Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The ninth-circuit denied the petitions in part, dismissed them in part, and granted them in part regarding Rafael Bustos-Alonso’s challenges to Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions. The court held that the BIA erred in ruling the petitioner forfeited his challenge to the denial of withholding of removal because, as a pro se litigant, his filings sufficiently put the agency on notice of the issue under Ninth Circuit precedent. Furthermore, the court found that the categorical bar to asylum previously applied due to the petitioner’s domestic violence convictions no longer applies following the en banc decision in *United States v. Gomez*, and the petitioner’s state court vacatur of those convictions under California Penal Code section 1473.7(a)(1) means he is no longer considered convicted for immigration purposes. Consequently, the petitions were granted with respect to asylum and withholding of removal, requiring the agency to reconsider these applications on remand. Regarding Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief, the court affirmed the BIA’s denial, finding substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a likelihood of future torture given the age of the threat against his father and the feasibility of safe relocation within Mexico. The court also denied challenges to the BIA’s denials of motions to reopen and reconsider for cancellation of removal, ruling that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the first motion due to procedural defects (failure to attach a completed application) and in denying the second motion because the petitioner failed to establish the requisite “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Finally, the court dismissed challenges to the denial of sua sponte reopening due to lack of jurisdiction. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded for further proceedings specifically concerning the petitioner’s eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, while all other relief requests are denied or dismissed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Todd Sutton, Jr.’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a visual strip search conducted upon his intake into the Cerro Gordo County Jail. The court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the standard established in *Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington*, 566 U.S. 318 (2012). Applying a deferential “substantial evidence” framework, the court reasoned that correctional officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect contraband and ensure facility safety when detainees are housed with the general population or in communal intake dormitories. The court rejected Sutton’s arguments that the *Florence* standard was inapplicable because he was arrested for a minor offense, would be held in a temporary intake dormitory rather than long-term housing, or would be placed with only two other detainees. The court found no substantial evidence in the record demonstrating that the jail officials’ decision to conduct the search was exaggerated, unnecessary, or unjustified given the security risks of communal housing, including the potential for smuggling contraband, spreading disease, and violence. Consequently, the methamphetamine discovered during the search remains admissible, and Sutton’s conviction stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The ninth-circuit granted the petitions regarding Rafael Bustos-Alonso’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal, dismissed the petition challenging the denial of Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief, and denied the petitions concerning motions to reopen or reconsider cancellation of removal. The court held that while the petitioner was previously ineligible for asylum due to a conviction under California Penal Code section 245(a), the en banc decision in *United States v. Gomez* overruled the precedent categorically barring such convictions, and a subsequent state court vacated the convictions under California Penal Code section 1473.7(a)(1) for procedural defects, meaning the petitioner no longer stands convicted of an aggravated felony or particularly serious crime for immigration purposes. Additionally, the court found that the petitioner did not forfeit his challenge to the withholding of removal ruling because his pro se filings sufficiently put the Board of Immigration Appeals on notice regarding mental health factors, and exhaustion was excused as futile given the binding precedent at the time. Consequently, the agency must reconsider the asylum and withholding of removal applications on remand. Regarding CAT relief, the court affirmed the denial based on substantial evidence that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a likelihood of future torture given the age of the threat and the possibility of safe relocation within Mexico. The petitions regarding cancellation of removal were denied because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting motions to reopen due to procedural failures, such as missing required application forms, and in finding the petitioner failed to establish the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” required by statute for his daughter’s potential deportation or relocation.