Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 2:19-cv-01115-ACA

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims, dismissal of class claims, and grant of summary judgment on retaliation claims against Day & Zimmermann. The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the discrimination claims as a shotgun pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) because the complaint failed to specify which defendant was responsible for which acts or omissions. Dismissal with prejudice was proper because the plaintiffs had fair notice of the defects from a prior dismissal without prejudice and failed to cure them. Regarding the class claims, the court affirmed because the plaintiffs abandoned any challenge to the shotgun pleading ground by failing to plainly and prominently raise it in their initial brief, leaving independent merits grounds for dismissal intact. On the retaliation claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), the court held summary judgment was proper because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the decisionmaker knew about their protected activity. Causation requires proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the adverse action under *Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar*, necessitating knowledge by the decisionmaker under *Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc.* Jones forfeited a new theory regarding who the decisionmaker was on appeal, and Samuel conceded the relevant supervisor lacked knowledge of his EEOC charges. The district court’s dismissal orders and summary judgment stand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The fourth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in a civil negligence action arising from a slip and fall incident at an Outback Steakhouse restaurant. The appellate court rejected Dr. Haysbert’s claim regarding the revocation of her attorney’s pro hac vice admission, holding she lacked standing to assert her counsel’s due process rights because she failed to demonstrate third-party standing requirements were met. Regarding the exclusion of expert witness Dr. Filler, the court held the district court did not abuse its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) and 26(e), applying the four-factor test from Anderson v. Foundation for Advancement of American Indians to find bad faith, prejudice, a need for deterrence, and that less drastic sanctions would be ineffective given the litigation history. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of Dr. Haysbert’s Batson challenge, concluding the district court did not clearly err in finding Outback provided race-neutral reasons for striking a Black potential juror—specifically his age, silence during voir dire, and shipyard employment—and that Dr. Haysbert failed to meet her burden of proving discriminatory intent under the three-step framework established in Batson v. Kentucky and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 4:25-CR-00265-SEH-1)

The tenth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding a forty-six-month prison sentence imposed for unlawful reentry of a removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Reviewing for plain error due to the defendant’s failure to object at sentencing, the panel held that the district court did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1) by relying on facts regarding the defendant’s drug trafficking behavior and relationships with drug trafficking organizations. The court found these factual findings were supported by the Presentence Investigation Report and the defendant’s prior convictions, meaning they were not clearly erroneous. Additionally, even assuming error, the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice affecting his substantial rights because the district court based its sentence on broader Section 3553(a) factors, including serious criminal history and habitual reentry, such that there was no reasonable probability a lesser sentence would have resulted.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 2:17-cr-00403-MHH-SGC-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the defendant’s 240-month sentence for production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The court reviewed factual findings for clear error and guideline application with due deference, holding that the district court properly applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b) because the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct. The court found credible evidence established the defendant’s intent to produce child pornography and that placing a cell phone in a bathroom to record minors constituted a substantial step toward the crime, satisfying the attempt standard under *United States v. Yost*. Additionally, multiple attempts against the same victim qualified as a pattern of activity under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5, cmt. n.4(B)(i), and prohibited sexual conduct includes attempts under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). On reasonableness grounds, the court found the sentence procedurally sound because the district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and substantively reasonable given the egregious nature of child sex crimes and the sentence being well below the statutory maximum. The conviction and sentence remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 2:19-cv-01115-ACA

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings in favor of the unions in a race-discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead disparate-treatment claims beyond instances where they were referred for work but white members were referred for leadership positions, rendering evidence outside this scope properly excluded at summary judgment under the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework and the “convincing mosaic” standard. Regarding disparate-impact claims, the court found the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the robust causality requirement by not isolating specific employment practices responsible for statistical disparities, noting that call-by-name referrals were ministerial acts by the union. The court further determined that evidence of a Confederate flag and isolated racist comments did not meet the “severe or pervasive” standard required for hostile-environment claims under *Adams v. Austal*. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of class allegations because the plaintiffs failed to challenge all independent grounds for dismissal in their brief, thereby abandoning one rationale. The district court’s orders remain effective, resulting in judgment for the defendants.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The eighth-circuit denied the debtor’s motion to dismiss the appeal and upheld the bankruptcy court’s orders allowing Kevin Dandurand to reject the stock purchase agreement with Kanyon Holdings and denying Kanyon relief from the automatic stay. The court first held the appeal could still be heard despite post-appeal events. It said Kanyon retained Article III standing and remained a “person aggrieved” under Eighth Circuit bankruptcy-appeal doctrine because the bankruptcy orders directly impaired Kanyon’s claimed contractual rights, including its asserted right to acquire the debtor’s company stock and seek specific performance in state court. The appeal also was not constitutionally moot because effective relief was still possible, and the court declined to dismiss on equitable-mootness grounds because the confirmed chapter 11 plan expressly contemplated alternative outcomes depending on whether rejection stood. On the merits, the court held the stock purchase agreement was an executory contract under 11 U.S.C. § 365 because both sides still had material unperformed obligations. Applying South Dakota contract law, it agreed the bankruptcy court could consider parol evidence because the agreement’s closing-condition provisions were ambiguous and because parol evidence was also admissible to show conditions precedent. Based on that evidence, the court accepted the bankruptcy court’s finding that Kanyon still had material obligations, including commitments tied to paying key DSF vendors and providing a financing plan, while Dandurand still had to transfer the stock and comply with other obligations. Because nonperformance by either side would have been a material breach, the agreement was executory. The court also held rejection was a proper exercise of the debtor’s business judgment. Under the § 365 business-judgment standard, rejection had to benefit the estate and not reflect bad faith or a gross abuse of discretion. The court said rejection benefited the estate by preserving Dandurand’s ability to keep working for the company, earn income to fund his chapter 11 plan, retain possible future value from the business, and avoid more costly litigation. It rejected Kanyon’s claim that the bankruptcy filing was in bad faith, finding the record showed legitimate bankruptcy purposes, including mounting personal financial distress, borrowing to pay debts, reduced or unpaid salary, and the burden of ongoing litigation. The court also upheld denial of stay relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). As to § 362(d)(1), it agreed there was no “cause” to lift the stay. The court recognized bad faith can qualify as cause, but found no bad-faith filing here. It also applied the Eighth Circuit balancing test for allowing outside litigation to proceed and agreed the factors favored keeping the dispute in bankruptcy: the state case was only partly developed, would be expensive and lengthy, bankruptcy issues could resolve or reshape the dispute, and continued state-court litigation would burden the estate and other creditors. As to § 362(d)(2), the court said rejection of the agreement eliminated Kanyon’s colorable claim to force transfer of the stock, and in any event Kanyon failed to prove the debtor lacked equity in the company or that the stock was unnecessary to an effective reorganization. The practical result is that Dandurand’s rejection of the stock purchase agreement remains in place, Kanyon cannot return to state court to pursue specific performance through stay relief, and the bankruptcy case proceeds under the confirmed chapter 11 plan, with any remaining dispute centered on whatever claim or damages issues may still be addressed in bankruptcy.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 4:22-md-03047-YGR

