Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-15

Docket: 3:22-cv-01158-

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Relator, LLC’s qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and remanded the case for further proceedings. The panel held that the FCA’s public disclosure bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), did not bar the claim because the information publicly disclosed on PandemicOversight.gov was not “substantially the same” as Relator’s allegations regarding CalCon Mutual Mortgage, LLC’s eligibility for Paycheck Protection Program funds. The court reasoned that while the website disclosed CalCon’s NAICS code indicating it was a mortgage lender, this disclosure did not conclusively establish ineligibility because federal regulations contained exceptions for certain mortgage servicing companies; therefore, the relator’s specific allegations addressing why those exceptions did not apply were not publicly disclosed. Additionally, the panel concluded that CalCon’s own website did not qualify as “news media” under the statute, as it primarily served a business purpose rather than disseminating news about recent events to the general public. Regarding the district court’s finding that Relator failed to plausibly allege false statements regarding employee headcount, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the current pleading was speculative and based on unreasonable inferences. However, the panel determined that the district court abused its discretion by denying Relator leave to amend the complaint. The court noted that a single voluntary amendment does not automatically render further amendment futile, and the district court should have provided an opportunity for Relator to cure the pleading deficiencies before dismissing the claim with prejudice. The practical consequence of this decision is that the case returns to the Southern District of California for further proceedings. The district court must address whether Relator can amend its complaint to provide factual support for the employee headcount theory and determine if the remaining theories of misrepresentation are subject to the public disclosure bar, as the panel did not resolve those specific issues on appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-15

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction and 126-month sentence for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court held that the district court did not commit plain error in applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense, nor in imposing a consecutive sentence to any potential state sentence for parole violations. Regarding the enhancement, the court applied the plain-error standard because Rincones failed to object to the specific factual finding that he pointed the gun at his victim rather than just the laser sight. The court found no error because the district court’s finding was plausible on the record, supported by Rincones’s own admission during a jail call where he did not deny aiming the gun and stated, “I didn’t think.” Additionally, the recovery of the firearm with an attached laser attachment supported the conclusion that the entire weapon was aimed at the victim. The court further ruled that the district court’s failure to explicitly cite all evidence supporting this finding did not constitute error, as sentencing courts are not required to provide a mathematical proof of facts if the basis is generally clear. Regarding the consecutive sentence, the court applied plain-error review after Rincones failed to object to the adequacy of the district court’s reasoning at sentencing. The court determined the district court satisfied its obligations under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) by reviewing a presentence report that cited relevant policy statements and providing a lengthy explanation of the § 3553(a) factors, including the seriousness of the offense and Rincones’s extensive criminal history. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed, and the defendant remains subject to the imposed federal sentence running consecutively to any state sentence for parole violations.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-15

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on a firearm seized during a September 2023 traffic stop, even though the defendant’s conviction was for methamphetamine possession from a November 2023 stop. The court applied the standard of review for clear error to the district court’s relevant-conduct findings under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), which governs whether uncharged acts are part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction. The court held that the enhancement was properly applied because the government met its burden to prove the firearm was possessed and it was not clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to drug trafficking activities. The court reasoned that the September 2023 stop involved marijuana and a firearm found in the same vehicle, and Nordby had stipulated to facts establishing this as relevant conduct for the base offense level calculation. Furthermore, the court determined that the two traffic stops were sufficiently connected by their temporal proximity (less than two months apart), spatial relationship (occurring along the same route between Oklahoma and Missouri), and common purpose (transporting drugs). The court noted that under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, a defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband involved in drug trafficking, regardless of whether the specific drug type matches the conviction charge. As a result of this affirmation, the district court’s judgment imposing a 144-month prison sentence remains in effect, and no further relief or resentencing proceedings are ordered based on this appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-15

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s reduction of attorney’s fees awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in a First Amendment civil rights action and remanded the case for recalculation. The court held that while the district court did not abuse its discretion by adjusting hourly rates based on local market conditions, it erred by reducing the fee award by 50 percent due to alleged duplication of legal work and limited success without providing sufficient explanation. Regarding the standard of review, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard to the fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), requiring the district court to calculate a “lodestar figure” (reasonable hours times reasonable rate) before adjusting for the degree of success under *Hensley v. Eckerhart*. The court found the reduction in hourly rates permissible because the district court reasonably considered attorney experience and analogous cases. However, the court ruled that the 50 percent reduction for duplication was improper because the district court failed to identify specific duplicative efforts or explain why consolidation of two distinct cases justified reducing fees for separate legal teams. Furthermore, the court determined that labeling the plaintiffs’ victory as “technical or de minimis” was erroneous; obtaining a permanent injunction striking down an ordinance on its face constitutes significant success under *Hensley* and *McQueary v. Conway*, regardless of whether the plaintiffs prevailed on all four constitutional grounds raised. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of specific litigation costs (transcript, process server, and PACER fees) under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, noting these expenses were either not reasonably necessary, did not meet statutory requirements for third-party payments, or fell outside recoverable categories. The practical consequence is that the case returns to the district court to recalculate the attorney’s fee award without the unjustified 50 percent reduction and to address the lack of explanation regarding legal duplication, while the denial of the specific costs remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-15

The fifth-circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that the petitioner failed to establish a nexus between the harm he suffered and his political opinion or activity as a whistleblower and anti-corruption activist, a finding supported by the record and dispositive of his asylum and withholding claims. Additionally, the court found that substantial evidence supported the agency’s factual findings regarding the denial of CAT protection, noting that the petitioner did not demonstrate reversible error despite citing country conditions evidence and credible testimony regarding police persecution. As a result, the petition is denied, leaving the BIA’s order affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-15

