Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: Here

Consolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

Overview

Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the Trump Tariff cases—Trump versus V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources versus Trump—a constitutional clash over tariffs and separation of powers. President Trump put sweeping tariffs on trillions of dollars in imports using a 1977 emergency law that says he can "regulate" trade—but the law never mentions tariffs, duties, or taxes, and the Constitution gives only Congress the power to tax.

Background:

Question Presented:

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, Oregon

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Overview

[00:00:44] Argument Begins

[00:00:56] Federal Parties Opening Statement

[00:02:53] Federal Parties Free for All Questions

[00:36:05] Federal Parties Sequential Questions

[01:15:56] Private Parties Opening Statement

[01:18:27] Private Parties Free for All Questions

[01:36:30] Private Parties Sequential Questions

[02:12:28] State Parties Opening Statement

[02:13:28] State Parties Free for All Questions

[02:33:00] State Parties Sequential Questions

[02:35:40] Federal Parties Rebuttal

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | Case No. 24-808 | Oral Argument Date: 11/5/25 | Docket Link: Here

Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Coney Island Auto Parts versus Burton, a time trap tangle examining when void verdicts gain validity. Coney Island's bank account gets frozen for nearly $100,000 based on a 2015 Tennessee judgment they claim they never knew about. When Coney finally fights back seven years later, the Sixth Circuit dismisses the case, saying that you waited too long to challenge the judgment Coney didn’t even know about. "If something never existed in the first place, does waiting too long to challenge it make it real?

Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Coney): Daniel Ginzburg, Freehold, N.J.
• For Respondent (Burton): Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:00:58] Argument Begins

[00:01:07] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:17] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:19:12] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:19:15] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:20:33] Respondent Free for All Questions

[00:34:10] Petitioner Rebuttal

Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist, a forum fight about when courts keep cases they never should have had. A Texas family sued two companies over their child's heavy metal poisoning from baby food—but after a federal court wrongly kicked out one defendant and ran a two-week trial, an appeals court said the case never belonged in federal court, forcing everyone back to square one.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.
2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Hain and Whole Foods): Sarah E. Harrington, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (Palmquist): Russell S. Post, Houston, Texas

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Overview

[00:00:42] Argument Begins

[00:00:50] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:08] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:26:21] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:26:24] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:28:31] Respondent Free for All Questions

[00:40:05] Petitioner Rebuttal

Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

A father seeks justice after his son, Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Hencely, was killed in a 2016 terrorist attack at Bagram Airfield. The Army's own investigation found contractor Fluor failed to supervise the Afghan worker who carried out the attack, calling it the "primary contributing factor." Yet Fluor claims federal law shields them from any state tort liability.

Question Presented: Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Hencely): Frank H. Chang, Arlington, Virginia argues for Petitioner Hencely.
• For Respondent (Fluor): Mark W. Mosier, Washington, D.C.
• For United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Overview

[00:00:48] Argument Begins

[00:00:55] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:32] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:26:18] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:33:50] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:36:12] Respondent Free for All Questions

[00:54:59] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:07:11] United States Opening Statement

[01:08:25] United States Free for All Questions

[01:18:13] United States Sequential Questions

[01:28:31] Petitioner Rebuttal

Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1234 | Oral Argument Date: 11/3/25 | Docket Link: Here

Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Rico versus United States, the disappearing defendant dilemma examining when sentence clocks stop ticking. Isabel Rico went on the run during her 42-month release term. The government says her time on the run doesn't count toward her sentence.

Question Presented: Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Overview

[00:00:37] Argument Begins

[00:00:45] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:30] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:24:20] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:24:35] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:26:25] Respondent Free for All Questions

[00:52:15] Respondent Sequential Questions

[00:52:20] Petitioner Rebuttal

Geo Group v. Menocal Case No. 24-758 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25

This episode examines The GEO Group, Inc. versus Menocal, a technical procedural fight with massive real-world consequences for the hundreds of billions of dollars the U.S. government spends on contracts annually. The case pits the efficiency of the justice system against the government's ability to use private contractors to carry out its functions. At stake is whether a government contractor who loses a pre-trial claim of "derivative sovereign immunity" can appeal that decision immediately, or must wait until after a full, costly trial before an appeals court can weigh in.

