Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying a motion to remand and remanded the case to state court because the defendant’s second removal attempt was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The court held that the 30-day deadline for removing a civil action to federal court is a strict, mandatory requirement that cannot be equitably tolled, even when a prior remand order created ambiguity regarding jurisdiction. The court applied the standard established by the Supreme Court in *Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel*, which forecloses equitable tolling of the removal deadline. The opinion clarified that under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), federal jurisdiction is determined at the time the action is commenced; therefore, a subsequent motion for class certification in state court does not reset the 30-day removal clock if the initial complaint contained “solid and unambiguous information” that the case was removable. Because GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II had received the initial complaint in 2019 and removed the case within the statutory window then, its attempt to remove the case again in February 2025—over 2,000 days later—exceeded the deadline. The district court’s reliance on equitable tolling to excuse this delay was error, as Congress did not authorize such exceptions outside of explicit statutory provisions. The practical consequence is that the case must be returned to Ohio state court. The Sixth Circuit declined to consider GateHouse’s argument regarding a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the prior remand order, finding that the issue was forfeited because it was raised only perfunctorily in a footnote of the appellee’s brief and not properly preserved for appellate review.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 1:23-cr-00028-LAG-TQL-1

The eleventh-circuit vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing because the district court erred in refusing to apply the federal kidnapping guideline as the most analogous offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court held that the cross-reference provision in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), which directs courts to use the “resulting offense level” if a defendant possessed a firearm “in connection with the commission… of another offense,” unambiguously applies to state offenses, not just federal ones. The court reasoned that the plain text of “another offense” encompasses any infraction of law in addition to the conviction offense, a conclusion supported by the guideline commentary defining the term as including federal, state, or local offenses. Regarding the application of the analogous offense rule under U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, the court determined that the federal kidnapping guideline is sufficiently analogous to Georgia state kidnapping despite the federal statute’s requirement of an interstate nexus. The court explained that this interstate element serves only as a jurisdictional hook and does not alter the underlying criminal behavior (actus reus) targeted by both statutes. Since both offenses target the unlawful abduction and holding of a person against their will, the federal guideline is the correct analog. Consequently, the district court was required to apply the base offense level for federal kidnapping rather than rejecting the cross-reference based on the lack of identical elements between state and federal kidnapping laws.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The seventh-circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy and distribution of cocaine, holding that while the district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of a prior heroin sale under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court applied the standard that Rule 404(b) prohibits using other-act evidence to prove a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes, requiring instead a propensity-free chain of reasoning for non-propensity purposes such as knowledge or intent. The court reasoned that because cocaine and heroin are distinct substances and the defendant did not contest his knowledge or intent at trial—focusing solely on drug quantity—the admission of the heroin evidence relied on a forbidden propensity inference and its probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403. However, applying the harmless error test, the court found that the government’s case included compelling direct evidence such as recorded conversations, physical seizure of over five kilograms of cocaine, and the defendant’s post-arrest admissions, rendering the exclusion of the heroin evidence unlikely to have changed the jury’s verdict. Additionally, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by commenting on his failure to testify, determining that the statement was a proper response to the defense’s closing argument and did not naturally remind the jury of the defendant’s silence, especially in light of curative jury instructions regarding the burden of proof. As a result, the judgment of the district court is affirmed and no new trial is ordered.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