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Aaron Dees’s civil rights lawsuit against Texas state agencies and officials. The court held that while the State of Texas waived sovereign immunity by removing the case to federal court, Dees failed to state a claim for relief because his complaint relied almost exclusively on conclusory allegations devoid of factual support. Specifically, the court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), noting that plaintiffs cannot rest on naked assertions or legal conclusions without further factual enhancement; Dees’s claims of fraud and retaliation lacked the necessary factual detail to proceed. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of leave to amend, applying an abuse of discretion standard and concluding that amendment would be futile because the proposed Third Amended Complaint suffered from the same defects as the original filings. As a result, the dismissal stands and the case is closed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-15

The eighth-circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence after he pleaded guilty to possessing and distributing child pornography. The court held that the district court did not engage in impermissible double counting when it applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) for knowingly engaging in the distribution of child pornography. Because Wameling failed to object to this calculation in the district court, the appellate court reviewed the claim for plain error, requiring him to show an error that was plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. The court reasoned that double counting is permissible when the Sentencing Commission intends each guideline section to further an independent purpose. Specifically, the base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(2) applies broadly to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), which criminalizes receiving, distributing, and reproducing child pornography; therefore, the specific conduct of distribution was not factored into the base level but was addressed solely by the subsequent enhancement. As a result, the judgment of the district court imposing a 300-month sentence on the distribution count and a concurrent 240-month sentence on the possession count remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

Docket: 5:23-CR-00114-PRW-1)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the 77-month prison sentence imposed on Glen Delane Arnett, Jr. for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court reviewed the district court’s application of a four-point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for plain error, as Arnett failed to preserve these arguments below. The court applied the four-prong plain-error standard: (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. First, the court agreed that the district court committed error by using a “factual approach” rather than the “categorical approach” to determine if Arnett’s prior state drug convictions qualified as a “drug, narcotic, or chemical offense” under 21 U.S.C. § 844(c). The court held that the statutory term “proscribes” mandates the categorical approach, which looks only at the elements of the prior statute rather than the underlying facts. However, the court found this error was not “plain” because two unpublished Tenth Circuit decisions (*United States v. Shaw* and *United States v. Simmons*) previously held that the categorical approach does not apply to § 844, rendering the legal landscape unsettled at the time of sentencing. Regarding Arnett’s alternative argument that the district court applied the wrong legal standard for constructive possession (failing to require proof of intent to exercise control), the court assumed without deciding that such an error occurred and was plain under *Henderson v. United States*. Nevertheless, the court held that Arnett failed to satisfy the third prong of plain-error review because he could not show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. The court concluded that the evidence—Arnett being the sole occupant of the vehicle, the marijuana’s open and obvious presence, its proximity to him and the firearm, and his admission to officers that marijuana was in the car—was sufficient to support a finding of intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs under the correct legal standard. Consequently, Arnett could not demonstrate that the alleged error affected his substantial rights or resulted in a lesser sentence.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

Docket: 4:24-CV-00421-JDR-CDL)

The Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismissed the matter, ruling that reasonable jurists could not debate whether the district court correctly determined that Isaiah Hasan Gilbert’s federal habeas corpus petition was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court applied the standard from *Slack v. McDaniel*, requiring a showing that reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of the procedural ruling or the outcome of the constitutional claim. Regarding timeliness, the court held that Gilbert’s petition filed in September 2024 was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as his conviction became final in April 2013. The court rejected Gilbert’s argument that a due process violation rendered his judgment “void” and thus exempt from the limitations period, noting he provided no authority for such a proposition. Furthermore, the court found that Gilbert failed to satisfy the “actual innocence” gateway required to excuse the untimeliness. Citing *Fontenot v. Crow*, the court determined that the six affidavits presented did not constitute new, reliable evidence sufficient to show that no reasonable jury would have convicted him. The court noted the affidavits were recantations from witnesses who testified against Gilbert at trial, were executed over ten years after the crime, contradicted each other, and conflicted with existing trial evidence including Gilbert’s own police interview and jail calls. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the petition could be disposed of on the existing record. The practical consequence is that Gilbert is barred from appealing the district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition to the Tenth Circuit or any other federal court on these grounds, and his request for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Fourth Circuit granted Dwayne Burey’s petition for review, reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision, and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The court held that the immigration court’s refusal to accept Burey’s timely-filed motion to reopen under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), despite repeated thwarted attempts to file electronically and in person, violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The court applied the standard for procedural due process violations, requiring a showing that a defect rendered proceedings “fundamentally unfair” and prejudiced the outcome. The court determined that Burey possessed a cognizable liberty interest in the statutory “right to file” a motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A). It found the proceedings fundamentally unfair because an immigration court cannot prevent a petitioner from filing a motion and then penalize him for failing to do so, noting that unrefuted evidence showed the electronic system rejected the filing and a clerk refused the paper copy on the statutory deadline. Regarding prejudice, the court rejected the BIA’s reasoning that Burey failed to show prejudice because his counsel did not return the next day or had not yet filed a Form I-360 with USCIS; the court clarified that the statute only requires submitting a copy of the self-petition “that has been or will be filed,” and the deadline for filing was determined by the one-year VAWA window rather than the date counsel returned to the court. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including a re-evaluation of whether the motion was timely under the correct legal standard regarding when the removal order became final. The court also noted that while Burey has been removed from the United States, the case is not moot because a favorable decision could provide a lawful pathway for his return.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.