NATO Review

Countries have increased their links in a smaller, globalised world. But reactions to Russia's actions in Ukraine mean that a brake has to be put on some of this interlinking. Has globalisation made it easier or more difficult to react? Has it made it impossible to punish Russia without suffering pain at home? And where next for the sanctions and counter-sanctions?

00.09 - Paul King – Editor, NATO Review – voice-over

Globalisation has made all of our lives more dependent on each other. As barriers fall and unions are built, the idea is that all of us stand to lose more in conflicts in a globalised world. But will this idea prove true in dealing with Russia’s activities in Ukraine?

00.27 – Liam Fox – Former UK Secretary of Defence

The great upside of globalisation should be that greater interdependence economically and should make countries less willing to be aggressive, but it is of course based on the fundamental premise that all countries are equally rational.

00.45 – Alex Petriashvili – State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration

Europe is opening borders and giving the opportunities to build bridges. As we see, the Russian Federation is trying to build new fences, new barbed wires on our territory. It is time to build bridges and to forget about the fences.

01.05 - Paul King – voice-over

But globalisation does not automatically lead to peace, either today or in previous examples of close relationships.

01.15 – Prof Julian Lindley-French – Director, Europa Analytica

Well this is not the first age of globalisation, the 19th century was. A hundred years ago there were many, even at this late date before the outbreak of World War I, who said: We are not going to war because we’re too economically interdependent.

01.26 – Rob De Wijk – Founder Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

Globalisation is going on for decades. It’s not something new. No, what is new, is the shift in balance of power in the world and the shifting centre of gravity, the economic shifting of gravity; and consequently the political centre of gravity, which is shifting to the East. What’s happening at the Crimea is very comparable to what’s happening right now in the South-China Sea.

01.58 - Paul King – voice-over

So, globalisation has spawned its own conflicts, not got rid of them. And security has become even more important for the economic development that globalisation is supposed to bring.

02.09 – Ten Jianqun – Director, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing

In recent years the South-China Sea has become a hot spot. The security, you know, should be two sides of one coin: one economy, another is security.

02.21 - Paul King – voice-over

And it’s not just conflicts, which highlight the changing landscape. Where security forces are positioned is also part of the shifting sands.

02.31 – Ten Jianqun – Director, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing

I think China is the largest contributor among P5 in peacekeeping troops in Africa.

02.40 - Paul King – voice-over

Using economics as a weapon can hurt in a globalised world, but this is no guarantee that it will have the desired effect.

02.48 – Prof Julian Lindley-French – Director, Europa Analytica

Yes, economic sanctions, economic penalties, costs rather than benefits for inappropriate action… They are calculated as part of the broad remit of choices that a state makes. But if a state or a regime becomes sufficiently committed to a cause of action for reasons that may not be immediately apparent to those outside of that state, then no amount of economic sanction will actually work if that state or regime believes it’s fundamental to its very survival.

03.23 - Paul King – voice-over

And finally, it’s ironically probably the national, not the international, globalised audiences that matter most in the recent moves by President Putin.

03.34 – Konstantin von Eggert – Kommersant FM Radio, Editor in Chief

We somehow forgot that there is a huge domestic angle to all these things. It is about Putin’s new legitimacy. Yes, he’s officially president, but he’s in fact a national leader who does not just ensure economic stability. Actually, that’s probably not as important to him as it used to be in his first presidential term, but more about him giving Russia a new face, a new spring in Russia’s step and a new image for himself.

NATO Review

www.nato.int/review

The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries.

This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

How much could we have seen the Crimea crisis coming? NATO Review talks to security experts and asks whether there were enough clues in Russia's previous adventures - especially in Estonia and Georgia - to indicate that Crimea would be next.

00.12 - Paul King – Editor, NATO Review – voice-over

When Russia annexed Georgia’s regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 some western politicians warned that Russia wasn’t finished yet.

00.21 – Linas Linkevičius – Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania

We said it would be more at that time. No one listened. By the way, we mentioned Crimea. We mentioned Transnistria. So Crimea is gone. Transnistria maybe not, but who can exclude it?

