Korea JoongAng Daily - Daily News from Korea

This article is by Lee Su-jeong and read by an artificial voice.

Hyundai Motor has extended its partnership with World Archery through 2028, continuing its role as title sponsor for major international archery competitions, the company announced on Tuesday.

World Archery oversees international archery competitions and organizes major events such as the World Archery Championships and the Archery World Cup.

Hyundai first signed a partnership agreement with World Archery in 2016. Since then, the automaker has promoted its brand through sponsorships.

The company later expanded the scope of its involvement to include Para-Archery world ranking events and the Archery Indoor World Series.

Under the extended agreement, Hyundai added a robotics sponsorship component, which will allow the company to showcase its robotics technology during broadcasts of major international tournaments.

"This partnership, which began under our executive chair's vision, reflects values deeply rooted in Korean culture and in our company," President and CEO of Hyundai Motor Company José Muñoz said. "We're proud to expand our support to include Para Archery and Indoor Archery, reinforcing our belief that sport, like mobility, should be accessible to everyone. Through this collaboration, we continue to champion precision, inclusivity and innovation on the global stage."

Hyundai Motor Group has supported archery in Korea for decades.

Chung Mong-koo, the group's honorary chairman, served as president of the Korea Archery Association beginning in 1985. Since 2005, Euisun Chung, executive chair of Hyundai Motor Group, has held the same position, continuing the group's long-term backing of the sport.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.

This article is by Lee Ga-ram and read by an artificial voice.

The government's push to develop Gwangju into a hub for advanced semiconductor packaging is unsettling companies in the Chungcheong region, where executives say years of government-backed clustering now appear to be shifting south.

An employee at a semiconductor packaging company in North Chungcheong said the plan to build a "southern semiconductor innovation belt" has left the company confused. The initiative would expand an ecosystem long concentrated in the Seoul metropolitan area by assigning advanced packaging to Gwangju, power semiconductors to Busan and materials and components to Gumi, North Gyeongsang.

"An advanced packaging hub is already taking shape in Chungcheong," the employee said. "Do we now have to move down to Gwangju? I worry whether government support might be cut if we stay in Chungcheong."

Industry confusion has grown as the government increasingly promotes Gwangju as the optimal location for packaging.

At the "Vision and Strategy for K-Semiconductors in the AI Era," chaired by President Lee Jae Myung on Wednesday, the government said it would establish an advanced semiconductor packaging cluster in Gwangju.

The plan calls for investing 42 billion won ($28.5 million) by 2030 to build an advanced packaging demonstration center, along with an additional 500 billion won to develop Gwangju into a national flagship packaging hub.

Semiconductor packaging involves cutting individual chips from completed wafers and assembling them with various components to create final products.

Outsourced semiconductor assembly and test companies, or OSAT firms, typically handle this back-end process. In recent years, advanced packaging has become important as chipmakers seek higher performance by vertically or horizontally stacking and interconnecting multiple chips on silicon interposers.

Industry concern over the government's announcement stems from what companies see as inconsistencies with earlier policy.

In 2021, under the Moon Jae-in administration, the government unveiled a roughly 510 trillion won semiconductor development strategy known as the "K-Semiconductor Belt."

The plan envisioned a K-shaped industrial corridor linking Pangyo, Gyeonggi, and Onyang, South Chungcheong, as well as Icheon and Yongin, Gyeonggi, and Cheongju, North Chungcheong. The government also proposed an advanced packaging platform spanning Cheonan, South Chungcheong, Onyang, and Goesan County, North Chungcheong.

At the time, officials said the central region - the Chungcheong area and nearby southern Gyeonggi - offered strong connections between foundry operations and packaging.

Chungcheong already hosts Samsung Electronics' packaging lines as well as major domestic OSAT firms such as Hana Micron, Nepes and SFA Semicon, while also sitting close to chip fabrication plants in Pyeongtaek, Hwaseong and Yongin, Gyeonggi.

However, the Lee administration has presented a different rationale.

"Gwangju hosts Amkor Technology, a global industry leader, and the construction of AI data centers is expected to generate packaging demand, so the city offers favorable conditions for clustering advanced packaging companies," the government said on Wednesday.

