Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 8:17-cr-00497-WFJ-SPF-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment and 18 months of supervised release imposed upon revocation of Yuoh’s supervised release. The court applied the abuse of discretion standard to review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, examining whether the term was reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), excluding the retributive factor under § 3553(a)(2)(A). The court held that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable because it fell within the applicable guideline range, thereby receiving a presumption of reasonableness, and because the district court expressly acknowledged considering the permissible statutory factors. The court further determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion by affording greater weight to factors such as public protection and deterrence over Yuoh’s mitigating arguments regarding mental health, age, and family needs, nor was there a requirement for the court to provide separate explanations for the imprisonment and supervised release terms. Consequently, the judgment of the district court remains in effect, and the defendant must serve the imposed sentence.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 2:21-CV-00455-DBB)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ephraim Olson, dismissing all claims brought by OL Private Counsel, LLC (OLPC). The court held that OLPC failed to establish a cognizable theory of damages under Utah law. Specifically, the court applied the “American Rule,” which generally bars the recovery of attorney’s fees as consequential or special damages unless an exception applies. While acknowledging the “third-party litigation exception,” the court found it inapplicable because OLPC was not a party to the underlying divorce proceedings and its decision to indemnify its clients for legal fees was a voluntary, post-hoc oral agreement rather than a foreseeable consequence of Olson’s conduct. Consequently, the asserted damages were not recoverable. Regarding the conversion claim, the court reviewed the district court’s requirement that OLPC prove damages under a plain error standard because OLPC failed to raise the argument that damages are not an element of conversion in Utah law before the district court. The appellate court determined that any potential error was not “plain” or clear under well-settled law, nor did it affect substantial rights or seriously impact the fairness of judicial proceedings. Finally, the court found no violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) regarding the sua sponte denial of injunctive relief, concluding that OLPC had sufficient notice to address the issue of irreparable harm during summary judgment briefing. The practical consequence is that OL Private Counsel’s lawsuit against Ephraim Olson is dismissed with no damages awarded and no injunctive relief granted. The case remains closed in favor of the defendant.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The eleventh-circuit dismissed the petition for review filed by Rosa Peralta, a lawful permanent resident seeking a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(h) and adjustment of status under INA § 245(a). The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the denial because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision solely as a matter of ultimate discretion, without addressing the IJ’s underlying statutory eligibility determination regarding Peralta’s criminal conviction or her failure to meet the “extreme hardship” standard. Under the principle that appellate review is limited to the grounds upon which the administrative order was based, and citing *Wilkinson v. Garland*, the court determined that it cannot review an agency’s discretionary decision to deny a waiver even if the petitioner met statutory requirements. Consequently, Peralta’s challenge to the balancing of equities and hardship findings was deemed beyond the court’s jurisdictional purview, resulting in the dismissal of her petition.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sterling George Spotted Elk, Jr.’s motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The court applied the two-step test established in *Dillon v. United States*, first confirming that Spotted Elk was eligible for a reduction because a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines lowered his advisory range, and second, concluding that a reduction was not warranted after applying the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and USSG § 1B1.10. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by weighing Spotted Elk’s serious underlying offense, his history of recidivism, and his post-sentencing disciplinary infractions in prison—including assault and weapon possession—against any rehabilitative efforts he claimed to have made. Because § 3582(c)(2) does not create a right to sentence reduction and the district court properly considered the relevant statutory factors, the original order denying the motion remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The seventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, Froedtert Health Inc., dismissing a class action lawsuit brought by employee Nichole Lutz alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Wisconsin state law regarding overtime and holiday pay calculations. The court held that Froedtert’s methodology for calculating overtime compensation was lawful under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) and its implementing regulations, specifically 29 C.F.R. § 778.109. Under the FLSA, an employer may calculate the regular rate by dividing total remuneration (including shift differentials and weekend bonuses) by total hours worked in a workweek, then paying an overtime premium equal to one-half of that regular rate for hours exceeding 40. The court rejected Lutz’s proposed method of segregating non-overtime and overtime hours for separate rate calculations, noting that her approach would create pay disparities between employees working identical hours with shift differentials depending on when those hours occurred within the workweek. Regarding holiday pay, the court ruled that Froedtert correctly excluded holiday premiums from regular rate calculations pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(6). The statute permits excluding payments for special days if they are paid at a rate of at least one and one-half times the bona fide rate applicable to like work performed on non-overtime hours. The court found that Froedtert’s holiday pay rates exceeded this threshold, thereby qualifying for exclusion. Including such premiums in the regular rate would create an unworkable “pyramiding” effect where overtime premiums are repeatedly added to the base rate, a problem the Supreme Court identified in *Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron*. The court further determined that Wisconsin