00.34 – Alex Petriashvili – State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration

The Russians have learned lessons from 2008. Unfortunately, the Western countries less.

00.42 - Paul King – voice-over

But many Western countries were anxious to keep the relationship with Russia stable

00.47 – Karel Kovanda – Former Czech Ambassador to NATO

The reaction to the Georgian invasion, I think, was number 1: very weak, and number 2: rather surprising.

00.58 – Linas Linkevičius

We told then, in 2008: Let’s be consistent. Let’s do what we decided. Let’s implement and let’s stick to this, you know, because we made very good statements at that time, very good demands, very clear. We can have a look. These documents are available. In meetings, communiqués… spending some time to draft. And in two months we’re back to business as normal.

01.20 - Paul King – voice-over

Some feel the West’s reaction may have fostered more confidence in the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin.

01.28 – Karel Kovanda

Calculations of a guy who has got his KGB history, who is a judo sportsman, in that sense makes use of the strength of the opponent by throwing him over, who has his history of dealing with the criminal gangs of Petersburg, and as somebody mentioned, a history of having been a hooligan in his youth.

01.50 – Konstantin von Eggert – Kommersant FM Radio, Editor in Chief

Well, I think the general perception in Moscow was that the West is weak. I’m not trying to psychoanalyse Putin, but if we are talking about the general feeling in the political class, that’s pretty true. I actually would concur with that. You’re looking at the most un-Atlanticist, to put it mildly, American administration in decades. You are looking at a European Union, which is consumed by its own problems and which actually is not ready and not willing to engage in any kind of major, coordinated foreign policy action with players like Russia. So, it’s very conducive from the point of view of Mister Putin.

02.34 - Paul King – voice-over

Regardless of the Russian leadership’s motivation, the Russian moves in Ukraine may have backfired in terms of what was intended and what has actually happened.

02.44 - Konstantin von Eggert

If you look back to mid December, people in the Kremlin were thinking and actually were saying: Ukraine is in our pockets. Yes, the Crimea now is in Russia’s pockets, but as far as Ukraine is concerned, it’s far from being in Russia’s pockets. Actually, I think that Russia’s influence in Ukraine, especially in Kiev, has dwindled to nearly zero. And I suppose that this is the law of unintended consequences that Lilia Shevtsova, so eloquently usually speaks about. It is about creating narratives, which in the end have their own logic. Sometimes you can control them, sometimes you cannot. And I think that this does create funnily enough or tragically enough, depending on how you look at it, more instability in Russia, not only externally, but possibly domestically.

03.35 - Paul King – voice-over

What is clear that what some have described as the mistakes of the approach of 2008, have not been repeated in 2014. And that at least is to be welcomed.

03.46 - Alex Petriashvili

This time the reaction was there, is there and I hope very much that there will be a stronger reaction if it goes farther.

03.59 - Linas Linkevičius

Non-action is provocative. No decision is provocative. This is a signal and this should be realised one day. It really should be learned. But sometimes we need many, many lessons. Many, many wake-up calls to be woken up, which is sad, but this is reality.

NATO Review

www.nato.int/review

The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries.

This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

How much could we have seen the Crimea crisis coming? NATO Review talks to security experts and asks whether there were enough clues in Russia's previous adventures - especially in Estonia and Georgia - to indicate that Crimea would be next.

00.12 - Paul King – Editor, NATO Review – voice-over

When Russia annexed Georgia’s regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 some western politicians warned that Russia wasn’t finished yet.

00.21 – Linas Linkevičius – Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania

We said it would be more at that time. No one listened. By the way, we mentioned Crimea. We mentioned Transnistria. So Crimea is gone. Transnistria maybe not, but who can exclude it?

00.34 – Alex Petriashvili – State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration

The Russians have learned lessons from 2008. Unfortunately, the Western countries less.

00.42 - Paul King – voice-over

But many Western countries were anxious to keep the relationship with Russia stable

00.47 – Karel Kovanda – Former Czech Ambassador to NATO

The reaction to the Georgian invasion, I think, was number 1: very weak, and number 2: rather surprising.