• Opening: A Procedural Privilege: A Fast-Pass to Appeal?
• Upcoming Oral Arguments: Week of November 3, 2025

1. Rico versus United States
2. Hencely versus Fluor Corp.

1. Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. versus Burton
2. Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist

1. The Trump Tariff Cases (Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. and Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump)

• Note: The argument for Hamm versus Smith has been moved to December 10th.

1. Sovereign Immunity: The "king can do no wrong" principle; governments generally cannot be sued without their consent.
2. Derivative Sovereign Immunity: The core defense from Yearsley, claiming a contractor shares the government's immunity when it "performed as the Government directed."
3. Collateral-Order Doctrine: The Cohen exception; allows immediate appeal for a true "immunity from suit," not just a "defense to liability."

• The GEO Group, a private contractor operating an ICE facility, was sued by detainees.
• The claims allege forced labor (violating the TVPA) and unjust enrichment ($1/day pay).
• GEO claimed Yearsley immunity, arguing ICE directed the policies.

• The district court denied GEO's immunity claim, finding GEO had discretion.
• The Tenth Circuit dismissed GEO's immediate appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
• The court found an "overlap" between the immunity claim (facts of direction) and the case merits (facts of lawfulness), so it was not a "collateral order."
• This created a deep circuit split.

• Yearsley provides a true "immunity from suit," not just a defense.
• Precedent compels appealability: Filarsky (giving immunity to an individual contractor) + Mitchell (making that immunity appealable) = GEO wins.
• The Tenth Circuit's "overlap" reasoning was rejected in Mitchell.
• Policy: Denying appeals hamstrings government functions; contractors will "raise their price."

• "Derivative sovereign immunity" doesn't exist; sovereign immunity is "non-delegable."
• Yearsley only grants a "defense to liability" (no liability), not an "immunity from suit" (no suit).
• A true immunity protects unlawful conduct (if law isn't clear), but Yearsley only protects lawful conduct (following directions).
• The order fails Cohen's third prong: It can be effectively reviewed after a final judgment.

• Respondents are attacking a "Grand Straw Man"; GEO claims conditional immunity, not the government's total immunity.
• The Court cannot ignore Filarsky: An individual contractor received this protection, and a corporation is no different.

• How will the Justices treat the Filarsky and Mitchell precedents?
• The "battle of the bright lines": Does GEO's rule flood the courts, or does Menocal's rule terrify contractors?

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.

This episode examines Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, a case that could reshape religious liberty enforcement in prisons by determining whether inmates can sue individual prison officials for personal damages under RLUIPA. The case centers on Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian whose decades-long dreadlocks were forcibly shaved despite existing Fifth Circuit precedent protecting such religious practices.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: Religious Freedom Behind Bars

• November 10th, 2025 oral argument date

• Stakes: Personal liability for prison officials violating religious rights

• Case follows Supreme Court's 2020 Tanzin decision allowing individual damages under sister statute RFRA

• Potential nationwide impact on prisoners' religious rights enforcement

Background: The Nazarite Vow Violation

• Damon Landor: devout Rastafarian following biblical Nazarite Vow for nearly two decades

• Dreadlocks fell "nearly to his knees" when incarcerated in August 2020

• First four months uneventful at two accommodating facilities

• Transfer to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center with three weeks left in sentence

• Landor provided intake guard with Ware decision requiring accommodation

• Guards threw legal materials in garbage and summoned warden

• Warden demanded documentation from sentencing judge

• When Landor couldn't immediately provide, officials handcuffed him to chair and shaved him bald

• Prison then kept Landor in lockdown for remainder of sentence

Statutory Framework: RFRA and RLUIPA as "Sister Statutes"

• Both enacted in response to Employment Division v. Smith limiting religious freedom protection

• RLUIPA applies to state prisons receiving federal funds through Spending and Commerce Clauses

• Identical language to RFRA: "appropriate relief against a government"

• Tanzin held RFRA permits individual-capacity damages - question is whether RLUIPA does same

• Fifth Circuit rejected individual-capacity claims under RLUIPA

• Distinguished Tanzin as applying only to federal officials under RFRA

• Judge Oldham's dissent called facts "stark and egregious"

