KEI Live

The ideology sustaining the Kim dynasty did not emerge from a vacuum. It was shaped, in part, by American missionaries who built a Christian following in Pyongyang in the late nineteenth century. That is the argument at the heart of Korean Messiah, and it reframes how Americans should think about their relationship with the Korean Peninsula and the Kim regime.

Join the Korea Economic Institute of America and the Atlantic Council for a conversation with China bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal Jonathan Cheng on his landmark new book, Korean Messiah: Kim Il Sung and the Christian Roots of North Korea's Personality Cult.

Cheng traces the surprising American origins of the Kim dynasty's personality cult and asks what understanding those origins can tell us about the nature of the regime Washington and Seoul face today.

[This material is distributed by KEI on behalf of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.]

Join KEI for a conversation with Bruce Bechtol, author of Rogue Allies: The Strategic Partnership between Iran and North Korea, on the security, economic, and strategic implications of North Korea-Iran relations and what Washington and Seoul should do about it.

Dr. Bechtol argues that Iran is North Korea's most important Middle Eastern partner. The two have maintained a strategic relationship for decades, forged on mutual animosity toward the United States and sustained largely through military and weapons sales.

As both regimes deepen their ties to Russia and China, that partnership is introducing new dimensions to an already dangerous proliferation threat to U.S. allies and partners in both the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East.

[This material is distributed by KEI on behalf of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.]

U.S.–South Korea nuclear cooperation is moving from long-term ambition into active policy discussion following the November 2025 Joint Fact Sheet.

But what will it take to turn commitment into real capability, given legal, industrial, and political constraints?

Join KEI on April 28 at 10:00 a.m. ET for a discussion on defense-industrial cooperation and nuclear-powered attack submarines in the U.S.–ROK alliance.

Featuring insights from former Minister of Defense Acquisition Program Administration Eunho Kang and moderated by KEI’s Ellen Kim.

[This material is distributed by KEI on behalf of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.]

In October 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump expressed his approval for South Korea to build a nuclear-powered attack submarine in the United States. But no progress has been made on the issue since then.

In this virtual event for KEI’s upcoming Korea Policy journal, KEI Senior Fellow and Director of Academic Programs Ellen Kim hosts Korea Institute for Defense Analyses’ Jihoon Yu to assess where U.S.-South Korea nuclear submarine cooperation stands after the May 11 meeting between Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Minister of National Defense Ahn Gyu-back.

Jihoon Yu is Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. He served twenty-seven years in the South Korean Navy as a submarine officer and strategic planner, was a member of the Navy's task force on the CVX light aircraft carrier, and is the principal author of "Vision 2045." He holds an MA in national security affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and a PhD in political science from Syracuse University.

Read more in the Spring/Summer 2026 issue of Korea Policy, KEI's flagship journal, which will be released in June.

[This material is distributed by KEI on behalf of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.]

Alliance modernization has moved fast. The publication of the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, combined with the ongoing war in Iran, has transformed what was once an abstract policy concept into an urgent operational reality, generating significant challenges and real opportunities for Washington and Seoul.

Can the two sides structure that conversation before political momentum outpaces institutional preparation? Dr. In-yo Seol of Korea National Defense University argues they can, and that alliance modernization need not mean a contraction of the U.S. commitment to South Korean security. Rather, it can be understood as a redistribution of roles built on converging military interests—a foundation more durable than the transactional logic of burden-sharing alone.

Join KEI for a discussion with Dr. Seol on the strategic logic underlying alliance modernization and its implications for both countries. His analysis appears in the Spring/Summer 2026 issue of Korea Policy, KEI’s flagship journal.

[This material is distributed by KEI on behalf of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.]

On January 23, 2026, the U.S. government released its 2026 National Defense Strategy. The document explicitly identifies defending the U.S. homeland and interests in the Western Hemisphere as the country’s top priority. In the Indo-Pacific, U.S. defense priorities focus on balancing deterrence and peaceful coexistence with China and emphasizing enhanced burden-sharing with regional allies and partners.

A clear shift from previous administrations, the Trump administration’s pivot toward “critical but limited support” from U.S. forces in the region holds military, political, and strategic implications for allies and partners facing growing threats from North Korea and China.

Join KEI and the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (IIPS) to discuss the evolution of U.S. defense priorities in the region and the implications of the newest defense strategy on South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.

Agenda

10:00 a.m.–10:30 a.m. | Fireside Chat with Randall Schriver and Scott Snyder

10:30 a.m.–11:30 a.m. | Panel Discussion moderated by Jennifer Hong

Participants

Randall Schriver, Chairman of the Board at The Institute for Indo-Pacific Security

Scott Snyder, President and CEO, Korea Economic Institute of America

Ellen Kim, Director of Academic Affairs, Korea Economic Institute of America

Michael Mazza, Senior Director for Research, Institute for Indo-Pacific Security

Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Director, Institute for Indo-Pacific Security

Jennifer Hong (Moderator), Senior Director, Institute for Indo-Pacific Security

[This material is distributed by KEI on behalf of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.]

