Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 2:22-cv-02313-DAD-CKD

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Michael Mitchum’s pro se complaint alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, by Butte County and its jail officials. The court held that the complaint plausibly stated a claim because it sufficiently alleged that Mitchum is a “qualified individual with a disability,” was denied meaningful access to the jail’s services due to his disability, and that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The court applied de novo review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations as true and construing them in favor of the non-moving party. Regarding the definition of disability, the court ruled that a plaintiff is not required to name a specific medical diagnosis; instead, the ADA requires a broad construction focusing on whether an impairment substantially limits major life activities. The complaint’s allegations that Mitchum suffers from knee impairments causing spontaneous dislocations and mobility limitations affecting his ability to walk, stand, shower safely, and care for himself satisfied this standard. On the issue of discrimination, the court determined that the ADA mandates meaningful access rather than mere physical entry into facilities. By denying requested accommodations—such as handrails, a shower chair, a cane, and an exemption from cleaning duties—the defendants denied Mitchum equality of opportunity and full participation in jail services. The court further found the complaint plausibly alleged deliberate indifference, noting that the jail was on notice of Mitchum’s needs through medical records and grievances yet failed to act. This included allegations that officials confiscated his mobility aids and physically dragged him when he could not walk unassisted, which evinces an element of deliberateness beyond mere negligence. The court also rejected the district court’s reliance on Mitchum’s employment status as a janitor and its misapplication of case law regarding injury versus risk of injury, clarifying that ADA claims are based on access to services rather than medical treatment adequacy. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, allowing Mitchum to pursue his claim for monetary damages and injunctive relief.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The eighth-circuit affirmed the bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence imposed on Brandon Castillo following his guilty plea to an ammunition offense. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a downward variance and did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. Applying the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review, the court determined there was no indication that the district court overlooked a relevant factor, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the sentencing factors. The court further noted that within-Guidelines-range sentences are presumed reasonable and that a district court exercises wide latitude to allot greater weight to aggravating circumstances over mitigating personal characteristics without needing a mechanical recitation of factors. Consequently, Castillo’s conviction and sentence stand as imposed by the District Court for the District of Nebraska.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. The court applied the standard that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A). Although the district court entered its final order on January 13, 2026, making the appeal period expire on February 12, 2026, the appellant filed the notice of appeal on February 16, 2026. The court found that the appellant failed to file within the statutory deadline and did not obtain an extension or reopening of the period under Rules 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6). As a result, the appellate court lacks authority to review the district court’s dismissal of the prisoner’s § 1983 complaint.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction and 400-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court addressed the defendant’s challenge to a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for drug distribution, which was not clearly raised in the district court and is therefore reviewed for plain error. Applying the standard that a district court may draw reasonable inferences from facts and noting the “low bar” for establishing a primary use of the premises for drug activity, the court held that the undisputed evidence supported a reasonable inference that the defendant’s residence was used to store, manufacture, and prepare controlled substances for distribution. Consequently, the sentence is upheld and the judgment is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal of William Lee Anderson, II, regarding his unauthorized successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition filed against the Commonwealth of Virginia. The court held that a certificate of appealability is required to proceed with such an appeal and determined that Anderson failed to make the requisite “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Applying the standard established in *Gonzalez v. Thaler*, the court found that Anderson did not demonstrate that the district court’s procedural ruling denying his successive petition was debatable or that his underlying claim of a constitutional violation was debatable, noting he had previously filed a § 2254 petition challenging the same convictions without authorization for a successive filing. Consequently, the court denied Anderson’s pending motions, including requests for counsel and an evidentiary hearing, refused to issue a certificate of appealability, and dismissed the appeal without oral argument.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of a Guidelines-range sentence on Rodolfo Urieta-Barba for a drug offense. The court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, first examining whether the sentencing procedure contained significant error and then assessing the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under the totality of the circumstances. Regarding procedural grounds, the court found no plain error because the district judge adequately explained the sentence by stating it had considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), adopted the pre-sentence report, and heard counsel’s mitigating arguments. On substantive grounds, the court held the sentence was reasonable because the district court properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors, including Urieta-Barba’s mitigating evidence, without overlooking relevant factors or committing a clear error of judgment. The court further noted that a Guidelines-range sentence carries a presumption of reasonableness. Consequently, the conviction and sentence remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Donald Wayne Barksdale’s civil rights action and remanded the case for further proceedings, granting his motion to proceed without prepayment of fees under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that while one prior dismissal qualified as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the other three dismissals identified by the district court did not count toward the statutory limit because they were dismissed on grounds of seeking monetary relief from immune defendants rather than solely for being frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Applying the standard that a case cannot count as a strike unless the entire action is dismissed on strike-qualifying grounds, the court determined Barksdale had incurred only two valid strikes, thereby allowing him to proceed in forma pauperis absent imminent danger of serious physical injury. The practical consequence is that the district court must reevaluate the complaint and may consider other prior dismissals if they properly constitute strikes under the PLRA.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The eighth-circuit reviewed a § 1983 excessive force and conditions of confinement case involving pretrial detainees who alleged that correctional officers used mace unreasonably in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court applied the qualified immunity standard, requiring an individualized analysis to determine if an officer violated clearly established law by using objectively unreasonable force against a detainee who did not pose a real threat or raise security concerns. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for Lieutenant Fowlkes regarding three specific incidents: spraying Derrick Jones while he was restrained and non-resisting in a medical room; spraying Darnell Rusan during a strip search after he made a comment to an officer; and spraying Jerome Jones while he was restrained and non-resistant in a visiting booth. In these instances, the court found that spraying a restrained, non-threatening detainee violates clearly established rights under *Bolin v. Wilkins*. The court also affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for Lieutenant Richard regarding Derrick Jones’s claim, finding her use of mace against him while he was standing still with arms crossed and surrounded by eight officers was objectively unreasonable. Conversely, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for Officer Jones and Captain Wills regarding Marrell Withers’s claims, holding that the video evidence showed Withers did not pose an immediate threat when sprayed despite verbal refusal to move, and finding no evidence linking the officers to the failure to provide showers or clothing changes. The court also reversed the denial of qualified immunity for Lieutenant Turner regarding Rusan’s claim, determining her use of mace was reasonable given Rusan’s escalating agitation and refusal to follow orders in a volatile situation with limited officer presence. Additionally, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for Lieutenant Fowlkes regarding his first use of force against Derrick Jones, finding it justified to protect Richard from an attack. The court also dismissed claims against Lieutenant Fowlkes regarding deprivation of water, ruling that Jerome failed to prove Fowlkes was responsible and that Derrick’s evidence showed the temporary shut-offs were not excessive given the security risks. Regarding pendent appellate jurisdiction, the court dismissed the City of St. Louis’s Monell claims for excessive force and conditions of confinement, as well as the ADA failure-to-accommodate claims brought by Withers and Rusan, because these claims were not inextricably intertwined with the qualified immunity analysis of the individual officers. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s decision on the individual officer claims.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

