Geopolitics Unplugged

Summary:

In this episode we examine the reasons behind Cuba's recent widespread power outages, specifically focusing on the country's dependence on unreliable oil suppliers. We highlight Cuba's reliance on Venezuelan oil, which has significantly decreased due to international sanctions and internal problems, leading to a shift towards Russian oil. Additionally, we criticize Cuba's choice to rely on Pemex, Mexico's dysfunctional state-owned oil company, as a supplier. We emphasize Cuba's lack of diversification in its energy mix, heavily reliant on crude oil, and the lack of investment in modernizing its power infrastructure. This combination of factors is presented as a major contributor to the ongoing power outages in Cuba.

Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. What factors contribute to Cuba's recurring power outages, and what are the underlying causes of these factors?


2. How has Cuba's dependence on crude oil impacted its energy security and economic stability, and what are the consequences of their reliance on unreliable suppliers?


3. What are the potential long-term implications of Cuba's failure to diversify its energy mix, and what are the challenges and opportunities associated with transitioning to alternative energy

Long format:

Cuba power outages, whose fault is it?

The island of Cuba has undergone a series of unplanned and involuntary blackouts island wide. Cuba blames the US for its sanctions policy and the lack of access to modernizing technology as the reason for their plight. While that may be a contributing factor to a degree is it the sole or even most impactful reason?

Cuba has a lot of power infrastructure problems.

I don’t know enough about that.

But I do know how to read export charts. And know mistakes when I see them.

Historically, Cuba got most of its crude from Venezuela.

Venezuela's oil exports to Cuba so in 2023 dropped to 55,000 barrels per day (bpd) from almost 80,000 in 2020 (Pandemic lows). So far this year as of June the delivery is only at 27,000 barrels per day (bpd), compared with 51,500 bpd in the same period of 2023.

This year PDVSA (Venezuela) failed to deliver on almost all of its commitments due to its ships being under international sanctions, US sanctions and holes (yes holes) in boats which ya know isn’t good.

So they chose a horrible supplier to rely upon.

So it seems they doubled down on imprudence by turning to…. you guessed it….Russia!

Wow. And further compounding that it seems according to those in the industry is that there was a lack of foresight that crude API and characteristics matter in refining. Venezuela is very heavy. Very. Russia is considered a medium-sour crude oil that's a blend of heavy oil from the Urals and Volga regions and lighter oil from Western Siberia.

Again, beating the drum. Crude is not crude for refining purposes. Your set up for your input matters. You have to set it up right for the refinery to produce efficiently.

And when all doubt appeared about the ability and stability of Russian crude, Cuba went to arguably the most dysfunctional and self harming international oil company, Pemex

A series of bad decisions. You add in whatever problems from their infrastructure…..

Sources:

https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-resorts-dark-fleet-supply-oil-ally-cuba-2024-06-25/

https://www.csis.org/analysis/2023-year-mexican-oil-cuba#:~:text=A1:%20For%20decades%2C%20Venezuelan%20oil,over%20a%2030%20percent%20decrease

https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russian-oil-arrives-cuba-after-year-long-hiatus-2024-03-31/#:~:text=Pi%C3%B1%C3%B3n%20said%20it%20was%20too,Sign%20up%20here

https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/CUB#:~:text=Cuba%20imports%20most%20of%20its,under%20a%202000%20energy%20agreement

Cuba's total energy supply mix in 2022 (must current year available) was: 0% coal, 80.6% crude, Biofuels and waste 11.6% and everything else including hydroelectric 7.8%.

Cuba's domestic energy production in 2022 was: 52.9% crude oil, Biofuels and waste 28.2, everything else 18.9%

Cuba's electricity generation mix in 2022 was: crude 83.5% and natural gas at 12.5 and everything else 4%

Energy mix meaning total final consumption in 2022 was: 4% crude oil, 50% crude refined products, electricity 23.4% and everything else 22.3%.

So you overload your crude oil basket and "secure" your crude partners who are anything other than reliable and you do not diversify your energy mix (the .... I mean how can you not see this as a mounting problem? Obtuse really.

Icloud link to some charts of value to me including the charts that show a complete non-responsiveness to diversifying out of crude oil into other means of power production since 2000: https://share.icloud.com/photos/0a5WDcRcv4YFBPQSMBiFW-TIw

Summary:

In this episode we discuss the development and deployment of autonomous hunter-killer drones by various countries, particularly focusing on the US, Israel, Turkey, and China. We examine the capabilities of specific drones such as the US' Replicator and Replicator 2, Israel's Orbiter 2 LM, Turkey's STM Kargu 2, and various Chinese drones. We also raise the question of whether the US is falling behind in the field of autonomous weapons systems and explores the implications of this technology in modern warfare.

 Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. What are the current capabilities of autonomous hunter-killer drones in different countries?


