Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment imposing a within-Guidelines sentence for failing to update sex-offender registration, which was ordered to run consecutively to a prior supervised release revocation sentence. The court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, noting that a within-Guidelines-range sentence is presumed reasonable. It found the district court properly considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) without overlooking relevant factors, giving weight to improper ones, or committing clear errors of judgment. Additionally, after conducting an independent review of the record under *Penson v. Ohio*, the court determined there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal and granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to *Anders v. California*.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that a district court’s mistaken advisement regarding the mandatory minimum sentence for a firearm count during a Rule 11 plea hearing did not warrant reversal under the plain error standard. The court applied the four-prong test from *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), concluding that while the district court committed an error by stating the statutory minimum was seven years instead of twenty-five, the defendant failed to demonstrate that this error affected his substantial rights. The record showed that the defendant explicitly confirmed he understood the twenty-five-year minimum during the plea hearing, signed a written plea agreement acknowledging the 25-year term, and raised no objections in the presentence report or at the sentencing hearing, even when the judge specifically asked for clarification regarding the discrepancy between the advisement and the actual statutory requirement. Consequently, the court denied the defendant’s motion to amend his brief with a new declaration as improper and futile, finding it contradicted the evidentiary record. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The dc-circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary stay of the Huffman Memorandum and an ICE email that directed immigration officers to consider subjecting parolees to expedited removal. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to establish standing, specifically failing to demonstrate redressability. The legal basis for this decision is that while the challenged actions (the memorandum and email) might have contributed to increased rates of expedited removal, the requested relief would not likely redress the alleged injury because the plaintiffs did not seek a stay of 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. This regulation independently authorizes the government to subject paroled aliens to expedited removal under the “arriving in” authority (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). Since the government retains the legal authority to continue subjecting parolees to expedited removal via this unstayed regulation, and has already done so following the district court’s stay of the memorandum and email, the plaintiffs could not show that a favorable decision would likely leave their members less liable to expedited removal. Consequently, the practical consequence is that the district court’s stay order is nullified, and the government may proceed with its enforcement actions without the interim injunction.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The D.C. Circuit denied the consolidated petitions for review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders approving a proposal by Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) to prospectively reclassify four transmission facilities in the Sunflower Zone from “Byway” status to “Highway” status, thereby shifting their remaining costs from local allocation to regional allocation. The court applied the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review, noting that its scrutiny of FERC’s technical ratemaking judgments is particularly deferential. Under this standard, the court examined whether FERC examined relevant data and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, rather than substituting its own judgment or determining if the decision was the “best” possible one. The court held that FERC’s reliance on the cost-causation principle—which requires rates to be just and reasonable and costs to be roughly commensurate with benefits—was supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected four specific challenges raised by petitioners: 1. **RCAR Analysis:** The court found it reasonable for FERC to approve facility-specific reallocation despite Regional Cost Allocation Review (RCAR) data showing the Sunflower Zone was a net beneficiary under the existing system. FERC correctly explained that RCAR is a “big picture” zonal analysis, whereas the proposal addressed specific facility imbalances; a favorable zone-wide ratio does not preclude correcting costs for individual facilities that are functioning as regional assets. 2. **Zone-by-Zone Benefit Analysis:** The court held that FERC was not required to conduct a granular, zone-by-zone assessment of benefits for all other SPP zones before reallocating costs regionally. The Highway/Byway framework itself allocates costs in broad strokes based on voltage and regional function, not with “exacting precision” or by tracing costs to specific entities. 3. **Order No. 1000 Compliance:** The court determined that FERC did not violate Order No. 1000’s ex ante cost-allocation requirement. While Order No. 1000 requires advance establishment of allocation methods, it does not bar Section 205 filings proposing rate changes when circumstances change. FERC adequately explained that the facilities’ usage had meaningfully changed due to increased wind generation, justifying the prospective adjustment without establishing a new standard process for future cases. 4. **Reliance on Technical Analyses:** The court found FERC’s reliance on SPP’s capacity, flow, and benefit analyses constituted substantial evidence. The court rejected petitioners’ objections regarding the methodology, noting that the inability to trace individual electrons does not invalidate modeling used to estimate generation sources, and that petitioners offered no competing data to undermine FERC’s findings. As a result of the denial, FERC’s orders approving SPP’s proposal stand, allowing the four facilities to be treated as Highway facilities for cost allocation purposes going forward, with costs borne regionally rather than locally.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The D.C. Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Friends of Animals, holding that Section 1533(e) of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) does not authorize the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to treat a species as endangered or threatened based on similarity of appearance if that species is already listed under the ESA. The Court applied de novo review to the statutory interpretation, concluding that the plain text of 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e) limits the Service’s authority to “unlisted” species. The opinion emphasized that the phrase “even though it is not listed pursuant to this section” functions as a necessary qualifier to the term “any species,” and the subsequent conditions in subsections (A) and (C), which explicitly refer to “unlisted species,” confirm Congress intended the provision to apply only to species not currently on the endangered or threatened lists. The Court rejected the argument that the word “any” grants broader authority, noting that reading the statute holistically renders the text consistent with contemporaneous regulations at 50 C.F.R. § 17.50(a) and legislative history. Furthermore, the Court held that statutory purpose cannot override clear statutory text, observing that the ESA already provides a mechanism under Section 1533(d) for the Service to extend endangered species protections to threatened species through specific regulations if deemed necessary for conservation. Consequently, the District Court’s finding that the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to conduct a similarity of appearance analysis for the Northern Distinct Population Segment of the Southern Subspecies of the scarlet macaw—which was already listed as threatened—is vacated, leaving the Service’s interpretation that it lacks authority to uplist an already listed species via this provision in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 3:24-cv-05212-SKV