00.58 – Linas Linkevičius

We told then, in 2008: Let’s be consistent. Let’s do what we decided. Let’s implement and let’s stick to this, you know, because we made very good statements at that time, very good demands, very clear. We can have a look. These documents are available. In meetings, communiqués… spending some time to draft. And in two months we’re back to business as normal.

01.20 - Paul King – voice-over

Some feel the West’s reaction may have fostered more confidence in the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin.

01.28 – Karel Kovanda

Calculations of a guy who has got his KGB history, who is a judo sportsman, in that sense makes use of the strength of the opponent by throwing him over, who has his history of dealing with the criminal gangs of Petersburg, and as somebody mentioned, a history of having been a hooligan in his youth.

01.50 – Konstantin von Eggert – Kommersant FM Radio, Editor in Chief

Well, I think the general perception in Moscow was that the West is weak. I’m not trying to psychoanalyse Putin, but if we are talking about the general feeling in the political class, that’s pretty true. I actually would concur with that. You’re looking at the most un-Atlanticist, to put it mildly, American administration in decades. You are looking at a European Union, which is consumed by its own problems and which actually is not ready and not willing to engage in any kind of major, coordinated foreign policy action with players like Russia. So, it’s very conducive from the point of view of Mister Putin.

02.34 - Paul King – voice-over

Regardless of the Russian leadership’s motivation, the Russian moves in Ukraine may have backfired in terms of what was intended and what has actually happened.

02.44 - Konstantin von Eggert

If you look back to mid December, people in the Kremlin were thinking and actually were saying: Ukraine is in our pockets. Yes, the Crimea now is in Russia’s pockets, but as far as Ukraine is concerned, it’s far from being in Russia’s pockets. Actually, I think that Russia’s influence in Ukraine, especially in Kiev, has dwindled to nearly zero. And I suppose that this is the law of unintended consequences that Lilia Shevtsova, so eloquently usually speaks about. It is about creating narratives, which in the end have their own logic. Sometimes you can control them, sometimes you cannot. And I think that this does create funnily enough or tragically enough, depending on how you look at it, more instability in Russia, not only externally, but possibly domestically.

03.35 - Paul King – voice-over

What is clear that what some have described as the mistakes of the approach of 2008, have not been repeated in 2014. And that at least is to be welcomed.

03.46 - Alex Petriashvili

This time the reaction was there, is there and I hope very much that there will be a stronger reaction if it goes farther.

03.59 - Linas Linkevičius

Non-action is provocative. No decision is provocative. This is a signal and this should be realised one day. It really should be learned. But sometimes we need many, many lessons. Many, many wake-up calls to be woken up, which is sad, but this is reality.

NATO Review

www.nato.int/review

The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries.

This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

What were the main objectives of Russian leader President Putin when he embarked on his support for pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine? Did they go beyond territory and aim to create - or increase - divisions between Western countries? And if so, has this strategy worked? NATO Review asks some leading security figures how they saw it.

What were the main objectives of Russian leader President Putin when he embarked on his support for pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine? Did they go beyond territory and aim to create - or increase - divisions between Western countries? And if so, has this strategy worked? NATO Review asks some leading security figures how they saw it.

When a country is attacked by conventional land, sea or air forces, it is usually clear how to best respond. But what happens when it is attacked by a mixture of special forces, information campaigns and backdoor proxies? What's the best response? And how can international security organisations like NATO adapt to these attacks?

00.10 - Paul King – Editor, NATO Review – voice-over

At one point during the Ukrainian crisis, Russia had 40,000 troops lined up on the Ukrainian border, but when it came to sowing instability in Ukraine, it was not these conventional forces who were used, but rather unorthodox and varied techniques, which have been dubbed hybrid warfare.

00.28 – Amb. Kurt Volker – Former US ambassador to NATO

Russia is using it to try to play for unilateral, national advantage, taking territory, imposing its will on others, invading countries, annexing territory… It’s stuff you couldn’t make up.