North Korea is finalizing a five-year military modernization plan and will hold its Ninth Party Congress in the coming days—the results of which could reshape security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula. New long-range missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland, a nuclear doctrine that explicitly permits preemptive use of nuclear weapons, and expanded conventional capabilities are reshaping deterrence and security in the Indo-Pacific.

North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine has added another dimension to the threat. North Korean troops have learned how to fight and deploy drones, small-unit tactics, and electronic warfare on a live battlefield. With North Korea’s recent pledge of unconditional support for Russia, along with China’s ongoing economic and political backing, this axis of upheaval is poised to continue.

Join the Korea Economic Institute of America and assess what North Korea’s weapons modernization means for the U.S.-South Korea alliance that has underpinned peninsula security for over seven decades. How does a credible first-use doctrine reshape the deterrence calculus? What new capabilities are the United States and South Korea developing to tackle more advanced conventional threats from the North? What do the Trump administration’s newly released national security and defense strategies, which notably deprioritize North Korea in favor of China, mean for burden-sharing and force posture?

[KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the KIEP, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC.]

The U.S. Supreme Court has delivered a significant check on White House trade authority — and America's trading partners, including South Korea, are now recalibrating. On Friday, February 20, the Court struck down the ability of the Trump administration to implement tariffs to regulate imports under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

While the decision strikes down the tariffs imposed under the April 2 “Liberation Day” announcement, the administration's underlying trade ambitions remain. Tariffs levied through IEEPA have been a cornerstone of the administration’s policies to reshore U.S. manufacturing, raise government revenue, and bilateral trade- and investment deal negotiations, including with Korea. What are some trade policy tools available to administration to achieve its objectives, following the Supreme Court ruling? How could this ruling impact investments made in the United States under the reciprocal tariff regime? What is the outlook for the trade deals negotiated between the United States and some of its major trading partners including Korea, Japan, and the EU? What emphasis might this now place on existing tariffs under Section 232 and other available provisions?

Join the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) for a reactive discussion on what lies ahead for U.S. national economic policy after the Supreme Court ruling and how it affects U.S. trading and investment relationships with some of Washington’s largest economic partners.

[KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the KIEP, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC.]

The Global America Business Institute (GABI), the Korea Economic Institute (KEI), and the International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Cooperation Center (INC) hosted a joint workshop discussing the future of nuclear energy in the context of AI and energy security.

Session I: Global Perspectives on AI Demand and Energy Needs

The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence is reshaping global energy demand, infrastructure planning, and national competitiveness. As AI applications scale across data centers, cloud computing, advanced manufacturing, and defense-related systems, countries face a shared challenge: delivering large volumes of reliable, affordable, and secure electricity while maintaining grid stability and meeting broader economic and strategic objectives.

This session examines AI-driven energy demand through an international lens, highlighting how governments and industry are forecasting AI-related load growth, adapting generation portfolios, and accelerating investment in firm, dispatchable energy resources.

Session II: AI, Energy Security, and Supply Chain Resilience

AI development depends not only on abundant electricity, but also on secure access to energy technologies, critical materials, manufacturing capacity, and cross-border infrastructure. This session explores how international energy cooperation is evolving in response to the security and supply-chain challenges created by rapidly rising AI-driven demand.

Discussion will examine allied and partner supply chains for energy generation, grid infrastructure, nuclear fuel, critical minerals, and advanced manufacturing; vulnerabilities exposed by geopolitical competition and regulatory fragmentation; and how bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks can reduce risk and accelerate deployment of AI-enabling energy infrastructure.

On December 5, 2025, Arizona State University, in partnership with the Korea Economic Institute of America and the Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosted a public program titled “U.S.–ROK Cooperation in the Semiconductor and EV Battery Supply Chain.”

As the United States and South Korea deepen cooperation in advanced technologies, semiconductor manufacturing, and electric-vehicle battery production, Arizona has emerged as a critical hub in the evolving industrial partnership. This program explored how both countries are working to strengthen secure, resilient supply chains that support economic security, technological innovation, and long-term strategic competitiveness.

The discussion brought together experts to assess the opportunities and challenges facing the semiconductor and EV battery sectors—including export controls, global competition, research collaboration, and the future of U.S.–Korea technological cooperation. The event highlighted how Korean investment and bilateral coordination are shaping the next generation of advanced manufacturing and innovation in the American Southwest.

Panel:

Lee Sung-hwan, Director-General for Diplomatic Strategy and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Lee Hyo-young, Associate Professor, Korean National Diplomatic Academy

Rodrigo Balbontín, Associate Director of Trade, IP, and Digital Technology Governance, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation

ASU Faculty Speaker: Sungik Yang, School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Arizona State University

Moderated by: Güneş Murat Tezcür, Director, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University

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[KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the KIEP, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.]