2. What is the US's role in the development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems?


3. How is the development and use of autonomous weapons changing the nature of warfare?

 Long format:

 Autonomous Hunter Killer Drones

 With the announced confirmed death of Yahya Sinwar with the following link reported to show his end moments

 https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1847006929790685652

 We can clearly see this was a weaponized UAV attack. 

 Israel has a quadcopter named Lanius that this appears to be that is a human driven hunter killer.

 Israel's Aeronautics Group has unveiled a new variant of its renowned Orbiter 2 unmanned aerial system (UAS) that combines surveillance and precision strike capabilities. The Orbiter 2 LM one-way attack platform is designed to neutralize targets with nearby intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drones.

 Goshawk: An autonomous drone hunter developed by Robotican and the Israeli Air Force. It's patterned after birds of prey and can reach speeds of nearly 80 miles per hour.

 ROTEM: Israel's version of a suicide drone system.

 Without a doubt the CLAIMED capabilities of Chinese with autonomous weapon systems sounds impressive such as GJ-11 Sharp Sword, Sunflower 200, Wing Loong and Caihong 4 (CH-4) as well as highly autonomous weapon systems like FH-97A.

 Where is the US?

 Maybe we haven’t publicly sent into the field a STM Kargu-2 (Turkey), Saker Scout (Ukraine) or Gospel (Israel) like weapon with great fanfare, but that doesn’t mean our military has not. We are just tight lipped about it as explained in the article below. 

 We do have Replicator (offensive  all-domain attritable autonomous ((ADA2) systems using AeroVironment Inc.’s Switchblade-600) and Replicator 2 (more defensive anti swarm minded AI autonomous based) that are in the field deployed in Ukraine per the below sources. 

 As PZ says one of the “nice” things about the war in the Ukraine and in Gaza is that we get to see the evolution and effectiveness of changes in tactics and techniques in this new asymmetrical warfare environment. We get to deploy and evaluate systems and see how they work in the real world in real conflict. 

UAVs. USVs. UGVs. 

 Are we at parity with China, Israel, Turkey or Ukraine? Dunno. Maybe. But $1B minimum sure ought to put you in the ballpark. 

 We are not idly sitting by like an Ostrich with its head in the sand waiting to be eaten by the Chinese lion. 

 Sources:

 https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-main/2024/09/pentagons-replicator-2-to-focus-on-drone-defense/#:~:text=Replicator%2C%20unveiled%20last%20August%2C%20is,time%20across%20multiple%20regions%20worldwide

 https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3766349/deputy-secretary-of-defense-hicks-announces-first-tranche-of-replicator-capabil/

 https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/05/new-details-give-replicator-distinct-ukrainian-flavor/396344/

 https://news.usni.org/2024/03/11/pentagon-will-spend-1b-on-first-round-of-replicator-drones

 Türkiye (the new name for the country of Turkey) has the current state of the art of true autonomous hunter killer UAV called STM Kargu 2 drone

 The STM Kargu 2 is a quadcopter drone with many features, including: The STM Kargu 2 is a quadcopter drone with many features, including:

 Attack capabilities: The Kargu 2 is designed to be an anti-personnel weapon that can select and engage human targets. It can be operated autonomously or manually

 Swarm operation: The Kargu 2 can operate in a swarm of up to 20 drones, which can provide a massive attack potential.

 Day and night operation: The Kargu 2 can operate reliably day and night.

 Target tracking: The Kargu 2 can track moving targets. 

 Navigation: The Kargu 2 has a high performance navigation and flight control system.

 Ammunition: The Kargu 2 can use different types of ammunition, including high-explosive fragmentation, thermobaric, and cumulative.

Safety: The Kargu 2 has in-flight mission abort and emergency self-destruction capabilities. It also has advanced electronic ammunition safety, setup, and trigger systems. 

 Artificial intelligence: The Kargu 2 has built-in artificial intelligence (AI). The details are a little fuzzy but clearly it has autonomous navigation capabilities. What is less clear is that it can be set up in a loitering/monitoring position (think like an IFR hold pattern) and has an automatic target recognition system. 

 Sources:

 https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/kargu-rotary-wing-attack-drone/#:~:text=The%207kg%20drone%20measures%20600mm%20long%2C%20600mm,and%20a%20user%2Dfriendly%20ground%20control%20unit%20interface

 https://lieber.westpoint.edu/kargu-2-autonomous-attack-drone-legal-ethical/

 https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/kargu-rotary-wing-attack-drone/#:~:text=The%207kg%20drone%20measures%20600mm%20long%2C%20600mm,and%20a%20user%2Dfriendly%20ground%20control%20unit%20interface

 https://www.turkishdefencenews.com/kargu-rotary-wing-attack-drone/

 https://automatedresearch.org/weapon/stm-kargu-loitering-munition/

Summary:

In this episode, we discuss the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on Russian crude oil exports, arguing that despite a price cap, the volume of Russian oil traded has increased. This increase is facilitated by a "dark fleet" of vessels, which allows Russia to evade sanctions and continue exporting oil. We also demonstrate that while Russian oil is sold at a discount compared to similar crudes, this discount is shrinking, implying that sanctions are becoming less effective at reducing revenue for Russia. We conclude by questioning the efficacy of the sanctions and raise concerns about their effectiveness in curbing Russia's oil income, which remains a significant portion of its federal budget.