The ninth-circuit dismissed Meta Platforms, Inc., TikTok entities, and plaintiffs’ conditional cross-appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders denying motions to dismiss based on section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The court held that section 230 provides a defense to liability rather than immunity from suit, meaning denials of such defenses do not satisfy the collateral order doctrine requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because they are effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Additionally, the court found the district court’s rulings failed to conclusively determine the disputed question and were not completely separate from the merits of the action. The practical consequence is that the appeals cannot proceed immediately, and the underlying multidistrict litigation must continue in the district court until a final judgment is entered.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The eighth-circuit affirmed the United States Tax Court’s denial of equitable tolling for an untimely petition for review filed under 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). Reviewing the ruling on equitable tolling de novo and factual findings for clear error, the court applied the standard requiring a litigant to establish both diligent pursuit of rights and extraordinary circumstances standing in their way. The court found Boechler, P.C. failed to demonstrate due diligence because the sole attorney miscalculated the filing deadline without taking steps to verify the calculation with counsel or staff. Furthermore, the court determined that a simple miscalculation does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance under Supreme Court precedent, and the attorney’s heavy caseload and personal caregiving responsibilities were insufficient to warrant tolling given she controlled her own workload and had family assistance available. Consequently, the Tax Court’s ruling sustaining the IRS Notice of Determination stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The eighth-circuit upheld Alexzandra Blanco’s convictions for two fentanyl-distribution conspiracies under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846, including the conspiracy that resulted in serious bodily injury when the buyer overdosed. The court said the district court did not reversibly err in admitting challenged evidence and properly denied Blanco’s motions for judgment of acquittal. Applying abuse-of-discretion review to the evidentiary rulings, the court held that testimony about unlabeled pill bottles found in the bedroom was relevant under Rules 401 and 403 because it tended to show possession of drugs and helped present the full picture of the room; testimony that buyers could text Blanco to reach Monroe was supported by sufficient personal knowledge and was not hearsay because it could be treated as Blanco’s own admissions or coconspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (E); and evidence that officers found five pounds of methamphetamine in a laundry room across from the bedroom was admissible as res gestae evidence to complete the story of the charged fentanyl trafficking. The court added that any evidentiary error would have been harmless because the government’s proof was strong. On sufficiency of the evidence, the court applied the rule that a conviction stands if a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It concluded that Boldt’s testimony showed Blanco helped prepare fentanyl for use on March 18 by crushing pills and handing over a rolled dollar bill, after which Boldt overdosed, and that the later controlled buys, Blanco’s presence and participation during those transactions, and fentanyl and cash found in the shared bedroom were enough to show Blanco knowingly joined Monroe in the distribution conspiracy. The practical result is that Blanco’s convictions and 240-month sentence remain in place.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 1:11-cv-22858-DLG

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a federal habeas petition challenging a death sentence on the grounds that the petitioner is intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for execution under the Eighth Amendment. Applying the deferential standard of review prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the court held that the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of the petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, *Atkins v. Virginia*, nor did it rest on an unreasonable determination of facts. The court explained that the state court properly evaluated the three requirements for intellectual disability—significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior, and onset before age eighteen—by considering expert testimony on IQ scores, standard error of measurement, and adaptive functioning across conceptual, social, and practical domains. The appellate court found the state court’s factual determinations were not objectively unreasonable given the record evidence, including testimony regarding potential malingering and the petitioner’s ability to function independently. Consequently, the judgment denying habeas relief remains in effect for the Hialeah case involved in this appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.