Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting ExxonMobil’s motion to quash a subpoena issued under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which Candel & Partners SAS had sought to obtain documents from ExxonMobil for use in a French judicial proceeding. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review to the district court’s weighing of the four discretionary factors established in *Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.*, 542 U.S. 241 (2004). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and provided sufficient reasoning for its decision, despite Candel’s argument that the oral ruling was too cursory. The appellate court found that the district court meaningfully engaged with the *Intel* factors during the hearing: it determined that the French tribunal had the ability to order production of documents within its own jurisdiction (addressing the first factor); expressed confidence in the integrity of the foreign tribunal and found no need for U.S. assistance (second factor); noted evidence that Candel was attempting to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions after failing to obtain the information domestically in France (third factor); and concluded the request was unduly broad, intrusive, and burdensome (fourth factor). The court clarified that a district court is not required to provide “authoritative proof” that a foreign tribunal would reject assistance under the second *Intel* factor. As a result of the affirmation, the subpoena quashed by the district court remains unenforceable, and Candel & Partners SAS is precluded from obtaining the requested discovery from ExxonMobil through the U.S. federal court system for its French litigation.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

Docket: 1:25-CV-01980-LTB-RTG)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Marshall Hughes’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, denying him relief because the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that while Hughes claimed his conviction barred him from future military service, this restriction stemmed from an Army regulation rather than the Colorado state court judgment he challenged. Under the statutory requirement that a petitioner be “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” the court determined that collateral consequences not imposed by the state sentence itself do not establish jurisdiction. Consequently, because Hughes was not in custody under the specific state judgment at issue, the federal courts could not hear his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the petition was dismissed without reaching the merits.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the United States Court of Federal Claims’ denial of Travoy R. Hollie, Jr.’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The court applied the standard that the decision to grant or deny IFP status lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and noted that orders denying such motions are immediately appealable. The appellate court found that Mr. Hollie’s opening brief failed to raise any cogent, non-frivolous arguments challenging the lower court’s determination, instead consisting largely of unfounded attacks against the Clerk of the Court of Federal Claims. Consequently, the court concluded that no substantial question regarding the outcome existed and affirmed the denial without a full briefing or oral argument. As a practical consequence, Mr. Hollie must pay the required filing fee to proceed with his underlying suit; additionally, the order notes that any subsequent judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to pay may be void and should be reentered following this mandate. All pending motions were denied, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The Federal Circuit allowed Petitioner Natalie Green’s appeal (No. 26-1658) to proceed to briefing after she clarified that she sought review solely of the Merit Systems Protection Board’s final decision dismissing her retirement annuity calculation appeal for lack of jurisdiction, while expressly abandoning any discrimination claims. The court granted the Office of Personnel Management’s request to redesignate the MSPB as the respondent pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(2) and dismissed related appeals (Nos. 26-1660 and 26-1661), noting that the Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) to review decisions of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The practical consequence is that the MSPB will be the named respondent, Green’s corrected statement concerning discrimination is accepted, and her opening brief is due within 60 days of the order’s entry.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

Docket: 3:25-cv-03336-JCS

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Mitchell Wine’s claims against federal agencies, state entities, and individual officials. The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Wine’s appeals to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) because they were not “mixed case” complaints involving discrimination based on a protected characteristic or breach of settlement agreement, but rather whistleblower appeals which must be brought in the Federal Circuit under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). Additionally, the court found that the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) provides the exclusive and preemptive administrative remedy for Wine’s claims regarding federal employment, barring district court review. Regarding sovereign immunity, the court ruled that the United States has not consented to suit for constitutional torts or actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state officials are similarly immune from suits seeking damages where no ongoing violation of federal law is alleged to support prospective relief under the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine. The court further determined that personal jurisdiction was lacking over individual defendants sued in their personal capacities because they did not direct activities toward California. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of Wine’s § 1983 claim as time-barred under California’s two-year statute of limitations and rejected his attempts to bring criminal causes of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 or invoke the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, noting these statutes apply only to government prosecutions or criminal proceedings. As a practical consequence, the dismissal of all claims stands, leaving Wine without a judicial forum for his grievances regarding his employment termination at the Department of the Interior.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The federal-circuit dismissed the appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) based on the agreement of both parties. The court ordered that each side shall bear its own costs, resulting in the termination of the appellate proceeding without a decision on the merits of the trademark dispute.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

