Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-24

The first-circuit affirmed the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s dismissal of Reynaldo Cruz’s claims as moot. The court applied the well-settled rule that a party’s interest in recouping attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 does not create a sufficient stake in the outcome to resuscitate an otherwise moot controversy, even if Cruz qualified as a prevailing party against UIA. The practical consequence is that Cruz’s claims for declaratory relief, damages, and other remedies are dismissed without prejudice to his ability to seek attorneys’ fees through separate proceedings, as the underlying constitutional dispute was rendered moot by PRASA ceasing the deductions and UIA depositing the disputed funds with the court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-24

Docket: 6:24-cr-00253-RBD-RMN-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed Miguel Aguasvivas Lizardo’s 84-month sentence for conspiracy to engage in money laundering, rejecting his claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court applied a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, noting that a district court need not discuss sentencing factors on the record if it acknowledges consideration of them. The appellate court found no error because the District Court properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Aguasvivas’ persistence in illegal activity after arrest and the reasonably foreseeable consequence of his wife’s death resulting from his criminal conduct. Consequently, the sentence remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-24

The dc-circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for D.C. Department of Corrections officials against Sergeant Jannease Johnson’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The court held that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity regarding Johnson’s termination for forwarding confidential internal emails to union attorneys because the government’s interest in enforcing confidentiality policies outweighed her interest in speaking as a citizen on matters of public concern under the *Pickering* balancing test. However, the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity regarding official Wanda Patten’s potential liability for firing Johnson in retaliation for granting a press interview to WUSA 9. The court determined that Johnson’s right to speak on such public concerns without retaliation was clearly established and that a material factual dispute exists as to whether Patten’s retaliatory motive was a substantial factor in the decision, a question reserved for trial. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-24

The dc-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of PhantomALERT Inc.’s antitrust claims against Apple Inc., holding that the amended complaint failed to state a claim under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, as well as California state law. The court determined that the district court’s order was a final, appealable decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it terminated the litigation on the merits and left nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Applying de novo review, the court held that PhantomALERT failed to plausibly allege relevant product markets, a threshold requirement for antitrust liability. For its tying claim under Section 1 and monopolization claim regarding general app access under Section 2, the court found the complaint lacked allegations demonstrating that the App Store constituted a distinct single-brand aftermarket free from reasonable substitutes, such as web browsers. The court rejected PhantomALERT’s “lock-in” theory due to insufficient factual support and its alternative “foremarket power” theory because it was forfeited by failing to raise it in the district court. Regarding the claim for monopolization of Covid-19-related tracing apps under Section 2, the court found the complaint failed to define the market boundaries, confusing a market for “access” to apps with a market for the apps themselves and offering only conclusory assertions that such apps were not substitutable for other applications. The practical consequence is that the dismissal of PhantomALERT’s original complaint without prejudice stands, and leave to late-file the amended complaint was properly denied as futile. The court clarified that the order does not operate as a dismissal with prejudice or trigger res judicata; therefore, PhantomALERT remains free to file a separate action in district court, provided it can adequately plead relevant product markets and other necessary elements of its antitrust claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-24

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction regarding Texas House Bill 18’s monitoring and filtering requirement as to the CCIA plaintiffs, but vacated the injunction as to the SEAT plaintiffs. The court held that the SEAT plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the monitoring, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements because their alleged injuries were too speculative and relied on an attenuated chain of third-party conduct, failing to demonstrate a substantial risk of imminent censorship. Additionally, the court found the SEAT plaintiffs’ challenge to the age-verification requirement was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent in *Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton*. Regarding the CCIA plaintiffs, the court held that the monitoring and filtering requirement is preempted by Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act because it imposes duties that necessarily require digital service providers to monitor, alter, or remove third-party content, thereby treating them as publishers or speakers. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-24