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s order upholding the Administrative Law Judge’s denial of Social Security disability benefits to Stephanie Ellis. The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings regarding the claimant’s residual functional capacity and step-five determination, noting that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for its conclusions. In applying this standard, the court cited *Stiffler v. O’Malley* and *Smartt v. Kijakazi*, explaining that the review focuses on whether the ALJ’s rationale is sufficient to convince a reasonable mind rather than whether the appellate court would have reached the same conclusion. The opinion specifically validated the ALJ’s consideration of inconsistent daily activities, marijuana usage testimony, and objective medical evidence that undercut the claimant’s subjective complaints, as well as the rejection of physician opinions deemed brief, conclusory, or inadequately supported. Additionally, the court ruled that Ellis forfeited issues not raised in the district court and exercised discretion to decline addressing her law-of-the-case argument even if an exception applied. The practical consequence is that the denial of benefits stands and no further administrative review or relief is granted on these grounds.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The eighth-circuit dismissed the defendant’s appeal enforcing her plea agreement’s appeal waiver. The court applied the standard that an appeal waiver must be enforced if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it, the issue falls within the scope of the waiver, and enforcement would not result in a miscarriage of justice. While a miscarriage of justice exception exists for illegal sentences not authorized by law, the court held that a miscalculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range constitutes a procedural error that does not qualify as an illegal sentence under this exception. Because the defendant’s challenge concerned the application of USSG § 2D1.1(b)(13)(A) and the resulting sentence was below both the statutory maximum and the calculated Guidelines range, the error fell within the scope of the waiver. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed without reaching the merits of the sentencing enhancement argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The eighth-circuit held that the 90-day filing deadline in 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) for petitioning the Tax Court to redetermine a tax deficiency is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar, and is therefore subject to equitable tolling. The court applied the “clear statement” rule derived from recent Supreme Court precedent, specifically *Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r*, 596 U.S. 199 (2022), which requires Congress to clearly state that a procedural time bar limits a court’s authority to be considered jurisdictional. The court found that the statutory text of § 6213(a) fails this test because the filing deadline is directed at the taxpayer (“the taxpayer may file”), while the explicit limitation on the Tax Court’s jurisdiction appears later in the statute and applies only to specific actions like enjoining proceedings or ordering refunds, not to the court’s general authority to hear a petition. Consequently, the court rejected the Commissioner’s arguments that interpreting the deadline as nonjurisdictional would create harsh consequences under 26 U.S.C. § 7459(d) or that historical context implied a jurisdictional grant, noting that such interpretations do not satisfy the clear statement requirement. Because the deadline is nonjurisdictional, the court further held that it is presumptively subject to equitable tolling. The court found no affirmative indication in the text of § 6213(a) rebutting this presumption, distinguishing the statute from highly technical provisions like those in *United States v. Brockamp* that explicitly limit exceptions. As a result, the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s dismissal of the Maniktalas’ petition for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the Tax Court to determine in the first instance whether the taxpayers have met their burden to warrant equitable tolling based on the specific facts of their delay.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of Lloyd Elk on four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor, one count of abusive sexual contact with a minor, and one count of witness tampering. The court held that the district court correctly denied Elk’s motion for acquittal regarding the witness tampering charge because the government met its burden under *Fowler v. United States* by demonstrating a “reasonable likelihood” that the victim would have communicated the abuse to federal law enforcement, given that child sex crimes in Indian country fall under federal jurisdiction via the Major Crimes Act and the victim did communicate with an FBI agent. Regarding the admission of prior bad act testimony from a second victim under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, the court ruled there was no abuse of discretion, finding the evidence highly probative due to the similarity in age, familial relationship, and modus operandi, and noting that any risk of unfair prejudice was mitigated by a limiting instruction. Finally, the court determined Elk’s below-Guidelines sentence was not substantively unreasonable because the district court properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including Elk’s military service and PTSD, despite the Guidelines range suggesting life imprisonment. As a result, Elk’s conviction and 600-month concurrent prison sentence remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Union Pacific Railroad Co. on Ross Christensen’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) disparate treatment claim. The court held that Union Pacific successfully established its “direct threat” affirmative defense under 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). To prevail on this defense, an employer must prove that the employee poses a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, based on an individualized assessment that is objectively reasonable and grounded in the most current medical knowledge or best available objective evidence. The court applied the four-factor test from *EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, considering the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of occurrence, and the imminence of the harm. The court found that Union Pacific satisfied all three prongs of the direct threat analysis. First, the employer conducted an individualized assessment through multiple fitness-for-duty evaluations and a comprehensive review of Christensen’s medical records. Second, the decision was objectively reasonable because it relied on the opinions of Union Pacific’s physicians and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) guidelines regarding seizure risks after cortical strokes, even though Christensen’s personal doctors cleared him for work. The court ruled that mere disagreement among medical experts does not render an employer’s judgment objectively unreasonable. Third, the reliance on FMCSA guidelines constituted the “best available objective evidence,” as those guidelines were developed through a consensus of medical experts and characterized risks for safety-critical positions, despite their subsequent withdrawal by the FMCSA. Because no genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding any element of the direct threat defense, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the employer.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.