Iuliia Mendel, who served as President Zelensky’s press secretary from 2019 to 2021, published an article in The Spectator on September 15, 2026, titled “Zelensky’s Strategy Is National Suicide.” In essence, she makes a compelling case that Ukraine is not simply losing its war with Russia but is being so thoroughly wrecked in the process that it is effectively committing national suicide.
 
Mendel made much the same case the following day, September 16, in a virtual address to an event at the European Parliament. She had intended to deliver the speech in person but was denied entry to the Parliament building and therefore had to appear virtually. Mendel attributes that decision to the sanctions President Zelensky had imposed on her three days earlier, although the European Parliament has not said why she was barred.
 
Mendel’s article and speech have generated substantial controversy, which is hardly surprising given the severity of her indictment and the fact that she served as Zelensky’s press secretary. My aim in this episode is to examine the arguments she makes in both her article and her European Parliament speech and explain why I think her description of what is happening to Ukraine is fundamentally correct.

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CHAPTERS

0:00 Intro
0:36 Yulia Mendel's "Zelensky's Strategy Is National Suicide"
1:23 Who is Yulia Mendel?
2:23 Her argument: national suicide, not just defeat
4:32 The five dimensions of disaster
5:30 1. Demographic disaster
7:26 Checking her numbers
10:23 Ukrainian casualty estimates
12:17 Can Ukraine recover demographically?
15:15 2. Economic disaster
16:43 Dependence on Western aid
20:22 Ukraine's debt
21:15 3. Territorial disaster
23:47 The threat to Odessa
25:31 4. Political disaster
28:16 Corruption
29:11 5. Security disaster
32:06 Recap: all five dimensions
34:15 The contrast with Russia
38:41 The West's responsibility
40:38 Conclusion

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
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I recently spent 8 days in Russia – September 5-12, 2026 – mainly in Moscow and St. Petersburg. I gave a series of talks and interviews and spoke with numerous people in the Russian security community, including senior figures like Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. In this episode, I describe what I learned during my trip.

Eli Clifton and Ian Lustick have just published a terrific new book called Israel’s Lobby: America in the Grip of a Foreign Power. It appears twenty years after Steve Walt and I published “The Israel Lobby” in The London Review of Books (March 2006), which we turned into a book a year later. Much has happened regarding Israel, the Israel lobby, and the US-Israeli relationship in the two decades since Steve and I first addressed those subjects. Clifton and Lustick do a great job explaining those fundamental changes. In this episode, I will discuss their new book and explain how it differs from what Steve and I wrote in our article and book on the lobby.

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BUY THE BOOKS

1. Israel's Lobby: America in the Grip of a Foreign Power 
by Eli Clifton and Ian Lustick
Purchase Here: https://amzn.to/4gMNJey

2. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt
Purchase Here: https://amzn.to/3SL2M0o

(As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.)

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CHAPTERS

0:00 Intro
0:28 The book: Israel's Lobby by Eli Clifton and Ian Lustick
2:38 The core arguments
5:15 The conceptual framework: discourse vs. policy
7:29 Where the new book breaks from Mearsheimer & Walt
8:01 How the discourse changed: dual loyalty and "Israel Firsters"
12:42 The internet and the collapse of media gatekeeping
15:08 Israeli behavior after October 7th
17:45 Israel as a "crazy state"
22:11 Israeli identity: "a nation that dwells alone"
27:51 Why Americans turned on Israel
29:29 The lobby fights back: redefining antisemitism
32:54 Government crackdowns on campus protests
35:40 Plutocrats, Citizens United, and policy capture
39:11 The bottom line and the big question ahead
41:14 Closing thoughts

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
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In recent months, Western news coverage of the Ukraine war tells us that Russia is suffering huge casualties on the battlefield while making hardly any progress capturing Ukrainian territory. At the same time, Ukraine’s long-range drone attacks on the Russian homeland are wreaking havoc, which will improve Ukraine’s position at the bargaining table. In short, Russia is in deep trouble and Ukraine’s situation is hardly dire. This episode explains why this perspective is wrong. Russia is winning on the battlefield – albeit slowly – and its ramped-up bombing campaign is doing egregious damage to Ukraine’s economy, which is essential for Kyiv to sustain the war on the front lines. This situation is unsurprising, as this is a war of attrition in which the side with an advantage in manpower and weaponry invariably wins. In that regard, the Russians have an overwhelming advantage. Indeed, were it not for the effect that drones have had on the battlefield, the Ukrainians would have lost a long time ago. 