Questions to consider while listening:

1. How have the volume and price of Russian crude oil exports changed since the implementation of sanctions?


2. How does Russia's use of a 'dark fleet' of oil tankers influence the effectiveness of sanctions?


3. What alternative strategies could be employed to effectively reduce Russian oil revenue and thereby impact its budget?

 Long Format:

Are Russian Crude Oil Sanctions not working?

There are two objective measures to this question. The first is in terms of volume. The second is in terms of price.

This article addresses the former. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/10/14/russian-oil-trade-rises-with-record-volumes-of-dark-fleet-crude.html 

(Russia’s oil trade is rising as record volumes of Russian crude are carried on ‘dark fleet’ vessels. )

Despite the crackdown, Russia has expanded the capacity of oil transported by its shadow fleet of oil tankers by almost 70 per cent year on year—from 2.4 million barrels per day in June 2023 to 4.1 million in June 2024. The article above suggests that it is even greater than those June 2024 numbers due to “record” dark fleet transportation.

Source material:

https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/KSE_core_shadow_fleet.pdf

Now as to price question, we have to examine this longitudinally. Yes, Urals crude is selling at a discount vis a vis other similar API graded crude, but that discount is evaporating. When the cap was fully phased in, in February 2023, Russian crude was selling at a 30% discount. A year ago, the discount was about 16%.

Now it is getting back up there with other comparables of medium sour crude.

Urals crude spot price was at $73.40 as of October 11, 2024. (Which is ay above the $60 cap)

Dubai Crude (medium sour) was $73.760 for September 2024. 

Mars (medium sour) was $75.56 as of October 13. 

Brent (light, sweet) on that day was $77.26.

WTI (light sweet) is at $74.130 today (October 19, 2024). 

Source: 

https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/crude-oil#:~:text=Crude%20Oil%20is%20expected%20to,point%20for%20global%20oil%20pricing

So, it begs the question that if the volume is way up and the discount is decreasing to closer to zero, is this sanction effective any more? Not a Russian apologist. Not a useful idiot. Just asking based upon the math.

Short of bombing the “dark fleet” what can be done in reality to have the desired impact of $60 or less and less volume to “starve” Russia of its income given that oil and gas revenues have accounted for 30–50% of Russia's federal budget in the past decade? (In the first half of 2024, oil and gas revenue rose 41% year on year).

Summary:

Moldova and Georgia are both holding elections that will determine their future direction: closer to Russia or toward the European Union (EU). In this episode we highlight the upcoming Georgian election on October 26th and share the results of a recent Moldovan referendum, which showed 50.16% of voters supporting closer ties with the EU. We also discuss the nine current EU candidate countries, including Moldova and Georgia, and provides a link for further information on each country's path to EU membership. 

Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. What factors are influencing Moldova and Georgia's choices regarding their future alignment with Russia or the EU?


2. How are the upcoming elections in Moldova and Georgia impacting the EU's expansion strategy?


3. What are the current challenges and opportunities for candidate countries seeking to join the European Union?

 Long format:

 Moldova and Georgia elections updated and Russian interference and joining the EU?

 Just like Moldova, Georgia (the country not the state ha ha) has an election coming up that will help decide its path back towards Russia’s orbit or towards the EU. It’s good to keep an eye on this one too. October 26 is the election. 

 Recommend reading: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2024/10/mil-241020-rferl02.htm

 ((The latest is that with 98.5 percent of the vote counted, some 50.16 percent of Moldovans votes "yes," to EU. Source: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2024/10/mil-241021-rferl01.htm ))

 I just looked this up and thought it might be interesting to share. 

 The following countries are currently candidate countries for membership in the European Union (EU):

 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye, and Ukraine.

 More details for each candidate and its current path can be found here:

 https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/eu-expansion-how-close-are-the-nine-candidate-states-to-membership#:~:text=More%20than%20a%20decade%20since,could%20be%20about%20to%20change

Summary:

In this episode we explore the potential consequences of North Korea sending troops to fight in the Ukraine war. We express skepticism about the practicality of integrating North Korean soldiers into the Russian military due to significant differences in language, military equipment, and cultural values. We speculate that a large-scale North Korean deployment could potentially lead to a higher rate of friendly fire incidents and could even expose North Korean soldiers to new ideas and freedoms, potentially triggering regime change within North Korea. We discuss the potential risks associated with North Korean involvement in the war are substantial for both Russia and North Korea.

Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. What are the potential risks and consequences of North Korean troops being deployed in Ukraine?


2. What are the potential effects on the North Korean regime and society if its troops are deployed in Ukraine?


3. What are the potential implications of North Korean troops being deployed in Ukraine for the broader geopolitical landscape?

Long format:

 What will North Koreans actually do in Ukraine?

 So they are coming. Some say up several brigades of up to 12,000 soldiers, some say they are special forces or elite troops, but what will they actually do?

 North Korean soldiers speak Korean, not Russian. Russians speak Russian not Korean. My due diligence search shows no large combined arms military exercises involving the two. Different munitions. Different systems. Different command and control. Different communications systems. Entirely different cultures. Different world views. Different psychologies. 

 It’s not like these 12,000 troops can be plugged into existing units as replacements to ameliorate the war of attrition at the unit level. 

 So what are they going to actually do? Provide for a higher rate of friendly fire, a higher rate on blue on blue incidents?

 One of the things I’m starting to wonder is if NK goes full on and sends a lot more troops, say 100k or 250k. After all they have 1,320,000 or so. 

 Does that bring Poland or the Baltics or Nordic countries or France boots on the ground?

 Ok. That’s a foreseeable level. Folks are talking about. 

 I want to go on deeper in the “what if”. 

 Suppose they do send 100k or more troops. Not all of them will die. Some will go home. 

 Being in the Ukraine war space and being around the Russians will be like an Amish person going to a rave to the North Koreans, I should think. They will undoubtedly be exposed to new thinking, some degree of new freedoms, some exposure to new cultures and thoughts. Being exposed to that versus the self reinforcing hermitage bubble of North Korea and now coming home with those broadened horizons en masse….

 I suppose some folks will think that ticket from NK to Ukraine is a one way ticket. No return. But if enough return…..

 I can’t think of better model for self inflicted regime change than this. 

 Seems really risky. 

 Risky to Russia for blue on blue. 

Risky to NK because of broadened horizons.

 I guess they will be reduced to point to human wave attacks like Berserkers. Dunno. I wouldn’t want them in my battle space.

Summary:

In this episode we explore the concept of Pan-Arabism, a political movement seeking to unify all Arab people into a single nation-state. We detail its origins, goals, and its connection to Arab nationalism, highlighting the movement's historical significance and its impact on regional politics. We also address the question of whether Iran, historically associated with not being an Arabs state but rather Persian and with Shia dominance, has shifted its focus towards Pan-Arabism in an attempt to exert greater influence across the region. The article from Mandate Brief analyzes the possible shift in Iranian policy, prompting reflection on their support for Sunni groups such as Hamas in Gaza.

Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. How does Iran's recent foreign policy shift towards pan-Arabism compare to its historical focus on Shia dominance?


2. What evidence suggests a move away from Shia dominance and towards a pan-Arabist strategy in Iranian foreign policy?


3. How does Iran's support of Sunni groups, such as Hamas, fit into its current foreign policy goals?

Long format:

Iran shifts form Shia dominance theory to Pan Arabism

Pan-Arabism is a political movement that seeks to unite all Arab people into a single nation-state. The movement originated in the late 19th century in the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire and was most popular in the 1950s and 1960s.

Pan-Arabism is based on the idea that Arabs are a single nation with a shared language, history, and destiny. The movement's goals include: 

• Abolishing the artificial boundaries between Arab states


• Empowering Arab states against outside forces


• Opposing Western political involvement in the Arab world

Pan-Arabism is closely linked to Arab nationalism, which is the idea that Arabs are a people with special bonds that justify political unification. The movement was driven by middle-class and bourgeois urban actors, and was sometimes used by the military to gain political control. 

 In short, we have to understand that Iranians are not Arabs in the classic sense. Arabs trace their ancestry to the original inhabitants of tribes of Arabia from the Syrian Desert and Arabian Peninsula; Persians are a part of the Iranian inhabitants. Arabs speak Arabic; Persians speak Iranian languages such as Farsi and other dialects.

As measured in the last year, has there been a shift of Iranian policy from a Shia dominance mindset to a pan Arabism (including I guess Persians) mindset in order to assert influence over the entire region? Does their very support of Sunni groups such as Hamas in Gaza signal this shift?

This article attempts to parse it out and is a very interesting read:

 https://www.mandatebrief.com/article/from-pan-arabism-to-pan-islamism

Sources:

https://www.us-iran.org/resources/2016/10/21/myth-vs-fact-persians-and-arabs

https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/rise-and-fall-pan-arabism#:~:text=Pan%2DArabism%20is%20a%20political,Egypt%20and%20Algeria%20in%20particular

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2024.2339356#:~:text=Pan%2DArabism%20is%20the%20belief,form%20in%20the%2020th%20century

Summary:

The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) aims to create a unified air defense system for Europe, but faces several challenges. First, the initiative involves a diverse group of nations, some within and some outside of NATO and the EU, requiring complex system integration. Second, there are competing national interests and strategic cultures, as seen in Poland’s reluctance to join and France’s potential rival initiative. Third, the specialization dilemma requires smaller nations to rely on larger nations for coverage against long-range threats. Finally, ensuring interoperability between diverse systems presents a significant challenge, requiring accurate air pictures and complex operating doctrines.

 Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. What are the biggest challenges to the success of the European Sky Shield Initiative?


2. How does the ESSI address the need for interoperability in a diverse European defense landscape?


3. What are the long-term implications of the ESSI for European defense cooperation and integration?

Long format:

 European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)

• Short range: Skyranger 30 (German manufactured, generally an anti-air cannon system with some optional missile capabilities, very short range mobile system capable of engaging fixed wing and rotary aircraft as well as UAS, loitering munitions and cruise missiles, only one prototype exists but a lot of orders for it)


• Medium range: primarily IRIS-T SLM (European manufactured, short/medium range air to air or surface to air missile using infra red as its base, in service since 2005)


• Long range: MIM-104 Patriot (the US system, mobile surface-to-air missile/anti ballistic missile system in operation since 1984)


• Very long range (exoatmospheric): Arrow 3 (Israeli with joint development with the US exoatmospheric hypersonic anti ballistic missile system, it can even be an anti-satellite weapon, in service since 2017

 My big question is the integration aspect. How do we get all of these players to communicate and work smoothly? 

 After all, we are talking quite a few players. Some in NATO some not. Some in the EU, some not. That’s a lot of systems to integrate.

 In October 2022, fifteen European states (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, the United Kingdom) signed a declaration to join the German-led initiative. In February 2024, the German government announced that Greece and Turkey would join the initiative. In February 2023, Denmark and Sweden joined the project.[9] In July 2023, neutral states Austria and Switzerland signed the declaration to join the initiative, raising questions about the future and practicalities of their policy of neutrality.

 As of today, France, Poland, Italy, and Spain did not make a decision to join the ESSI.

 This report gives some answers: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-05/230519_Monaghan_European_SkyShield.pdf?VersionId=lqRTBNFTvHja1Qc3ThfdCfvL5B0GSChA 

 From the report…

 The strategic cacophony problem occurs when domestic imperatives to develop national forces and defense industries work against cooperation. One example is Poland’s conspicuous absence from Sky Shield following a difficult period between Warsaw and Berlin, including a public spat over deployment of German Patriot systems to Poland, given Warsaw has recently committed to developing its own short- and medium-range GBAD systems in cooperation with the United Kingdom.

 The strategic fit problem relates to overcoming deep national differences in strategic culture, priorities, and so on. For Sky Shield, navigating both problems among 17 members will require strong leadership and creative solutions. An example is the potential for a competing French led initiative on Europe’s air defense announced by President Macron at the Munich Security Conference. This could be due to concerns about a north-south divide in European air defense, especially given the industrial expertise in southern European nations such as France, Spain, and Italy, or the sputtering “Franco-German engine.” As one assessment of Sky Shield puts the political challenge bluntly: “Important European partners, above all France and Italy, are currently unwilling to follow Germany’s lead. The lack of political unity shows that Germany’s proposal does not take European security interests sufficiently into account, has failed to convince partners, and leaves many questions unanswered on the strategic, military, industrial, and economic levels.”

 The specialization dilemma undermines reliance on others to deliver shared capability. For Sky Shield, specialization is unavoidable because not every nation in Europe can afford to develop and field an independent air defense system. For example, smaller nations that cannot afford to procure or operate complex systems must rely on others for coverage against long range missile threats. Conveniently, some specialization already exists through NATO’s Air Policing and Air Shielding mission

 The next challenge is interoperability between nations. This is especially demanding for integrated air and missile defense, which requires a common air picture that is extremely accurate and complex operating doctrine that requires high levels of training. This is why the Latvian state secretary Jānis Garisons suggested interoperability “might be the big challenge” for Sky Shield.

Summary:

In this episode we discuss the potential decline of OPEC+ and its influence on the global oil market. We highlight the Saudi Arabian government's recent decision to unilaterally adjust production levels, questioning the OPEC+’s authority. We discuss the emergence of major oil discoveries outside of OPEC+ controlled regions, such as with American shale and in Guyana and Namibia, as a factor contributing to the group's diminishing control over global production. We ultimately suggest that while OPEC+ remains relevant, its influence and prestige have waned in the current volatile oil market. 

Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. What are the key factors contributing to OPEC+'s potential decline in relevance?


2. How might the discovery of new oil reserves impact the future of OPEC+?


3. What are the potential economic and geopolitical ramifications of OPEC+'s decline?

Long format: 

Has OPEC+ lost relevance?