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The seventh-circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Consolidated Chassis Management LLC and Chicago-Ohio Valley Consolidated Pool LLC regarding their breach of contract and declaratory relief claims, while affirming the judgment in favor of Northland Insurance Company on Consolidated’s claim for penalties under § 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. The court held that under Illinois law, an insurer is not required to reimburse an insured for the cost of independent counsel unless there is a serious, actual conflict of interest between the interests of the insurer and the insured. The court determined that no such conflict existed in this case because Northland withdrew its reservation of rights early in the litigation, eliminating any potential coverage dispute, and had no financial incentive to favor one insured over another regarding the negligence claims. Furthermore, the court found that mere adversity or “diametric opposition” between insured codefendants, without a concurrent conflict involving the insurer, does not trigger the right to independent counsel at the insurer’s expense. Because Northland fulfilled its duty to defend and did not breach the insurance contract, Consolidated was not entitled to recover legal fees for independent counsel, and consequently, no “vexatious and unreasonable” conduct occurred to support a § 155 penalty claim. The practical consequence is that Consolidated must bear the cost of its own chosen counsel, and Northland’s liability is limited to the policy limits it already paid to settle the underlying accident lawsuit.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 8:23-cv-02322-FWS-ADS

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Quick Dispense, Inc.’s Fourth Amended Complaint alleging breach of an implied contract. Applying a de novo standard of review and accepting all nonconclusory factual allegations as true, the court applied the plausibility standard set forth in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly* and *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, requiring facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Under California law, an implied contract requires conduct manifesting mutual assent to obligations not expressed in words. The court held that the complaint failed to state a claim for three reasons: first, it did not allege that both parties continued to perform most of the Distribution Agreement’s specific terms after expiration; second, allegations that the defendant’s post-expiration conduct violated the original agreement do not plausibly suggest an intent to renew; and third, a letter sent by the defendant referenced only a term that naturally persisted for one year following expiration, rather than confirming a renewal of the entire agreement. Consequently, the complaint failed to adequately allege the existence of an implied contract, which is a necessary element of the claim. The judgment of dismissal is affirmed, and no further proceedings are required on other issues raised by the appellant.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Ninth Circuit denied Zaji O. Zajradhara’s petition for review of an Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) order dismissing his citizenship-status discrimination claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. The court held that the ALJ properly dismissed the claim as a matter of law because the employer, Taga, Inc., employed fewer than three people at all relevant times, falling outside the statutory coverage threshold of § 1324b(a)(2)(A). Reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence, the court found that Taga submitted undisputed affidavits establishing it had no more than two employees, and Zajradhara failed to contest this evidence or provide genuine dispute through discovery. The court further affirmed the ALJ’s decisions on several procedural grounds: (1) vacating a default judgment against Taga was not an abuse of discretion because Taga’s conduct was not culpable and it had a meritorious defense; (2) declining to disqualify or sanction Taga’s counsel was proper as no material adversity between clients was shown; (3) any error in declining judicial notice regarding Taga’s affiliated entities was harmless as it did not affect the numerosity threshold; (4) visa-fraud allegations provided no basis for relief under § 1324b, and no private right of action exists for alleged violations of § 1324c; and (5) constitutional claims alleging Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process violations and Equal Protection discrimination were without merit because the ALJ provided ample opportunity for discovery, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil proceedings, and Zajradhara failed to identify a similarly situated class treated disparately. The practical consequence is that the OCAHO’s dismissal of the discrimination claim stands, and the petition for review is denied. All associated motions to supplement the record or reinstate default orders were also denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 2:25-cv-02545-SPG-SHK

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order remanding a putative class action to state court and remanded the case for further proceedings so that the defendant could perfect its waiver of the defense regarding the adequacy of legal remedies. The court held that while federal district courts possess equitable jurisdiction to remand cases where a plaintiff seeks only equitable relief, they must first afford the removing defendant an opportunity to waive the “adequate remedy at law” issue to retain the case in federal court. Because the defendant had indicated an intent to waive this defense but was not given the chance to formally perfect that waiver before the remand order was entered, the district court’s decision was erroneous under Ninth Circuit precedent established in *Ruiz v. Bradford Exch., Ltd.* The practical consequence is that the district court must recall its remand order and notify the state court that it has resumed jurisdiction over the action, allowing the defendant to formally waive the equitable defense and keep the case in federal court; the appellate court declined to address the separate basis for remand regarding Article III standing.