This episode applies the distinction between personal and shared inquiry—developed in the previous episodes—to philosophical inquiry, arguing that philosophy is a personal affair. It sketches a picture of doing philosophy as the activity of creating an equilibrium of philosophical ideas based on personal nodes that are best described as a kind of intellectual tastes. This picture is shown to be superior to the naturalist picture of philosophy—according to which philosophy is a scientific inquiry—because it can explain why philosophers could rationally believe their theories in the face of systemic peer disagreement and why there can be a sense of philosophical progress in spite of such disagreement.

This episode sets the stage for the next one by drawing and explaining a distinction in epistemic rationality. It argues that rationality is always a structural feature. When inquiry is personal—such as inquiry into matters of taste—this structure is internal to the individual and it is characterized by certain personal nodes, such as aesthetic predilections or fundamental moral convictions, whereas when inquiry is shared—such as scientific inquiry—we aim toward an interpersonal structure that is purely based on shareable evidence and lacks these personal nodes. This difference in rationality sheds light on differences in the mechanics of testimony and peer disagreement that will be very important for explaining why philosophy is a personal inquiry.

Is truth plural? And what does it mean to say that truth is plural? In this episode, I interview the inventor of truth pluralism, Crispin Wright. We’ll talk about how his views have changed since the publication of his book Truth & Objectivity, back in 1992, and how his methodology compares to pragmatism. By the end of the episode, I will have shared my own take on pluralism, as well as my attempt to synthesize the various theories in the literature: deflationism, pluralism, and the correspondence theory. This episode is loosely based on my paper, “Truth and Its Uses: Deflationism and Alethic Pluralism” (2023). You can check it out here: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-023-04362-5

The correspondence theory of truth is an incredibly popular philosophical theory, yet the pragmatist remains staunchly opposed to it. In this episode, I interview one of the leading contemporary pragmatists, Huw Price, to find out why. We’ll discuss his take on the function of truth, and I’ll argue that truth could only play the role Price thinks it does if it consists in correspondence to the facts. The story of this episode is roughly based on my paper, “The Practical Bearings of Truth as Correspondence” (2023). You can check it out here: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-023-00765-5