Saudi Arabia’s announcement on October 18, 2024 to unilaterally switch to punitive production without OPEC+’s blessing is a possibility. It’s also on a scale, right? How much are they going to produce over and beyond what they are doing now? How much pain will they endure to inflict pain, right?

Right now it’s talk. MBS and the Prince are usually pretty good at follow through historically. 

One of my main take aways is that OPEC+ really is losing international relevance and prestige and may even totally fall apart, in my opinion. 

 When you have major major discoveries outside of their zone of influence, not just talking American shale, but let’s not forget Guyana Stabroek Block, including the Liza, Payara, Snoek, Turbot, Ranger, and Hammerhead discoveries and major discoveries are located in deepwater regions, including off the coast of Namibia, and Brazil. 

 They no longer control production. 

 I’m not saying OPEC+ isn’t relevant but it certainly has lost some relevancy I would think. 

 It’s a volatile market. The base case for me is frequently neither of the extremes not $500 oil or $20 oil.

Summary:

In this episode we debunk common misconceptions about the ability to intercept nuclear missiles. We explain that recalling or aborting a launched ICBM or SLBM is impossible, and that shooting them down in flight is unreliable due to the complexity of their flight phases and the effectiveness of countermeasures. We also highlight the challenges of intercepting tactical nuclear weapons, particularly those with hypersonic capabilities, due to their short range, low altitude, and high speed, making detection and tracking extremely difficult.

 Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. What are the different phases of a nuclear missile's flight, and how do they affect our ability to intercept it?


2. What are the limitations of current missile defense systems in intercepting nuclear missiles, and what are the potential solutions?


3. How does the development of new, non-ballistic nuclear weapons, like hypersonic missiles, challenge existing missile defense systems?

Long format:

But we can shoot down nuclear missiles, right?

Some myth busting. 

Myth #1: You can recall, redirect, abort or self destruct a nuclear ICBM or SLBM. 

 Truth: No you can’t recall or abort a nuclear ICBM or SLBM once it has been launched. I’m sorry Spies Like Us the great movie that it is lied to you. (sources: https://spectrum.ieee.org/nuclear-war#:~:text=Today%20the%20delivery%20of%20a,they%20are%20on%20their%20way and https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/01/Hair-Trigger%2520FAQ.pdf)

 Myth #2: You can shoot down ICBMs or SLBMs in flight:

 Truth: Not reliably. 

 In order to understand this as a problem, you have to appreciate the basic nature of ballistic weapons. The three phases of flight for an ICBM are: boost phase, midcourse phase, and terminal phase.

 The boost phase is the initial phase where the missile's engines fire to accelerate it to the necessary velocity to reach its target. Typically at altitudes between 150 and 400 kilometers (93 to 249 miles).

 The midcourse phase is once the engines shut off, the missile continues its trajectory through space, typically at a high altitude, with no propulsion. Reaching apogee (highest point) at around 1,200 kilometers (750 miles) altitude. 

 The terminal phase is the final phase where the missile re-enters the atmosphere and descends towards its target. Begins re-entry into the atmosphere at around 100 kilometers (62 miles) altitude.

 The Holy Grail in anti-ballistic missile defense against ICBMs is to intercept during the boost phase (Boost Phase Intercept-BCI). The boost phase, is ICBMs most vulnerable and easiest to target during this early stage of flight when its rocket engines are still firing. In the boost phase the target is a large, hot booster that is moving more slowly. BPI also eliminates the problems of dealing with multiple warheads or submunitions or decoys.

 In the next phase the mid course phase, modern nuclear ICBMs place the nuclear warhead in a metal-skinned balloon surrounded by dozens of similar decoy balloons would thoroughly disguise it to radar and to the seeker on the homing kill vehicle of the interceptor missile. Plus, it is where multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) are deployed.

 Currently the best strategy is to concentrate on intercepting at the midcourse phase because BCI is not capable due to deployment issues and intercept times and the OODA loop. Intercepting in the terminal phase is not a great strategy. The terminal phase is very short, with an intercept time of less than 30 seconds. The MIRVs or the single warhead are small and are moving incredibly fast. Over 15,000 mph. And if the intercept happens during the terminal phase there will be a release of nuclear materials whose damage/consequence depends on the altitude and conditions. So it’s not optimal.

 There are several advantages of a midcourse intercept and why it is attractive. The boost phase lasts about 3-5 minutes. The midcourse phase lasts longest, under 20 minutes. As such, it offers more opportunities to intercept the missile. If the first intercept attempt fails, more shots can be taken. There terminal phase is under 2 minutes.

 When there is a ICBM launch, within 5 minutes, the US Missile Defense Agency in Fort Belvoir, MD is provided data to try to engage the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) and in the case of a Pacific or Arctic transit using the SBX.  launching from US Army Space and Missile Defense Command in Fort Greeley, Alaska. 