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 1:23-cr-00121-SPW-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury conviction of Adriano Sparkxxx LeBeaux for one count of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)(1) and 1153(a). The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to review the district court’s evidentiary rulings, concluding that the admission of evidence regarding LeBeaux’s alleged prior sexual abuse of Jane Doe 1 was proper under Federal Rules of Evidence 104(b), 413, and 403. Specifically, the court held that the government met its burden to show conditional relevance under *Huddleston v. United States*, that Rule 413 permitted the admission of similar crime evidence in sexual assault cases, and that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under the factors set forth in *United States v. LeMay*. The court further held that precluding evidence of the dismissal of the prior charge was reasonable to avoid jury confusion under Rule 403. Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the court applied the standard from *United States v. Hursh*, finding that a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the complainant’s testimony, corroborating witnesses, DNA evidence, and LeBeaux’s tribal status. Finally, the court determined that any prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments did not constitute plain error because LeBeaux failed to demonstrate that such errors affected his substantial rights or the outcome of the proceedings, thereby rejecting his cumulative-error claim. As a result, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 2:22-cr-00013-PA-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of a supervised release condition prohibiting the defendant from residing within 2,000 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, and other facilities primarily used by persons under age 18. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to review both procedural and substantive reasonableness under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Regarding procedural reasonableness, the court held that the district court properly considered the statutory sentencing factors, specifically articulating a basis for the condition tailored to the defendant’s offense and history. The court found the district judge’s explanation sufficient because it detailed the defendant’s prior convictions for child sex abuse and possession of child pornography, his pattern of failing to register as a sex offender, his use of an alias to run a camp where he made inappropriate remarks, and his recent coordination of travel to Panama with another registered sex offender near schools. The court determined these findings were not illogical or implausible and that the court permissibly considered older offenses from 1988–1990 given more recent relevant events. Regarding substantive reasonableness, the court found the restriction reasonably related to the goals of deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the restriction imposed an excessive deprivation of liberty, distinguishing this case from *United States v. Collins* by noting the supervised release term is only five years and the defendant was convicted of child sex abuse rather than merely possession of child pornography. Additionally, the district court considered countervailing factors, including the defendant’s health issues and the burden on him, before imposing the restriction. As a practical consequence, the challenged residency restriction remains in effect, and the defendant’s supervised release continues under these terms without reassignment to a different district judge.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 3:24-cv-00265-WHO

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Abdelfatah Ellawendy’s ten claims against the Secretary of the Army arising from his resignation from the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. The court reviewed the dismissals de novo and applied the following standards and rules to each claim: 1. **Title VII Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation Claims:** Dismissed as barred by res judicata because Ellawendy raised almost identical claims in a prior lawsuit (“Ellawendy I”) where a final judgment on the merits was entered, and the parties were identical. 2. **Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) Claim:** Dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Ellawendy failed to present the claim to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which holds exclusive original jurisdiction over WPA claims. The court affirmed the denial of leave to amend but remanded for the judgment to reflect dismissal without prejudice. 3. **Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Claim:** Dismissed because Ellawendy failed to allege that he exhausted administrative remedies or that such exhaustion would be futile. 4. **Privacy Act Claim:** Dismissed as barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations, as the claim arose from the same nucleus of facts as “Ellawendy I” and was time-barred under 5 U.S.C. § 552(g)(5). 5. **Copyright Infringement Claim:** Dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because copyright claims against the United States must be filed in the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), and the claim did not satisfy the Little Tucker Act exception. The court affirmed the denial of leave to amend but remanded for the judgment to reflect dismissal without prejudice. 6. **Equal Protection, State Law Wrongful Termination, and Defamation Claims:** Dismissed as barred by res judicata due to the same nucleus of facts and privity with the prior litigation. 7. **Fourth Amendment/18 U.S.C. § 242 Claim:** Dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 242 does not give rise to civil liability, and the claim was also barred by res judicata. The practical consequence is that all claims are dismissed; however, for the jurisdictional dismissals (WPA and Copyright), the dismissal is without prejudice, allowing Ellawendy to potentially refile in the proper forum or agency if he satisfies procedural requirements. The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.