Hancock's blog

I'm talking to Tim Tutton who was in the mainstream of UK electricity and gas market reform from the late 1980s, including eight years as Director of Regulation at National Grid.

Tim wrote a stimulating paper Does Ofgem have a future? for the economic consultancy Oxera in May this year. It's a provocative challenge and I thought it would be fun to invite him onto the podcast to explore the themes in it – both his specific observations about the UK and the general issues they raise about governments and their agencies in our industry.

Last week, Tim looked to America and found positives in their regimes. This week he considers the evolving regime in the UK where the regulated system operator has an increasingly key role in setting policy more focused on enabling competition for long-term contracts than instantaneous dispatch.

I'm talking to Tim Tutton who was in the mainstream of UK electricity and gas market reform from the late 1980s, including 8 years as Director of Regulation at National Grid.

Tim wrote a stimulating paper Does Ofgem have a future? for the economic consultancy Oxera in May this year. It's a provocative challenge and I thought it would be fun to invite him onto the podcast to explore the themes in it – both his specific observations about the UK and the general issues they raise about governments and their agencies in our industry.

Last week, Tim contrasted the theoretically ideal relationship between a government and its regulator and recent European experience. This week, he looks to America and finds things look a bit different there.

I'm talking to Tim Tutton who was in the mainstream of UK electricity and gas market reform from the late 1980s, including 8 years as Director of Regulation at National Grid.

Tim wrote a stimulating paper Does Ofgem have a future? for the economic consultancy Oxera in May this year. It's a provocative challenge and I thought it would be fun to invite him onto the podcast to explore the themes in it – both his specific observations about the UK and the general issues they raise about governments and their agencies in our industry.

Last week, Tim considered what an ideal relationship between a government and its regulator might look like. This week, he contrasts that with recent experience.

I'm talking to Tim Tutton who was in the mainstream of UK electricity and gas market reform from the late 1980s, including eight years as Director of Regulation at National Grid.

Tim wrote a stimulating paper Does Ofgem have a future? for the economic consultancy Oxera in May this year. It's a provocative challenge and I thought it would be fun to invite him onto the podcast to explore the themes in it – both his specific observations about the UK and the general issues they raise about governments and their agencies in our industry.

Last week, Tim explained the change in the relationship between the UK government and its regulator and how elements of this change remind him of Russia in 1918. This week he considers what an ideal relationship between a government and its regulator might look like.

I'm talking to Tim Tutton who was in the mainstream of UK electricity and gas market reform from the late 1980s, including eight years as Director of Regulation at National Grid.

Tim wrote a stimulating paper Does Ofgem have a future? for the economic consultancy Oxera in May this year. It's a provocative challenge and I thought it would be fun to invite him onto the podcast to explore the themes in it – both his specific observations about the UK and the general issues they raise about governments and their agencies in our industry.

Last week, Tim talked about the extraordinary change in UK energy policy and the sector regulator's role in it, or lack thereof. This week, he explains the broader shift that this represents in the relationship between the UK government and its regulator and how elements of this shift remind him of Russia in 1918.

I'm talking to Tim Tutton who was in the mainstream of UK electricity and gas market reform from the late 1980s, concluding with eight years as Director of Regulation at National Grid.

Tim wrote a stimulating paper Does Ofgem have a future? for the economic consultancy Oxera in May this year. It's a provocative challenge and I thought it would be fun to invite him onto the podcast to explore the themes in it – both his specific observations about the UK and the general issues they raise about governments and their agencies in our industry.

Last week, Tim explained what led him to the suggestion that the role of industry-specific regulators can change dramatically when government policies for that sector change. This week, he talks specifically about the extraordinary shift in UK energy policy and the sector regulator's role in it, or lack thereof.

I'm talking to Tim Tutton who was in the mainstream of UK electricity and gas market reform from the late 1980s, including eight years as Director of Regulation at National Grid.

Tim wrote a stimulating paper Does Ofgem have a future? for the economic consultancy Oxera in May this year. It's a provocative challenge and I thought it would be fun to invite him onto the podcast to explore the themes in it – both his specific observations about the UK and the general issues they raise about governments and their agencies in our industry.

In this first interview, Tim explains what led him to the suggestion that the role of industry-specific regulators can change dramatically when government policies for that sector change.

I'm talking to Larry Ruff, another giant of energy market reform. Larry worked with Bill Hogan, whom many of you enjoyed listening to on the podcast last year, on the design of the UK and New Zealand electricity markets in the 1990s, but he's probably best known as the brain behind Victoria's gas market. He's been watching the NZ regime with interest and recently put in an independent submission to the NZ Gas Industry Company's Review of Transmission Access and Capacity Pricing about which he agreed to come and talk to us.

Last week, Larry showed us a way out of the capacity trading maze: market carriage. In this, the final episode of the current series, he reflects on the options open to New Zealand and suggests that it might be possible to do better that we've managed in the past.

I'm talking to Larry Ruff, another giant of energy market reform. Larry worked with Bill Hogan, whom many of you enjoyed listening to on the podcast last year, on the design of the UK and New Zealand electricity markets in the 1990s but he's probably best known as the brain behind Victoria's gas market. He's been watching the NZ regime with interest and recently put in an independent submission to the NZ Gas Industry Company's Review of Transmission Access and Capacity Pricing about which he agreed to come and talk to us.

Last week, Larry explained the problems that beset capacity-only markets for gas transmission. They don't work as contract paths (or "straws" as we seem to be calling them) and the European solution to this problem - defining capacity in terms of entry and exit - is even worse, no matter how liquid it makes the market. This week, he shows us a way out of the maze: market carriage.

I'm talking to Larry Ruff, another giant of energy market reform. Larry worked with Bill Hogan, whom many of you enjoyed listening to on the podcast last year, on the design of the UK and New Zealand electricity markets in the 1990s but he's probably best known as the brain behind Victoria's gas market. He's been watching the NZ regime with interest and recently put in an independent submission to the NZ Gas Industry Company's Review of Transmission Access and Capacity Pricing about which he agreed to come and talk to us.

Last week, Larry debunked the received truth that because you can control physical gas flows (which you can't with electricity), it makes sense to allocate gas transmission capacity as contractual "paths". This week he explains the problems that beset capacity-only markets for gas transmission. They don't work as contract paths (or "straws" as we seem to be calling them) and the European solution to this problem - defining capacity in terms of entry and exit - is even worse, no matter how liquid it makes the market.