Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The fourth-circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Willie Narciso Quinones’ postjudgment motion for appointment of counsel. The court reviewed the record and found no reversible error, issuing an unpublished per curiam opinion. Because the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the materials before the court, oral argument was dispensed with. As a result, the district court’s denial of the request for appointed counsel stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The fourth-circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Weldon Eugene Holtzclaw, Jr.’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to comply with court orders. The court applied the standard that an appellant’s informal brief limits appellate review to issues preserved therein; because Holtzclaw’s brief did not challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, he forfeited appellate review of the dismissal. Consequently, the court denied Holtzclaw’s pending appellate motions and affirmed the judgment without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The fourth-circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal from the district court’s denial of relief on the petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The court applied the standard under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2), which requires a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” to issue a certificate of appealability. Specifically, the court determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong, as required when relief is denied on the merits. Consequently, no further appellate review will occur, and the district court’s order denying habeas relief remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit granted the Government’s motion to dismiss Samer Othman’s appeal as untimely. The court held that because Othman failed to file a notice of appeal within the 14-day deadline established by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A) following the entry of the amended criminal judgment, and did not obtain an extension from the district court under Rule 4(b)(4), the appeal was procedurally barred. Although the time limit is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional provision, the court applied the standard set forth in *United States v. Oliver*, requiring dismissal when the Government promptly invokes the rule in response to a late-filed criminal appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without reaching the merits of Othman’s pro se challenges regarding his Sentencing Guidelines range or claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, the court denied counsel’s request to withdraw immediately, ordering that counsel must first inform Othman in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review before a motion to withdraw may be granted if the potential petition is deemed frivolous.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence without oral argument. The court addressed two issues raised by appointed counsel in an *Anders* brief: whether a condition of supervised release added to the written judgment constituted error under *United States v. Rogers*, and whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during plea negotiations. Regarding the supervised release condition, the court applied the standard from *United States v. Rogers*, which requires that non-mandatory conditions be included in the oral pronouncement of sentence. The court held that no *Rogers* error occurred because the district court orally ordered Howell to “submit” to substance abuse testing, and the written judgment’s addition prohibiting obstruction or tampering with those tests was not a material discrepancy but a necessary clarification of what it means to submit to a test. Regarding the ineffective assistance claim, the court applied the standard that such claims may be raised on direct appeal only where the record conclusively establishes ineffectiveness. Finding that the record did not meet this threshold, the court ruled that the claim should be raised in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal. The practical consequence is that Howell’s conviction and sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment, a $30,000 fine, and five years of supervised release remain in effect. Counsel is required to inform Howell in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The seventh-circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Francos’ state-law consumer protection claims against Chobani, LLC, holding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged deceptive marketing and that their suit is not preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The court applied a de novo standard of review to the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Regarding preemption, the court determined that the FDCA’s express preemption provision does not bar state claims seeking to enforce labeling standards identical to federal requirements. The central legal question was whether allulose qualifies as “sugar” under 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(6)(ii), which defines “total sugars” as “the sum of all free mono- and disaccharides.” Relying on the FDA’s amicus brief, which the court found persuasive under *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, the court concluded that the regulation is unambiguous: because allulose is a monosaccharide, it falls within the definition of total sugars. The court rejected the district court’s deference to the FDA’s “Allulose Guidance” under *Auer v. Robbins*, ruling that the guidance was an announcement of enforcement discretion rather than an official interpretation of the regulation, and that the regulation itself contained no ambiguity requiring such deference. Consequently, because Chobani’s product contained four grams of allulose (a sugar) per serving while labeled “sugar free,” the state-law claims alleging violations of identical federal standards are not preempted. On the alternative ground of deception, the court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged that reasonable consumers could be misled by an absolute promise of “sugar free” on a product containing four grams of allulose. The court reasoned that whether consumers understand “sugar” to include allulose is a question of fact for trial, not a matter of law to be decided at the pleading stage, especially given the literal falsity of the label’s absolute promise. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the district court to proceed on the merits, allowing the Francos to pursue their claims under state consumer protection laws and conduct discovery regarding consumer deception.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that a magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss a civil complaint is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or § 1292. Because the district court has not yet entered a final judgment on the underlying civil rights action, the appellate court lacks authority to review the recommendation at this stage. Consequently, the appeal is terminated without prejudice, and the case must proceed in the district court for entry of a final order before any further appellate review may be sought.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fifth Circuit granted the Government’s unopposed motion for summary affirmance and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the defendant’s argument challenging the constitutionality of the sentencing enhancement under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), as confirmed by recent Supreme Court precedent in *Erlinger v. United States*, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). Because the defendant conceded that this legal issue is settled, the court applied the standard for summary affirmance under *Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis* and denied the alternative motion for an extension of time as moot. The practical consequence is that the conviction and sentence for illegal reentry remain in effect without further briefing or oral argument.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 2:24-cv-00040-

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Wellpinit School District and its superintendent in a whistleblower retaliation action brought by David Krzesni under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (“NDAA”), 41 U.S.C. § 4712, and Washington state law. The court held that to establish a prima facie claim under the NDAA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) they are an employee covered by the statute; (2) they communicated to a qualified person or body; (3) they made a protected disclosure containing information they reasonably believe evidences gross mismanagement, waste, abuse, danger to public health or safety, or a violation of law; and (4) they suffered an adverse employment action as a reprisal for that disclosure. The court applied an objective “reasonable belief” standard, requiring that a disinterested observer with knowledge of the operative facts would reasonably conclude the disclosure evidences misconduct. The court concluded that Krzesni failed to satisfy these requirements because his reporting of a Hawaii trip in an annual performance report was merely descriptive and contained no suggestion of wrongdoing, and his rhetorical question to a supervisor did not convey information regarding misconduct. Furthermore, even if a protected disclosure occurred during a phone call with a federal grant contact, it could not serve as the basis for retaliation because the school district had already decided not to renew Krzesni’s contract before that call took place. Regarding the state law claim, the court affirmed summary judgment on the grounds that Washington law distinguishes between a “discharge” and a “nonrenewal,” and the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy applies only to actual discharges, not the nonrenewal of a contract. As a result, Krzesni’s claims were dismissed, and the judgment for the defendants stands.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Steven Dorfman’s convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud, finding no reversible error in the district court’s proceedings. The court addressed three primary arguments raised by Dorfman regarding jury instructions, evidence admission, and indictment scope. First, regarding the jury instruction on “scheme to defraud,” the court held that the instruction was a correct recitation of the law under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343. Applying de novo review for the accuracy of the legal summary and abuse of discretion for the phrasing, the court determined that federal fraud statutes do not require statements to be expressly false. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Seventh Circuit ruled that “fraudulent” pretenses encompass misleading half-truths, omissions of material facts, and deceptive appearances created by the arrangement of words or circumstances, even if individual statements are literally true. The court found that while two isolated sentences in the instruction regarding “false appearances” were potentially ambiguous, the instructions viewed as a whole did not mislead the jury or prejudice Dorfman, particularly given the overwhelming evidence of his intent to deceive customers through omissions and misleading scripts. Second, concerning the admission of Exhibit 10 (a training video) into the jury room despite it not being presented during trial, the court applied plain error review because the objection was raised for the first time on appeal. The court concluded that while the district court has broad discretion to admit exhibits in deliberations, providing an admitted but unused exhibit does not constitute plain error in this instance. Even assuming error, the court found no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. The video contained both inculpatory and exculpatory statements, and the record was replete with other independent evidence of Dorfman’s knowledge and participation in the fraudulent scheme, rendering the exhibit cumulative rather than determinative. Third, the court rejected Dorfman’s claim of constructive amendment and the need for a specific unanimity instruction. The court clarified that evidence regarding attempts to conceal the fraud from regulators or insurers was introduced solely to prove the defendant’s intent and knowledge regarding the primary scheme to defraud customers, not to charge a separate offense. Because the trial focused exclusively on the single scheme alleged in Count 1 of the indictment—defrauding customers—the government did not materially alter the charges at trial, and no specific unanimity instruction was required. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and the concurrent sentences imposed by the district court remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.