Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Fourth Circuit granted Dwayne Burey’s petition for review, reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision, and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The court held that the immigration court’s refusal to accept Burey’s timely-filed motion to reopen under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), despite repeated thwarted attempts to file electronically and in person, violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The court applied the standard for procedural due process violations, requiring a showing that a defect rendered proceedings “fundamentally unfair” and prejudiced the outcome. The court determined that Burey possessed a cognizable liberty interest in the statutory “right to file” a motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A). It found the proceedings fundamentally unfair because an immigration court cannot prevent a petitioner from filing a motion and then penalize him for failing to do so, noting that unrefuted evidence showed the electronic system rejected the filing and a clerk refused the paper copy on the statutory deadline. Regarding prejudice, the court rejected the BIA’s reasoning that Burey failed to show prejudice because his counsel did not return the next day or had not yet filed a Form I-360 with USCIS; the court clarified that the statute only requires submitting a copy of the self-petition “that has been or will be filed,” and the deadline for filing was determined by the one-year VAWA window rather than the date counsel returned to the court. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including a re-evaluation of whether the motion was timely under the correct legal standard regarding when the removal order became final. The court also noted that while Burey has been removed from the United States, the case is not moot because a favorable decision could provide a lawful pathway for his return.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s confirmation of a foreign arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York Convention because the petition was filed more than three years after the award was made, violating the mandatory statute of limitations in 9 U.S.C. § 207. The court held that while the word “may” in the statute grants parties discretion to seek confirmation, the phrase “within three years” imposes a mandatory time limit on that right, rendering the petition untimely. The court distinguished its prior precedent regarding domestic arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 9, noting that the specific statutory scheme for international awards under Chapter 2 of the FAA requires strict adherence to the three-year deadline. However, the court affirmed the district court’s determination that the Dutch Court of Rotterdam’s order confirming the arbitration award constitutes a foreign-country judgment recognizable under the North Carolina Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1C-1850 et seq.). The court rejected the respondents’ arguments that the Act excludes judgments confirming awards or requires the judgment to explicitly restate the monetary amounts, concluding that the Dutch order was final, conclusive, and enforceable under North Carolina law. Consequently, the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the petitioners’ motion to enforce the Dutch judgment under state law.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Dawn Lusk’s complaint against United States Postal Service employees Chris Merchant and April Peppers, as well as the federal government. The court held that Lusk’s claims for negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness arising from an assault by employee Peppers are generally barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) intentional tort exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), which precludes liability for claims “arising out of” assault or battery. However, the court reversed the dismissal regarding a narrow segment of Lusk’s claim against Postmaster Merchant based on the Supreme Court’s decision in *Sheridan v. United States*. The court applied the standard that government liability for negligence resulting from an assault is permissible only where the duty breached is independent of the tortfeasor’s employment status. Under South Carolina law, the court found that Lusk sufficiently alleged that Merchant negligently created the risk of harm by unlocking double-locked doors to allow a known violent employee to confront Lusk, thereby establishing an independent duty of care separate from Peppers’ employment status. The court affirmed the dismissal of Lusk’s remaining claims: her FTCA claim for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention was barred by the discretionary function exception; her *Bivens* claim for Fourth Amendment violations was dismissed because the Supreme Court has refused to extend *Bivens* remedies to new contexts involving excessive force by federal officers; and her Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) claim was dismissed because she failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court noted that under the Westfall Act, the certification that the employees were acting within the scope of their employment renders the FTCA the exclusive remedy for common-law torts, effectively barring Lusk from suing the employees individually or in state court for the assault, leaving her with only the narrow negligence claim against Merchant to pursue.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Kirsten Ball’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute and distribution of oxycodone, rejecting her argument that jury instructions failed to account for the Supreme Court’s decision in *Ruan v. United States*. The court held that while *Ruan* requires the government to prove a physician subjectively knew their conduct was unauthorized, the scope of what constitutes “unauthorized” prescribing remains an objective standard based on the usual course of professional medical practice, not the defendant’s personal or idiosyncratic habits. The court applied the standard of review de novo for jury instructions and interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) alongside 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). The opinion clarified that *Ruan* mandates a two-part inquiry: an objective determination of whether the prescriptions fell outside the bounds of professional practice, and a subjective determination that the defendant knew they were acting outside those bounds. The court found that although the district court deleted the possessive pronoun “her” from the phrase “course of her professional practice,” the instructions as a whole accurately stated the law. The charge explicitly required the government to prove Ball knew she was acting without authorization, defined good faith as subjective belief in proper medical practice, and instructed the jury that negligence or mistake was insufficient for criminal conviction. Consequently, the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia is affirmed, and Ball’s convictions stand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

Docket: 1:26-cv-20464-DSL

The eleventh-circuit dismissed the appeal sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction because the district court’s May 27, 2026 order directing the plaintiff to respond to motions to dismiss was not a final decision or an otherwise appealable interlocutory order. The court held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the order did not end the litigation on the merits as the complaint remained pending in the district court, and it did not qualify for the collateral order doctrine because the ruling was effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and all pending motions are denied as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