law, which mirrors FLSA language regarding the “regular rate,” supports this exclusion and declined to certify the question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court as there was no genuine uncertainty regarding state law interpretation. Consequently, Lutz’s claims were dismissed with prejudice, and her motion for certification of a state-law question was denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal and denied the appellant’s motion for the appointment of counsel. The court held that Porter forfeited his right to appellate review of the district court’s dismissal order because he failed to file timely, specific objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation after receiving proper notice of the consequences of such failure. The underlying district court had dismissed the § 1983 complaint based on the magistrate judge’s finding that the filing was illegible and not double-spaced in violation of local rules. Applying the standard established in *Thomas v. Arn* and Fourth Circuit precedent, the court determined that because Porter did not object to the recommendation regarding the formatting defects, he could not challenge the substantive basis for the dismissal on appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 1:24-CV-02450-DDD-KAS)

The tenth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to state officials, holding that Colorado’s Congestion Impact Fee is not preempted by the federal Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA), 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d)(2)(A)(v). The court determined that the AHTA prohibits states from levying or collecting fees “upon any business located at a commercial service airport,” but the Colorado statute imposes the fee on consumers who rent short-term vehicles, not on the rental businesses themselves. The court applied de novo review to its interpretation of both federal and state statutes, focusing on the plain wording of 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d)(2)(A)(v) and Colorado Revised Statute § 43-4-806(7.6). The court concluded that the statutory term “fee payers” refers to the consumers renting the vehicles, who are the beneficiaries of the surface transportation infrastructure projects funded by the fee revenue. Although car rental businesses are required to collect and remit the fee to the state, the court reasoned this is analogous to sales tax collection mechanisms where businesses act as agents for the state rather than the primary subjects of the levy. Consequently, because the legal incidence of the fee falls on consumers rather than airport-based businesses, the AHTA’s preemption provision does not apply. The practical consequence is that the Colorado Congestion Impact Fee remains in effect and may be enforced against short-term vehicle rentals throughout the state. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, leaving the federal preemption claim unsuccessful.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 1:19-cr-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the mandatory minimum sentence imposed on James Patterson under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) following his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that while the district court violated *Apprendi v. New Jersey* by determining as a matter of fact whether Patterson’s prior offenses occurred on “different occasions” rather than submitting that issue to a jury, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the record contained overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence—specifically the dates in the indictments and presentence report showing offenses separated by years—that the crimes were committed on different occasions. Additionally, applying the modified categorical approach, the court ruled that Patterson’s prior Oregon convictions for third-degree assault and strangulation qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA, rejecting arguments regarding overbreadth or accomplice liability because he was convicted as a principal and the state statutes required intentional or knowing conduct capable of causing physical injury. As a result, the judgment of the district court is affirmed, and Patterson’s sentence remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 2:24-cr-00002-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Mark William Anten’s jury conviction for transmitting threats to injure another in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The court held that the true-threat statute requires both an objective element and a subjective mental state element. Specifically, the court ruled that whether a statement constitutes a “threat” must be judged through the eyes of a reasonable person based on the context, language, and reaction of recipients, while the government must also prove the defendant acted with knowledge or conscious disregard of a substantial risk that the communication would be viewed as a threat. Regarding the jury instructions, the court determined that although they could have been more clearly formulated by explicitly mentioning the “reasonable person” standard or defining a threat as a “serious expression,” the instructions provided to the jury sufficiently covered the objective element. The instructions directed jurors to consider the circumstances, context, language used, and the reaction of those who received the communication, thereby preventing conviction based on jokes or hyperbole. Additionally, the court rejected Anten’s claim that the district court invaded the province of the jury by responding to a note asking which exhibits were referenced in the indictment; the court found the judge’s response merely identified the specific exhibits quoted or referenced without acting as a factfinder. As a result of this decision, the conviction stands and Anten remains subject to the sentence imposed by the district court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The eighth-circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurer and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that under Minnesota law, the policy’s “cosmetic damage” exclusion does not preclude coverage merely because a hail-damaged roof has not yet leaked or allowed elements to penetrate it. Instead, the phrase “function as a barrier to entrance of the elements to the same extent as it did before” requires an assessment of whether the damage has diminished the roof’s present functional capacity to resist wind and snow loads. Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the hail damage weakened the roofs such that they cannot resist common local wind and snow loads, the case must proceed to trial. Additionally, the court remanded for the district court to address the insurer’s *Daubert* motion challenging the admissibility of the plaintiff’s expert testimony on roof weakening, which the district court had previously denied as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.