00.41 – Marcin Zabarowski – Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs

I think the Russians have been very smart. Frankly, I think they have outsmarted us. They use commandoes and they pretend they are not Russian. In terms of information warfare, they have been extremely good, really. You know, we have here a debate in the West: Provocative, not provocative, presence here, presence there. And the Russians have their Russia Today, which responds to the orders from Putin, having one clear message, and it reverberates. It’s using Western technologies. Whereas the message itself is very, you know, kind of communist style, one would say.

01.20 – Liam Fox – Former UK Secretary of Defence

This crisis goes well beyond the borders of Ukraine. What effectively Putin has now said, is that the defence of ethnic Russians does not lie in the countries in which they reside or with their laws or their government or their constitution, but with an external power, Russia. This blows a hole in everything we understood about international law.

01.42 - Paul King – voice-over

But despite these techniques often being referred to as a new approach, there is evidence to indicate that it’s not new for Russia.

01.51 – Michael Chertoff – Former US Secretary of Homeland Security

Go back to Estonia in 2007, go back to Georgia in 2008. I think the concept of using kind of a slow effort, a slow encroachment, has been part of the strategic landscape, certainly for Russia, for quite some time. And sometimes it involves more overt and obvious moves, sometimes it’s more subtle moves, it involves economic warfare, sometimes it may be cyber attacks, conducted under the cover of being activists at work. And it can be a combination of them and I think this has been a set of tactics that has been deployed to some degree or another, certainly for the last five or six years.

02.30 – Prof Julian Lindley-French – Director, Europa Analytica

I mean, as a student of Russian history and particularly Russian military history, the use of such agents provocateurs through mainly military intelligence organs,… special forces, goes way back. Destabilising, decapitating administrations, creating the space for influence, let's call it that, that’s nothing new. So, we’ve just got to have the political courage to call it for what it is. There is still a profound split in Europe between those willing to say… confirm what it is they are seeing, and those who’d rather it all went away and will find almost any excuse for what Russia is doing.

03.17 - Paul King – voice-over

So the question now is: how does an organisation like NATO respond to the use of these techniques and is it the most appropriate organisation to do so?

03.27 - Amb. Kurt Volker

Russia is going to use special operations forces, intelligence forces, economic pressure, energy pressure, cyber attacks and potential conventional force directly to achieve imperial goals. And is NATO willing to use any of those tools to prevent that or not? That’s what we need to see.

03.47 – Karel Kovanda – Former Czech Ambassador to NATO

I don’t think NATO has the tools for that. The European Union might have the tools, but if the European Union, shall we say the European Commission particularly, does have them, I still haven’t seen them being employed.

04.03 – Linas Linkevičius – Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania

My point is we should be flexible enough to take all these new threats, new challenges, like energy, like cyber, like media, like these strange green human beings… You know, and we should really do that on time, not after something happens.

04.20 - Paul King – voice-over

Some recommend that the best way to counter this type of technique is to invite a stronger, not weaker response.

04.27 - Amb. Kurt Volker

What creates de-escalation is a strong response that causes Russia to think twice about going any further, stabilises a tense situation and then allows it to de-escalate. This has all been still been very reactive, very slow… Indeed, many of the statements we’ve heard from NATO leaders, have been that ‘if Russia goes further, then we will take additional steps’. It ought to be the other way around.

04.53 - Paul King – voice-over

And these techniques also pose the problem that without clear command and control of certain forces, it can be difficult for all sides to know how events will unfold.

05.04 – Rob De Wijk – Founder Hague Center for Strategic Studies

The problem is that starting a crisis is easy, but ending it is extremely difficult. So, you know what you do when you start creating unrest at the Crimea and maybe at the eastern part of Ukraine. But then it gets a dynamic of its own and that is highly dangerous. And I’m fully confident that Putin simply doesn’t know the next steps as well.

NATO Review

www.nato.int/review

The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries.

This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

When a country is attacked by conventional land, sea or air forces, it is usually clear how to best respond. But what happens when it is attacked by a mixture of special forces, information campaigns and backdoor proxies? What's the best response? And how can international security organisations like NATO adapt to these attacks?