Docket: 6:19-CV-00379-EFM)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff B.J. Hedgecock, dismissing the plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding inadequate jail staffing and failure to supervise. The court held that while the underlying constitutional violations by individual jailers were established, the plaintiffs failed to prove the requisite element of “deliberate indifference” necessary for municipal liability. Under the standard set forth in *Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown*, a municipality maintaining a facially lawful policy is liable only if it acted with actual or constructive notice that its action was substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation. The court determined that such notice is typically established by a pattern of similar constitutional violations. Because the plaintiffs could not introduce evidence of a prior pattern of nonconsensual sexual abuse at the jail—distinguishing between consensual encounters, which do not constitute constitutional violations under Tenth Circuit precedent, and nonconsensual ones—the Sheriff’s Office was found not to have been deliberately indifferent in maintaining its staffing and supervision policies. Consequently, the plaintiffs’ claims against the municipality fail as a matter of law, and the judgment for the Sheriff stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

Docket: 4:23-CV-00232-GKF-JFJ)

The Tenth Circuit denied Christopher Barnett’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, thereby preventing him from appealing the dismissal of his civil rights suit against prison officials without paying the filing fee. The court applied the three-strikes rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which bars prisoners with at least three prior dismissals for frivolousness or failure to state a claim from proceeding in forma pauperis unless they demonstrate an imminent danger of serious physical injury. While Barnett did not contest his three prior dismissals, the court held that he failed to satisfy the required nexus between his alleged imminent danger and the claims in his complaint. Adopting the two-part test from the Second Circuit regarding standing, the court required a showing that the alleged injury is traceable to the defendant’s conduct and that a favorable judicial outcome would redress that injury. The court determined that the relief requested in Barnett’s complaint—addressing retaliation for complaining about a mail clerk and limited court access—would not redress his alleged danger of beatings and relocation to a more dangerous prison, particularly since he had been transferred to a different facility during litigation where the current defendants lacked control over his conditions. Consequently, the motion is denied; if Barnett does not pay the appellate filing fee within 30 days, the appeal may be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The fifth-circuit granted the appointed attorney’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal after reviewing the Anders brief and the record. The court applied the standard established in *Anders v. California* and *United States v. Flores*, concurring with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues for appellate review. As a result, the attorney is excused from further responsibilities, and the case is dismissed without addressing the merits of the criminal conviction.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Fifth Circuit denied the prisoner-appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his appeal as frivolous. The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate an arguable merit to his claims, specifically rejecting his arguments regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the denial of his Rule 59(e) motion. Regarding the PLRA, the court found that while the appellant filed a timely grievance regarding property confiscation, he failed to exhaust claims related to excessive force because his grievance on those specific events was untimely. Additionally, the court noted that the district court’s denial of the post-judgment motion was based on the rehashing of arguments rather than the presentation of new evidence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without addressing the merits of the underlying constitutional claims regarding excessive force and retaliation, and the dismissal was recorded as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), warning the appellant that three strikes will bar future in forma pauperis filings while incarcerated unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

Docket: 2:24-CV-02046-KHV-ADM)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of KetoNatural Pet Foods’ Lanham Act false advertising claim against Hill’s Pet Nutrition, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that KetoNatural plausibly alleged that specific statements made by Hill’s on its own website and through its veterinary education materials constituted actionable commercial speech that was literally false under the Lanham Act. Conversely, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims regarding statements made by co-conspirator veterinarians and non-profit organizations, ruling that these entities’ public media appearances, academic articles, blog posts, and social media content did not constitute commercial speech because they lacked the necessary economic motivation to promote Hill’s products and were too attenuated from Hill’s brand to be considered advertisements. The court applied the four-part test for “commercial advertising or promotion” established in *Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen*, requiring that the representation be (1) commercial speech, (2) made by a defendant in commercial competition with the plaintiff, (3) for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy the defendant’s goods, and (4) disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public. Applying *Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.*, the court analyzed whether Hill’s statements were advertisements referencing specific products made with economic motivation, concluding that Hill’s disparagement of “boutique, exotic, or grain-free” (BEG) pet food functioned as a tacit promotion of its own traditional grain-containing food due to its market dominance and financial incentive. Regarding falsity, the court applied the “establishment claim doctrine,” finding that KetoNatural plausibly alleged Hill’s statements were literally false because they relied on scientific data that did not actually establish the asserted correlation between BEG diets and canine heart disease. The court further determined that academic articles and non-commercial speech by third parties are protected under the First Amendment and do not qualify as commercial speech under the Lanham Act. On remand, the district court is directed to determine whether Rule 9(b) or Rule 12(b)(6) applies to the Lanham Act claims and to assess whether KetoNatural has sufficiently pleaded its claim under the appropriate standard. Additionally, the case will be remanded to address the derivative Kansas civil conspiracy claim, which depends on the viability of the underlying Lanham Act violation, including whether a Lanham Act violation can serve as the predicate wrong for a state law conspiracy claim and whether the remaining elements of that claim are adequately alleged.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.