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Chapters
0:00 Intro
0:34 What This Episode Covers
0:50 The Story the Western Media Is Telling
3:25 The Battlefield: A War of Attrition
4:20 The Balance of Manpower
6:41 Force-to-Space Ratio: Gaps in the Line
8:13 The Balance of Firepower: Artillery
10:51 Drones: What's Keeping Ukraine in the Fight
12:02 Russian Casualties: The Numbers Don't Add Up
15:01 Ukrainian Casualties: 30,000 a Month
18:18 Why Russia Takes Territory So Slowly
20:11 The Air War: Russia's Inventory
28:45 Why Punishment Campaigns Don't Work
29:35 Russia Changes Strategy
33:49 Warehouses and the Energy Grid
36:11 Ukraine's Drone Campaign Can't Win the War
37:40 Outside Support for Ukraine
38:12 Trump and the Shifting Burden
42:29 Inside Ukraine: War Weariness
43:51 Zelensky's Political Troubles
45:31 Where the War Stands Today
47:48 The Cost of Rebuilding
49:16 The Best Ukraine Can Hope For
50:34 Conclusion

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Music

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
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Music modified (edited/remixed) from the original.

There is considerable evidence that the US is interested in “expanding its options” for using its nuclear arsenal. In particular, it appears that the Pentagon would like to increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons for both deterrence and warfighting should deterrence fail. 

I will argue that fighting a war with tactical nuclear weapons is unlikely to produce a meaningful military victory and is likely to have catastrophic consequences. In fact, the US and NATO embraced this very option in the 1950s in the context of a war in Europe, only to realize that they had to find a different way to deter the Soviet Union and fight it should deterrence break down. The same basic logic that applied then still applies today. Simply put, tactical nuclear weapons are not war-winning weapons.

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CHAPTERS

00:00 Introduction
00:31 Why tactical nuclear weapons, why now
01:52 From massive retaliation to flexible options
03:04 The real driver: weakened conventional forces
04:46 Ukraine, Iran, and depleted munitions
05:07 Balancing conventional and nuclear deterrence
06:24 The appeal of tactical nukes on the battlefield
07:04 Why that thinking is misguided
07:55 Defending Europe in the 1950s
10:26 NATO's nuclear answer — and why the US never adopted "no first use"
11:54 Carte Blanche: the June 1955 war game
14:41 Destroying Germany to save Germany
15:38 The escalation problem
16:47 Command and control in a nuclear war
18:50 MC 14/2: NATO doubles down in 1957
20:20 Shift one: rebuilding conventional deterrence
23:03 Shift two: nuclear weapons as coercion, not warfighting
25:19 A handful of weapons and the slippery slope
28:00 MC 14/2 vs. MC 14/3
29:30 Recap: how NATO moved away from warfighting
31:30 What this means for the US today
33:49 Conclusion

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
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The June 17, 2026, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expired today – August 17, 2026. The US has not achieved any of its initial objectives. It is now mainly concerned with opening the Strait of Hormuz without having to accept Iran’s far-reaching demands for ending its blockade of the Strait. 

The Trump administration is trying to achieve that goal with a naval blockade, a strategy it employed earlier in the war, and which failed. I will argue that the strategic situation facing the US in the Gulf is much worse now and there is virtually no chance that this second blockade will work. Moreover, that deteriorating strategic situation makes escalation even less attractive.

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CHAPTERS
0:00 Introduction
0:29 The MOU expires today
1:23 Why the US is now relying on a naval blockade
2:49 America's four original war aims — and why all four failed
3:40 What America wants now: open the strait, get a nuclear deal
4:58 Iran's goals and its list of demands
7:22 How we got here: the phases of the war
7:38 Phase one — the 40-day air campaign
8:06 Phase two — the first blockade and the surrender document
9:13 Phase three — the tit-for-tat campaign
10:49 Phase four — the second blockade, where we are today
11:24 Bessent's promise of "unprecedented economic hurt"
12:53 Can the second blockade actually work?
14:39 Problem one: the state of the US Navy
17:05 Problem two: stripping East Asia to cover the Gulf
19:17 Problem three: oil, the Red Sea, and drained reserves
21:50 Problem four: Iranian hardliners take control
23:50 Is there an escalation option? Three reasons why not
25:34 The July 6th attack — and what the US isn't doing now
28:15 Iran now holds the escalation card
29:59 Conclusion: the US has no strategy left

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
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Music modified (edited/remixed) from the original.

