The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Open Cheer and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether USASF’s marks, “THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS” and “WORLDS,” are sufficiently distinctive to warrant trademark protection under the Lanham Act and Florida common law. The court applied the standard for summary judgment de novo, requiring that evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (USASF) to determine if a reasonable jury could find in its favor. The court rejected USASF’s argument that Open Cheer was barred from contesting distinctiveness because an earlier affirmative defense had been dismissed with prejudice, clarifying that such a dismissal did not preclude the defendant from challenging an essential element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Regarding the merits, the court applied the trademark distinctiveness hierarchy (fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, generic) and the “imagination” and “third-party need” tests to conclude that while the marks were not inherently suggestive, they were not generic as a matter of law. The court found that USASF presented sufficient evidence—including media coverage, participant testimony, and industry usage—to create a triable issue on whether the marks are descriptive and have acquired secondary meaning through long-standing use, substantial advertising, and public association with USASF’s specific event rather than international cheerleading competitions generally. Additionally, the court determined that there was insufficient record development to decide the likelihood of confusion or the personal liability of the individual defendants as a matter of law, necessitating a jury trial on those issues. The practical consequence is that the case returns to the Middle District of Florida for trial, where a jury will determine whether the contested marks are distinctive and protectable, whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion, and whether the individual defendants are personally liable for trademark infringement.