Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The fourth-circuit affirmed Jack Benson Flanders’s conviction for engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor while living in a foreign country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), (e), and his sentence of 198 months’ imprisonment followed by five years’ supervised release. The court rejected Flanders’s claim that the prosecutor’s closing argument comment urging the jury to “do the right thing” violated his due process rights, applying a plain error standard because he failed to object at trial. Under this standard, the court found no clear or obvious error because the improper remark was isolated, unlikely to mislead the jury given the strength of the evidence, and mitigated by curative instructions. The court also rejected Flanders’s challenge to the Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for unduly influencing a minor under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), applying a harmless error analysis. The court held that any potential miscalculation was harmless because the district court explicitly stated it would have imposed the same downward variance sentence based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and the sentence was substantively reasonable. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The eleventh-circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order affirming the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) for a Nicaraguan national. The court applied the substantial evidence standard, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision. Regarding asylum and withholding of removal, the court held that the immigration judge properly considered the cumulative impact of Obando’s experiences but correctly determined that intermittent police presence outside his business and vague threats from government sympathizers constituted mere harassment rather than persecution, as they did not rise to the extreme level required by law. The court also rejected arguments regarding country conditions evidence, noting that reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were not part of the administrative record. For CAT relief, the court affirmed that substantial evidence supported the finding that Obando failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not that he or his family would be tortured upon return to Nicaragua, citing the lack of prior arrests, the peaceful operation of his business until departure, and the absence of active government pursuit. The practical consequence is that the removal order against Obando and his family remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 6:19-cv-00308-CEM-LHP

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of motions for judgment as a matter of law and new trial regarding trademark infringement, unfair competition under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), and equitable remedies, but reversed the false advertising verdict and vacated the damages award, remanding for a new trial on damages. The court held that Deltona’s “Battery Tender” marks are not generic; they are at least descriptive and have acquired secondary meaning, supported by federal registration and evidence of long-term use and consumer recognition. The court affirmed that NOCO engaged in trademark infringement through its use of the marks in Amazon ad text, product descriptions, and customer communications, which created a likelihood of confusion. However, the court held that mere keyword bidding does not constitute trademark infringement because it occurs behind the scenes and is unlikely to cause consumer confusion. Regarding FDUTPA, the court ruled that while NOCO’s conduct violated the statute, Deltona was not entitled to actual damages because it failed to prove direct financial loss, limiting relief to injunctive relief. The court also reversed the false advertising verdict, finding that Deltona failed to adequately plead a separate false advertising claim under § 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act and that NOCO did not impliedly consent to its trial. Finally, the court affirmed the disgorgement of profits and permanent injunction, noting NOCO’s willful infringement justified such equitable relief. Because the jury’s $1.3 million actual damages award was a lump sum that could have included amounts attributable to the invalid keyword bidding theory, the unsupported FDUTPA damages claim, and the reversed false advertising claim, the court vacated the damages award and remanded for a new trial on damages consistent with these holdings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 5:25-CV-01085-R)

The tenth-circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismissed the appeal from the district court’s dismissal of David Lee Daniels II’s second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application. The court applied the standard under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), requiring a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and determined that no reasonable jurist would find debatable whether Daniels stated a valid claim or whether the district court was correct in its procedural rulings. Regarding claims challenging the Oklahoma Survivors’ Act proceeding, the court held they were not cognizable in habeas because challenges to state post-conviction procedures do not implicate the underlying judgment of incarceration. Regarding claims challenging his conviction and sentence based on neurobiological evidence, the court found they constituted unauthorized second or successive § 2254 claims that were available during his prior proceedings. The court further held that no reasonable jurist would debate the district court’s discretion to dismiss rather than transfer the application for authorization under *In re Cline*, given the lack of risk that a meritorious claim would be lost. Consequently, Daniels failed to demonstrate a due process violation regarding notice and opportunity to be heard. The practical consequence is that the appeal is dismissed without prejudice to filing a properly authorized successive petition.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 6:22-cr-00020-CEM-RMN-2