The aim of this video is to compare the terms of the new deal to end the Iran war, which key Iranian spokesmen have just described, with those of the June 17, 2026, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Tehran and Washington.

I will explain why President Trump should have embraced the original MOU instead of walking away. The US has since lost significant bargaining leverage, and is now facing Iranian demands that far exceed those in the original MOU. 

It is difficult to see how Trump can accept Iran’s demands, as that would represent a humiliating defeat for the US. At the same time, it is hard to see how he can reject them, as he has to open the Strait of Hormuz sooner rather than later and he has hardly any coercive leverage over Iran.

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CHAPTERS

0:00 Introduction
0:32 The state of US–Iran negotiations
1:37 Background: Obama and the 2015 JCPOA
2:09 Trump tears up the JCPOA (2018)
3:03 Biden fails; Trump returns (2025)
3:57 The June 2025 "12-Day War"
4:33 The February 28th war
5:53 The 40-day bombing and the April 8th ceasefire
6:33 Failed talks and the June 17th Memorandum of Understanding
8:43 The 11 issues on the table
9:19 Issue 1: Opening the Strait of Hormuz
9:56 Issue 2: Lifting oil sanctions
10:23 Issues 3 & 4: The ceasefires
11:33 Issue 5: Who controls the Strait
11:44 Issue 6: Tolls and fees
12:07 Issue 7: US military presence
12:40 Issues 8–10: The big three economic issues
14:11 Issue 11: The nuclear question
15:30 MOU - June 17th
20:36 The July tit-for-tat and the collapse of US leverage
21:38 Iran's Proposal - August 8th
27:11 What can Trump do?
29:36 Conclusion

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
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In today’s video I’ll explain why I believe a US victory is not possible and why the longer Trump waits to cut a deal with Iran, the worse the outcome for the US. 

I’ll argue that Trump would have been wise to settle the war months ago, after the initial bombing campaign failed. Instead, he kept looking for some way to win the war or at least find an off ramp that would allow him to make the case that the US achieved some of its goals and did not walk away from the fight empty-handed. But that search is a futile enterprise. There is no war-winning strategy available to him.

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CHAPTERS

0:00 Introduction
0:33 The Current Situation in Iran
0:44 Overview of the Episode
2:47 The Four Goals of the US
6:17 The June 17 Memorandum of Understanding: A Surrender Document
9:18 Why Did our Strategies Fail?
9:51 The Five Possible Military Strategies
10:30 Strategy 1: The Discriminate Air Campaign
11:51 Strategy 2: The Indiscriminate Air Campaign
12:35 Strategy 3: Tit-for-Tat
13:07 Strategy 4: The Naval Blockade
13:26 Strategy 5: The Land Option
13:57 What the US Actually Did: The Timeline
18:35 Signing the MoU, Then Violating It
22:46 Why the Three Strategies Failed
36:20 Where We Are: America Has Lost
38:46 What Trump Must Do Now
40:31 The Iranians Hold the Cards
41:13 Summary & Conclusions

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
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In this video, my first substantive one, I lay out my theory of conventional deterrence and use it to explain Russian thinking in the run up to the war in Ukraine as well why the war has taken the form it has over the past 4+ years.

The key question I address is: why wasn’t Russia deterred from attacking Ukraine? After all, Russia did not have a large and finely-tuned army and the West had gone to substantial lengths to arm and train the Ukrainian army between February 2014 and February 2022. 

This was not a case of Bambi versus Godzilla. So, why did conventional deterrence fail in this case? 

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REFERENCE

Buy Conventional Deterrence Here: 
https://amzn.to/450DPRh
(As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.)

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CHAPTERS

0:00 Introduction
0:31 Overview: Russia, Ukraine & Conventional Deterrence
3:25 What is Conventional Deterrence?
5:20 The Military Variable: Three Strategies
8:52 Which Military Strategies Deter and Which Fail
11:34 The Limited-Aim Strategy Explained
13:23 The Political Variable and The Pressure To Go to War
15:30 The Political Variable: Sinai Peninsula 1973 & Pearl Harbor 1941
18:43 Turning to Ukraine: The Conventional Wisdom
22:07 Why the "Russian Blitzkrieg" Story Is Wrong
28:38 What Actually Happened: A Limited-Aim War
34:53 Summary & Conclusions

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
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Music modified (edited/remixed) from the original.