Central banks around the world bought up alot of securities. To what extent have central banks turned to buying private sector securities in a macroeconomic environment characterised by zero percent interest rates, low growth, investment, and ballooning debts? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795

Why can't central banks normally buy stocks and bonds from the private sector? What happens if/when they do? We introduce our subject, and quickly present our findings (that central bank purchases can promote investment under certain circumstances).

For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795

Why don't central banks buy our companies' stocks and bonds? Should they fund mostly governments? And expand credit through banks? We look at central banks' role as a "funder of last resort." We find that investment increases when central banks buy private sector assets - except under a certain "sloth effect." We describe how law fails to give central banks the authority they need - and show how drafting a nominal GDP target objective directly into the central bank law helps promote investment and growth. For more: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795

Most governments copied competition law "best practice" - without accompanying templates on improving innovation/productivity. Competition acts are easy to copy. New ideas are not. Some countries like Singapore and Hong Kong will win out from more competition. Vietnam and even Japan won't -- unless law incentivises creativity.

To see how much money your country will win/lose, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240

The international organisations have pressured most countries into adopting competition laws. Many governments rightfully ignore them - because they harm domestic business (and particularly SMEs). If lawmakers adopt an innovation act at the same time as an antitrust act though, competition law can do more good than harm. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240

Like with central banks, conventional wisdom has increasingly made competition authorities (commissions) independent. How does such independence look like in black letter law? Does the econometric evidence suggest that independence makes competition "better"? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240

Competition law helps shape competition in a jurisdiction. "Better" laws help protect vulnerable businesses like small and medium enterprises (SMEs) - without hurting consumers. How do we measure the quality of such competition law? Who is ahead... and behind? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240

SMEs provide much employment and longer-term economic growth. They also often provide the next, new idea which leads to entire industries. Which countries encourage these SMEs? How competitive are they? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240

Competition often hurts SMEs more than helps them. In this presentation, we review competition laws in various countries (mostly Asia and Brunei as a concrete example). Without passing innovation legislation at the same time, competition law could well do more harm than good. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240

What concrete laws can a jurisdiction pass to make its financial institutions more attractive for sunrise industries looking for money? We illustrate how new laws in Hong Kong can make its financial institutions ready to fund the complex and capital-intensive industries like the solar/photovoltaic sector. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495259