Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 5:22-cv-00987-LCB

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of three police officers and the City of Hanceville on claims for false arrest, retaliatory arrest, and excessive force brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because Phillips failed to establish a violation of clearly established constitutional rights. Specifically, the court ruled that the officers had probable cause to arrest Phillips for disorderly conduct and second-degree trespass under Alabama law, which defeated both the false arrest and retaliatory arrest claims, as an absence of probable cause is required to sustain a retaliatory arrest claim. Regarding excessive force, the court determined that the force used by Officers Duncan and Howell during the initial arrest was de minimis and reasonable given Phillips’s physical resistance, and that Deputy Chief Hadder’s use of force against Phillips while he was a pre-trial detainee was objectively reasonable under the Due Process Clause to maintain order. Consequently, because no underlying constitutional violation occurred, the City could not be held liable under *Monell*. The practical consequence is that the judgment for the defendants stands and the case is closed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The seventh-circuit affirmed Ausarian Carney’s kidnapping conviction and twenty-four-year sentence. Regarding the Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of his sister’s jailhouse letters, the court applied plain-error review because Carney failed to object at trial. The court held that even assuming a constitutional error occurred, Carney could not demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights or compromised the fairness of the proceedings, given the overwhelming independent evidence of guilt, including fingerprints, cell-site location data, and physical evidence linking him to the crime scene. Additionally, the court rejected Carney’s sentencing arguments, finding no procedural error because the district court meaningfully considered his mitigation claims regarding his lesser role in the kidnapping, and no substantive abuse of discretion in imposing a below-Guidelines sentence that was six years lighter than his sister’s.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 2:11-cv-00283-

The ninth-circuit reversed the district court’s orders blocking the Federal Trade Commission’s efforts to collect on a money judgment obtained against Benjamin Hoskins and Leanne Rodgers for their involvement in a telemarketing scam, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The panel held that the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act (FDCPA) preempts Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations for enforcing judgments because the FDCPA contains no time limit for collecting debts owed to the federal government by writ of execution. The court rejected the argument that the judgment was not a “debt” under the FDCPA simply because the proceeds would ultimately be disbursed to victims, reasoning that the judgment was entered in favor of the FTC and thus constitutes an amount owing to the United States. Additionally, the panel reversed the district court’s quashing of the writ of execution, holding that the FTC need not establish alter ego liability under Nevada law to levy on property held in a trust. Under the FDCPA, the agency may levy any property in which the judgment debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest, however held; because Hoskins and Rodgers were trustees and beneficiaries of the trust holding their Las Vegas home, they possessed such an interest subject to levy.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 2:24-cv-05374-SVW-JC

The ninth-circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Leonard Mitchell’s Montreal Convention negligence claim against Air India for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in implicitly denying Mitchell’s request for jurisdictional discovery because the record was insufficiently developed regarding the relationship between Air India and United Airlines, which is pertinent to establishing jurisdiction. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, jurisdictional discovery should be granted when facts bearing on jurisdiction are controverted or a more satisfactory showing is necessary. On remand, the district court must permit Mitchell to conduct appropriate jurisdictional discovery into the Air India-United relationship before ruling on personal jurisdiction.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The fourth-circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss Amer Rizvi’s complaint, which asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court found no reversible error in the district court’s decision and dispensed with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the record. Additionally, the court denied Rizvi’s motion to file a supplemental brief, citing previous orders striking his serial filings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not bar the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims because he properly exhausted administrative remedies before raising those specific claims in his amended complaint, even though his original complaint was filed prior to exhaustion. Regarding his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims, which were unexhausted when initially filed, the court remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether the Virginia Department of Corrections grievance process was genuinely “available” to the plaintiff under *Ross v. Blake*. Additionally, the court found that the district court erred in dismissing the Eighth Amendment supervisory liability claim against VDOC Director Harold Clarke and the First Amendment retaliation claims against Wardens Beth Cabell and Kevin McCoy, ruling that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to state plausible claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The fourth-circuit denied Bluff Spur Coal Corporation’s petition for review of the Benefits Review Board’s order affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s award of black lung benefits to Frederick Bateman. Applying a deferential standard of review to determine whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law, the court held that the ALJ’s finding that Bateman was totally disabled was supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ properly identified relevant evidence, resolved material conflicts, and adequately explained why certain physician opinions were credited over others. Additionally, the court affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Bateman was a never smoker, noting that the ALJ did not reweigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations but rather credited Bateman’s credible testimony regarding his smoking history. The practical consequence is that the Benefits Review Board’s decision and the underlying award of benefits remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The eleventh-circuit dismissed the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that although it retains jurisdiction to review constitutional claims or questions of law under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), it lacks jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Because the immigration judge made an independent, dispositive determination at step two of the Wilkinson inquiry—exercising discretion to deny relief even if statutory eligibility were established—the court lacked jurisdiction to review the underlying step-one ineligibility determination, regardless of any colorable legal challenges presented by the petitioner. The practical consequence is that the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming the denial of cancellation of removal stands without judicial review on the merits.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The eleventh-circuit granted Jeremias Pasqual-Andres’s petition for review and vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by requiring a complaint to a state bar as the sole method to satisfy the third prong of *Matter of Lozada*, which mandates that petitioners file complaints with “appropriate disciplinary authorities.” The court reasoned that the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is an appropriate disciplinary authority because its 2009 regulatory enhancements provide robust sanctions and serve the same policy goals as state bar complaints, including deterring meritless claims and policing attorney conduct. Additionally, the court held that strict adherence to *Lozada*’s procedural requirements is not necessary; substantial compliance is sufficient, and Pasqual-Andres’s filing of an EOIR complaint satisfied this standard by meeting the underlying purposes of the rule. The practical consequence is that the BIA’s denial is vacated, requiring the agency to reconsider the motion to reopen in light of the court’s ruling.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment convicting Darren Duncan of distributing fentanyl and imposing a sentence within the United States Sentencing Guidelines range. Applying the sufficiency of the evidence standard under *United States v. Oliver*, 90 F.4th 1222, 1224–25 (8th Cir. 2024), the court held that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Duncan knowingly distributed a controlled substance. The court relied on witness testimony, text messages, and an autopsy report to conclude that the government satisfied its burden under *United States v. Campbell*, 986 F.3d 782, 809 (8th Cir. 2021), noting that proof of the exact nature of the substance is not required, only that it was a controlled substance of some kind. The court further distinguished the facts from *United States v. Cheshier*, 134 F.4th 534, 538 (8th Cir. 2025), finding sufficient evidence that Duncan distributed fentanyl to the victim. Consequently, the conviction and sentence are affirmed with no further proceedings required.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.