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Alejandro Acevedo Luna’s pro se motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The court held that Luna was ineligible for relief under Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines because he failed to satisfy the criteria of U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(7), which requires that a defendant not have possessed, received, purchased, transported, transferred, sold, or otherwise disposed of a firearm in connection with the offense. The court determined that Luna was ineligible for this adjustment for the same reason he was previously found ineligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 5C1.2(a)(2): he possessed a loaded firearm during the commission of his drug trafficking offense. Consequently, the district court correctly declined to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The practical consequence is that Luna’s original sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 2:92-cr-00169-ACA-GMB-2

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Dedrick Germond Smith’s motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The court held that Smith failed to establish an “extraordinary and compelling reason” warranting relief because he did not demonstrate an intervening change in the law that would produce a gross disparity between his current life sentence and the sentence likely imposed if he were sentenced today. Smith, who received a mandatory life sentence in 1993 for murdering a federal agent under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1111, and 1114, argued that his sentence was unusually long and disproportionate given his youth at the time of the offense and exemplary institutional record. However, the court noted that Smith conceded the statute mandating his sentence has not been amended. Citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), the court explained that a change in law is required to establish a gross disparity for an unusually long sentence; because the governing statute remains unchanged, no such disparity exists. The court further rejected Smith’s reliance on non-binding out-of-circuit decisions and his actual innocence argument, noting that compassionate release motions are not vehicles for raising innocence claims under *Fernandez v. United States*. Because the district court properly determined Smith was ineligible based on the lack of an extraordinary and compelling reason, it was not required to consider the § 3553(a) factors or individualized circumstances. The practical consequence is that Smith’s sentence of life imprisonment remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The sixth-circuit affirmed the district court’s 276-month sentence imposed on Kenneth Jackson, Jr., following resentencing under § 403 of the First Step Act of 2018. The court held that the district court adequately considered Jackson’s arguments regarding his youth at the time of the offenses, the accuracy of his criminal history score, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court reasoned that the district court expressly addressed these points by questioning defense counsel, rejecting Jackson’s characterization of his criminal history, incorporating the Government’s arguments regarding the seriousness of the crimes, and properly calculating the Guidelines range. The court noted that recurring violent criminal behavior can outweigh a defendant’s young age, thereby justifying the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Consequently, Jackson’s sentence stands and he remains imprisoned for the specified term.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The fourth-circuit granted Kadiatou Babila Keita’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), vacated the Board’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the immigration judge violated the statutory requirement to provide a “full and fair hearing” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) by denying Keita’s cancellation application without allowing her to present evidence or argument regarding the exceptional hardship her United States citizen children would suffer if she were removed to a country other than Guinea. Although the immigration judge had granted Keita withholding of removal to Guinea, which precluded removal to that specific country, he failed to hold a promised evidentiary hearing to consider whether third-country removal would result in the requisite hardship, instead relying on briefing limited to the legal question of whether withholding relief categorically barred cancellation eligibility. The court dismissed as moot Keita’s separate petition for review of the Board’s denial of her motion for reconsideration.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 6:23-cv-00950-GAP-LHP

The eleventh-circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the district court lacked equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue a universal injunction prohibiting enforcement of Florida’s Protection of Children Act against all persons in the state, citing *Trump v. CASA, Inc.*, which established that such injunctions lack historical pedigree. Furthermore, the court determined that the plaintiff did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its facial First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Applying rational-basis review to the statute’s regulation of obscenity for minors, the court found the Act constitutional because it tracks the *Miller* standard as adapted for children in *Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton*. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s authoritative construction of the term “lewd” eliminated any overbreadth or vagueness concerns, and that the statute’s age-variable standard (“age of the child present”) did not render the law unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment convicting Darren Duncan of distributing fentanyl and imposing a sentence within the United States Sentencing Guidelines range. Applying the sufficiency of the evidence standard under *United States v. Oliver*, 90 F.4th 1222, 1224–25 (8th Cir. 2024), the court held that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Duncan knowingly distributed a controlled substance. The court relied on witness testimony, text messages, and an autopsy report to conclude that the government satisfied its burden under *United States v. Campbell*, 986 F.3d 782, 809 (8th Cir. 2021), noting that proof of the exact nature of the substance is not required, only that it was a controlled substance of some kind. The court further distinguished the facts from *United States v. Cheshier*, 134 F.4th 534, 538 (8th Cir. 2025), finding sufficient evidence that Duncan distributed fentanyl to the victim. Consequently, the conviction and sentence are affirmed with no further proceedings required.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.