Amkor Technology, the world's second-largest OSAT company headquartered in the United States, operates facilities in Songdo and Bupyeong, Incheon, and Gwangju.

Industry insiders, however, question whether Amkor Technology's Gwangju operations meaningfully strengthen Korea's domestic packaging capabilities.

"Expanding operations in Gwangju would raise logistics costs and make it harder to secure skilled workers," one packaging industry official said.

The Lee administration itself pointed to structural limits in the packaging sector. When announcing the K-Semiconductor Belt-related policy, it noted that Korea's packaging production base consists of both domestic firms and Korean subsidiaries of foreign companies, underscoring the need to streng...

This article is by Kim Won and read by an artificial voice.

Despite U.S. President Donald Trump's pledge to impose high tariffs to reduce the United States' chronic trade deficit, the data tell a different story. The goods trade deficit has continued to grow even after the trade war began, and recent monthly reductions have been attributed to a slowdown in domestic demand - a sign of economic contraction rather than a healthy recovery.

According to the U.S. Department of Commerce on Dec. 14, the country's goods trade deficit - the difference between exports and imports - totaled $978.7 billion from January to September this year, up $106.2 billion from the $872.5 billion recorded during the same period last year.

The deficit widened sharply at the beginning of the year as companies front-loaded imports in anticipation of tariff hikes, particularly in the first quarter of January to March this year.

While import adjustments have since narrowed the monthly deficit in August and September compared to last year, the improvement is viewed as a "recessionary" decrease driven by weakened domestic demand. In September, the goods trade deficit fell to $52.8 billion - the smallest since June 2020. Exports rose by 3 percent that month, while imports edged up just 0.6 percent.

Analysts say the trade war did little to reduce the overall deficit but instead shifted the deficit to different trading partners. The U.S. goods trade deficit with countries such as Korea, Japan, China and the European Union narrowed, while deficits with Mexico, Southeast Asia and Taiwan expanded.

From January to September this year, the U.S. goods trade deficit with China stood at $160.5 billion, down from $217.5 billion during the same period last year. The deficits with Korea and Japan also shrank, falling from $50.4 billion to $44.4 billion and from $49.8 billion to $48.4 billion, respectively - largely due to slower growth in U.S. imports of cars and machinery.

In contrast, the U.S. goods trade deficit with Mexico increased from $125.5 billion to $145.9 billion from January to September this year. Deficits with Vietnam and Thailand also rose - from $90.6 billion to $129.5 billion, and from $32.9 billion to $48.7 billion, respectively. The data suggests that U.S. tariffs targeting China prompted a shift in global supply chains, redirecting production and imports through Mexico and Southeast Asia.

The United States also saw a growing trade deficit with Taiwan. From January to September this year, the U.S. deficit with Taiwan surged to $94.4 billion, up from $54.5 billion during the same period last year. While U.S. exports to Taiwan totaled just $39.8 billion, imports reached $134.2 billion, driven largely by soaring demand for semiconductors and IT equipment amid expanding AI investment.

The broader impact of tariffs has extended beyond trade figures to the overall U.S. economy. Initial jobless claims rose to 236,000 last week, up 44,000 from the previous week - the sharpest weekly increase in nearly six years. Jobless claims are considered a leading indicator of labor market trends.

On Dec. 8, the Trump administration announced a $12 billion relief package for U.S. farmers, aimed at offsetting losses caused by the U.S.-China trade conflict, including the suspension of soybean exports. The move was intended to compensate for the fallout of the administration's tariff policies using federal funds.

Meanwhile, concerns over rising inflation are growing. According to research from regional branches of the Federal Reserve, tariffs increased the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index by 0.5 percentage points as of this summer, and the core PCE index - which excludes volatile food and energy prices - by 0.4 percentage points.

Internal Fed analysis also found that tariffs raised prices of core goods by roughly 0.3 percent, which in turn pushed the overall inflation rate up by 0.1 percentage point. The Congressional Budget Office projected that tariff...

This article is by Noh Yu-rim and read by an artificial voice.