• Judge Clement's concurrence noted "visceral" need for damages remedy

• RLUIPA's text is "identical" to RFRA's - same language must mean same remedies

• Damages were available against state officers before Smith decision

• RLUIPA "made clear" Congress intended to "reinstate" pre-Smith protections and remedies

• Damages often "only form of relief that can remedy" violations like forced head-shaving

• RLUIPA only permits suits against "government" entities, not individual officials

• Sossamon precedent shows Congress did not clearly authorize damages against states

• Spending Clause conditions cannot extend to individual officer liability

• Sovereign immunity principles protect state officials from personal damages

• Whether Congress can impose personal liability conditions on state officials through federal funding

• Landor argues conditions clearly relate to federal spending on prisons

• Louisiana contends extending liability to individuals exceeds spending power

• Parallel to other federal funding programs requiring individual compliance

• Damages as deterrent: Will personal liability improve religious accommodation?

• Louisiana's policy change: Department amended grooming policy in response to lawsuit

• Private enforcement supplement: Government cannot monitor all prison violations

• Fifth Circuit precedent shows even clear legal rulings insufficient without enforcement mechanism

If Landor Wins:

• Prisoners gain powerful enforcement tool for religious rights violations

• Individual deterrent effect on prison officials nationwide

• Consistency with Tanzin's RFRA interpretation

• Enhanced protection for minority religious practices in institutional settings

• Limits enforcement to institutional defendants only

• Potential immunity shield for individual religious rights violations

• Inconsistency between RFRA and RLUIPA despite identical language

• Reduced deterrent effect on individual officer misconduct

• Justices' reaction to "sister statute" argument and Tanzin precedent

• Questions about Spending Clause limits on individual officer liability

• Practical enforcement concerns and deterrent effects

• Constitutional consistency between federal (RFRA) and state (RLUIPA) religious liberty protection

• Individual-capacity versus official-capacity lawsuits
• RLUIPA's Spending Clause and Commerce Clause foundations
• Religious accommodation in correctional settings

• Statutory interpretation of identical language across related statutes

• Personal liability as enforcement mechanism for constitutional rights

Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | Case No. 24-808 | Oral Argument Date: 11/5/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a default judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

This episode examines a deceptively simple civil procedure case that could fundamentally reshape how federal courts handle void judgments, creating a constitutional tension between centuries-old legal principles and modern procedural rules about timing requirements for challenging judgments that courts never had authority to enter.

Opening: The Void Judgment Paradox

• November 5th, 2025 oral argument date
• Circuit split: Sixth Circuit stands alone against every other federal circuit
• Core tension: Can procedural rules validate what should never have existed?
• Affects every federal court nationwide using Rule 60

Background: The Seven-Year Journey

• Vista-Pro Automotive bankruptcy in Nashville, Tennessee
• February 2015: Default judgment against Coney Island Auto Parts for $48,696.21
• Coney Island claims never received proper service - no personal jurisdiction
• 2020: Trustee registers judgment in New York, freezes $100,000 in bank accounts
• March 2022: Seven years later, Coney Island files Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate

The Central Legal Question

• Rule 60(b)(4): Courts can vacate judgments that "are void"
• Rule 60(c)(1): "Any motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time"
• Does "reasonable time" apply to truly void judgments?
• Fundamental question: Can time limits apply to legal nullities?

Lower Court Journey

• Tennessee bankruptcy court grants motion to vacate
• Sixth Circuit reverses 2-1, applies "reasonable time" requirement
• Creates circuit split with every other federal circuit
• Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve nationwide inconsistency

Constitutional Framework: Due Process and Jurisdiction

• Personal jurisdiction: Court's authority over parties
• Void judgment: "No judgment at all" - legal nullity from inception
• Due process concerns: Enforcing judgments without proper notice
• Historical principle: Void judgments attackable at any time

Argument 1: Logical Impossibility

• "If a judgment is void immediately upon entry, how could the passage of time vivify it?"
• Void means legal nullity - cannot gain validity through delay
• Procedural rules cannot breathe life into what never existed

Argument 2: Historical Practice and Tradition

• Centuries of precedent allowing challenges to void judgments at any time
• 1946 Advisory Committee intended "reasonable time" for voidable, not void judgments
• Advisory Committee statements distinguish void from voidable judgments

