Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 0:23-cr-60244-PCH-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the 60-month imprisonment sentence imposed on Marco Vado for illegal re-entry into the United States after prior deportation. The court held that the district court did not commit procedural error in explaining its upward variance, nor was the sentence substantively unreasonable. Regarding procedural reasonableness, the court applied the plain-error standard because Vado failed to object at sentencing after being given an opportunity to do so. Under this standard, the defendant must demonstrate an error that is plain and affects substantial rights. The court found no such error, ruling that the district court adequately explained its decision to impose a 14-month upward variance from the advisory guideline range of 37-46 months. The district court specifically identified Vado’s criminal history category as “understated” due to an attempted sexual battery of a minor and the unusual concurrent nature of a probation revocation sentence for cocaine trafficking, which satisfied the requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) to state the reason for a sentence outside the guideline range with specificity. Regarding substantive reasonableness, the court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard, placing the burden on Vado to show the sentence was unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court determined that the district court properly weighed Vado’s criminal history, the parties’ arguments, and the statutory factors, including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law. The court noted that the district court acted within its discretion to consider facts underlying prior conduct when determining an upward variance. As a result of this decision, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida is affirmed, and Vado’s sentence remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The First Circuit issued an erratum sheet to amend its opinion issued on July 14, 2026, in the case of Czereno v. General Electric Company et al. The court directed a clerical correction on page 25, footnote 10, line 4, replacing the word “district” with “district court.” This administrative order clarifies the text of the prior opinion without altering the court’s substantive holding or disposition.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The fifth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Steven D. Magee’s civil action involving breach-of-contract and trademark claims, as well as his request to pierce the corporate veil. The court held that under Texas law, specifically Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.223(b) and § 21.224, a party may only pierce the corporate veil by demonstrating that the entity was used to perpetrate actual fraud for the direct personal benefit of its owner. The court further ruled that although pro se filings receive liberal construction, Magee failed to preserve his arguments because he did not specifically address or identify errors in the district court’s finding that his allegations of fraud were conclusory, thereby abandoning the challenge. Additionally, the court denied Magee’s request for a writ of mandamus to remand the case to a different geographic forum upon any potential reversal, noting that such relief was conditional on a reversal that did not occur and that the petition regarding the judge’s recusal was not properly before this panel. Consequently, the district court’s judgment stands, and Magee’s motions for remand and stay of appeal are denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants in Jay Folse’s civil rights action. The court confined its review to the issues raised in the appellant’s informal brief, adhering to Fourth Circuit Rule 34(b) and the precedent set in *Jackson v. Lightsey*, which limits appellate review to arguments preserved in such filings. After reviewing the district court’s order alongside Folse’s arguments, the court found no reversible error. Consequently, the judgment of the Southern District of West Virginia is affirmed, and oral argument was dispensed with as the record adequately presented the facts and legal contentions.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 2:24-cr-00045-AMM-SGC-1

The eleventh-circuit granted the motion of appointed counsel to withdraw from representation in this direct criminal appeal and affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences. The court applied the standard established in *Anders v. California*, conducting an independent review of the entire record to verify counsel’s assessment that the appeal lacks arguable merit. Finding no issues of merit upon independent examination, the court denied any further appellate arguments on behalf of the appellant while simultaneously upholding the district court’s judgment.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 2:24-CV-00458-JNP-CMR)

The tenth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Narvin Lichfield’s defamation and related claims against filmmaker Katherine Kubler and Netflix. The court held that the contested statements in Kubler’s documentary series, *The Program*, were not capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter of law under Utah state law and are protected by the First Amendment. Applying de novo review to the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the court analyzed three specific segments of the documentary. First, regarding a visual juxtaposition of Lichfield’s photo with a headline about a teen’s death and the narration that “people at the top seem to get away with murder,” the court found this was not defamatory because “get away with murder” is a common idiom used figuratively in this context to discuss accountability, and a reasonable viewer would not accept it as a literal accusation of homicide. Second, regarding the omission of information that criminal charges against Lichfield were dismissed after his arrest in Costa Rica, the court ruled that the statement was substantially true under the “substantial truth” doctrine; the gist of the speech—that executives in the troubled-teen industry evade liability—remained the same regardless of the omitted facts. Third, regarding Kubler’s narration at a karaoke bar stating she knew about “the children he abused, the parents he conned, all the crimes he’s gotten away with,” the court determined these were protected privileged opinions and rhetorical hyperbole. The court emphasized the subjective, personal, and advocacy-driven context of the documentary, noting that terms like “abused” and “conned” were used broadly to critique a business model rather than to assert specific, objectively verifiable criminal facts. Consequently, because Lichfield failed to allege statements capable of defamatory meaning, his derivative claims for defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy also failed. The court further held that Lichfield waived his arguments regarding the application of state anti-SLAPP laws in federal diversity actions by previously urging the district court to apply Utah law rather than arguing they were inapplicable under *Erie*. Additionally, the court declined to grant leave to amend the complaint due to insufficient procedural motion. While the court noted that Lichfield’s counsel filed a brief containing fabricated legal citations likely resulting from generative artificial intelligence, it determined the errors did not warrant sanctions but issued a stern warning regarding attorney responsibility for verifying legal authorities. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 1:06-cr-00296-WMR-CCH-1

