MCMP – Philosophy of Science

R. A. Rynasiewicz (Johns Hopkins University) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (10 June, 2015) titled "On the Role of the Light Postulate in Relativity". Abstract: As presented by Einstein in 1905, the theory of special relativity follows from two postulates: first, what he called the principle of relativity, and second, an empirical fact about the relation of the propagation of light relative to its source that has come to be called the light postulate. In 1910 Waldemar von Ignatowsky claimed to be able to derive the Lorentz transformations, and hence special relativity, without the light postulate using only the principle of relativity and assumptions that Einstein seems to have implicitly made, such as linearity and the isotropy and homogeneity of space. In his authoritative Relativitätstheorie of 1921, Pauli dismissed Ignatowsky’s result without explanation as void of physical significance. More recently, respected physicists and foundationalists, such as David Mermin (1984), have defended Ignatowsky and claimed that special relativity pre- supposes nothing about electromagnetism. In the first part of this talk, I discuss just what the light postulate asserts (both in special and in general relativity). In the second, I hope to shed light on the debate, if not definitively settle it. (To say on which side would spoil the suspense.) I will also discuss related attempts to dismiss the conventionality of simultaneity.

Peter Pickl (LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (10 June, 2015) titled "Explaining Macroscopic Systems from Microscopic Principles". Abstract: The revolutionary idea of the late 19th century that the physics of gases can be explained by the dynamics of small, point-like particles had a great influence on physics as well as mathematics and philosophy. This idea has changed our understanding of the physics of macroscopic systems significantly as well as the way we see our universe as a whole. The question of how the connection between the microscopic and the macroscopic world can be explained also arises in other fields, for example the life sciences. Answering this question might have a similar impact on the research in these fields. In the talk I will present recent techniques and results of our research group in deriving macroscopic evolution equations from microscopic principles for certain classical, quantum mechanical and biological systems.

Berna Kilinç (Boğaziçi University) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (3 June, 2015) titled "Convergence of Iterated Belief Updates". Abstract: One desideratum on belief upgrade operations is that their iteration is truth-tropic, either on finite or infinite streams of reliable information. Under special circumstances repeated Bayesian updating satisfies this desideratum as shown for instance by the Gaifman and Snir theorem. There are a few analogous results in recent research within dynamic epistemic logic: Baltag et al establish the decidability of propositions for some but not all upgrade operations on finite epistemic spaces. In this talk further convergence results will be established for qualitative stable belief.

Wolfgang Pietsch (MCTS/TU Munich) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (3 June, 2015) titled "The Causual Nature of Modeling in Data-Intensive Science". Abstract: Abstract: I argue for the causal character of modeling in data-intensive science, contrary to wide-spread claims that big data is only concerned with the search for correlations. After introducing and discussing the concept of data-intensive science, several algorithms are examined with respect to their ability to identify causal relationships. To this purpose, a difference-making account of causation is proposed that broadly stands in the tradition of David Lewis’s counterfactual approach, but fits better the type of evidence used in data-intensive science. The account is inspired by causal inferences of the Mill’s method type. I situate data-intensive modeling within a broader framework of a Duhemian or Cartwrightian scientific epistemology, drawing an analogy to exploratory experimentation.

Alexandra Zinke (Konstanz) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (28 May, 2015) titled "Against Grue Mysteries". Abstract: In a recent paper, Freitag (2015) reduces Goodman’s new riddle of induction to the problem of doxastic dependence. We are not justified in projecting grue because our grue-evidence is doxastically dependent on defeated evidence. I try to implement this solution into an inductive extension of AGM belief revision theory. It turns out that the grue-example is nothing but an inductive version of well-known examples by Hansson (1992), which he uses to argue for base revision: If revision takes place on belief-bases, rather than on logically closed belief sets, we can easily account for the doxastic dependence relations between our beliefs. To handle the grue-case, I introduce the notion of an inductively closed belief-base. If we update on this inductively closed belief-base, the grue problem dissolves.

