Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 5:24-cv-02081-SRM-JDE

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Colen’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force action for failure to serve the summons and complaint. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion because Colen failed to effect proper service despite notice and opportunities to do so, and failed to establish good cause for the failure. The court noted that Colen did not comply with the service requirements for local government entities under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c) and (j)(2), as well as California Code of Civil Procedure sections 416.50 and 415.20, and failed to meet the strict requirements for service by publication. Colen’s request for service by the U.S. Marshals was denied as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental Resources, Inc. and Petro-Hunt, LLC, holding that a 1948 mineral lease (the County Lease) governs the subject property in North Dakota rather than a subsequent 2019 lease (the Rolfsrud Lease). Applying de novo review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the court relied on North Dakota Supreme Court precedents, specifically *Ulrich v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation* and *Holbeck v. Hull*, to determine that the County Lease was voidable, not void, when the prior owner redeemed the property from the county in 1951. The court reasoned that because Hans Stole, the redeeming owner, ratified the County Lease in 1954, it remained valid and binding on his successors. Furthermore, the court rejected the appellants’ argument that the lease had terminated due to lack of production on the specific subject property, applying North Dakota law which provides that continuous production anywhere on the leased unit extends the lease for all land covered by the lease in the absence of an explicit “Pugh clause.” Consequently, the Rolfsrud Lease was deemed a “top lease” that did not take effect because the County Lease remained in force. The practical consequence is that Petro-Hunt retains its interest in the subject property under the 1948 County Lease, entitling it to pay royalties at the lower rate specified therein rather than under the terms of the later Rolfsrud Lease.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 3:24-cv-01864-MMC

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Monika Kulikova’s action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and wrongful foreclosure under California law. The court reviewed the dismissal de novo and held that the district court properly dismissed the FDCPA claims because the defendants, acting as nonjudicial foreclosure trustees, do not qualify as “debt collectors” under the relevant statutory sections. Regarding the FCRA claims, the court affirmed dismissal because Kulikova failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that the information furnished to credit reporting agencies was inaccurate. The wrongful foreclosure claim was also properly dismissed because Kulikova did not allege she tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from doing so. The court rejected Kulikova’s procedural arguments regarding the lack of a hearing and alleged tampering with exhibits as meritless, declined to consider her abandoned RICO claims which were not repleaded in an amended complaint, and denied all pending motions.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 1:23-cv-00484-AKB

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Andrew J.J. Wolf’s pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case because Wolf failed to comply with a specific court order directing him to file an opposition to defendants’ motions for summary judgment, despite being warned that such failure would result in dismissal. The appellate court applied the standard of review for dismissals based on a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comply with court orders, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and the factors established in *Pagtalunan v. Galaza* and *Ferdik v. Bonzelet*. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of Wolf’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, finding no basis for relief. Consequently, the court declined to consider Wolf’s challenges to the denial of preliminary injunctive relief or other interlocutory orders as moot or unappealable following the final dismissal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The seventh-circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians against Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., holding that Enbridge is liable for trespass and unjust enrichment because its rights-of-way over allotted trust lands within the reservation expired in 2013 and were not renewed with the requisite tribal consent. The court rejected Enbridge’s arguments that a 1992 agreement obligated the Band to consent to future easements or that the Administrative Procedure Act preserved the expired easements pending administrative review, finding that neither federal common law nor Wisconsin contract principles support such an expansive reading of tribal sovereign authority or contractual intent. Regarding remedies, the court affirmed that restitution and injunctive relief are available for intentional trespass on Indian lands but vacated the district court’s specific awards due to errors in calculation and discretion. The court found the restitution award abused discretion by potentially double-counting Enbridge’s profits and the economic benefit of deferred reroute costs, and by improperly discounting the latter based on pipeline mileage. Furthermore, while affirming that injunctive relief is warranted to protect tribal sovereignty, the court held the district court exceeded its discretion in imposing a three-year shutdown deadline, as this risked violating the U.S.-Canada Transit Treaty and harming public energy interests; instead, the injunction must allow Enbridge a reasonable opportunity to complete its proposed reroute. Finally, the court reversed the district court’s judgment on the Band’s federal common law nuisance claim, holding that the Pipeline Safety Act (49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq.) displaced federal common law in this area. The court determined that the Act’s comprehensive regulatory scheme, which delegates authority to the Secretary of Transportation and PHMSA to monitor pipeline safety and issue corrective orders, speaks directly to the risk of pipeline rupture due to erosion, leaving no gap for judicially created nuisance remedies. The case is remanded to the district court to recalculate the restitution award using a single, properly explained measure of Enbridge’s wrongful gain and to fashion injunctive relief that balances the Band’s sovereign rights with the public interest in uninterrupted energy flow and treaty obligations.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 2:24-cv-02478-ROS–JZB

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Bartha’s § 1983 action against the State of Arizona as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court applied de novo review and held that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against unconsenting states regardless of the relief sought, and that a state is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. The court declined to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. The judgment of the district court stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 3:25-cv-05240-

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a class of detained aliens, holding that aliens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United States are not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The court reasoned that, based on the text and context of the Immigration and Nationality Act, § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to aliens seeking entry at the border, whereas aliens apprehended in the interior remain subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for release on bond. The court found that interpreting “seeking admission” as requiring an affirmative process of attempting to gain entry at the border avoids rendering statutory language superfluous, aligns with the ordinary meaning of the terms, and is consistent with longstanding executive branch practice and Supreme Court precedent. Consequently, the challenged government policy mandating detention without bond for interior apprehensions was invalid, and the detained aliens are entitled to bond hearings under § 1226(a).

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The first-circuit affirmed Napoleon Gonzalez’s convictions for identity theft, passport fraud, Social Security benefit fraud, furnishing false information to the SSA, and mail fraud, as well as the accompanying restitution order of $175,757.00. Regarding venue for the passport fraud counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1542, the court applied the standard that a verdict must be upheld if a rational juror could have found proper venue by a preponderance of the evidence. The court held that venue was proper in Maine for the false statement count because circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s long-term residence and mailing address in Maine, supported the inference that the application was completed there. For the use-based passport fraud count, the court determined venue was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3238 because the defendant used the passport outside the United States in Canada, making the district of his last known residence appropriate. On restitution, the court reviewed for abuse of discretion and upheld the district court’s selection of a calculation scenario that credited the higher earnings figure for each year rather than combining records, finding sufficient evidence from the defendant’s own admissions that he did not work under both identities in the same year. The practical consequence is that the convictions and sentence stand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

The ninth-circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying the petitioners’ motion to reopen their asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture applications based on changed country conditions in Ukraine. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard, upholding the BIA’s determination unless it was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. The court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions sufficient to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. Specifically, the court agreed with the BIA that evidence regarding persecution of Pentecostal Christians in eastern Ukraine was not material because the petitioners did not show they lived or would be forced to live in that region. Additionally, the court found that forced military conscription generally does not constitute persecution on account of a protected ground, and the petitioners provided no evidence that their derivative petitioner would be targeted for conscription due to his religion. Finally, the court concluded that evidence of generalized violence from the armed conflict did not establish eligibility for relief without showing a specific well-founded fear of future persecution. The practical consequence is that the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen stands and the petitioners’ applications remain denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-30

Docket: 2:22-cv-01157-TLN-JDP

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Kim Edward Rogers’s pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging California’s sex offender registration requirements. Applying de novo review, the court held that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief because it lacked sufficient factual matter, as required by the standard established in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*. The court declined to consider arguments not specifically raised in the opening brief and denied all pending motions.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.