00.10 - Paul King – Editor, NATO Review – voice-over

At one point during the Ukrainian crisis, Russia had 40,000 troops lined up on the Ukrainian border, but when it came to sowing instability in Ukraine, it was not these conventional forces who were used, but rather unorthodox and varied techniques, which have been dubbed hybrid warfare.

00.28 – Amb. Kurt Volker – Former US ambassador to NATO

Russia is using it to try to play for unilateral, national advantage, taking territory, imposing its will on others, invading countries, annexing territory… It’s stuff you couldn’t make up.

00.41 – Marcin Zabarowski – Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs

I think the Russians have been very smart. Frankly, I think they have outsmarted us. They use commandoes and they pretend they are not Russian. In terms of information warfare, they have been extremely good, really. You know, we have here a debate in the West: Provocative, not provocative, presence here, presence there. And the Russians have their Russia Today, which responds to the orders from Putin, having one clear message, and it reverberates. It’s using Western technologies. Whereas the message itself is very, you know, kind of communist style, one would say.

01.20 – Liam Fox – Former UK Secretary of Defence

This crisis goes well beyond the borders of Ukraine. What effectively Putin has now said, is that the defence of ethnic Russians does not lie in the countries in which they reside or with their laws or their government or their constitution, but with an external power, Russia. This blows a hole in everything we understood about international law.

01.42 - Paul King – voice-over

But despite these techniques often being referred to as a new approach, there is evidence to indicate that it’s not new for Russia.

01.51 – Michael Chertoff – Former US Secretary of Homeland Security

Go back to Estonia in 2007, go back to Georgia in 2008. I think the concept of using kind of a slow effort, a slow encroachment, has been part of the strategic landscape, certainly for Russia, for quite some time. And sometimes it involves more overt and obvious moves, sometimes it’s more subtle moves, it involves economic warfare, sometimes it may be cyber attacks, conducted under the cover of being activists at work. And it can be a combination of them and I think this has been a set of tactics that has been deployed to some degree or another, certainly for the last five or six years.

02.30 – Prof Julian Lindley-French – Director, Europa Analytica

I mean, as a student of Russian history and particularly Russian military history, the use of such agents provocateurs through mainly military intelligence organs,… special forces, goes way back. Destabilising, decapitating administrations, creating the space for influence, let's call it that, that’s nothing new. So, we’ve just got to have the political courage to call it for what it is. There is still a profound split in Europe between those willing to say… confirm what it is they are seeing, and those who’d rather it all went away and will find almost any excuse for what Russia is doing.

03.17 - Paul King – voice-over

So the question now is: how does an organisation like NATO respond to the use of these techniques and is it the most appropriate organisation to do so?

03.27 - Amb. Kurt Volker

Russia is going to use special operations forces, intelligence forces, economic pressure, energy pressure, cyber attacks and potential conventional force directly to achieve imperial goals. And is NATO willing to use any of those tools to prevent that or not? That’s what we need to see.

03.47 – Karel Kovanda – Former Czech Ambassador to NATO

I don’t think NATO has the tools for that. The European Union might have the tools, but if the European Union, shall we say the European Commission particularly, does have them, I still haven’t seen them being employed.

04.03 – Linas Linkevičius – Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania

My point is we should be flexible enough to take all these new threats, new challenges, like energy, like cyber, like media, like these strange green human beings… You know, and we should really do that on time, not after something happens.

04.20 - Paul King – voice-over

Some recommend that the best way to counter this type of technique is to invite a stronger, not weaker response.

04.27 - Amb. Kurt Volker

What creates de-escalation is a strong response that causes Russia to think twice about going any further, stabilises a tense situation and then allows it to de-escalate. This has all been still been very reactive, very slow… Indeed, many of the statements we’ve heard from NATO leaders, have been that ‘if Russia goes further, then we will take additional steps’. It ought to be the other way around.

04.53 - Paul King – voice-over

And these techniques also pose the problem that without clear command and control of certain forces, it can be difficult for all sides to know how events will unfold.

05.04 – Rob De Wijk – Founder Hague Center for Strategic Studies

The problem is that starting a crisis is easy, but ending it is extremely difficult. So, you know what you do when you start creating unrest at the Crimea and maybe at the eastern part of Ukraine. But then it gets a dynamic of its own and that is highly dangerous. And I’m fully confident that Putin simply doesn’t know the next steps as well.