Gábor Hofer-Szabó (Hungarian Academy of Sciences) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (28 May, 2015) titled "On Einstein's Reality Criterion". Abstract: In the talk we characterize the different interpretations of QM in an operationalist-frequentist framework and show what entities the different interpretations posit. We define completeness and correctness of an interpretation in terms of how this posited ontology relates to the "real world ontology" posited by principles independent of the interpretations. We argue that the Reality Criterion is just such a principle. We also argue that the EPR argument, making use of the Reality Criterion, is devised to show that certain interpretations of QM are incomplete, whereas Einstein's latter arguments, making no use of the Reality Criterion, are devised to show that the Copenhagen interpretation is simply wrong. Next, investigating the nature of prediction, an essential part of the Reality Criterion, we formulate two hypothesis: (i) the Reality Criterion is a special case of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle; (ii) it is a special case of Bell's Local Causality Principle.

Dirk Kindermann (Graz) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (25 June, 2015) titled "Context, Conversation, and Fragmentation". Abstract: What is a conversational context?One inuential account (Lewis, Stalnaker, Roberts) says that it is a shared body of information | the information conveyed and/or presupposed by all interlocutors. Conversation, on this account, proceeds by variously influencing, and being influenced, by this body of information. In this talk, I argue that standard idealising assumptions, according to which this body of information is consistent and closed under entailment, put the account at risk of being inapplicable to ordinary speakers|rational agents with limited cognitive resources. I argue that to mitigate the problem, we should think of context as a fragmented body of information. I explain what fragmentation amounts to and develop a simple model of afragmented common ground. I close by presenting some advantages of a fragmentation strategy in explaining some otherwise puzzling conversational phenomena.

Ralph Hertwig (Max Planck Institute for Human Development) gives a talk at the Workshop on Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning (18-20 June, 2015) titled "Navigating the Twilight of Uncertainty: Decisions from Experience". Abstract: In many of our decisions we cannot consult explicit statistics telling us about the relative risks involved in our actions. In lieu of explicit statistics, we can search either externally or internally for information, thus making decisions from experience (as opposed to decisions from descriptions). Recently, researchers have begun to investigate choice in settings in which people learn about options by experiential sampling over time. Converging findings show that when people make decisions based on experience, choices differ systematically from description-based choice. Furthermore, this research on decisions from experience has turned to new theories of decision making under uncertainty (ambiguity), “rediscovered” the importance of learning, and suggested important implications for risk and precautionary behavior. I will review these issues.

David Ludwig (VU University Amsterdam) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (17 June, 2015) titled "Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge. A Model of Knowledge Integration and its Limitations". Abstract: Philosophical debates about indigenous knowledge often focus on the issue of relativism: given a diversity of local knowledge systems, how can certain types of (e.g. scientific or metaphysical) knowledge claim to transcend their historical and cultural contexts? In contrast with philosophical worries about differences between knowledge systems, research in ethnobiology and conservation biology is often motivated by the practical need to integrate indigenous and modern scientific knowledge in the co-management of local environments. Instead of focusing on alleged incommensurability, real-life conservation efforts often require the incorporation of knowledge from different sources. Based on ethnobiological case studies, I propose a model of knowledge integration that reflects shared reference to property clusters and their inferential potentials. Furthermore, the proposed model does not only explain integration of indigenous and modern scientific knowledge but also predicts limitations of knowledge integration. I argue that the proposed model therefore does not only help to understand current practices of ethnobiology but also provides a nuances picture of the ontological and epistemological relations between different knowledge systems.

R. A. Rynasiewicz (Johns Hopkins University) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (10 June, 2015) titled "On the Role of the Light Postulate in Relativity". Abstract: As presented by Einstein in 1905, the theory of special relativity follows from two postulates: first, what he called the principle of relativity, and second, an empirical fact about the relation of the propagation of light relative to its source that has come to be called the light postulate. In 1910 Waldemar von Ignatowsky claimed to be able to derive the Lorentz transformations, and hence special relativity, without the light postulate using only the principle of relativity and assumptions that Einstein seems to have implicitly made, such as linearity and the isotropy and homogeneity of space. In his authoritative Relativitätstheorie of 1921, Pauli dismissed Ignatowsky’s result without explanation as void of physical significance. More recently, respected physicists and foundationalists, such as David Mermin (1984), have defended Ignatowsky and claimed that special relativity pre- supposes nothing about electromagnetism. In the first part of this talk, I discuss just what the light postulate asserts (both in special and in general relativity). In the second, I hope to shed light on the debate, if not definitively settle it. (To say on which side would spoil the suspense.) I will also discuss related attempts to dismiss the conventionality of simultaneity.