Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 3:25-cv-00690-GPC-JLB

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration in an employment dispute involving age discrimination claims under California law. The court held that the employer failed to meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff assented to the Mutual Dispute Resolution Agreement (MDRA). Applying ordinary principles of California contract formation, the court determined that mutual assent requires both notice and an objective manifestation of agreement, noting that silence alone does not constitute assent. Because electronic records showed the plaintiff never viewed the emails containing the agreement or interacted with the hyperlink, and because continuing employment without a signed acknowledgment or affirmative conduct such as clicking a button was insufficient to establish acceptance under California law, no binding arbitration agreement existed. Consequently, the denial of the motion to compel stands, and the case proceeds in district court without an order requiring the parties to arbitrate their dispute.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 2:25-cv-02545-SPG-SHK

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order remanding a putative class action to state court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred by ordering a remand based on a lack of equitable jurisdiction without first allowing the removing defendant, Great American Life Insurance Company, the opportunity to waive its defense regarding the adequacy of legal remedies. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a defendant may defeat a remand on equitable jurisdiction grounds by waiving the adequate-remedy-at-law issue to retain the case in federal court. The appellate court found that the defendant had indicated an intent to waive this defense but was not afforded the chance to perfect that waiver before the remand order was entered. Consequently, the district court must recall the remand order and notify the state court that it has resumed jurisdiction over the action. The Ninth Circuit declined to address whether the district court erred in relying on a lack of Article III standing as an additional basis for remand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 8:18-cv-00333-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction but reversed the denial of its motion for a new trial and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that whether a waterway qualifies as a “water of the United States” under the Clean Water Act is a merits question regarding statutory coverage, not a prerequisite for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over a citizen suit; therefore, the district court properly retained jurisdiction despite the defendant’s later challenge to the creek’s status. However, the panel concluded that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in *Sackett v. EPA*, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States” to require relatively permanent bodies of water with a continuous surface connection to navigable waters, constituted a substantial change in law that rendered the defendant’s previously foreclosed argument viable. Because the defendant raised this issue at the earliest opportunity after the legal shift and the district court retained jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit determined that a new trial was warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 to allow the parties to litigate whether Temescal Creek satisfies the new *Sackett* standard, as the existing record was insufficient to make this determination in the first instance.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Town Chairman Kenneth Leners, holding that it was clearly established law in September 2022 that a government official violates the First Amendment by engaging in viewpoint discrimination within a public forum on an official municipal website. The court applied the standard for qualified immunity, which shields officials only if their conduct did not violate a federal right that was “clearly established” such that every reasonable official would have understood it to be unlawful. The court reasoned that the Town’s comment section functioned as a public forum open to private speech because the Town had no policy regulating who could comment or what they could say, and it allowed members of the public to discuss municipal affairs freely. Citing *Shurtleff v. Boston*, the court determined that the lack of editorial control meant the comments were private speech, not government speech, thereby prohibiting Leners from deleting comments based on their critical viewpoint regarding recreational vehicles. The court rejected Leners’s arguments that online comment sections are unique forums or that the Town was engaging in its own speech, noting that Supreme Court precedent and decisions from other circuits had already established that websites are protected public forums subject to traditional free speech analysis. Consequently, Leners could not claim ignorance of the law, as it was well-settled that viewpoint discrimination in such a context is unconstitutional. The practical consequence is that the appeal by the Town of Cedar Lake is dismissed because municipalities cannot claim qualified immunity, and the case against Leners proceeds to trial on the merits of the First Amendment violation claim.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The seventh-circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Consolidated Chassis Management LLC and Chicago-OHio Valley Consolidated Chassis Pool LLC regarding their claims for declaratory relief and breach of contract, while affirming the judgment in favor of Northland Insurance Company on Consolidated’s claim for penalties under § 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. The court held that under Illinois law, an insured is not entitled to independent counsel at the insurer’s expense solely based on adverse interests between codefendants or a temporary reservation of rights; rather, such a right arises only when there is a serious, actual conflict of interest directly between the insurer and the insured. The court applied the standard that the insurer’s general right to control the defense of its insured yields only in narrow circumstances where the insurer’s interests are fundamentally at odds with the insured’s, such as when coverage depends on factual issues contested in the underlying suit or when the insurer has an incentive to pursue a less vigorous defense. The court found no such conflict existed here because Northland withdrew its reservation of rights before the defense began, and the policy covered all claims of negligence regardless of how liability was apportioned among the insureds. Consequently, the mere risk of an excess judgment or the filing of crossclaims for contribution between codefendants did not create a “diametrically opposed” conflict sufficient to override the insurance policy’s terms granting Northland control over the defense. Because Northland fulfilled its duty to defend without breaching the contract or engaging in vexatious conduct, Consolidated was not entitled to reimbursement for independent counsel fees nor statutory penalties under § 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. As a practical consequence, the judgment is reversed as to the breach of contract and declaratory relief claims, meaning Consolidated must return any award previously granted for independent counsel costs, and affirmed as to the § 155 claim, leaving Northland free from penalties. The case returns to the district court to enter judgment consistent with this opinion, effectively ending Consolidated’s attempt to recover legal fees from Northland.