Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the 121-month sentence of imprisonment imposed on Rafael Cee-Erwin Solomon following his guilty plea to three counts of fentanyl distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to review the sentence for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Regarding procedural reasonableness, the court reviewed the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Solomon constructively possessed the drugs and firearms found in an apartment, noting evidence that he was the lessee, wore clothes found at the scene, and left the apartment immediately prior to sales. Furthermore, the court concluded the district court correctly applied the relevant conduct standard under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.3, determining that this possession was part of the same course of conduct as the distribution offenses given the temporal and spatial relationship between the possession and the drug trafficking activity. Regarding substantive reasonableness, the court found the sentence presumptively reasonable because it fell within the properly calculated Guidelines range and was supported by the district court’s consideration of Solomon’s serious offenses, violent criminal history, and recidivism. The practical consequence is that the judgment of conviction and the 121-month sentence are upheld, and no relief is granted to the appellant.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) on Stanley L. Felton’s claims and its dismissal of his son G’eas Kalafi’s complaint at screening. The court held that Felton’s termination did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Regarding the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court applied the standard requiring a public employee to show their speech touched on a “matter of public concern.” Under this rule, the court found Felton’s statement to his son about an upcoming prison search was purely private, relating only to his personal frustration with job-related inconvenience rather than a matter of political or social concern to the community. Because the speech was not constitutionally protected, the claim failed as a matter of law. The court rejected arguments that other topics discussed during the call or DOC’s general communication policies rendered the specific statement about the search protected. Regarding the procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court applied the standard requiring a state to provide notice and an opportunity to respond before termination, followed by adequate post-termination remedies. The court found Felton received constitutionally adequate pre-termination process through a pre-disciplinary meeting where he was notified of charges and could present his defense. Furthermore, the court held that the three-step state administrative appeals process provided adequate post-termination remedies. The court ruled that Felton’s failure to exhaust these remedies, specifically his delay in correcting a filing error with the wrong agency, did not constitute a due process violation, noting that an employee cannot refuse available state remedies and then claim federal due process rights were denied. The court also found no evidence of sufficient bias to invalidate the proceedings. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of Kalafi’s First Amendment claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (28 U.S.C. § 1915A). The court reasoned that even viewing his pro se complaint liberally, he failed to state a valid claim because the underlying speech was not protected and he failed to explain how his father’s termination constituted a deprivation of his own constitutional rights. The practical consequence is that the judgment in favor of the DOC stands, Felton remains terminated, and Kalafi’s lawsuit is dismissed without reaching the merits of discovery or trial.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit vacated Demichael J. Peeples’ sentence and remanded the case for resentencing due to a reversible error in the imposition of supervised release conditions. The court held that the district court violated Rule 43(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to orally pronounce all discretionary conditions of supervised release at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, while the district court orally imposed home confinement, the written criminal judgment added material discrepancies requiring location monitoring technology and the payment of associated costs, which were not mentioned during the oral pronouncement. Relying on *United States v. Rogers*, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), and *United States v. Singletary*, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021), the court applied the standard that a defendant has a right to be present when all non-mandatory conditions are imposed, as this opportunity is necessary to object to discretionary terms. The court determined that the omission of these additional conditions in the oral pronouncement constituted a “material discrepancy” between the oral order and the written judgment. Under established Fourth Circuit precedent, such an error requires vacatur of the sentence and remand for full resentencing to ensure the defendant’s right to be present is preserved.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The sixth-circuit dismissed Sabrina Garcia’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice and affirmed her 30-month prison sentence. The court held that the ineffective assistance claim is premature because the record lacks specific facts regarding counsel’s alleged deficient performance or a reasonable probability that different conduct would have resulted in a shorter sentence, rendering Garcia’s assertions conclusory under *Strickland v. Washington*. Furthermore, the court ruled that other challenges to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence are barred by Garcia’s valid appellate waiver contained within her plea agreement, as she failed to argue that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary or that enforcing it would result in a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the district court’s judgment is affirmed, leaving the ineffective assistance claim available for future litigation if the record becomes sufficiently developed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The fourth-circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal because the petitioner failed to make the requisite showing that his petition was debatable. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a certificate of appealability is required to appeal a district court’s dismissal of a habeas corpus petition on procedural grounds, such as untimeliness. The court applied the standard established in *Gonzalez v. Thaler* and *Slack v. McDaniel*, which requires a prisoner to demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the underlying claim of the denial of a constitutional right is debatable. After independently reviewing the record, the court concluded that Harris did not meet this standard. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The fourth-circuit affirmed Heflin’s conviction and sentence while dismissing the appeal regarding challenges to the reasonableness of her sentence. The court held that Heflin’s valid appeal waiver, executed knowingly and intelligently during a Rule 11 colloquy, precluded her from appealing the sentence or conviction, except for colorable challenges to the validity of the guilty plea itself. Applying a plain error standard due to the lack of preservation, the court reviewed the record and concluded that Heflin’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. Consequently, the court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal on waived issues and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, while noting counsel must inform Heflin of her right to petition the Supreme Court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment revoking Devontea M. Fonteneau’s term of supervised release and imposing a 24-month prison sentence. The court applied the standard that a district court possesses broad discretion in sentencing upon revocation, affirming if the sentence is within the statutory maximum and not plainly unreasonable. In reviewing the sentence, the court assessed both procedural and substantive reasonableness, noting that the district court correctly determined the nonbinding Sentencing Guidelines recommended a 24-month term and properly explained its rejection of Fonteneau’s request for a concurrent sentence based on the seriousness of the violations and the needs for deterrence and incapacitation. The court found no procedural error and held that nothing in the record rebutted the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded to a sentence within the policy statement range. Additionally, pursuant to *Anders v. California*, the court reviewed the entire record and found no meritorious issues for appeal, directing counsel to inform Fonteneau of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The eighth-circuit affirmed the below-Guidelines-range sentence imposed on Anthony Olguin for a drug offense after independently reviewing the record under *Penson v. Ohio* and finding no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard to evaluate the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, concluding that the district court did not fail to consider relevant factors, give significant weight to improper factors, or commit a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors. Consequently, the court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw under *Anders v. California* and dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of the substantive reasonableness challenge raised by appointed counsel.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The sixth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction based on the *Younger v. Harris* abstention doctrine, while dismissing for lack of appellate jurisdiction Holly Hooven’s appeal regarding the dismissal of her *Monell* claim against the City of Cincinnati. Regarding the injunctive relief issue, the court held that federal courts must abstain from interfering with pending state judicial proceedings that implicate important state interests and provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges. The court applied the three-pronged test established in *Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n* following the categorization of the case under *New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans*. Specifically, the court determined that the state domestic relations court’s contempt order fell within the third category of *Younger* abstention: pending civil proceedings involving orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions. The court found that the state proceeding was ongoing, that Ohio has a significant interest in enforcing its contempt powers and administering its judicial system, and that the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise her First Amendment claims within the state forum. The court rejected arguments that the case was moot or that exceptions for bad faith or flagrant unconstitutionality applied. Regarding the *Monell* claim, the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the dismissal of the municipal liability claim against the City of Cincinnati because the district court’s order was not a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court had explicitly declined to certify the dismissal as final under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and because other claims in the lawsuit remained pending and discovery was ongoing, the dismissal did not end the litigation on the merits for that specific claim. The practical consequence is that the federal court’s refusal to intervene in the state custody and contempt proceedings stands, leaving the plaintiff to pursue her constitutional challenges within the state court system or after a final judgment is entered in the federal case. The appeal concerning the *Monell* dismissal is terminated without prejudice to being raised again if and when the district court enters a final judgment on all claims.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-27

The sixth-circuit vacated the district court’s affirmation of an Administrative Law Judge’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to return it to the ALJ for a new determination regarding the Medicare safe harbor defense. While the court affirmed that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that the hospice services at issue did not meet the statutory standard for terminal illness under Local Coverage Determination (LCD) 33393, it held that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard when denying the provider’s protection from financial liability. The court ruled that the ALJ erred by concluding that a provider is automatically disqualified from the safe harbor simply because it knew of the existence of Medicare notices and standards. Instead, under 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp(a)(2), the proper inquiry is whether the provider “did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know” that the services were not reasonable and necessary. The court clarified that even if a provider has notice of an LCD, the safe harbor applies if the provider adopted a reasonable interpretation of that notice as applied to the specific claims. Because LCD 33393 contains ambiguous, fact-intensive criteria regarding patient decline and stability, multiple reasonable interpretations may exist. Consequently, the ALJ was required to assess whether In Home Health LLC’s belief that the patients were terminally ill was reasonable in good faith, rather than imputing knowledge of the notice as a dispositive bar to the defense. The practical consequence is that the case will be returned to the agency for the ALJ to re-evaluate the 104 disputed claims under the correct “reasonableness” standard. The ALJ must determine whether In Home Health reasonably interpreted LCD 33393 as covering the specific patients’ conditions, rather than relying solely on the provider’s awareness of the regulation’s existence.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.