On Dec. 8, a large banner reading "Closing Down Sale" in Korean covered part of the exterior of the Raboum Outlet near Seoul National University in Gwanak District, southern Seoul. The outlet, which has been in business for nearly two decades since opening in 2006, is scheduled to close for good on Dec. 31.

Inside, signs advertising farewell sales were next to piles of unsold clothing and accessories - but few customers were in sight.

"Outlet brands feel a bit outdated, so I usually buy clothes online," said Ko Seung-jae, a resident of Gwanak District.

Han Hee-jae, who had just bought gloves at a discount, added, "Outlet clearance items used to be much cheaper, but now they don't seem any cheaper than what I can find for sale online."

Korea's overall offline retail sector continues to struggle, and urban outlets in particular are seeing sharp declines in purchases. "In the early 2010s, outlet stores attracted families and helped drive industry performance," said an industry source. "They even pushed department stores to become more experience-oriented shopping spaces."

But urban outlets have since found themselves caught between large shopping complexes that emphasize interactive experiences and e-commerce platforms that offer more competitive prices. Complexes including HDC Group I'Park Mall and Shinsegae Property's Starfield Mall are enticing customers with popular fashion labels and interactive pop-up stores.

By contrast, the Lotte Factory Outlet in Gasan, which opened in 2016, closed in September before it could celebrate its 10th anniversary. The store's revenue last year dropped by 9.4 percent on year to approximately 22.1 billion won ($15 million). E-Land Retail's NewCore Outlet in Nonhyeon, Incheon, also shut down in June.

The growth of e-commerce poses another major threat to urban outlets, especially as some online platforms are solely dedicated to offseason and clearance inventory. According to fashion platform Zigzag, operated by Kakao Style, transactions in its "Jikjin Outlet" category - which offers discounts on past-season merchandise - rose by 35 percent between September and November compared to the same period last year. During those months, spending by consumers in their 40s jumped by 72 percent, indicating growing online outlet use across age groups.

As of this month, Hyundai Department Store operates four urban outlets, Lotte Shopping nine and E-Land Retail 41. Since the Covid-19 pandemic began in 2019, Lotte has closed one location, and E-Land has closed seven.

"Urban outlets were once highly competitive brick-and-mortar shopping venues [...] 10 to 20 years ago," said Lee Jung-hee, an economics professor at Chung-Ang University. "But today, they are falling behind in regard to consumer trends and failing to attract foot traffic. Unlike premium outlets in the suburbs, which are built on larger areas, urban outlets are constrained by space, so they face limits in offering new content."

Major retailers are responding to the slump by revamping their remaining urban outlets. In March, Hyundai Department Store redesigned the second floor of its Hyundai City Outlet in Dongdaemun as "Seoul Edition," a content-based space showcasing modern Seoul style and Korean culture. In April, Lotte Shopping doubled the size of its food court at its Cheongju outlet. E-Land Retail is upgrading food and beverage brands at key locations and introducing more nonfashion retailers such as Olive Young and Daiso to draw in shoppers.

"Urban outlets have lost their competitiveness due to the rise of e-commerce and stagnation in the fashion sector," said Jung Yeon-sung, a business professor at Dankook University. "Now is a critical time for them to analyze consumer demand in each commercial zone, develop specialized store concepts and diversify product categories."

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of gene...

This article is by Sarah Chea and read by an artificial voice.

[NEWS ANALYSIS]

From Tesla's Full Self-Driving (FSD) suite to GM's Super Cruise, a wave of U.S. automotive technologies - only recently seen in Korea - has swelled on the country's roads, despite falling strikingly short of Korea's safety standards.

This stems from Korea's decision to dismantle its cap on U.S.-made vehicles entering the Korean market - so long as they met U.S. safety standards, not Korea's - a provision that U.S. President Donald Trump denounced as a "nontrade barrier." In return, the United States agreed to lower its auto tariffs from 25 percent to 15 percent.

With the United States maintaining far looser traffic and safety standards, U.S. vehicles are often ill-suited for Korea's narrower, denser roads - prompting criticism that such disparities effectively impose a form of reverse discrimination on domestic automakers.

