Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The ninth-circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of a judicial competency hearing. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding insufficient indicia of incompetency under *Matter of M-A-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. 474 (BIA 2011). Applying the standard that serious mental illness does not automatically equate to a lack of competency, the court noted that while Cruz Matas suffered from anxiety and depression, these conditions did not prevent meaningful participation in proceedings, unlike cases involving hallucinations or psychotic features. The court further found that the IJ properly relied on recent medical records and Cruz Matas’s demonstrated ability to represent himself, distinguishing the case from prior remands where outdated records were used or speech patterns indicated disorganized thought. Additionally, the court rejected arguments regarding the *Franco-Gonzalez* injunction, concluding that the IJ did not err in relying on a mental health evaluation that showed no signs of mania or suicidal ideation, and found no due process violation from translation pauses because Cruz Matas failed to demonstrate that better translation would have likely changed the outcome. The petition for review was denied, and the motion to stay removal was denied as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The seventh-circuit affirmed that Enbridge Energy Company committed trespass by operating Line 5 across 12 parcels of land within the Bad River Reservation after its rights-of-way expired in 2013 without tribal consent or valid federal approval. The court rejected Enbridge’s arguments that a 1992 agreement obligated the Band to consent to renewed easements for these specific parcels and that the Administrative Procedure Act preserved the easements during pending renewal applications, holding that the applications were insufficient under applicable regulations because they lacked required tribal consent. Regarding remedies, the court affirmed that restitution and injunctive relief are appropriate for intentional trespass on Indian lands but vacated the district court’s specific awards due to calculation errors. The court found the district court abused its discretion by double-counting Enbridge’s profits and by improperly discounting the value of deferred reroute costs based on pipeline mileage. The court remanded these monetary and injunctive remedies for recalculation, instructing the district court to fashion an injunction that allows Enbridge a reasonable opportunity to complete its proposed reroute of Line 5 around the Reservation to avoid violating a U.S.-Canada Transit Treaty and disrupting energy supplies, while ensuring accountability for the eventual removal of the pipeline. Finally, the court reversed the district court’s judgment on the Band’s federal common law nuisance claim, holding that the Pipeline Safety Act displaced such claims. The court reasoned that the Act provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme administered by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to address pipeline safety hazards, including erosion risks, thereby leaving no gap for federal common law to fill.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The seventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Saggezza, Inc., and its denial of Arkeyo LLC’s motions for spoliation sanctions, reconsideration, and relief from judgment, as well as the award of attorney’s fees to Saggezza. The court held that Arkeyo failed to establish liability under any of its claims. For copyright infringement, the court found no evidence of copying, rejecting Arkeyo’s argument that superficial similarities between the software allowed for an inference of copying given fundamental differences in code and development approaches. Regarding trade secret misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, the court ruled that the source code was not protected because it had been publicly disclosed online, and other alleged secrets were either readily ascertainable to users or too generic to qualify as concrete trade secrets. On tortious interference, the court applied Illinois law to determine that Saggezza’s competitive conduct did not involve wrongful means, particularly since the underlying intellectual property claims lacked merit. For conversion, the court noted that Arkeyo lacked an immediate right to possess the touchscreen computer, which was owned by Metro Bank, and failed to make a pre-suit demand for its return. The court also affirmed the denial of spoliation sanctions because Arkeyo’s claims were based on speculation rather than evidence that Saggezza destroyed existing evidence. Finally, the court upheld the attorney’s fees awarded under 17 U.S.C. § 505, citing the strong presumption in favor of fee-shifting for prevailing defendants against objectively baseless copyright claims. The practical consequence is that Arkeyo’s lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice and it must pay Saggezza’s legal costs.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 2:21-cv-01149-

The ninth-circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s judgment in favor of Multiple Energy Technologies, LLC against Seth Casden. Regarding the claim for tortious interference with contract under California law, the panel held that corporate agents are ordinarily immune from such suits when acting on behalf of their principal. The court determined that the district court erred by denying immunity solely because Casden acted for his “individual advantage,” clarifying that an agent loses immunity only when acting outside the scope of agency by benefiting himself at the expense of the principal, not merely when advancing personal interests alongside corporate goals. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment on the tortious interference claim and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this standard. Regarding the false advertising claim under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)), the panel reversed the district court’s award of disgorgement of Casden’s salary. The court reasoned that the statute permits recovery of a defendant’s “profits,” which requires proof of the defendant’s sales; because Casden as an individual had no sales, his salary could not be treated as profits distinct from corporate expenses. Finally, the panel affirmed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act, finding no abuse of discretion in deeming the case “exceptional” based on the jury’s finding that Casden’s representations were deliberately or intentionally false.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 2:24-cv-00150-DCN

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying James Newlin’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard, holding that the district court did not err because Newlin failed to demonstrate any basis for relief, noting that Rule 60(b) relief is granted sparingly and only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action. The practical consequence is that the underlying judgment remains in effect, and arguments raised for the first time on appeal were not considered.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a civil rights employment action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his failure-to-accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation claims. Regarding the failure-to-accommodate claim, the court applied the standard requiring an employer to engage in the interactive process in good faith. It determined that any breakdown in this process was attributable to the plaintiff’s failure to provide updated medical documentation explaining his disability and limitations, rather than the employer’s refusal to accommodate. The court noted that the plaintiff submitted only parking placard renewal paperwork, which lacked the necessary medical details required by company policy and Eighth Circuit precedent to allow the employer to propose a reasonable accommodation. For the discrimination and retaliation claims, the court applied the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework. It concluded that the employer articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination—insubordination for repeated violations of the company’s parking policy despite warnings. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that this reason was pretextual or that discriminatory animus motivated the adverse employment action. The court found that supervisor statements questioning the need for accommodation did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination, nor did they establish a causal link to the termination decision, which occurred after continued policy violations. As a practical consequence, the judgment for the defendants stands, and the plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with no further proceedings in the district court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The eighth-circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal. The court held that the defendant’s valid and enforceable appeal waiver barred review of the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, as enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. After conducting an independent review of the record under Penson v. Ohio, the court found no nonfrivolous issues outside the scope of the waiver. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and counsel was permitted to withdraw.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The eighth-circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal. The court held that the defendant’s appeal waiver was enforceable because it applied to the substantive reasonableness challenge raised in the Anders brief, and enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. After independently reviewing the record under Penson v. Ohio, the court found no non-frivolous issues outside the scope of the waiver. The practical consequence is that the appeal is dismissed and counsel is permitted to withdraw.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 3:21-cv-01445-JO-MMP

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment and dismissal orders in Marin’s civil rights action alleging discrimination and retaliation at San Diego State University. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims because Marin failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether he was “otherwise qualified” to remain a student, as required under *Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of California*. The court further affirmed the dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment claim challenging the university’s vaccination rule, finding it barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity because the state is the real party in interest. Additionally, the court affirmed the dismissal of remaining claims for failure to state plausible relief under *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, noting that § 1983 liability requires personal participation by defendants and due process claims require a protected liberty or property interest. The court also affirmed the denial of Marin’s motion to seal documents, ruling that he failed to provide the documents to the district court despite the strong public policy favoring access to judicial records. Finally, the court denied Marin’s motion for a stay and permission to file a new appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 2:22-cv-01157-TLN-JDP

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Kim Edward Rogers’s pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging California’s sex offender registration requirements. Applying de novo review, the court held that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief because it lacked sufficient factual matter, as required by the standard established in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*. The court declined to consider arguments not specifically raised in the opening brief and denied all pending motions.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.