Argument 3: Judicial Consensus

• Every circuit except Sixth Circuit recognizes exception for void judgments
• Well-established understanding that void judgments are special category
• Circuit split demonstrates widespread acceptance of traditional rule

Argument 1: Plain Text Controls

• Rule 60(c)(1): "A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time"
• Rule 60(b)(4) is part of Rule 60(b) - text is unambiguous
• Every tool of statutory interpretation supports time limits

Argument 2: Rule Structure and Drafting History

• Drafters knew how to create exceptions - did so for Rules 60(b)(1)-(3)
• Advisory Committee rejected proposal imposing no time limits for void judgments
• Committee agreed "all motions should be made within a reasonable time"

Argument 3: Procedural vs. Substantive Distinction

• Time limits don't validate void judgments - they impose procedural requirements
• Distinction between judgment validity and challenge procedures
• Prevents "flagrantly inequitable conduct" and protects finality interests

• Personal Jurisdiction: Court's legal authority over parties to a lawsuit
• Void Judgment: Legal nullity with no validity from the moment entered
• Default Judgment: Judgment entered when defendant fails to respond
• Rule 60(b)(4): Federal rule allowing relief from void judgments
• Service of Process: Legal requirement to provide proper notice of lawsuit
• Circuit Split: When federal appeals courts reach conflicting decisions
• Due Process: Constitutional requirement of fair legal proceedings

Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: Here

Consolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

September 10th Episode (A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of Powers): https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/a-constitutional-clash-trumps-tariffs-and-the-separation-of-powers/

This episode examines the Supreme Court's September 9, 2025 Order that expedited review of two consolidated cases challenging President Trump's authority to impose sweeping tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), representing a constitutional clash over the separation of powers and presidential trade authority.

• September 9, 2025 certiorari grant and consolidation order
• Expedited briefing schedule for November 2025 oral arguments
• Stakes: Presidential power to tax trillions in trade and reshape the economy

• Reciprocal Tariffs: 10% on virtually all imports, higher rates for 57 countries
• Trafficking Tariffs: Levies on Mexico, Canada, and China for drug enforcement
• IEEPA as claimed statutory authority for both tariff schemes
• National emergency declarations underlying the orders

• Does "regulate" in IEEPA include power to impose tariffs?
• Constitutional separation of taxing vs. regulating powers
• Article I distinctions between taxation and commerce regulation
• Historical significance: "No taxation without representation"

• Multiple simultaneous lawsuits in different courts
• District court and Court of International Trade conflicting approaches
• Federal Circuit en banc decision striking down tariffs
• Judge Taranto's influential dissent supporting tariff authority

Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose these specific sweeping tariffs

Government Arguments:

• "Regulate" includes power to impose tariffs as lesser-included authority
• Historical practice supports broad executive trade power during emergencies
• Major questions doctrine doesn't apply in foreign policy contexts

V.O.S. Arguments:

• Constitutional separation requires clear authorization for taxation
• "Regulate" and "tariff" are distinct powers with different purposes
• Major questions doctrine requires explicit congressional authorization

Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes any presidential tariffs whatsoever

Learning Resources Arguments:

• "Regulate" means control behavior, "tariff" means raise revenue - fundamentally different
• No historical practice of IEEPA tariffs in nearly 50 years
• Constitutional avoidance: IEEPA covers exports where tariffs are prohibited

Government Arguments:

• Plain text of "regulate importation" naturally includes tariff authority
• Yoshida precedent shows Congress ratified tariff interpretation
• Presidential action deserves greater deference than agency action

• Gibbons v. Ogden (1824): Marshall's distinction between taxing and regulating powers
• United States v. Yoshida International (1975): Nixon import surcharge precedent
• Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG (1976): "Adjust imports" includes fees

• Major Questions Doctrine: Clear authorization required for "vast economic and political significance"
• Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
• Noscitur a Sociis: "Word known by company it keeps" interpretive principle

• Textual: "Regulate" includes "control" and "adjust by rule" - tariffs qualify
• Historical: Congressional ratification of Yoshida through IEEPA enactment
• Foreign Policy Exception: Major questions doctrine doesn't apply to national security
• Presidential vs. Agency: Direct presidential delegation deserves greater deference

