Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

Docket: 5:22-cv-01306-DSF-MAR

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and her state law claims. Regarding the individual defendant’s qualified immunity, the court applied a two-step inquiry but addressed only the second step: whether the constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. The court held that neither the plaintiff’s special relationship claim nor her state-created danger claim were clearly established. For the special relationship claim, the court found that the cited district court case, *Lum v. County of San Joaquin*, was an unpublished opinion and factually distinguishable because a 13-minute car ride does not constitute the “incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty” required to trigger such a duty under *DeShaney*. For the state-created danger claim, the court determined that the cited precedents, *Munger* and *Ostrander*, did not clearly establish the right because the specific circumstances in those cases—leaving an individual in subfreezing temperatures or in a high-crime area—made the resulting harm a “known and obvious consequence” of the officers’ actions, whereas it was not a known or obvious consequence that the decedent would attempt to jump onto a train. Regarding the municipal liability claim against San Bernardino County under *Monell*, the court affirmed summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a “longstanding practice or custom.” The court found that the three incidents cited by the plaintiff were insufficient to establish such a practice, noting that one incident involved no constitutional violation and the remaining two were separated by a twelve-year gap, lacking the necessary duration, frequency, and consistency. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the claim under California’s Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1), ruling that even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was no evidence that the deputy threatened, intimidated, or coerced the decedent when ordering him to exit the vehicle. Finally, the court affirmed the judgment as a matter of law on the negligence claim under California law, holding that the deputy owed no legal duty to protect the decedent from his own suicidal or reckless conduct and that the decedent’s attempt to board the train constituted a superseding cause of his injury. The practical consequence is that the plaintiff’s appeal is denied, and the district court’s rulings in favor of the defendants stand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

Docket: 1:20-cv-03241-TOR

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the United States government’s position was not substantially justified under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), but reversed and remanded the fee award calculation for further proceedings. The court held that the government failed to meet its burden of showing its conduct regarding prevailing wage surveys was reasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, noting that a position violating regulations cannot be considered substantially justified. Regarding the fee reduction, the court applied the standard from *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, which requires fees to reflect the degree of success obtained, and reviewed the district court’s application of an across-the-board 75% reduction under heightened scrutiny. The court found the district court’s four-sentence explanation insufficient to justify such a significant cut given that plaintiffs secured injunctions and amendments protecting millions in wages, even though they did not achieve all goals. Consequently, the case is remanded to the district court to determine an upward adjustment of the fee award with a clear explanation considering the relationship between the results obtained and the hours expended, while costs are taxed against the federal government parties.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

Docket: 3:21-cv-00205-ART-CLB

The ninth-circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the district court’s denial of qualified immunity turned on factual disputes rather than pure questions of law. The court applied the standard established in *Johnson v. Jones*, which holds that a district court’s determination that a record raises a genuine issue of fact is not an appealable “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 when the appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence or requires credibility determinations. Specifically, the appellate court found it lacked jurisdiction to review the defendants’ arguments regarding whether they were aware of ineffective food contamination measures and whether the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim involved genuine factual disputes about the defendants’ knowledge and the legitimacy of penological interests. Consequently, the case remains in the district court for further proceedings on the merits, as the appellate panel cannot evaluate evidence-sufficiency determinations in this interlocutory posture.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

The Ninth Circuit denied Salvador Palacios Perez’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The court held that the agency permissibly determined his proposed particular social group, “Americanized Mexicans,” is not cognizable under Ninth Circuit precedent, citing *Barbosa v. Barr* and *Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder*. Additionally, the court found unexhausted and therefore properly before it any arguments regarding a distinct social group based on his relationship to his niece, as required by the mandatory exhaustion rule of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) under *Santos-Zacaria v. Garland*. Regarding the Convention Against Torture claim, the court affirmed the agency’s finding that Perez failed to meet his burden of showing government consent or acquiescence to potential torture, noting he forfeited this issue by failing to meaningfully contest it in his opening brief. Finally, the court rejected Perez’s due process claims, concluding there was no evidence in the record that the proceedings were fundamentally unfair and characterizing his arguments as impermissible re-characterizations of merits-based disputes. As a result of these holdings, the petition is denied and the agency’s order denying relief stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