NATO Review

www.nato.int/review

The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries.

This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

Football and the defence sector have a lot in common. For example, they both need a strong defense, potent attacks and a capable captain organizing everything. NATO Review tries to show how recent changes in the defense industry would look if they were played out on the football pitch.

00.04 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

Hello, my name is Paul King and today I’m going to try and explain the changes in defense with the aid of a football. The ball represents everything the armed forces need in the field. This can be from top-end jets through to simple uniforms or advanced arms through to cleaning services. The list is nearly endless. And this is the goal, which is the security world. It can contain threats as large as the conflicts in Afghanistan or security challenges closer to home, like terrorism. The idea is always to find the quickest, most effective way of getting this into that.

00.41 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

The way to get them there has been companies producing equipment and services, that’s the defense industry, working closely with those who are paying for them, that’s the governments. But there are always obstacles in the process. These can be long lead times, budget overruns and many unforeseen factors, but it’s up to the governments and the defense industry to find a way around them.

01.03 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

Until now they worked pretty well together. Since 2001 there have been two major wars, several major terrorist attacks, an increase in piracy, the list goes on. This meant that companies could offer solutions that governments not only wanted, but desperately needed. That was the time to get more creative. The money was available. So you wanted something more advanced, you got it. But then around 2008 things started to change. President Obama came to power and vowed to end the Iraq war. More importantly, the economic crisis exploded. This meant not only that there were less demands coming from governments, it also meant they had less money.

01.40 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

Now companies knew they had less opportunities and could expect less money. It was a new situation… and a more difficult one. Add to this rapidly changing security threats. Large-scale wars were over or coming to an end, cyber has been moving up the agenda. The goal posts have literally been moved.

02.04 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

And finally, the obstacles have got bigger. Cyber for example is an area where the threat changes vary rapidly, where it’s more difficult to collaborate and where companies have to change the way they’ve been working for years. So, it’s a long time since the days of easy solutions and there’s only one thing that’s clear: that things are going to get tougher.

Football and the defence sector have a lot in common. For example, they both need a strong defense, potent attacks and a capable captain organizing everything. NATO Review tries to show how recent changes in the defense industry would look if they were played out on the football pitch.

00.04 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

Hello, my name is Paul King and today I’m going to try and explain the changes in defense with the aid of a football. The ball represents everything the armed forces need in the field. This can be from top-end jets through to simple uniforms or advanced arms through to cleaning services. The list is nearly endless. And this is the goal, which is the security world. It can contain threats as large as the conflicts in Afghanistan or security challenges closer to home, like terrorism. The idea is always to find the quickest, most effective way of getting this into that.

00.41 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

The way to get them there has been companies producing equipment and services, that’s the defense industry, working closely with those who are paying for them, that’s the governments. But there are always obstacles in the process. These can be long lead times, budget overruns and many unforeseen factors, but it’s up to the governments and the defense industry to find a way around them.

01.03 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

Until now they worked pretty well together. Since 2001 there have been two major wars, several major terrorist attacks, an increase in piracy, the list goes on. This meant that companies could offer solutions that governments not only wanted, but desperately needed. That was the time to get more creative. The money was available. So you wanted something more advanced, you got it. But then around 2008 things started to change. President Obama came to power and vowed to end the Iraq war. More importantly, the economic crisis exploded. This meant not only that there were less demands coming from governments, it also meant they had less money.

01.40 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

Now companies knew they had less opportunities and could expect less money. It was a new situation… and a more difficult one. Add to this rapidly changing security threats. Large-scale wars were over or coming to an end, cyber has been moving up the agenda. The goal posts have literally been moved.

02.04 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review

And finally, the obstacles have got bigger. Cyber for example is an area where the threat changes vary rapidly, where it’s more difficult to collaborate and where companies have to change the way they’ve been working for years. So, it’s a long time since the days of easy solutions and there’s only one thing that’s clear: that things are going to get tougher.