• Separation of Powers: Taxing and regulating are constitutionally distinct
• Textual Context: Other IEEPA verbs don't involve revenue raising
• Constitutional Avoidance: Export tax prohibition requires narrow reading
• Major Questions: $4 trillion impact requires explicit authorization

• Sweeping presidential tariff authority during declared emergencies
• Expansion of executive power over traditionally congressional domain
• Potential model for other emergency economic powers

• Reinforcement of congressional primacy over taxation
• Strengthening of major questions doctrine application to presidential action
• Constraint on emergency powers in economic regulation

• IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act): 1977 law granting emergency economic authorities
• Major Questions Doctrine: Requirement for clear authorization for actions of vast significance
• Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
• Separation of Powers: Constitutional division of authority between branches
• Foreign Policy Exception: Debate over whether normal limits apply to international contexts

• September 19, 2025: Opening briefs due
• September 23, 2025: Amicus briefs due
• October 20, 2025: Response briefs due
• October 30, 2025: Reply briefs due
• November 2025: Oral arguments (first week)
• Expected Decision: January 2026 or sooner

Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal; and whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.

This episode examines a technical but consequential case about federal court jurisdiction that could affect thousands of removal cases nationwide. The dispute centers on whether federal courts can preserve judgments when they make jurisdictional errors, presenting a fundamental tension between judicial efficiency and strict adherence to jurisdictional limits in our federal court system.

Opening: When Federal Courts Keep Cases They Shouldn't

• November 4th, 2025 oral argument date
• Circuit split requiring Supreme Court resolution
• Stakes: Balance between judicial efficiency and jurisdictional integrity
• Affects every lawsuit involving forum manipulation and removal

Background: A Family Tragedy Becomes a Jurisdictional Mess

• The Palmquist family's baby food poisoning lawsuit in Texas
• E.P.'s severe heavy-metal toxicity from Hain's Earth's Best products
• Complete diversity destroyed by Texas plaintiffs suing Texas defendant Whole Foods
• Defendants' removal strategy and fraudulent joinder claim

Constitutional and Statutory Framework

• 28 U.S.C. § 1332: Complete diversity requirement for federal jurisdiction
• 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c): Mandatory remand when jurisdiction lacking
• "Completely diverse" means every plaintiff from different state than every defendant
• Federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction

Procedural Journey: From State Court to Supreme Court

• District court's fraudulent joinder ruling dismissing Whole Foods
• Two years of federal litigation and two-week jury trial
• Fifth Circuit reversal: Whole Foods properly joined, judgment vacated
• Case remanded to state court after years of federal proceedings

The Central Legal Questions

• Can jurisdictional "cure" occur through erroneous dismissal?
• Voluntary versus involuntary party dismissals
• When does jurisdictional defect "linger" through final judgment?

Petitioners' Three-Pronged Strategy (Hain and Whole Foods)

• Caterpillar Cure Doctrine: Drawing on 1996 precedent arguing jurisdictional defects can be cured by dismissing non-diverse parties before final judgment, tracing principle to 19th-century cases
• Efficiency and Finality: Emphasizing "considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming" once diversity case tried in federal court with state law
• Newman-Green Discretionary Authority: Arguing Fifth Circuit should have dismissed Whole Foods as "dispensable party" under Rule 21 to preserve final judgment

Respondents' Counter-Attack (The Palmquist Family)

• Voluntary vs. Involuntary Distinction: Emphasizing Caterpillar involved voluntary settlement dismissal while here "respondents opposed the dismissal of Whole Foods and never voluntarily abandoned their claims"
• Master of Complaint Principle: Invoking plaintiff's right to "establish—or not—the basis for a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction" and choose forum
• No Cure Occurred: Arguing jurisdictional defect persisted because "the case has lacked complete diversity at every minute from the moment of its filing"

Key Legal Concepts Explained

• Diversity jurisdiction and complete diversity requirement
• Fraudulent joinder doctrine and removal strategy
• Voluntary versus involuntary dismissals in jurisdictional context
• Newman-Green dispensable party doctrine under Rule 21

Competing Precedential Interpretations

• Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis (1996): Battle over whether jurisdictional cure applies to involuntary dismissals
• Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger (2025): Recent decision on voluntary versus involuntary dismissal effects
• Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group (2004): Limits on Caterpillar's jurisdictional cure doctrine