Under the FTA, U.S. automakers were allowed to ship as many as 50,000 vehicles into Korea each year as long as they meet U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. They are not obliged to comply with Korean safety rules, as Seoul is barred from unilaterally prohibiting or disadvantaging safety, environmental or technological specifications legally permitted in the United States. The quota was previously 25,000 units, but President Trump widened it to 50,000 in his first term in 2018.

That cap has now been abolished entirely. Though the Korean government argued that the "impact will be negligible," the repercussions are expected to be far more substantial as sales of U.S. brands, such as Tesla, are accelerating at a breakneck pace.

Made for the United States, risky for Korea

With Korea maintaining far more stringent overall safety standards than the United States, there are concerns that vehicles engineered to meet U.S. regulations can operate safely within Korea's complex and constricted driving ecosystem.

In environments marked by heavy rain or snow, dimly lit alleyways and dense traffic involving motorcycles and bicycle couriers, sensor and camera misreadings or delayed reaction times could further amplify collision risks.

"In Korea, drivers are legally required to keep their hands on the wheel at all times - but Tesla's FSD entered the market and has been marketed as a supervised autonomy system that allows the cars to navigate roads without the driver holding the steering wheel," said Lee Ho-geun, a professor of future automotive studies at Daedeok University.

"Tesla itself does not offer fully autonomous driving, yet what is currently circulating on the roads can be considered hazardous."

Tesla's electronic door mechanisms have also been cited as a serious design flaw, as when electrical power is cut, whether from a battery failure or a crash, occupants may be unable to escape. While there is a manual release lever, many drivers do not even know it exists.

The company's flush, retractable door handles have likewise been implicated in multiple fatal incidents worldwide, as first responders have struggled to open the doors after a collision.

In fact, a Tesla Model X crashed into a wall and burst into flames inside a parking area in Yongsan District, central Seoul, in December 2020, killing the driver. A parking attendant reportedly attempted to open the door but failed, and firefighters eventually forced open a rear door with specialized equipment, but by then it was too late to save the driver.

"Tesla's door-related defects have effectively been overlooked for years under the FTA exemption framework, provisions that would be inconceivable under Korea's own law related to automobiles," said Kim Pil-soo, a professor of automotive engineering at Daelim University College and chairman of the Korea Electric Vehicle Association.

"I have raised these concerns for more than a decade in various locations, like in the National Assembly, at policy hearings and in broadcasts, yet not a single substantive improvement has come due ...

Roh Jeong-tae

The author is a writer and senior fellow at the Institute for Social and Economic Research.

On the evening of Dec. 16, 1773, dozens of men disguised as Native Americans gathered at Boston Harbor. Calling themselves the Sons of Liberty, they boarded three ships anchored in the port: the Dartmouth, the Eleanor and the Beaver. After threatening the captains and crews into compliance, they spent nearly three hours dumping 342 chests of tea into the sea. So much tea was thrown overboard that the waters off Boston reportedly turned brown. It was a turning point in history that later historians would wryly label the Boston Tea Party.

The roots of the incident lay in the Seven Years' War, which ended in 1763. Britain emerged victorious over France but at the cost of a massive fiscal deficit. To shore up its finances, London began imposing new taxes on the American colonies, starting with the Sugar Act of 1764 and the Stamp Act of 1765. The Tea Act of 1773, enacted in May of that year, was part of the same revenue-raising effort.

At the time, tea consumed in the American colonies was typically exported from China to the Netherlands and then smuggled into the colonies by local traders. The Tea Act allowed the British East India Company to ship tea directly from China to the colonies and sell it there, ensuring that taxes would be collected. The new distribution system actually lowered the price of tea. But colonists were outraged that a tax had been imposed without their consent. Their anger and resentment erupted and ultimately pushed the colonies toward the American Revolutionary War.

The reasons the United States broke away from Britain cannot be reduced to a single sentence. Religious tensions between Protestant groups and the Church of Britain played a role, as did the vast geographic distance across the Atlantic Ocean. Independence was the product of multiple overlapping forces. Still, there is little doubt that arbitrary taxation served as the decisive catalyst.

