In times of crisis and conflict, advanced artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) might become as much part of the problem as the solution. An ever-growing number of children in need risk having their data used as part of AI systems that do not implement safeguards and protections for vulnerable populations. Given the short- and long-term consequences for the first generations to grow up with AI, there is an urgent need to scrutinize AI-powered systems that are not aligned with the rights, needs, and realities of children in humanitarian action.

In this post, part of a series on Cybersecurity and data protection in humanitarian action, Roxana Radu, Associate Professor of Digital Technologies and Public Policy at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, and Eugenia Olliaro, Programme Specialist at UNICEF’s Chief Data Office and the global UNICEF lead of the Responsible Data for Children (RD4C) initiative, make three recommendations for the humanitarian sector to become children-centred in the age of AI.

Mobile phones are a powerful tool for participation and engagement in humanitarian crises. Responsible public/private partnerships are increasingly unleashing their potential.

In this post, part of a new series on Cybersecurity and data protection in humanitarian action, Susanna Acland and Barnaby Willitts-King from the GSMA Mobile for Humanitarian Innovation programme outline the private sector perspective on this important trend.

The deployment of open-source intelligence, or OSINT – information gathered from publicly-available data sources and used for intelligence purposes – is having a dramatic impact on armed conflict in the 21st century, rebalancing information asymmetries between states and other actors while supporting accountability efforts. There is, however, a downside to these developments, with OSINT creating and enabling the risk of harm to civilians’ rights, lives, and safety in ways that are not yet fully understood.

In this post, part of a new series on Cybersecurity and data protection in humanitarian action, legal researcher and OSINT analyst Ed Millett considers how far international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) currently regulate the use of OSINT techniques by state and non-state actors in armed conflict settings, suggesting that our limited understanding of emergent harms is hampering effective regulation

At COP28, states and organizations will adopt a Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace, committing to strengthen climate action and finance in conflict and fragile settings. Over the last few years, the ICRC has carried out analysis on reducing the impacts of the climate and environment crisis on people enduring conflict, notably captured in a new report, Weathering the Storm.

In this post, part of a series on Climate Change, Conflict and Humanitarian Action, Catherine-Lune Grayson and Amir Khouzam, co-authors of the report and respectively head of the policy team and policy advisor at the ICRC, reflect on dilemmas pertaining to strengthening the response to growing climate risks in conflict settings.

During an international armed conflict, commercial space actors under the jurisdiction or control of a third, neutral state may find themselves implicated in the conflict in various ways, which could increase tensions and trigger misunderstandings between a belligerent and neutral state and risk the latter losing its neutral status.

In this post, part of a series on War, law and outer space, Professor Guoyu Wang of the Academy of Air, Space Policy and Law at the Beijing Institute of Technology discusses the potential legal issues raised by such involvement under both neutrality law and international humanitarian law (IHL), including the significance of legal interpretation of the lex lata for space security governance

Technological trends and the rapid expansion of activity in outer space is creating new urgency for the pursuit of effective measures to ensure peace and security in this crucial domain. Efforts by the United Nations in this area have traditionally been aimed at moderating strategic competition among the major military powers by preventing any arms race in outer space.

In this post, part of a series on War, Law, and Outer Space, Michael Spies, Senior Political Affairs Officer at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, explains how a human-centered approach to disarmament can accelerate progress toward agreements on outer space security.

Despite the longstanding efforts of the international community to prevent an arms race in outer space, the rules governing the potential use of force there is something worth serious consideration – and we have already have seen spill-over effects of terrestrial conflicts into space. This raises the question, how would international humanitarian law (IHL) apply to the conduct of hostilities in outer space?

In this post, part of a series on War, Law and Outer Space, Svenja Berrang, Legal Adviser for the German Federal Ministry of Defence, gives a short overview of the basic IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution and takes a closer look at the challenges in their application to outer space posed by the widespread dual-use of space systems, the employment of civilian operators for space systems used by the military, and the creation of space debris by attacking a space object.

In less than a year, Chat-GPT has become a household name, reflecting astonishing advances in artificial intelligence-powered software tools, especially generative AI models. These developments have been accompanied by frequent forecasts that AI will revolutionise warfare. At this stage of AI development, the parameters of what is possible are still being explored, but the military response to AI technology is undeniable. China’s white paper on national defense promoted the theory of the “intelligentization” of warfare, in which leveraging AI is key to the PLA’s modernization plan. The director of the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Jen Easterly warned that artificial intelligence may be the “most powerful weapon of our time.” And whilst autonomous weapon systems have tended to dominate discussions about AI in military applications, less attention has been paid to the use of AI in systems that support human decisions in armed conflicts.

In this post, ICRC Military Adviser Ruben Stewart, and Legal Adviser Georgia Hinds seek to critically examine some of the touted benefits of AI when used to support decisions by armed actors in war. In particular, the areas of civilian harm mitigation and tempo are discussed, with a particular focus on the implications for civilians in armed conflict.

In situations of armed conflict, access to digital technology can save lives. But the use of cyber, information, and other digital operations by belligerents during armed conflict also brings new threats and risks for civilians. Think about cyber operations disrupting civilian infrastructure and services, information operations inciting violence against civilian populations, and digital operations undermining humanitarian relief efforts. In ever-more interdependent digital and physical environments, civilians and civilian infrastructure are increasingly drawn upon to support military operations and, as a result, face real risks of being targeted. As digital technologies permeate our lives and societies, cyber and information operations are no longer abstract or “only online”. They can, directly or indirectly, have serious online and ‘offline’ consequences and harm people.

Between 2021 and 2023, the International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) President convened a Global Advisory Board of high-level experts from the legal, military, policy, technological, and security fields to advise the organization on digital threats and to develop concrete recommendations to protect civilians against such threats. Today, this Board released its report entitled ‘Protecting Civilians against Digital Threats During Armed Conflict’. In this post, Cordula Droege (chief legal officer and head of the legal division of the ICRC), Laurent Gisel (Head of the Arms and Conduct of Hostilities Unit of the ICRC), Tilman Rodenhäuser (Legal Adviser at the ICRC) and Joelle Rizk (Digital Risks Adviser at the ICRC) present four worrying trends the Board identified, and examples of the Board’s recommendations to address one of them, namely the growing civilian involvement in digital military operations.

Read the full blog post here: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/

“In war, truth is the first casualty” is perhaps one of the best known aphorisms about armed conflict. Information operations have long been conducted to influence or mislead military adversaries or civilian populations during war. However, the instantaneous transmission of information from any distance – through social media platforms and messaging apps – has changed the scale, speed, and reach of information operations. Today, generative artificial intelligence provides seemingly infinite possibilities to create misleading or dangerous content. In light of these developments, states (para. 33 and 57), humanitarians and human rights advocates have voiced concern that spreading harmful information risks inciting violence, causing distress, increasing vulnerabilities, denying access to essential services, and may also undermine or disrupt humanitarian operations. Worryingly, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression has found that in today’s armed conflicts, disinformation and hate speech are “increasing[ly] focus[ed] on civilian populations rather than military personnel”.

In light of this reality, we must recall that there is a red line between an information operation that complies with international humanitarian law and one that violates it. In this post, ICRC Legal Advisers Tilman Rodenhäuser and Samit D’Cunha explain some of the legal boundaries of information operations under international humanitarian law (IHL) through four examples. Limits on information operations under public international law as applicable outside armed conflict, or under human rights law during armed conflict, are not examined in this post.

Read the full blog post here: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/