Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The ninth-circuit denied Rohit Rohit’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied the substantial evidence standard to review the agency’s adverse credibility determination and its findings regarding eligibility for relief. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that Rohit lacked credibility due to material inconsistencies between his application and hearing testimony concerning the affiliation of his attackers, omissions in his written materials regarding threats by police and travel to Dubai, and his voluntary return to India prior to fleeing. Because the agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, the court further held that substantial evidence also supported the BIA’s determination that Rohit failed to establish eligibility for CAT relief, as his claim rested on evidence deemed not credible and he identified no other evidence compelling a conclusion that he was more likely than not to be tortured. Consequently, the petition is denied and the agency’s order remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of two adversary proceedings filed by Elshan and Babak Bayramov against American Credit Acceptance, LLC, Peritus Portfolio Services II, LLC, and related defendants. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring these claims in their personal capacities because the alleged injuries belonged to Total Auto Financing, LLC, the business entity they owned, rather than to them individually. The court applied the “claim-ownership principle,” clarifying that this rule is a merits issue regarding who owns a cause of action, not a jurisdictional Article III standing requirement. Under Virginia law and general corporate principles, members of an LLC cannot sue in their own right for injuries sustained by the LLC, such as the depreciation of their equity interest or increased liability as guarantors resulting from harm to the business. The court explained that when a business is injured by a third party, the claim belongs to the entity; if the entity is in bankruptcy, the claim becomes property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) and must be pursued exclusively by the bankruptcy trustee for the benefit of all creditors. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that their status as guarantors or the nature of their reputational harm created a “special injury” sufficient to support direct claims, noting that their losses were merely downstream effects of the harm done to Total Auto. Consequently, the plaintiffs failed to state valid causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, negligence, tortious interference, conspiracy, quiet title, or equitable subordination. The practical consequence is that the dismissal of the complaints remains in effect. The Bayramovs’ claims regarding the mismanagement of Total Auto’s loan portfolio and the validity of American Credit’s lien must be pursued by the bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the estate. The plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaints was denied because they failed to propose a viable theory for direct claims or explain how they would remedy the defects in their pleadings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The eighth-circuit affirmed the sentences of Latroy Currie and Malik Marshall for conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering. The defendants challenged their sentences by arguing that the district court erred in using “intended loss” rather than “actual loss” to calculate the applicable sentencing guidelines range, contending that Supreme Court precedent in *Kisor v. Wilkie* no longer supports giving controlling weight to Sentencing Guidelines commentary interpreting the term “loss.” The court applied the standard of review established in *Stinson v. United States*, which mandates that Guidelines commentary is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution, a federal statute, or is plainly erroneous. The court noted that while the Sentencing Commission amended § 2B1.1 in November 2024 to move the intended loss language from commentary to the text of the guideline, the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes applying the newer version to these defendants who were sentenced prior to the amendment. Relying on its recent decision in *United States v. Nock*, the court held that even post-*Kisor*, Eighth Circuit precedent continues to afford controlling weight to the commentary directing courts to use the greater of actual or intended loss. Consequently, the district court’s application of a 20-level enhancement based on the intended loss amounts was correct under controlling circuit authority. The judgments of the district court are affirmed, and the defendants’ sentences remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 8:22-cr-00259-WFJ-AEP-7

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the defendants’ conspiracy convictions for acting as foreign agents without notifying the Attorney General in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951(a) and conspiring to do so under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The court held that the statutes are constitutional as applied, applying intermediate scrutiny because the laws are content-neutral regulations of conduct with an expressive element that serve the important governmental interest of identifying individuals acting on behalf of foreign governments without suppressing free speech. Regarding sufficiency of evidence, the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude the defendants agreed to act under the direction of a Russian official and committed overt acts in furtherance of that agreement, interpreting “direction” under § 951(d) to include guidance or supervision rather than requiring strict control. The court further ruled that the government was not required to prove the defendants knew of the registration requirement, as § 951 is a general intent crime and conspiracy under § 371 does not require specific knowledge of the underlying law’s illegality. Additionally, the court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting co-conspirator hearsay statements, refusing to give requested jury instructions regarding the elements of the substantive offense or limiting evidence against a former member, and finding that prosecutorial questions about a proposed “doxing” website were accurate reflections of meeting notes and not misconduct. Consequently, the defendants’ convictions stand and their sentences remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 4:23-cv-00003-RSB-CLR

