Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The sixth-circuit vacated the district court’s attorney fee award and remanded the case with instructions to enter a significantly reduced award, finding the original order an abuse of discretion. The court applied the “lodestar” method under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and the standard from *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, which requires that fees be based on hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate, while mandating that counsel exercise “billing judgment” to exclude excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours. The court identified several specific categories of non-compensable work that should have been excluded from the lodestar: 573 hours spent litigating failed class certification motions which were legally meritless under controlling precedent; 189 hours spent litigating claims against parties other than the County defendant; and 32.5 hours billed for a motion to reopen that was never filed. Furthermore, the court determined that only 75 of the 1,643 hours billed by counsel for work on the appeals to this court were reasonable, given that the Pacific Legal Foundation provided pro bono representation for the primary constitutional argument and the local firm largely copied those arguments. The court also found that no more than 10 of Mark McAlpine’s 999 billed hours were compensable due to a lack of concrete work product in his billing records. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately address the County’s argument for a blended hourly rate, instructing the district court to apply a $325 per hour blended rate to all reasonable hours rather than the higher individual rates previously approved. On remand, the district court must recalculate the fee award by excluding the specific categories of hours identified above, applying a 40% across-the-board reduction for pervasive overbilling and vague entries to the remaining hours, applying the 1.1 multiplier already used by the district court, and calculating the final award using the $325 blended hourly rate. The plaintiffs are not entitled to any fees for the litigation of this appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The ninth-circuit granted the petitions in part, dismissed them in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding Rafael Bustos-Alonso’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that while the petitioner had forfeited his challenge to the denial of asylum and withholding of removal before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the failure to exhaust was excused because an appeal on those grounds would have been futile under binding precedent at the time, and the BIA erred in finding forfeiture given the petitioner’s pro se status and the specific arguments raised. Furthermore, the court noted that the Supreme Court’s en banc decision in *United States v. Gomez* overruled prior precedent categorically barring asylum for convictions under California Penal Code section 245(a), and a state court subsequently vacated the petitioner’s domestic violence convictions due to procedural errors, meaning he no longer stands convicted of an aggravated felony or particularly serious crime for immigration purposes. Consequently, the agency must reconsider his eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. Regarding the Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim, the court denied relief, finding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a likelihood of future torture, citing the age of the threat against his father and the feasibility of safe relocation within Mexico. The court also affirmed the denial of motions to reopen for cancellation of removal, ruling that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the initial motion due to a failure to attach a completed application and in denying the request for an extension as untimely. Additionally, the court dismissed challenges to the denial of reconsideration and sua sponte reopening, finding the petitioner could not establish a reasonable likelihood of success regarding the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard required for cancellation of removal and that the BIA had applied correct legal principles.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 2:20-cr-00091-

The Ninth Circuit vacated John Chapman’s conviction for kidnapping resulting in death and remanded the case for a new trial due to impermissible jury coercion by the district court. Although the panel affirmed the denial of Chapman’s motion for acquittal, holding that the federal kidnapping statute’s “holding” element can be satisfied through non-physical means such as deception rather than requiring physical force, and affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress a confession finding his Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the conviction could not stand because the jury’s verdict was coerced. The court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances standard to determine jury coercion, identifying four primary factors that rendered the district court’s actions improper. First, the district court gave an Allen charge without disclosing to the parties that it had received two substantive jury notes on the first day of deliberations containing the numerical breakdown of the jurors’ votes; the Ninth Circuit has previously held that giving an Allen charge while knowing the vote count is per se coercive. Second, the district court’s comments during the canvassing of a holdout juror were coercive, as the judge explicitly told the juror to “surrender that opinion” and dismissed evidence the juror relied upon as “irrelevant.” Third, the jury deliberated for only thirty-seven minutes after receiving the Allen charge before returning with a unanimous verdict, a short timeframe that favors a finding of coercion. Finally, other indicia of coerciveness included the court directing comments at a specific holdout juror and the jury being deadlocked when the supplemental instruction was given. The practical consequence is that Chapman’s conviction is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court for the District of Nevada for a new trial. The panel did not reach the merits of other jury instruction challenges, noting they could be raised in the new trial proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Ninth Circuit denied Zaji O. Zajradhara’s petition for review of an Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) order dismissing his citizenship-status discrimination claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. The