OVERVIEW

Three opinions released June 30th, 2026 — the final day of the October 2025 Term — spanning birthright citizenship, transgender athletes in school sports, and political party campaign spending.

Two decisions split 6-3 along identical lines — the same conservative majority, anchored by Kavanaugh — in West Virginia v. B.P.J. (Title IX and equal protection) and NRSC v. FEC (First Amendment). A third split 5-4 in Trump v. Barbara, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett crossing coalitions to strike down the President's birthright citizenship order alongside the Court's three liberal justices.

Justice Kavanaugh authored two majorities and a pivotal concurrence-in-judgment-and-dissent-in-part in the third — the day's most prolific author. Justice Gorsuch filed three separate writings across two cases — two dissents in Barbara (one joining Thomas, one solo) plus a concurrence in B.P.J. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in Barbara and a concurrence in B.P.J. The liberal bloc — Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson — voted together in all three cases, splitting only in B.P.J. where Sotomayor and Jackson each filed separate partial dissents.

Trump v. Barbara spans 194 pages — 30 more than another blockbuster this Term, the Trump Tariff Cases.

Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Argued: 04/01/2026 | Decided: 06/30/2026

Overview: President Trump's executive order strips birthright citizenship from children of unlawfully or temporarily present parents, triggering a constitutional fight over the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause.

Question Presented: Whether the Citizenship Clause guarantees citizenship to children born here to unlawfully or temporarily present parents.

Posture: District Court enjoined the order; Supreme Court granted cert before judgment.

Holding: Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present still fall "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States and thus qualify as citizens at birth under the Citizenship Clause.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, joined by Sotomayor as to the introduction and Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Gorsuch. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a separate dissenting opinion. Affirmed.

Majority Reasoning: (1) English common law granted citizenship by birth regardless of parents' momentary presence; (2) The Fourteenth Amendment and Wong Kim Ark (1898) codify that rule, rejecting Dred Scott; (3) Historical record shows scant evidence Congress intended a domicile requirement.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Jackson (concurring): Rebuts Thomas's narrower reading, framing the Amendment as a broad anticaste reset rather than a remedy solely for formerly enslaved people.
• Justice Kavanaugh (concurring in judgment, dissenting in part): Order violates a federal statute, not the Constitution; Congress could legislate new exceptions but hasn't.
• Justice Thomas (dissenting): Citizenship requires actual domicile, not mere birth; Amendment protected only those with "no other homeland."
• Justice Alito (dissenting): Citizenship requires sole allegiance; majority's rule extends citizenship to children of "birth tourists."
• Justice Gorsuch (dissenting): Advances a distinct "settler's view" tying citizenship to parents making America their permanent home.

Implications:

• (1) Executive orders alone cannot narrow birthright citizenship nationwide;
• (2) Congress gains a roadmap, via Kavanaugh's statutory theory, to legislate new exceptions;
• (3) Families with undocumented or temporary-status parents retain citizenship certainty for now.

The Fine Print:

• Fourteenth Amendment, Citizenship Clause: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."
• 8 U.S.C. §1401(a): Persons "born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" qualify as "nationals and citizens of the United States at birth."

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): Confirms the Fourteenth Amendment extends birthright citizenship broadly, with only narrow exceptions for diplomats and similar categories.
• Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): Denied citizenship based on ancestry; the Fourteenth Amendment overturns this ruling entirely.

West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 (consolidated with Little v. Hecox, No. 24-38) | Argued: 01/13/2026 | Decided: 06/30/2026

Overview: West Virginia and Idaho ban transgender girls from girls' school sports, prompting a Title IX and Equal Protection Clause challenge from two transgender athletes.

Question Presented: Whether Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause permit schools to limit girls' sports teams to biological females.

Posture: Fourth Circuit partially reversed; Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction against Idaho's law.

Holding: Schools may limit girls' and women's sports teams to biological females under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause without violating federal law or the Constitution.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kagan and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Title IX's own regulations expressly permit separate-sex teams, so separation doesn't constitute prohibited discrimination; (2) Safety and competitive fairness qualify as important interests satisfying intermediate scrutiny; (3) States need not conduct individualized athlete-by-athlete physical assessments.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Thomas (concurring): Argues transgender status doesn't qualify as a suspect class warranting heightened constitutional scrutiny.
• Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Title IX never "clearly and unambiguously" warned schools that single-sex teams violate funding conditions.
• Justice Sotomayor (dissenting in part): Majority resolves an unsettled factual dispute over athletic advantage prematurely, before required fact-finding completes.
• Justice Jackson (dissenting in part): Majority needlessly narrows Title IX's definition of "sex," risking broader transgender-student protections.

Implications:

• (1) States gain constitutional cover for laws restricting girls' sports to biological females;
• (2) Transgender athletes lose their strongest federal legal argument for inclusion;
• (3) Voluntary inclusion policies and male/co-ed team questions remain unresolved.

The Fine Print:

• Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a): "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in...any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
• 34 CFR §106.41(b): Schools may "sponsor separate teams for members of each sex" based on competitive skill or contact-sport status.

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Virginia (1996): Physical differences between men and women qualify as "enduring," justifying sex-based athletic classifications under intermediate scrutiny.
• Bostock v. Clayton County (2020): Firing someone for being transgender violates Title VII, but the ruling doesn't address single-sex facilities or sports teams.

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC | Case No. 24-621 | Argued: 12/09/2025 | Decided: 06/30/2026

Overview: Political committees challenge federal limits on party spending coordinated directly with candidates, asking the Court to overrule its own 2001 precedent upholding those caps.

Question Presented: Whether FECA's limits on political-party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment.

Posture: En banc Sixth Circuit upheld the limits, following Colorado II as binding precedent.

Holding: FECA's limits on political parties' coordinated expenditures with candidates violate the First Amendment, and Colorado II no longer retains vitality.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Coordination between parties and candidates forms the essence of the party system, with no documented historical corruption; (2) Modern precedent demands narrower tailoring than Colorado II applied; (3) Earmarking and disclosure rules already guard against circumvention concerns.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Kagan (dissenting): Coordinated spending lets donors circumvent base contribution limits entirely, recreating quid pro quo corruption risks Congress targeted after Watergate.

Implications:

• (1) Political parties may now spend unlimited sums coordinating directly with their own candidates;
• (2) Donors gain a new high-dollar channel to support specific candidates through party committees;
• (3) Outside-group coordination limits remain untouched, leaving that question open.

The Fine Print:

• First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech."
• 52 U.S.C. §30116(d): Caps the amount national party committees may spend in coordination with individual candidates.

Primary Cases:

• FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. (2001): Originally upheld party coordinated-expenditure limits; now overruled.
• McCutcheon v. FEC (2014): Requires campaign-finance restrictions to satisfy a narrowly tailored, necessary standard rather than looser scrutiny.