Docket: 2:21-cr-00037-LGW-BWC-1

The eleventh-circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Michael Kersey’s appeal from a 1,200-month sentence for child exploitation offenses. The court held that the appeal waiver contained in Kersey’s plea agreement was enforceable and applicable, barring his claim of substantive unreasonableness based on an alleged sentencing disparity with a co-defendant. The court applied the standard of review de novo to determine the validity of the appeal waiver, enforcing waivers made knowingly and voluntarily unless doing so would result in a miscarriage of justice. The court rejected Kersey’s argument that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver unenforceable, noting that while his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult him about filing an out-of-time appeal, that specific failure did not render the earlier-entered plea agreement waiver itself the product of ineffective assistance. Furthermore, the court found that Kersey’s claim of unwarranted disparity did not meet the “high bar” required to establish a miscarriage of justice, which necessitates egregious error that brings the judicial system into disrepute. The practical consequence is that the appeal is dismissed, leaving the district court’s judgment and sentence in place without further appellate review on the merits.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for Trooper Andrew Ager on Travis Kotke’s excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, while remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that a reasonable jury could find Ager violated Kotke’s constitutional rights by using an arm-bar takedown maneuver on a suspect who was seated, holding his young child, and not actively resisting arrest or posing an immediate threat to officer safety. Applying the *Graham v. Connor* factors, the court determined that while the domestic violence offense involved violence (favoring the officers), Kotke posed no immediate threat and did not actively resist, as mere verbal noncompliance and refusal to release his child did not constitute active resistance under Sixth Circuit precedent. The court further ruled that this right was clearly established by existing circuit law prohibiting injurious physical force against suspects who are not actively resisting arrest or posing a safety risk. Consequently, Ager is not entitled to qualified immunity, and the case proceeds to trial on the excessive force claim.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the criminal judgment of defendant Randy Price, who was sentenced to 97 months’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) and possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court held that Price’s Second Amendment challenges to both convictions are foreclosed by binding precedent, specifically the en banc decision in *United States v. Price*, 111 F.4th 392 (4th Cir. 2024), which rejected a § 922(k) challenge following *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen*, and subsequent panel decisions in *United States v. Canada* and *United States v. Hunt*, which confirmed the facial and as-applied constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The court applied a de novo standard of review for preserved constitutional claims but declined to consider Price’s request for supplemental briefing regarding the Supreme Court’s decision in *Wolford v. Lopez*, noting that prior Fourth Circuit precedent remains binding absent contrary law from an en banc or Supreme Court ruling. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Herbalife International of America, Inc., dismissing Cameron J. Aikens’ claims of discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court held that, regardless of whether the analysis proceeds under the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework or directly under the text of § 1981, Aikens failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his claims. The appellate court found no reversible error in the district court’s application of legal standards, its weighing of evidence, or its decision to strike certain evidence submitted by the appellant. Consequently, the judgment of the district court remains in effect, and the case is closed without further proceedings on the merits.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying relief on the appellant’s amended complaint filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act and *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics*. The court held that the district court did not err in determining that the appellant’s Eighth Amendment claims presented a new *Bivens* context and in declining to extend the *Bivens* remedy to those claims. Additionally, the court denied the appellant’s motion to place the case in abeyance. As a result of this affirmation, the district court’s dismissal stands, and no further relief is granted on these claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The seventh-circuit affirmed Shawn Pena’s 24-month revocation sentence but vacated Special Condition 13 of his supervised release and remanded the case for the district court to recast that condition in more concrete terms. The court held that the district court did not err in considering police reports related to dismissed theft violations to assess Pena’s risk to the community, as the information possessed sufficient indicia of reliability and Pena waived any due process objections by electing to proceed with the hearing without requesting a delay. Furthermore, the court found no breach of the plea agreement by the government for acknowledging the court’s sentencing discretion or failing to oppose probation’s recommendation, noting that probation officers act as neutral informants rather than adversaries. The court also rejected Pena’s argument that the sentence was motivated by retribution, concluding the district court properly relied on permissible factors of public safety and deterrence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(c) and 3553(a)(2)(C). Regarding the vacated condition, the court applied the standard that conditions requiring a probation officer to determine if a defendant is a “risk” to “another person” are unconstitutionally vague under Seventh Circuit precedent, such as *United States v. Greco* and *United States v. Bickart*, because they fail to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct. Consequently, the practical consequence is that Pena must serve his affirmed prison term and one year of supervised release, but the district court must modify the specific condition regarding notification of risks to third parties to ensure it is not unconstitutionally vague.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-05

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Madison and Jefferson County, holding that Dupont Water Company failed to establish a violation of 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). The court applied the “physical capability” test established in *Washington County Water Co. v. City of Sparta*, which requires a rural water association to demonstrate it has “pipes in the ground” and the ability to provide service within a reasonable time after a request for service occurs. The court found that Dupont did not meet this standard because, despite extensive communications with Jefferson County regarding the new jail’s water needs starting in 2020, Dupont failed to provide an infrastructure plan, a rate quote, or a contract for years. The record showed Dupont sat on its hands while the county built the facility and secured water from Madison, only initiating engineering studies after litigation began. Consequently, no reasonable jury could find that Dupont had “provided or made available” service within a reasonable time. While the court noted serious questions regarding the tension between its precedent in *Jennings Water*—which broadly prohibits municipal encroachment—and the statutory text, it declined to overrule that precedent in this instance, ruling instead that Dupont’s claims failed under existing law due to its own inaction. The practical consequence is that Madison and Jefferson County are permitted to continue providing water service to the Jefferson County Jail without liability for violating Dupont’s federally protected monopoly rights, as Dupont did not satisfy the statutory requirements to trigger those protections.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.