statute is divisible and that the petitioner’s specific conviction renders him ineligible for relief, rejecting arguments based on *State v. Yong* and *State v. Glaspey* as they did not establish divisibility or alter the statutory requirements regarding harm to children. Additionally, the court ruled that any defect in the Notice to Appear regarding the lack of hearing date-and-time information was not a jurisdictional defect but rather a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) that was cured by subsequent notice provided to the petitioner. As a result of this decision, the petition is denied and the BIA’s order affirming the petitioner’s removability and denying his requested forms of relief remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s factual findings regarding Trayvon Murphy’s involvement in a murder, his drug quantity calculations, and the denial of a mitigating role adjustment, but reversed the application of a sentencing cross-reference to first-degree murder and remanded the case for resentencing. The court held that under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1), a cross-reference to a homicide offense applies only if the specific firearm used in the other offense is “cited in the offense of conviction,” meaning it must be identified in the indictment or information charged against the defendant, not merely in relevant conduct or uncharged facts. Because Murphy’s superseding indictment did not specifically cite the .223 caliber rifle used in the murder of Jermaine Gooden, the cross-reference was inapplicable despite evidence that Murphy provided the weapon. The court further ruled that the district court correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a heightened burden of proof for the sentencing enhancement and properly credited the testimony of co-defendant Alexander regarding Murphy’s role in the murder and drug trafficking, as the defendant failed to present rebuttal evidence showing those findings were materially untrue. Consequently, the sentence based on the first-degree murder cross-reference is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing without that enhancement.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

Docket: 7:24-cr-00154-AMM-GMB-1

The eleventh-circuit vacated Jamarus Hoskins’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, reversing the district court’s application of a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4) for receiving stolen property while affirming the four-level leadership-role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). The court held that the receipt-of-stolen-property enhancement was improper because Hoskins acted as an “operative actor” and “thief” within the car theft ring rather than a “fence” who merely sells goods stolen by others. Citing *United States v. Bradley*, the court explained that § 2B1.1(b)(4) applies only to defendants who sell items stolen by others, not to those who direct the thefts themselves. The record showed Hoskins directed co-conspirators on which vehicles to steal, how to steal them, and managed the sales, establishing his role as a thief rather than a receiver of stolen property. Conversely, the court affirmed the leadership-role enhancement, finding no clear error in the district court’s determination that Hoskins was an organizer or leader of criminal activity involving five or more participants. The court relied on evidence that Hoskins exercised decision-making authority, recruited accomplices, controlled the scope of the illegal activity, and managed transactions by instructing runners and paying them, which exceeded mere orchestration of specific transactions. The practical consequence is that Hoskins’s sentence will be recalculated in the district court without the two-level increase for receiving stolen property, while the four-level leadership enhancement remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

Docket: 8:24-cv-00227-SVW

The ninth-circuit dismissed the cross-appeals filed by Klein, Kimura London and White, LLP, and Todd Becker regarding the district court’s order remanding claims to state court, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), an order remanding a case to state court is not reviewable on appeal when based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a procedural defect in removal. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment regarding the bankruptcy court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over “core” claims and ancillary claims, finding that the bankruptcy court properly exercised jurisdiction because the claims arose exclusively from the bankruptcy context and were covered by a stipulation retaining jurisdiction to effectuate its decree. Additionally, the court affirmed the imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 against the appellants, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming their motion for rehearing frivolous given the clarity of the remand order. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to carry out the remand order.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

Docket: 8:24-cv-00227-SVW

The Ninth Circuit dismissed in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects, and remanded the case with instructions to carry out the remand order. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the cross-appellants’ appeal regarding the district court’s order remanding claims to state court because 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) prohibits appellate review of any order remanding a case to state court, regardless of whether the remand was based on a procedural defect or a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Regarding the remaining issues, the court affirmed that the bankruptcy court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over the “core” claims against certain defendants because those claims arose exclusively in the context of the bankruptcy case, and it further held that the bankruptcy court validly exercised ancillary jurisdiction to resolve non-core claims based on a stipulation explicitly retaining jurisdiction. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the appellants’ motion for clarification frivolous given the clarity of the remand order and the absence of any nonfrivolous argument for changing existing law.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

Docket: 2:24-cr-00482-

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Binisio Nicolas Pereda’s motion to suppress evidence found in a trailer and a pickup truck, holding that the warrantless searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment’s parolee exception. The panel applied the totality-of-the-circumstances standard for probable cause to determine whether officers had sufficient grounds to believe Pereda resided in or controlled the searched property pursuant to his state early-release supervision conditions. Regarding the trailer, the court concluded that officers possessed probable cause to believe it was Pereda’s residence based on GPS data showing his consistent overnight presence at the location for months, corroborating testimony from a third party identifying him as being inside, and physical evidence such as an extension cord connecting the trailer to the main house. The court further held that even if the trailer were not considered a residence, officers had probable cause to believe it was “property under [Pereda’s] control” because it functioned as a mobile recreational vehicle to which Pereda demonstrated a strong nexus through his prolonged occupancy. Regarding the pickup truck, the court found probable cause existed based on Detective Amjadi’s prior observations of Pereda driving a white Ford F-150 registered to him and the truck’s immediate proximity to the trailer from which Pereda had just exited. The panel rejected the district court’s “divide-and-conquer” analysis and its reliance on specific factors from *United States v. Howard* as a mandatory checklist, emphasizing instead that probable cause is a fluid concept requiring only a fair probability of criminal activity or residence. The practical consequence of this ruling is that the suppression order is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the admission of the seized evidence, including the drugs, ammunition, and paraphernalia found during the searches.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The federal-circuit dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal as required by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and governing statutes. The court applied the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which mandates that a notice of appeal must designate the specific judgment being appealed, along with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2522 and 2107(b), which require the notice to be received by the Court of Federal Claims within 60 days of the entry of the appealed judgment. The court found that the appellant’s December 2025 filing was untimely and rejected his submitted email correspondence as insufficient notice because they failed to identify a specific case number or the judgment being appealed. As a result, the appeal is dismissed, the appellee’s motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss is accepted, all other pending motions are denied, and each side shall bear its own costs.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

Docket: 4:25-cr-00001-AW-MAF-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed Jerelle Jones’s sentence of 114 months of imprisonment for bank fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and forgery. The court held that any procedural error regarding the district court’s calculation of the loss amount or failure to apply a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility was harmless because the district court explicitly stated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the guideline range. Applying the standard of review established in *United States v. Grushko* and *United States v. Keene*, the court assumed an error existed, reduced the guideline range as argued by Jones, and determined the sentence remained substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court found the sentence was sufficient to reflect the seriousness of the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public, noting it was well below the statutory maximum. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed and no remand is required.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of T.J. Aguilar for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) by receiving a firearm while under felony indictment. The court granted the Government’s motion for summary affirmance, rejecting Aguilar’s constitutional challenges to the statute as foreclosed by controlling precedent: the Second Amendment argument was barred by *United States v. Quiroz*, the Commerce Clause challenge failed under plain error review pursuant to *United States v. Jones* and *United States v. Alcantar*, and the sentencing guideline objection regarding the definition of a “large capacity magazine” was precluded by *United States v. Martin*. The court also denied Aguilar’s motion for an extension of time as moot. Consequently, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas is affirmed, leaving the conviction and sentence in full force.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.