The eleventh-circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Jazzma Hall’s claims and remanded the case with instructions to enter an order remanding the matter to state court. The court held that while the district court correctly determined Hall lacked standing because she was not a party to the contracts at issue, it applied the wrong procedural remedy. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), when a federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to a lack of standing in a removed case, it must remand the case to state court rather than dismiss the plaintiff’s claims without prejudice. Consequently, the practical consequence is that the case will be returned to the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia, for further proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The sixth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of claims brought by Dr. Mark Charlton-Perkins against the University of Cincinnati and its administrators regarding a cancelled job search. The court held that relief was denied because Charlton-Perkins’s Title IX claim failed as he was not a “person in the United States” within the meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) at the time the discriminatory decision to cancel the search was made, given that he resided in the United Kingdom. Applying plain-language statutory interpretation and clear-statement rules for Spending Clause legislation, the court concluded that “in the United States” requires physical presence within U.S. territory, distinguishing citizenship from geographic location. Regarding the equal-protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court affirmed dismissal on two grounds. First, sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment barred official-capacity claims because the requested remedy of “instatement” (creating and funding a new position) would impose a direct financial burden on the state treasury, unlike reinstatement to an existing position, and lacked historical precedent in Founding-era equity. Second, qualified immunity barred individual-capacity claims against the administrators because Charlton-Perkins failed to demonstrate that his right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct; the court found no precedent placing the unconstitutionality of cancelling a job search due to gender concerns beyond debate, noting that a reasonable administrator could have believed such action was legal given the conflicting interests and lack of on-point authority. The practical consequence is that the judgment in favor of the defendants stands, the University of Cincinnati faces no liability under Title IX or equal-protection claims for this hiring cancellation, and Charlton-Perkins receives no injunctive relief or damages.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Daryl Smith’s 120-month sentence for distributing cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The court held that the Government did not breach its plea agreement by characterizing Smith’s criminal history as “understated” during sentencing advocacy. Because Smith failed to object to this conduct at the district court level, the appellate court applied the plain error standard of review. Under this standard, an error must be clear or obvious to warrant reversal. The court reasoned that the Government fulfilled its contractual obligation by recommending a sentence within the guideline range and was expressly permitted by the plea agreement to respond to statements made by the defendant or his counsel regarding criminal history. Consequently, Smith’s claim that the Government impliedly advocated for an upward variance was not plain error, and the judgment of the district court remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 0:24-cv-62453-RS

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Svetlana Wrightson’s corrected amended complaint alleging hostile work environment and retaliation claims in violation of Title VII. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting the complaint’s allegations as true but requiring sufficient factual content to state a claim that is plausible on its face rather than mere conclusory statements. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the court held that Wrightson failed to allege conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment. The court found that the alleged incidents, occurring over just two days involving a single manager, were not frequent enough, and the specific actions—such as staring, suggestive gestures, and verbal comments—did not constitute physical threats, humiliation, or interference with job performance sufficient to create an objectively hostile environment. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court affirmed dismissal based on the failure to allege a causal connection and the lack of significant harm, applying the standard established in *Muldrow v. City of St. Louis*. Although the district court utilized an incorrect legal standard for defining adverse employment actions in the discrimination context, the appellate court determined that the dismissal was proper because Wrightson’s allegations of increased scrutiny, unreasonable deadlines, and sabotage were conclusory and did not demonstrate the significant harm required to dissuade a reasonable employee from making a charge of discrimination. The practical consequence is that Wrightson’s appeal is denied, and the district court’s order dismissing her claims remains in effect with no further opportunity for amendment or relief on these specific grounds.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 8:23-cr-00024-CEH-SPF-1

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Alexander Alli’s convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and two counts of wire fraud arising from a fraudulent application for an $80,500 Economic Injury Disaster Loan from the Small Business Administration during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit additional excerpts of Alli’s interviews with a special agent under Federal Rule of Evidence 106 (the rule of completeness). The appellate court reasoned that Rule 106 does not allow a party to introduce evidence merely to advance an alternative theory of the case or to correct an impression when the prosecution’s introduced excerpts already covered the same contentions, and that the requested excerpts were either duplicative or unrelated to the specific portions of the interview the government played. The court further determined that sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy conviction, finding that a reasonable jury could infer Alli knowingly participated in the scheme based on his signature on loan documents restricting fund usage, his receipt of proceeds for unauthorized purposes, and his false statements to investigators which could be treated as substantive evidence of guilt. Additionally, the court found no error in the district court’s instructions regarding Pinkerton liability and deliberate ignorance, concluding there was sufficient evidence that Alli was aware of a high probability of fraud and deliberately avoided learning the truth, and that any potential error in the deliberate-ignorance instruction was harmless given the jury’s alternative ability to convict on actual knowledge. As a result, Alli’s 13-month prison sentence and $82,500 restitution order remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 1:23-cv-21392-RNS

The eleventh-circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Michelle Maupin’s federal employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADA, and § 1983, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The court applied the standard requiring a finding of “a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt” and a determination that “lesser sanctions would not suffice” before dismissing a case with prejudice. The appellate panel concluded that Maupin’s conduct amounted to simple negligence or isolated mistakes rather than willful contumacious conduct, noting her pro se status, the short three-day window provided for compliance with the ultimatum, and the fact that she had already filed the operative Third Amended Complaint which was available on the docket. Furthermore, the court found the district court failed to explain why no lesser sanction would serve the interests of justice, as the failure to re-file the pleading did not prejudice the defendants or frustrate review of the claims. The court also declined to address Maupin’s appeal regarding the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion to reopen the judgment because the underlying dismissal was vacated.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.