Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The seventh circuit affirmed the convictions and life sentences of four defendants (Frank Smith, Warren Griffin, Sean Clemon, and Dominque Maxwell) for racketeering conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering, attempted murder in aid of racketeering, and firearm offenses arising from their roles in the Gangster Disciples. The court held that although the district court erred by failing to require a pretrial “Santiago proffer” to evaluate the admissibility of numerous coconspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), this procedural misstep did not result in reversible error because the defendants failed to identify specific inadmissible statements that affected the trial outcome, and any potential errors were harmless. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support all convictions, finding ample proof of the defendants’ participation in the conspiracy and predicate acts, including murders and drug trafficking. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of Maxwell’s motion to suppress a handgun, ruling that the traffic stop was lawful under the collective knowledge doctrine and the canine sniff did not unreasonably prolong the detention. The court also found no error in the district court’s handling of a prospective juror’s comment during voir dire or in the admission of testimony from a cooperating witness. Consequently, the defendants’ convictions and sentences remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The fourth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Central Intelligence Agency in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action seeking disclosure of documents regarding American prisoners of war and government recovery efforts. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to compel a search of the CIA’s operational files under the CIA Information Act because the agency was still conducting its search, meaning it had not yet “improperly withheld” records, and the plaintiffs provided only general affidavits rather than specific evidence of improper placement. Regarding redactions to the Joint Report, the court determined that the CIA’s affidavit sufficiently described the withheld material with reasonable specificity and explained how it fell under FOIA Exemption 1 (national defense and foreign policy secrets) and Exemption 3 (statutory exemptions protecting intelligence sources, methods, and agency personnel). The court rejected arguments that the affidavit was conclusory or that past disagreements regarding the accuracy of a National Intelligence Estimate constituted bad faith sufficient to overcome the presumption of the agency’s good faith. As a result, the district court’s decision is affirmed, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to the disclosure of the redacted information or an in camera inspection.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The fourth circuit affirmed Devon Sherman Mickins’s sentence after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court held that the district court did not err in classifying Mickins’s prior Virginia conviction for malicious wounding under Va. Code § 18.2-51 as a crime of violence for purposes of calculating his base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Applying de novo review and the categorical approach, the court determined that the statute requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person, thereby satisfying the definition of a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Consequently, the district court properly assigned Mickins a base offense level of 22 under Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(3), and the judgment was affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The eleventh-circuit issued an order in case 26-10573 on August 4, 2026. The provided text consists solely of the caption and page headers for a four-page document and contains no substantive judicial opinion, holding, or stated basis for decision. Consequently, no specific legal ruling, standard applied, or practical consequence can be summarized from the available information.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 5:24-cv-01803)

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Paul Lisenby’s retaliation claim under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). The court held that to constitute protected conduct under the “other efforts” prong of the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision, a plaintiff must hold an objectively reasonable belief that their employer is violating or will violate the FCA by submitting false claims for payment to the federal government. While the court determined that FCA retaliation claims are not subject to the heightened particularity pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), it found Lisenby’s Amended Complaint failed to allege facts connecting his concerns about FDA regulatory violations and patient safety risks to a belief that Olympus was committing fraud against the government. Consequently, Lisenby did not engage in protected activity, and the dismissal stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The ninth-circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of an appeal from an Immigration Judge’s denial of applications for asylum and withholding of removal. The court applied the substantial evidence standard, upholding the agency’s determinations because the evidence did not compel a contrary conclusion. Specifically, the court found that the petitioner’s experiences, including an attempted robbery, school discrimination, and extreme poverty, did not rise to the level of past persecution or establish a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his Quiché ethnicity or proposed particular social group. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate an individualized risk of persecution despite membership in a disfavored group. Because the petitioner failed to meet the lower standard for asylum, he could not satisfy the higher “clear probability” standard required for withholding of removal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The sixth circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the defendant officers failed to concede the plaintiff’s version of the facts as required for interlocutory review of a qualified immunity denial. The court applied the standard that appellate jurisdiction over qualified immunity denials is limited to purely legal questions and does not extend to disputes over material facts, unless the defendants explicitly concede the plaintiff’s factual assertions or the record evidence blatantly contradicts those assertions. The court found that although the officers purported to accept the record, their briefing relied on contested factual disputes regarding whether the plaintiff actively resisted during two separate uses of force. Furthermore, the video evidence did not blatantly contradict the district court’s determination that genuine issues of material fact existed. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the plaintiff’s civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to proceed in the district court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 4:25-cv-00323-KAW

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Linda Furst Mayne’s complaint against her former attorneys. Although the court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar jurisdiction because Mayne alleged a legal injury caused by an adverse party rather than a state court judgment, it affirmed the dismissal on the alternative ground that the claims were time-barred. The court determined that the gravamen of the complaint was professional negligence (legal malpractice) arising from services rendered in July 2019, which is subject to Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542. Because Mayne filed her complaint in January 2025, more than two years after the alleged wrongful acts, the claims were barred and amendment would be futile.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

Docket: 2:20-cv-08985-FWS-DFM

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Charles Everett’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), reviewing the denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court properly concluded Everett’s claims under Rules 60(b)(2) and (3) were untimely, as the one-year deadline in Rule 60(c)(1) expired more than two years prior to his filing and was not tolled during the pendency of his appeal. The court further held that relief under Rule 60(b)(5) was properly denied because the Supreme Court’s decision in *SEC v. Jarkesy* applies only to administrative proceedings before SEC judges, not to civil enforcement actions litigated in federal district courts where summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment jury trial rights. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief, noting that Everett failed to identify any extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from a judgment entered more than two years earlier and that the motion could not serve as a substitute for appeal on the merits. The practical consequence is that the underlying summary judgment against Everett remains in full force and effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-04

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment convicting Darren Duncan of distributing fentanyl and imposing a sentence within the United States Sentencing Guidelines range. Applying the sufficiency of the evidence standard under *United States v. Oliver*, 90 F.4th 1222, 1224–25 (8th Cir. 2024), the court held that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Duncan knowingly distributed a controlled substance. The court relied on witness testimony, text messages, and an autopsy report to conclude that the government satisfied its burden under *United States v. Campbell*, 986 F.3d 782, 809 (8th Cir. 2021), noting that proof of the exact nature of the substance is not required, only that it was a controlled substance of some kind. The court further distinguished the facts from *United States v. Cheshier*, 134 F.4th 534, 538 (8th Cir. 2025), finding sufficient evidence that Duncan distributed fentanyl to the victim. Consequently, the conviction and sentence are affirmed with no further proceedings required.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.