That history resonates in the present. On April 2, the Trump administration abruptly announced a sweeping package of reciprocal tariffs targeting countries around the world. The move stunned not only China, which Washington has long treated as a strategic rival, but also U.S. allies, many of whom were confronted with unexpectedly high tariff demands.

How will future historians record this moment? Will it be seen as a necessary assertion of economic sovereignty or as a miscalculation that strained alliances and disrupted global trade? The Boston Tea Party reminds us that disputes over taxation and trade have consequences that can far exceed their immediate economic impact.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.

Park So-young

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Tensions between China and Japan triggered by remarks from Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggesting possible Japanese involvement in a Taiwan contingency appear set to linger. Beijing has formally demanded that the comments be withdrawn and has stepped up pressure across diplomatic, military and economic fronts. What is unfolding is not a fleeting exchange of words but a renewed surfacing of structural tensions that have long defined relations between the two countries.

The roots of Prime Minister Takaichi's remarks lie in Japan's security legislation enacted in 2016 under the second administration of Shinzo Abe. That legal framework allows Japan to classify a situation as a "threat to national survival" if armed conflict were to erupt between U.S. and Chinese forces around Taiwan and the consequences spill over in ways that endanger Japan. In such circumstances, an attack by Chinese forces could effectively be treated as an attack on Japan, enabling the limited exercise of collective self-defense.

When the legislation was introduced, domestic backlash in Japan was intense. Legal scholars and civic groups staged daily protests in front of the National Diet, arguing that the law ran directly counter to Article 9 of the Constitution, which renounces the use of force abroad. Neighboring countries also expressed deep concern. Mindful of this domestic and regional opposition, Abe and subsequent prime ministers, including Yoshihide Suga, Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba, refrained from elaborating on specific scenarios in which the legislation might be applied. The legal framework was in place, but Japan maintained what amounted to strategic ambiguity.

Prime Minister Takaichi has broken with that longstanding restraint. Her remarks align with a broader push to expand Japan's military capabilities and revise its pacifist constitution, part of a trajectory that seeks to elevate Japan from a "normal country capable of war" to a full-fledged security power. Beijing does not view Takaichi's comments as casual diplomatic rhetoric but as a signal of a shift in Japan's policy direction. China's position that Taiwan constitutes a core interest among its core interests has remained unchanged. With tensions already rising ahead of President Xi Jinping's anticipated fourth term, sensitivities surrounding the Taiwan Strait are especially pronounced.

What makes the situation more troubling is the absence of a clear exit strategy. Takaichi is unlikely to have been unaware of China's diplomatic red lines. As a political figure closely associated with Abe's hawkish legacy, she has placed the idea of rebuilding a "strong Japan" at the center of her leadership. The resolute image she has projected since making the Taiwan remarks has resonated with many voters, particularly younger ones. Her approval ratings have exceeded expectations, prompting speculation that she could dissolve the Diet and call a snap election to overturn the current parliamentary balance. In domestic political terms, retreat carries significant costs.

The lack of a coherent China strategy within the Takaichi administration further contributes to the standoff's persistence. During previous periods of heightened Sino-Japanese tension, informal channels of reconciliation often played a stabilizing role. When disputes flared during Abe's tenure over visits to Yasukuni Shrine, former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai traveled to China to help mend ties. Under the previous Ishiba government, former Secretary-General Hiroshi Moriyama visited Beijing twice. Since Takaichi took office, however, no comparable back-channel diplomacy has been visible.

Another complicating factor is the distancing of Komeito, the LDP's longstanding coalition partner. Komeito's founder, the late Daisaku Ikeda, honorary president of Soka Gakkai, played a notabl...

Kang Won-taek

The author is a professor of political science and international relations at Seoul National University.

"Fellow citizens, are you happy? Has your everyday life gotten any better?"

Those words, spoken during a televised debate in the 2002 presidential election by Kwon Young-gil, then the Democratic Labor Party's candidate, suddenly came back into mind. Perhaps it is because the year's end invites reflection. More than that, however, the phrase resurfaced because the past year has been unusually difficult for Korean society.