Docket: 1:22-cv-00207-LAG

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Sumter County, Georgia, dismissing Rhonda Jackson’s discrimination and retaliation claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The court applied a de novo standard of review, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine if a reasonable jury could find intentional discrimination or retaliation. Regarding the discrimination claim, the court held that Jackson failed to present a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence proving her termination was motivated by her disability. The court rejected her argument regarding suspicious timing because her own testimony established she informed management of her disability six months prior to termination, which is too long an interval to support such an inference. Furthermore, the court found no similarly situated employees who were treated more favorably, as Jackson was the only employee spraying Lysol on coworkers rather than just using it for general safety. Finally, the court determined that the employer’s justification—that Jackson violated harassment policies by targeting specific individuals with chemical sprays—was not pretextual, noting that the policy prohibited harassment regardless of whether it was based on a protected trait and that Jackson was free to use Lysol without spraying others. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court held that Jackson failed to establish the first element of the test: engaging in statutorily protected expression. The court reasoned that her internal grievance did not oppose an unlawful practice or make a charge under the ADA; rather, it merely disputed the investigation’s findings and sought to excuse her conduct based on her health. Because the grievance did not constitute protected activity, there was no causal link between such activity and her termination. Additionally, the court noted that Jackson could not expand the scope of her protected activity claim beyond the “filing a grievance” allegation made in her complaint during briefing. The practical consequence is that the judgment in favor of the employer stands, and Jackson’s estate receives no relief on these claims.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit dismissed in part and affirmed in part the appeal of Jamaahl Burch regarding his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit health care fraud, health care fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The court held that Burch’s plea agreement contained a valid waiver of his right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, which barred his challenges to the reasonableness of his custodial sentence and orders restricting his communications during pretrial detention. Applying the totality of the circumstances standard, including the district court’s Rule 11 colloquy, the court found that Burch knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and understood the scope of the waiver, which covered appeals on “any ground whatsoever.” Consequently, those specific challenges were dismissed. However, the court affirmed the judgment regarding Burch’s challenge to four supervised release conditions because such claims fall outside the scope of the appeal waiver. On the merits of that remaining issue, the court rejected Burch’s argument that the district court violated *United States v. Rogers* by imposing unpronounced conditions, noting that two challenged requirements were actually part of a mandatory restitution order and one was a statutory drug testing mandate required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), while another condition regarding financial information access had been properly announced at sentencing. The practical consequence is that the appeal is partially dismissed based on the waiver, and the criminal judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.