court held that the ALJ properly dismissed the claim as a matter of law because the employer, Taga, Inc., employed fewer than three people at all relevant times, falling outside the statutory coverage threshold of § 1324b(a)(2)(A). Reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence, the court found that Taga submitted undisputed affidavits establishing it had no more than two employees, and Zajradhara failed to contest this evidence or provide genuine dispute through discovery. The court further affirmed the ALJ’s decisions on several procedural grounds: (1) vacating a default judgment against Taga was not an abuse of discretion because Taga’s conduct was not culpable and it had a meritorious defense; (2) declining to disqualify or sanction Taga’s counsel was proper as no material adversity between clients was shown; (3) any error in declining judicial notice regarding Taga’s affiliated entities was harmless as it did not affect the numerosity threshold; (4) visa-fraud allegations provided no basis for relief under § 1324b, and no private right of action exists for alleged violations of § 1324c; and (5) constitutional claims alleging Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process violations and Equal Protection discrimination were without merit because the ALJ provided ample opportunity for discovery, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil proceedings, and Zajradhara failed to identify a similarly situated class treated disparately. The practical consequence is that the OCAHO’s dismissal of the discrimination claim stands, and the petition for review is denied. All associated motions to supplement the record or reinstate default orders were also denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 2:22-cv-00211-RLP

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Kelly Altiero’s federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and her state law claims, holding that the animal protection officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court applied the two-step qualified immunity inquiry, determining whether the facts demonstrated a constitutional violation and, if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. Regarding Altiero’s unlawful search claim, the court affirmed summary judgment because she failed to cite any precedent clearly establishing her constitutional right in this context, noting that the presence of “No Trespassing” signs does not negate an implied license for a knock-and-talk under existing Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit authority. On her procedural due process claims, the court held that Washington Revised Code § 16.52.085(2) grants officers discretion to authorize veterinary examinations before seizure, and Altiero failed to identify clearly established law supporting her claim. Similarly, regarding the failure to provide notice prior to the euthanization of a horse named “Melvin,” the court exercised its discretion to address only the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, concluding that no clearly established precedent supported her right to such notice. The court declined to consider Altiero’s arguments concerning unlawful seizure, municipal liability for negligent training and supervision, and other state law claims because she failed to present any argument challenging the district court’s summary judgment on those specific issues.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Valentin Herrera and Teresa Najera regarding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of their motion to reopen. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, upholding the BIA’s conclusion that the Petitioners failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court reasoned that the Petitioners’ claims relied on general conditions of crime and violence in Mexico rather than specific evidence of persecution on account of a protected ground. Citing *Zetino v. Holder* and related precedent, the court found that their fear of harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random gang violence lacks the required nexus to a protected ground. Furthermore, the court determined that the Petitioners’ affidavits were too speculative to demonstrate a risk of persecution based on family ties, land ownership, or disability, and failed to provide specific evidence showing it is more likely than not they would be tortured if removed to Mexico. As a practical consequence, the petition was denied, and the court lifted the temporary stay of removal that had been entered pursuant to General Order 6.4(c), effective immediately.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The ninth-circuit held that the United States Environmental Protection Agency exceeded its statutory authority when it approved a State Implementation Plan for California’s San Joaquin Valley that included a feasibility exemption for contingency measures under Section 172(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act. Applying the standard of review established in *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, which requires courts to exercise their independent interpretive authority rather than deferring to agency interpretations, the court concluded that Congress did not expressly provide for a feasibility exemption in Section 172(c)(9). The court reasoned that because other provisions within the Clean Air Act explicitly reference feasibility considerations while Section 172(c)(9) remains silent on the matter, the EPA erred by reading such an exemption into the statute. Furthermore, the court found that the directive for measures to be “specific” and to “take effect” without further action did not implicitly grant the EPA discretion to consider feasibility, as doing so would undermine the statutory purpose of contingency measures as a reliable backup to ensure continued emissions reductions when primary plans fail. The court remanded the case to the EPA without vacatur to allow for reconsideration of the rule while avoiding the disruptive consequences of the Valley lacking contingency measures during the agency’s review process.