Since the shocking declaration of martial law on Dec. 3 last year, the country has endured months of political instability, deep social division and pervasive uncertainty about the future. Fortunately, the decree was lifted quickly without a loss of life. The Constitutional Court upheld impeachment, former President Yoon Suk Yeol was removed from office and a snap presidential election led to a transfer of power. After nearly half a year of turmoil, the restoration of constitutional order naturally raised high public expectations that a new president would heal instability and division.

President Lee Jae Myung echoed those hopes in his inauguration address. He spoke of building bridges of coexistence, reconciliation and solidarity over hatred and confrontation, opening an era of happiness filled with dreams and hope.

Six months have now passed and the year is drawing to a close. It is time to ask what has actually changed. The short answer is that despite the change in administration, daily reality feels much the same. Politics have not regained balance simply because the opposition became the ruling party. Extreme confrontation between the ruling and opposition camps remains intact. President Lee hasn't demonstrated a markedly different leadership style centered on inclusion and integration. The promised bridges of coexistence and reconciliation have yet to appear. Korea remains trapped in a politics of hostility and confrontation. Although he pledged to end divisive politics, President Lee now stands at its very center, with little difference from his predecessor.

If anything, new sources of conflict have emerged. The ruling party, which forms a core pillar of the administration, has advanced controversial policies with such force that it can seem less a governing party than a generator of conflict. While the Lee government boasts of democratic recovery at international forums, at home, it has pressed legislation widely seen as targeting the judiciary, one of the three pillars of constitutional government. Bills to establish a special tribunal for insurrection cases and to introduce a crime of "distortion of law" have been pushed forward despite widespread concern about their intent. The ruling party has also pursued revisions to the Media Arbitration Act that include punitive damages provisions.

The rhetoric is democratic, but the substance threatens the foundations of democracy. These reckless and irrational legislative drives have alienated many who genuinely hoped the Lee administration would restore democratic norms. This is not a matter of partisan disagreement but of confidence in the government's commitment to constitutional principles.

President Lee spoke of coexistence and reconciliation. The peaceful coexistence of differing views and ideologies is a core principle of democracy, one that requires dialogue and compromise among competing political forces. Yet, while the president invoked reconciliation, the ruling party has declared that it will not even shake hands with the opposition. Such behavior signals not coexistence but further division and conflict. Over the past six months, the Democratic Party has shown that while it may be adept at acquiring power, its capacity to govern effectively remains questionable.

In his inauguration address, President Lee also said that integration is a measure of competence and division the result of incompetence, adding that political forc...

The special prosecutor team led by Cho Eun-seok has announced the results of its investigation into former President Yoon Suk Yeol's declaration of martial law on Dec. 3, concluding that the move constituted crimes of insurrection and foreign collusion. In a briefing, Cho said Yoon declared martial law "with the aim of monopolizing and maintaining power by using force to seize control of the legislative and judicial branches." The team dismissed the claims by Yoon's camp that the decree was meant as a "wake-up call" to the public, instead characterizing the episode as a "palace coup."

The findings include several notable elements. According to investigators, Yoon began preparing for martial law as early as October 2023, during senior military personnel appointments, well before last April's 22nd general election. The team also presented evidence that Yoon sought to exploit a period of political uncertainty between the U.S. presidential election and Washington's inauguration of a new administration.

Particularly shocking was the allegation that military intelligence officers prepared baseball bats, awls and hammers to violently coerce staff members of the National Election Commission to fabricate evidence of election fraud ahead of the general election. At the same time, the special prosecutor suggested that the declaration of martial law may have been motivated in part by an attempt to mitigate what it described as "spouse-related risks." The team drew a clear line, however, stating that no direct link had been confirmed between the martial law decree and former first lady Kim Keon Hee.

The investigation began in mid-June and, after two extensions, lasted a total of 180 days. A combined 238 personnel were deployed. Seven suspects were taken into custody, and 27 individuals were indicted, three of whom were prosecuted by military authorities. Court proceedings were broadcast live for the first time in Korea's history. Of the 249 cases transferred from the special task force on martial law under the National Police Agency, 34 were returned. Park Ji-young, a deputy special prosecutor, said that the cases sent back accounted for "a very small number," and that most offenses within the special prosecutor's jurisdiction had been fully investigated.