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The seventh-circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Consolidated Chassis Management LLC and Chicago-Ohio Valley Consolidated Chassis Pool LLC on their breach of contract and declaratory relief claims, while affirming the judgment in favor of Northland Insurance Company regarding Consolidated’s claim for penalties under § 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. The court held that under Illinois law, an insured is entitled to independent counsel at the insurer’s expense only when there exists a serious, actual conflict of interest between the interests of the insurer and the insured. The court determined that no such conflict existed in this case because Northland withdrew its reservation of rights early in the litigation, eliminating any potential coverage dispute, and because the adverse interests between Consolidated and its codefendants (Midvest Transport Corporation and Bakari Lambert) were not “diametrically opposed” as required to trigger the exception. The court clarified that while conflicts between insured codefendants can be relevant, they do not independently entitle an insured to independent counsel absent a concurrent conflict with the insurer, nor does the mere risk of an excess judgment create such a conflict where the insurer has settled within policy limits. Consequently, because Northland fulfilled its duty to defend without breaching the contract or engaging in vexatious conduct, Consolidated is not entitled to reimbursement for its independent counsel fees, and the § 155 claim fails as a matter of law since it presupposes an underlying legal wrong by the insurer.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 1:20-cr-00089-JRH-BKE-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Jerome Kiggundu’s motion to dismiss his indictment and vacate his conviction for bank fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and making a false statement under oath. The court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine bars Kiggundu from raising these challenges on this second appeal because he failed to raise them during the merits briefing stage of his first appeal, thereby waiving his right to challenge those specific district court rulings. The court applied the standard rule that legal decisions made at one stage of litigation, which are not challenged in a subsequent appeal when the opportunity existed, become the law of the case and preclude revisiting them later. The court noted three exceptions to this doctrine—substantially different evidence, a change in controlling law, or a prior decision that was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice—but found none applicable here since there was no second trial, no change in controlling law, and Kiggundu had been given the opportunity to raise these issues during his first appeal’s merits briefing. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s order without addressing the substantive merits of the bank fraud or constructive amendment arguments.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The ninth-circuit denied Chuanen Chen’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order affirming an immigration judge’s denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Chen’s experiences in China did not constitute past persecution, as he failed to establish that fines paid for violating the one-child policy resulted in substantial economic disadvantage or that he suffered physical harm, arrest, or detention. Furthermore, the court found substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that Chen’s fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable because he is no longer in violation of current population control policies and has not shown a reasonable possibility that Chinese authorities will forcibly sterilize him or his wife. Consequently, Chen did not establish eligibility for asylum or meet the higher standard required for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). The petition is denied, leaving the BIA’s order denying relief in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of Christopher Louis Park in part and dismissed the appeal in part. The court held that Park’s valid appeal waiver, entered into knowingly and intelligently during a Rule 11 colloquy, barred his challenges to the substantive reasonableness of his 180-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Although the Government moved to dismiss based on this waiver, the court clarified that an appeal waiver does not preclude colorable challenges to the validity of a guilty plea itself; however, because Park failed to preserve any claims regarding the plea proceedings, the court reviewed the adequacy of the colloquy for plain error and found the plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. The court further determined that the substantial upward variance in Park’s sentence did not constitute a “miscarriage of justice” sufficient to render the waiver unenforceable under *Hunter v. United States*. Consequently, the court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal regarding all issues within the scope of the waiver and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, directing counsel to inform Park of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The ninth-circuit denied Rohit Rohit’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied the substantial evidence standard to review the agency’s adverse credibility determination and its findings regarding eligibility for relief. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that Rohit lacked credibility due to material inconsistencies between his application and hearing testimony concerning the affiliation of his attackers, omissions in his written materials regarding threats by police and travel to Dubai, and his voluntary return to India prior to fleeing. Because the agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, the court further held that substantial evidence also supported the BIA’s determination that Rohit failed to establish eligibility for CAT relief, as his claim rested on evidence deemed not credible and he identified no other evidence compelling a conclusion that he was more likely than not to be tortured. Consequently, the petition is denied and the agency’s order remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.