The eleventh-circuit dismissed in part as untimely and affirmed in part the district court’s denial of Jeremiah Travis III’s motion for relief from judgment. The court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 does not provide a vehicle for relief from a judgment in a criminal case, citing *United States v. Fair*, 326 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003). Alternatively, the court determined that any appeal regarding Travis’s denied motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) or related reconsideration motions was untimely because his notice of appeal was filed more than 14 days after the district court’s order denying his second motion for reconsideration, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A). The court noted that even if the appeal were timely, it would lack merit because Supreme Court precedent in *Rutherford v. United States* precludes using changes to § 924(c) stacking rules or updated Sentencing Commission guidance as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release. Consequently, Travis’s request for a sentence reduction based on these grounds was rejected, and the district court’s orders remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit vacated Donald Craig Melvin’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement. The court held that the district court committed reversible procedural error by allowing the Government to introduce a new ACCA predicate offense at the sentencing hearing after failing to object to the presentence report within the 14-day deadline required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f). The court applied the standard established in *United States v. Hodge*, 902 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2018), which mandates that the Government be held to the same procedural standards as a defendant regarding objections to presentence reports. Under Rule 32, parties must state objections in writing within 14 days of receiving the report; absent “good cause,” untimely objections are forfeited. The court found no good cause existed for the Government’s failure to object earlier, noting that the Government’s strategic decision not to raise the new predicate until after its initial arguments failed constituted an impermissible attempt to surprise the defense and subvert sentencing strategy. The court further rejected the Government’s argument that the error was harmless under *United States v. Dix*, distinguishing *Dix* on the basis that the Government in this case withheld its argument until after an adverse ruling, whereas *Dix* involved arguments made before any adverse ruling. Because the untimely predicate increased Melvin’s sentence from a 10-year maximum to an 188-month mandatory minimum, the error was not harmless. As a practical consequence, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to resentence Melvin without applying the ACCA enhancement based on the newly introduced predicate offense. Additionally, the court held that the Government forfeited its argument regarding Melvin’s appeal waiver by failing to raise it in its initial responsive filings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Olivia Johnson’s civil complaint without prejudice for failure to correct deficiencies in her filing requirements. The court applied a standard of review finding no reversible error in the lower court’s procedural dismissal and determined that oral argument was unnecessary as the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the record. As a result, the district court’s dismissal order remains in effect, leaving the case dismissed without prejudice for Johnson to potentially refile if she can satisfy the required filing standards.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 6:26-cv-00711-PGB-NWH

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting a petition for the return of a minor child to Norway under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). The court held that the father established a prima facie case of wrongful retention because the child habitually resided in Norway, the father had exercised parental rights, and there was credible evidence he did not consent to the mother’s removal of the child to the United States. The court applied clear error review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions, specifically regarding the “grave risk” affirmative defense under Article 13(b) of the Convention (22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A)). The appellate court rejected the mother’s arguments that repatriation posed a grave risk of harm, noting that Norway provides comprehensive support for children with special needs and that the loss of specific educational accommodations in Florida does not constitute a grave risk under the Convention. The court further ruled that the district court properly excluded an out-of-court clinical evaluation report as inadmissible hearsay since the expert did not testify, thereby avoiding any need for a *Daubert* analysis. Additionally, the court found no clear error in the district court’s credibility determinations regarding the father’s cessation of video calls and his lack of consent to the relocation, emphasizing that appellate courts must defer to the trial court’s opportunity to judge witness credibility. The court also determined that the return order did not violate international comity because it addressed custody jurisdiction under the Hague Convention rather than conflicting with a temporary Norwegian custody ruling. The practical consequence is that the minor child remains subject to the district court’s order directing his return to the Kingdom of Norway, and all pending motions for stays or reconsideration are denied as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.