 The GMD has been a resounding disappointment. The GMD system has a 55% success rate in very highly-scripted tests, but has missed in the last six tries. The US Army has tacitly admitted defeat, I think, in that there are only 44 ground-based missile interceptors housed at two military bases (Fort Greeley, Alaska has 40 and Vandenberg Space Force Base, California has 4), not hundreds or thousands. It is a three-stage solid rocket booster to fly out of Earth's atmosphere at near-hypersonic speeds. At one time, the kill component of the kill  was in space and was a kinetic event involving the Raytheon Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) which had very large difficulties (it was off course by a lot) The successor replacement is the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) which may be deployed in 2025.

 As great as the THAAD system is, it has not been found to be conclusively effective to intercept ICBMs. Its very technology is for short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles and not true ICBMs. The THAAD interceptor reportedly “carries no warhead” and relies on physically striking its target to defeat it. It is a kinetic killer which has not been proven to be optimal against ICBMs, see the above. 

 Sources:

https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/missile-defense/gmd-frequently-asked-questions/

The US isn’t the only folks trying to work on this. The other ones of note include:

The Russian A-135 anti-ballistic missile system which is deployed around Moscow was originally armed with nuclear warheads, but were updated in 2017 to use non-nuclear kinetic interceptors. Russia is very guarded about its efficacy. To date in the public record is one and only one successful test of an intercept. But what are the details? Did it in fact intercept a ICBM or just launch. Unknown.

Source: https://missilethreat.csis.org/tag/a-135/  and https://tass.com/defense/1228071  and https://sputnikglobe.com/20201126/russian-military-successfully-tests-new-anti-ballistic-missile-1081278309.html ) 

The Israeli Arrow 3 system is touted as being capable of intercepting ICBMs during their spaceflight portion of their trajectory (midcourse phase). It is also a potential anti-satellite weapon. It has intercepted some of Iran’s exoatmospheric missiles (which are long-range ballistic missiles), but these are not ICBMs at ICBM altitudes and speeds.

The Indian Prithvi Defence Vehicle Mark 2 has completed developmental trials and is awaiting government clearance for deployment. Other than opaque claims that it has been tested multiple times over years, the exact efficacy of this system against a true ICBM appears to be not of public record. All of the public record tests were not for ICBMs and not during the midcourse phase.  

Sources: https://www.usiofindia.org/publication-journal/Evolution-of-India-Ballistic-Missile-Defence-Program-Prospects-and-Challenges.html#:~:text=India's%20BMD%20shield%20is%20basically,the%20enemy%20missile's%20launch%20trajectory and https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/interceptor-missile-test-fired-successfully-449178

 Myth #3: Shooting down a tactical nuclear weapon is possible.

 Truth: The very basis of a non ballistic tactical nuclear weapon especially a hypersonic one is as follows:

1. very short range (300 miles or way less) deployment 

2. At incredibly at very low altitude (cruise) (30–90 meters (100–300 feet AGL)

3. at very fast speeds (hypersonic) )(greater than 3000 mph and Mach number M greater than five, M > 5)

Number one and three make the maximum flight time at 3000mph and at the max 300 miles that’s 6 minutes max. 

Flying at 30–90 meters (100–300 feet AGL) makes detection exceedingly difficult to detect and track. In fact they require very special radar to POSSIBLY detect them. 

All resulting in no apogee as its non ballistic in nature meaning no boost phase, no midcourse phase, and no terminal phase therefore defying all current means of interception which are non existent in boost phase, less than 50% successful in the midcourse and generally most successful in boost (provided not too many or going too fast). 

So the opportunity to observe is very short and unlikely and therefore your OODA loop is non existent. 

So yes it’s a cat and mouse but the cat is by far the winner and there’s 

Source:

https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=2337#:~:text=Further%2C%20it%20is%20very%20difficult,track%2C%20identify%20or%20engage%20them

https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Ballistic-vs.-Cruise-Missiles-Fact-Sheet.pdf

https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-basics/cruise-missile-basics/#:~:text=Their%20low%20flight%20path%20makes,and%20track%20high%20altitude%20threats.%20%5B

https://www.popsci.com/technology/cruise-missile-defense/

https://archive.ll.mit.edu/publications/journal/pdf/vol12_no2/12_2detectcruisemissile.pdf

https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/boost-phase-missile-defense/#:~:text=Boost%20phase%20missile%20defense%20entails,a%20geographic%20and%20engineering%20standpoint

Summary:

In this episode we explore the potential for instability in Jordan, examining the country's complex history, political landscape, and current events. The We highlight the historical tensions between Jordan and its Palestinian population, which has become increasingly sympathetic to Hamas, a group supported by Iran. The author also discusses the difficult balancing act that Jordan's King Abdullah II faces, attempting to maintain relations with both Israel and his own Palestinian population. Ultimately, we raise concerns about the possibility of civil unrest and the potential for Iranian influence to destabilize Jordan.

Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. What are the historical and current factors contributing to tensions between Jordan and its Palestinian population, and how are these tensions exacerbated by Iran's influence in the region?