Docket: 2:23-cv-00368-TOR

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing Ali Kane’s § 1983 claims regarding First Amendment retaliation and free exercise of religion. The court applied de novo review to the summary judgment decisions, requiring that there be no genuine dispute of material fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Regarding the retaliation claims, the court held that Kane failed to establish a causal connection between his protected conduct (filing grievances) and the adverse actions taken by Correctional Officer Waldo, noting that timing alone is insufficient and Waldo lacked knowledge of the grievance at the time of the alleged retaliatory acts. The court further determined that any adverse actions, such as cell searches or orders to “cell in,” were motivated by legitimate penological interests like security and contraband prevention rather than retaliation. As to Defendant Stull, the court found that an isolated question and a disputed threat did not constitute an “adverse action” sufficient to chill First Amendment rights, evidenced by Kane’s continued filing of grievances immediately following the alleged threats. On the free exercise claim, the court applied the *Turner v. Safley* balancing test to evaluate whether prison regulations limiting religious practice were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The court concluded that the search and confiscation of books lacking proper DOC identification numbers were rationally connected to security and order goals. Additionally, the court found that Kane had alternative means to exercise his religion, as he could have obtained a compliant English Quran through proper channels, rendering the restriction permissible under the First Amendment. The practical consequence is that the judgment in favor of the defendants stands, and Kane’s lawsuit is dismissed without further proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

Docket: 3:23-cv-01582-AR

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of McCollough’s due process claim but reversed the dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim and the grant of qualified immunity to Defendant Jeffords, remanding the case for further proceedings. Regarding the due process claim, the court held that because the Ninth Circuit has not imposed a specific evidentiary standard on public school disciplinary proceedings, the district court correctly dismissed the allegation that the hearing failed to apply a “preponderance” or “substantial evidence” standard. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, finding that McCollough sufficiently pleaded that his speech merited protection and that the university’s actions were motivated by his viewpoint. The court applied the standard from *Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L.*, noting that while schools may regulate student speech in limited circumstances (such as lewd content or material disruption), PSU’s rationale that a single email was “upsetting” did not fit these categories, and crude language used to communicate a political point remains protected under *Cohen v. California*. Additionally, the court ruled that McCollough adequately alleged retaliatory motive without needing to prove that an individual official took personal offense, as the disciplinary action could have been motivated by his heated rhetoric on a controversial issue. The court also reversed the qualified immunity ruling for Defendant Jeffords, determining that because there is no clearly established right to discipline students for using profane language in nonpublic communications when such speech is protected, immunity does not apply at the pleading stage. Finally, the court addressed sovereign immunity by reversing the district court’s reliance on outdated precedent; it remanded the issue for application of the controlling *Kohn v. State Bar of California* test to determine if Portland State University qualifies as an arm of the state. The court declined to consider arguments regarding judicial recusal and claims raised for the first time on appeal, including those under the Oregon Constitution and disability discrimination statutes.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment ordering Moarbes, LLP to pay fifty percent of a $46,438.60 sanctions award against it and its client, FrenchPorte IP LLC, for repeated failures to comply with court orders. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning liability between the law firm and its client. The key legal basis for this decision was the district court’s explicit statement that it had not considered an ex parte letter submitted by FrenchPorte’s CEO, combined with the record showing that the sanctions allocation relied solely on Moarbes’s own filings which detailed the firm’s failure to comply with orders despite having received funding. Because Moarbes conceded that its appeal failed if the court found no reliance on the letter, and the appellate court found no such reliance, the judgment stands. The practical consequence is that Moarbes remains liable for half of the sanctions award.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-23

The eighth-circuit affirmed Christopher Martez Hoover’s 93-month sentence for being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (g)(3), and § 924(a)(8). The court applied the abuse of discretion standard to review Hoover’s claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable, examining whether the district court failed to consider relevant factors, gave significant weight to improper factors, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing appropriate factors. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion because the district court explicitly considered Hoover’s arguments regarding his need for self-protection after being shot and his difficult upbringing, but reasonably weighed these mitigating circumstances against the serious nature of his offense, which included recruiting a straw purchaser, supplying firearms to other prohibited persons, and lying to law enforcement about his involvement. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, meaning Hoover must serve the imposed term of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.