The fifth-circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary order of forfeiture regarding six pieces of jewelry valued at $40,000 in a criminal conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin. The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate reversible error because the plea agreement explicitly required forfeiture of property specified in the bill of particulars, and the defendant had confessed the requisite nexus between the jewelry and the charged offense under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(B). The court declined to consider a pro se letter submitted by the defendant after the preliminary order was issued, noting it was untimely, and found that defense counsel made no substantive objection at rearraignment. As a result, the forfeiture order stands and the conviction is upheld.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-24

Docket: 2:23-CV-00468-DBP)

The Tenth Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant Ian Cooperstein’s civil rights lawsuit against Salt Lake City police officers and municipal defendants. The court held that it could not proceed to the merits of Cooperstein’s Fourth Amendment claims because he failed to provide a sufficient appellate record. Specifically, Cooperstein omitted the motion-to-dismiss briefing and the body-camera footage that were central to the district court’s decision. Under the de novo standard of review applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and qualified immunity determinations, the appellate court is obligated to independently evaluate the materials before the district court. Because the absence of these critical documents prevented the Tenth Circuit from conducting such review without resorting to guesswork, the judgment was affirmed. The dismissal with prejudice remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-24

The ninth-circuit granted the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that the BIA committed legal error by declining to address the petitioner’s involuntary sterilization claim on the basis that she failed to raise her political opinion claim before the Immigration Judge, finding instead that she sufficiently raised the claim by checking the relevant box on her application and testifying about the sterilization. Regarding factual findings, the court determined that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s conclusions that the Guatemalan government was able or willing to protect the petitioner from persecution, noting that arrests of third parties unrelated to the petitioner and a three-month delay in investigating imminent death threats do not demonstrate government willingness to control persecutors. Similarly, the court found that the police’s delayed investigation did not preclude a finding of acquiescence for CAT relief. The case is remanded to the BIA to consider the political opinion claim in the first instance and to decide any remaining issues regarding asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. A motion to stay removal was also granted.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Plaintiffs, including Nicholas Knaack, Billy Bramblett, James Lacy, and Dion Lumadue, appealed a district court grant of summary judgment in favor of Allied World Specialty Insurance Company. The plaintiffs had been assigned rights under an Allied insurance policy held by American Behavioral Health Systems after settling with the system. They alleged that Allied breached its contract and duty of good faith by refusing to defend the system against an underlying complaint containing allegations of sexual harassment and sexual abuse.

The court applied Washington law, which requires ambiguities in insurance policies to be construed liberally in favor of the insured. The court found that the policy could conceivably cover allegations of sexual harassment while excluding sexual abuse, and that the complaint could be separated into covered and excluded portions. Because the insurer denied a defense when a conceivable basis for coverage existed, it breached its duty to defend. This breach established liability for common law bad faith and a violation of the Insurance Fair Conduct Act. The court also held that the insurer is estopped from denying coverage due to its bad faith. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on the Washington Consumer Protection Act claim because the plaintiffs did not meet their burden for partial summary judgment on that specific issue.

The decision mandates that insurers must consider partial coverage when a complaint mixes covered and excluded claims. It reinforces that denying a defense based on a questionable policy interpretation constitutes bad faith, triggering estoppel remedies and statutory penalties under the Insurance Fair Conduct Act.

Plaintiffs appealed a district court grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer, Allied World Specialty Insurance Company. The underlying dispute arose from a claim against the insurer’s insured, American Behavioral Health Systems, involving allegations of sexual harassment and sexual abuse. The insurer denied a duty to defend based on a sexual abuse exclusion in the policy.

The Ninth Circuit applied de novo review to the interpretation of the insurance policy. The court found that the policy could conceivably cover allegations of sexual harassment separately from allegations of sexual abuse. The court reasoned that the terms sexual molestation and sexual abuse require sexual contact and force, which were absent in the plaintiffs allegations. Consequently, the insurer breached its duty to defend and acted in bad faith by denying coverage. The court also found a violation of the Insurance Fair Conduct Act but vacated the Washington Consumer Protection Act claim for further proceedings on liability elements.

The decision clarifies that insurers must provide partial coverage when a complaint contains mixed allegations, and it establishes that denying a defense based on an arguable interpretation of policy language constitutes bad faith under Washington law.