Despite this, Jung Chung-rae, the leader of the Democratic Party, said the motives behind the alleged insurrection and suspicions of foreign collusion had not been sufficiently clarified and announced plans to pursue a second comprehensive special investigation. But another probe risks the Democratic Party appearing to go too far. It could invite suspicion that the ruling party intends to politically exploit the insurrection through next year's local elections. Doubts over fairness have also grown after Jung said allegations involving the Unification Church would not be included in any second probe, raising concerns of selective justice.

Now it is the judiciary's turn. A first-instance ruling scheduled for January in the case of former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, charged as a key participant, will serve as the first judicial test of whether the martial law declaration constitutes insurrection under criminal law. Park emphasized that the full truth will ultimately be determined by court rulings. Politics should step back and allow the judiciary to decide, guided by law and conscience.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.

This article is by Sarah Chea and read by an artificial voice.

Korea Zinc will invest $7.4 billion to build a smelting facility in Tennessee, in a move under which the U.S. government itself will take the unusual step of investing directly in a foreign private company.

Aimed at a shared goal of reducing reliance on China, the world's largest zinc smelter approved the plan at a board meeting on Monday, positioning the project as the first tangible case of cooperation between Korea and the United States following their tariff deal.

Under the plan, Korea Zinc and Washington will establish a joint venture, Crucible JV, valued at $1.9 billion.

While the specific U.S. government entities participating in the project and precise details have not been formally disclosed, the U.S. Department of War will inject $760 million to become the largest shareholder with 40 percent.

Other U.S. participants reportedly include the Department of Commerce, U.S. private defense firms and a U.S. defense-oriented strategic enterprise.

For the funds, Korea Zinc on Monday approved a 2.85 trillion won ($1.9 billion) third-party allotment capital increase, with all newly issued shares to be allocated to Crucible JV. If completed as planned, the U.S. government would ultimately hold a roughly 10 percent stake in Korea Zinc through the joint venture.

Up to $4.7 billion will be raised through loans backed by the U.S. government and financial investors. An additional $210 million will come in the form of subsidies from the Department of Commerce, which plans to acquire a corresponding equity stake in the joint venture.

The remaining $585 million will be funded by Korea Zinc.

The project will proceed with the acquisition of Nyrstar's existing smelter site in Clarksville, Tennessee, which will be redeveloped to rebuild core infrastructure.

Once operational, the facility is expected to produce 13 products, including key nonferrous metals such as zinc, lead and copper; precious metals such as gold and silver; strategic minerals including antimony, germanium and gallium; as well as sulfuric acid used in chip manufacturing.

Construction is scheduled to begin in 2027, with completion targeted for 2029. Annual production goals include 300,000 tons of zinc, 200,000 tons of lead, 35,000 tons of copper and 5,100 tons of rare and strategic metals.

"The investment reflects the growing need to establish additional production sites to address expanding global supply-chain risks and rising U.S. demand for nonferrous and strategic minerals, while securing stable and sustainable profit opportunities by positioning itself for long-term growth in the North American market," Korea Zinc said in a regulatory filing.

"With the United States pursuing the restructuring of critical mineral supply chains as a national strategy, we reviewed the project at the request of the U.S. government."

The agreement appears to have been forged out of Washington's desperate reality when it comes to critical minerals. Rare earths are indispensable to every key industry, from semiconductors to defense and aerospace, yet the global market is overwhelmingly dominated by China.

Dependence on China exceeds 70 percent for some materials like antimony and bismuth, which those essential to the manufacture of artillery shells and missiles.

The United States has sought to rebuild domestic supply chains, but the smelting ecosystem has largely collapsed, hobbled by stringent environmental regulations and persistent challenges to commercial viability. Making things worse, China in October announced stricter export controls on rare earths.

Korea Zinc is the world's largest zinc smelter, accounting for around 10 percent of the world's zinc production. The company produces around 1.2 million tons of around 10 types of nonferrous metals including zinc, lead and copper.

Talks on the deal started in August, during Chairman Choi Yoon-beom's visit to White House as part of the Korean presidential economic delegation....