Docket: 9:24-cv-00175-DWM

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of William Goulette’s diversity action alleging breach of contract against United Wholesale Mortgage. The court held that the district court correctly applied the local action doctrine, which vests exclusive jurisdiction over actions involving real property in the state where the property is located. Because Goulette’s complaint concerned real property in New Hampshire and the relief sought related to the title or status of that land, the Montana federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction regardless of where the contract was made or the cause of action accrued. The appellate court further ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Goulette’s motion for a default judgment, as the defendant had timely filed a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, which altered the deadline for filing an answer and demonstrated an intent to defend. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of Goulette’s motions to vacate the dismissal order and for reconsideration, finding he failed to establish any basis for relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). The court rejected Goulette’s arguments regarding caption errors in the motion to dismiss and improper docketing as meritless, and declined to consider allegations raised for the first time on appeal. All pending motions are denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Evansville Western Railway, Inc. (EVWR) and its denial of Lloyd’s motion for judgment as a matter of law against CSX Transportation, Inc., holding that both carriers validly limited their liability under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11706. The court applied the three-prong test established in *Nipponkoa Ins. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.*, requiring a carrier to (1) provide a reasonable opportunity to choose between liability levels, (2) obtain the shipper’s agreement to a specific choice, and (3) issue a receipt or bill of lading prior to shipment. The court distinguished the case from *ABB Inc. v. CSX Transportation, Inc.*, finding that unlike the plaintiff in *ABB*, NRE’s logistics manager had actual knowledge of the carriers’ publicly available price lists and affirmatively elected lower rates associated with liability caps ($25,000 per item for EVWR and $10,000 per item for CSX) because NRE maintained its own insurance. Regarding the sufficiency of the written agreement, the court determined that the Standard Transportation Commodity (STC) Code 3741110 included in the bills of lading was an ambiguous contractual term. Applying standard principles of contract law, the court utilized extrinsic evidence, specifically the parties’ seventeen-year course of dealing and the shipper’s testimony, to conclude that the code objectively manifested NRE’s intent to select the limited liability rates. The court ruled that this evidence was sufficient to establish a binding agreement on the liability caps as a matter of law for EVWR and provided a rational basis for the jury’s verdict in favor of CSX. Consequently, Lloyd’s recovery is limited to the maximum liability amounts specified in the shipping contracts ($25,000 per locomotive for EVWR and $10,000 per locomotive for CSX) plus prejudgment interest, and the district court’s judgment is final.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Weston Merriott’s complaint challenging a Bossier City Council policy regulating public speech at meetings. The court held that Merriott plausibly alleged that the policy was facially overbroad, void for vagueness, and constituted unconstitutional viewpoint and content-based discrimination under the First Amendment as applied to him under *Monell*. The court applied the standard of review de novo for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, accepting all factual allegations as true. Regarding the overbreadth claim, the court reasoned that the policy’s prohibitions on “personal,” “impertinent,” “slanderous,” and “boisterous” remarks were not coterminous with Merriott’s own conduct but reached a substantial number of unconstitutional applications relative to their legitimate sweep. The court interpreted these terms by their ordinary meaning, concluding they prohibited core First Amendment activities such as bold criticism of council members and that the “boisterous” prohibition turned entirely on the subjective annoyance of council members, citing *Coates v. City of Cincinnati*. On the vagueness claim, the court found the policy failed to provide reasonable notice of prohibited conduct and invited arbitrary enforcement because terms like “personal” and “impertinent” depended on a listener’s sensitivity without explicit standards, rendering them unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. Regarding viewpoint discrimination, the court held that prohibiting speech that is “personal,” “impertinent,” or “slanderous” effectively banned expression merely because it offended council members, which constitutes an impermissible restriction in a limited public forum. The court distinguished the “boisterous” prohibition as viewpoint-neutral and reasonably tailored for decorum. The court also affirmed Merriott’s *Monell* claim against the City, finding that the policy itself constituted official municipal policy and was the moving force behind the constitutional violations. However, the court reversed the dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim, finding he plausibly alleged self-censorship due to fear of removal. Conversely, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Louisiana Open Meetings Law (OML) claim against Councilmember Free, as Merriott did not allege Free attended the secret meeting, and affirmed the dismissal of the OML civil penalties claim because Merriott failed to allege that the defendants acted “knowingly and willfully.” The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The district court’s judgment is reversed regarding the facial overbreadth, vagueness, viewpoint discrimination, content-based discrimination (excluding the “boisterous” provision), *Monell*, and retaliation claims. The dismissal of the OML claim against Free and the OML civil penalties claim remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying Jorge Martinez Zarate’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied a substantial evidence standard to the agency’s factual findings and de novo review to questions of law. The court held that substantial evidence supports the agency’s determinations that Martinez Zarate failed to demonstrate harm rising to the level of persecution or a clear probability of future persecution based on his ethnicity, political opinion, or former military service, noting that persecution due to current or former membership in a police force or military is not on account of a particular social group. Additionally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the denial of CAT protection because Martinez Zarate failed to show it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the Mexican government upon return. As a practical consequence, the petition for review is denied, and the temporary stay of removal is lifted while the motion to stay removal is denied, allowing for his removal from the United States.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

The ninth-circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing an appeal from an Immigration Judge’s decision denying applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and withholding of removal because the petitioners’ receipt of two vague, anonymous threats without confrontation or other mistreatment is insufficient to establish past persecution. Additionally, the court found that the petitioners forfeited arguments regarding objective well-founded fear of future persecution and internal relocation by failing to make dedicated arguments in their opening brief. Regarding CAT relief, the court ruled that because the past harm did not amount to persecution, it necessarily could not rise to the higher standard of torture required under the “more likely than not” standard; furthermore, country condition evidence reflecting general risks to the population did not demonstrate a particularized risk of torture for the petitioners. As a practical consequence, the petition is denied and the temporary stay of removal entered pursuant to General Order 6.4(c) is lifted effective immediately.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-25

Docket: 4:25-cv-00903-JSW

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of Ravon Lovowe Ramsey’s pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his safety as time-barred. Applying a de novo standard of review, the court held that the plaintiff failed to file the action within the applicable two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims under California Civil Procedure Code §§ 335.1 and 352.1(a), which govern § 1983 cases in the Ninth Circuit. The court further determined that Ramsey did not allege sufficient facts to establish equitable tolling, noting that his pursuit of successive claims in the same forum does not warrant such relief. Consequently, the court denied Ramsey’s motions for appointment of pro bono counsel and for discovery, as these matters were not specifically and distinctly raised or argued in the opening brief. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, leaving the dismissal in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.