2. How is the relationship between Jordan and Israel influenced by Jordan's internal political dynamics and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine?


3. What are the potential consequences of Iran's growing influence in Jordan, and how might this impact the future of Jordan's stability and its relationship with the international community?

Long format:

Is Jordan truly a puppet state? And is Jordan going to be the new Syria?

Interesting article to read is:

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/iran-gaining-ground-jordan-213288

Consider this part of the story:

The streets echoed with chants of “Labayk ya Nasrallah” (“We are here, oh Nasrallah”), a Shia chorus of devotion rarely heard in Jordan, which is almost entirely Sunni.

(https://x.com/jamedJeddan/status/1840487888007385457)

Also other protests such as the one depicted here:

https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2024-09-16/ty-article-opinion/.premium/border-crossing-shooting-shows-jordans-relations-with-israel-are-a-tough-balancing-act/00000191-f6cc-db99-adfb-f6ee758c0000 ('Carry a Quran With a Knife': How Growing Extremism Threatens Jordan – and Its Security Partnership With Israel - Opinion - Haaretz.com)

And other large groups of people talking long walks (as PZ likes to call it) is all over X  with “Put the bullet in the chamber…We are your men, [Yahya] Sinwar” and “Our army is the army of the free…We are your soldiers, oh Sinwar.”

Is Iran gaining a foothold into Jordan?

Will this cause insurrection against the King and tip Jordan into a civil war?

This is most interesting given the history of Jordan, Palestinian and Iran. Here’s why…

So Jordan has a very complicated history. 

Let’s stroll down the corridors of history. During World War I, the Arabs revolted against the Ottomans in 1916. The League of Nations awarded the region to the United Kingdom as a mandate for Palestine and Transjordan.

In 1921, the British established the Emirate of Transjordan, a semiautonomous region ruled by Hashemite Prince Abdullah. 

In 1946, Transjordan gained independence from the British and became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 

What is a Heshimite?

With no offense intended, simplified grossly, a Hashemite is a sect of the Arab family that descends from the prophet Muhammad and has founded dynasties in the eastern Mediterranean. The Hashemites originated in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and ruled the city from the 900s to the 1900s. The Hashemites led the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916, which freed the lands of Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, and the Hijaz. But the Hashemites were in control of Mecca and parts of modern day Saudi Arabia (then called Hijaz) until defeated in battle in 1924 by King Abdulaziz bin Saud, founder of the current Saudi kingdom. Losing the holy sites was a big blow as one can imagine. 

Why this becomes important will be apparent later but bookmark it for now. 

Now we need to look at a specific part of the history of Palestine. 

Jordan became populated with Palestinians after the 1948 Palestine War, when the country annexed parts of Palestine and granted citizenship to Palestinian refugees and indigenous West Bankers. 

In 1949, Jordan signed an armistice with Israel that gave it control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In 1950, Jordan formally annexed this territory, which included the former Palestinian districts of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Ramallah, East Jerusalem, and Hebron.

Jordan granted citizenship to Palestinian refugees and indigenous West Bankers on the same basis as existing residents. This was unlike other Arab countries that hosted Palestinian refugees.

Between 1947 and 1967, about 250,000–300,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from Mandatory Palestine. Many of these refugees settled in Jordan.

Jordan is the only Arab country that fully integrated the Palestinian refugees of 1948. However, relations between Palestinians and Jordan have been strained at times, including in 1970 when King Hussein sent troops against Palestinian guerrilla strongholds.

They took in a very large population of Palestinians. This has led at least one prominent observer to call Jordan a puppet state of a few tribes overwhelmed by Palestinians. 

The post October 7th position of the King has certainly been a very tense balancing act between acknowledging his large Palestinian population which is very sympathetic to Gaza and Israel which the King really wants to get along with and is allied with the US. An insightful article is offered here: https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/09/jordans-three-balancing-acts-navigating-post-october-7-middle-east

When you enter into the equation that Jordan’s unemployment rate is now 21 percent. We get a large population of disaffected people generally and a population specifically aligned more with the message of Iran to support Hamas than the Kjng himself. 

It makes for odd bed fellows. You have Shia Iran that historically seen Sunni as apostates (recall apostasy is punishable by death in Iran, although the Islamic Republic has never codified the crime of apostasy) now supporting Sunni Hamas (while they of course support Shia Hezbollah). 

This is not the first time this tension has come to a head. Consider https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/15/jordan-difficult-balancing-act-row-downing-iranian-drones-israel

But post October 7th and the Israeli invasion of Gaza makes this sit different. 

What’s going to happen? Dunno

Can King Abdullah II continue to walk the tightrope? Dunno

But large groups of people taking long walks chanting any government things isn’t historically a good thing, right? Time will tell. 

Sources:

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/royal-rifts-history-jordanian-and-saudi-monarchies