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Bryan Wardell’s employment discrimination claims against Pitt County, its Board of Commissioners, and individual defendants Janis Gallagher and Christopher Nunnally under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that Wardell failed to plead sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief regarding his termination as County Attorney. Applying the standard from *Ashcroft v. Iqbal* and *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, the court determined that Wardell’s complaint relied on conclusory allegations rather than facts allowing a reasonable inference of liability. Under Title VII, while the court acknowledged the “cat’s paw” theory of liability, it found Wardell did not plausibly allege that County Manager Gallagher was the “actual decisionmaker” or principally responsible for the termination; rather, the Board of Commissioners acted as the final policymaking authority and voted to terminate him. The court further ruled that Wardell provided no facts sufficient to support an inference that Gallagher harbored discriminatory animus or that her recommendations were motivated by race, noting that his allegations largely described personal conflicts and management disagreements. Regarding claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the court affirmed dismissal because Wardell failed to allege facts showing that race was the “but for” cause of the adverse employment action against Gallagher in her individual capacity. Against Pitt County, the court applied *Monell* liability standards, requiring a showing of an express policy, custom, or deliberate indifference by the municipality’s final policymaking authority. The court found the complaint lacked allegations that the Board acted with racial animus or demonstrated the requisite “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights, as mere negligence or rubber-stamping a recommendation without evidence of discriminatory intent was insufficient. Consequently, the district court’s order dismissing all claims was upheld.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The fourth-circuit affirmed the dismissal of TitleMax of South Carolina, Inc.’s claims challenging an ongoing Pennsylvania administrative enforcement proceeding under the Younger abstention doctrine, and affirmed the dismissal of its claims challenging a separate investigative subpoena on ripeness grounds while vacating the “with prejudice” designation for those subpoena claims. Regarding the administrative enforcement proceeding, the court held that federal courts must abstain because the state proceeding falls within the “quasi-criminal civil enforcement” category established in *Sprint Communications Inc. v. Jacobs*. The court found the proceeding satisfied the three factors from *Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association*: it was an ongoing, judicial-style administrative hearing initiated by a formal Order to Show Cause; it implicated Pennsylvania’s important interest in protecting residents from usury and enforcing consumer credit laws; and the state process provided TitleMax with an adequate opportunity to raise its Dormant Commerce Clause and other federal constitutional defenses. The court rejected TitleMax’s arguments that the proceeding was brought in bad faith or that the requested relief was wholly prospective, noting that a ruling on future regulation would interfere with the determination of liability for past conduct already under review. Regarding the 2024 investigative subpoena, the court applied Article III justiciability standards to determine ripeness. The court held that the claims were unripe because the subpoena is non-self-executing and TitleMax failed to allege a present, concrete injury caused by the issuance of the subpoena itself. Unlike precedents where a subpoena directly burdens associational rights or imposes immediate penalties, this subpoena merely sought business records without triggering immediate sanctions or enforcement proceedings. Consequently, any injury was contingent on future court enforcement actions that had not yet occurred. The practical consequence is that TitleMax must proceed through the Pennsylvania administrative process to litigate its constitutional challenges regarding the usury law enforcement. The federal claims challenging the 2024 subpoena are dismissed without prejudice, allowing TitleMax to refile those claims in federal court if and when the Department seeks judicial enforcement of the subpoena or otherwise causes a concrete injury.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 3:24-cv-00265-WHO

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Abdelfatah Ellawendy’s ten claims against the Secretary of the Army arising from his resignation from the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. The court reviewed the dismissals de novo and applied the following standards and rules to each claim: 1. **Title VII Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation Claims:** Dismissed as barred by res judicata because Ellawendy raised almost identical claims in a prior lawsuit (“Ellawendy I”) where a final judgment on the merits was entered, and the parties were identical. 2. **Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) Claim:** Dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Ellawendy failed to present the claim to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which holds exclusive original jurisdiction over WPA claims. The court affirmed the denial of leave to amend but remanded for the judgment to reflect dismissal without prejudice. 3. **Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Claim:** Dismissed because Ellawendy failed to allege that he exhausted administrative remedies or that such exhaustion would be futile. 4. **Privacy Act Claim:** Dismissed as barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations, as the claim arose from the same nucleus of facts as “Ellawendy I” and was time-barred under 5 U.S.C. § 552(g)(5). 5. **Copyright Infringement Claim:** Dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because copyright claims against the United States must be filed in the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), and the claim did not satisfy the Little Tucker Act exception. The court affirmed the denial of leave to amend but remanded for the judgment to reflect dismissal without prejudice. 6. **Equal Protection, State Law Wrongful Termination, and Defamation Claims:** Dismissed as barred by res judicata due to the same nucleus of facts and privity with the prior litigation. 7. **Fourth Amendment/18 U.S.C. § 242 Claim:** Dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 242 does not give rise to civil liability, and the claim was also barred by res judicata. The practical consequence is that all claims are dismissed; however, for the jurisdictional dismissals (WPA and Copyright), the dismissal is without prejudice, allowing Ellawendy to potentially refile in the proper forum or agency if he satisfies procedural requirements. The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.