Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 27, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026

Overview: Federal pesticide law blocks a Missouri cancer patient's failure-to-warn lawsuit against Monsanto after the EPA repeatedly approved Roundup's label without requiring a cancer warning, despite the patient's claims linking Roundup to his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.

Question Presented: Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act expressly preempts a state-law failure-to-warn claim seeking a cancer warning the EPA declined to require.

Posture: Missouri jury awarded Durnell $1.25M; Court of Appeals affirmed; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Main Arguments:

• Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's registration and label approval without a cancer warning creates a binding federal requirement that preempts stricter state demands; (2) Riegel v. Medtronic establishes that analogous agency approval processes create preemptive federal requirements; (3) Missouri's failure-to-warn verdict retroactively penalizes Monsanto for complying with the federal label EPA mandated.

• Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA's misbranding prohibition — not EPA's specific label approval — sets the operative federal labeling requirement, and Missouri's tort mirrors it exactly; (2) FIFRA § 136a(f)(2) bars treating registration as a complete defense, stripping EPA approval of conclusive force; (3) Manufacturers can add a cancer warning through amended registration or minor modification, defeating impossibility preemption.

Holding: FIFRA's preemption clause, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), expressly preempts Durnell's state-law failure-to-warn claim because the claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to Roundup's label in addition to or different from the label required under FIFRA. Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch. Reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: • (1) FIFRA's registration process mandates substantive EPA label review; after approval, manufacturers must use that label and cannot change it without prior agency authorization; • (2) Riegel v. Medtronic establishes that analogous agency approval creates binding federal "requirements" — EPA pesticide registration functions identically and carries the same preemptive force; • (3) Durnell's claim imposes a labeling requirement "in addition to or different from" the EPA-approved label, triggering FIFRA's express preemption clause and its mandate for nationwide uniformity.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Thomas (concurring): Joined the majority fully; wrote separately to flag three constitutional concerns: FIFRA may exceed Congress's Commerce Clause authority, violate the non-delegation doctrine, and rely on a form of agency preemption the Supremacy Clause may not support.

• Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Gorsuch): FIFRA's misbranding prohibition — not EPA's label approval — constitutes the operative federal requirement. Missouri's failure-to-warn tort mirrors that prohibition, imposing nothing "in addition to or different from" federal law; § 136a(f)(2) confirms registration carries no preemptive force.

Implications: • (1) State-law failure-to-warn claims against federally registered pesticides face preemption nationwide, closing state courtrooms to injured consumers seeking damages; • (2) Plaintiffs must petition the EPA directly, then seek judicial review of agency decisions, rather than pursue state tort remedies — a longer, harder road with no individual damages award; • (3) Manufacturers across food, drug, medical device, and consumer product industries gain stronger preemption defenses under analogous federal labeling statutes.

The Fine Print:

• FIFRA § 136v(b) — "Uniformity": "A State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."

• FIFRA § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter. Such registration shall, however, be accepted as prima facie evidence that the pesticide, its labeling and packaging comply with the registration provisions of this subchapter."

Primary Cases:

• Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn tort claims qualify as labeling "requirements" under FIFRA's preemption clause; courts must assess whether those requirements exceed or differ from FIFRA's own mandates.

• Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008): FDA premarket approval of a medical device creates binding federal "requirements" under a nearly identical preemption clause, preempting state tort claims seeking additional or different safety measures.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Monsanto): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy
• Respondent (Durnell): Ashley C. Keller of Keller Postman
• Amicus Curiae (United States): Sarah M. Harris of the Department of Justice

Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. v. Doe, et al. | No. 25-1083 (consolidated with Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. Miot, et al., No. 25-1084) | Docket: Here | Argued: April 29, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026

Overview: The TPS statute strips federal courts of all power to review the Secretary of Homeland Security's mandatory procedures when terminating Temporary Protected Status, cutting off legal relief for hundreds of thousands of immigrants from thirteen countries.

Question Presented: Whether the TPS statute's judicial review bar blocks all court challenges — including claims the Secretary violated mandatory statutory procedures — when terminating TPS designations for Syria and Haiti.

Posture: District courts granted emergency relief; appellate courts declined stays; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Main Arguments:

• Government (Petitioner): (1) "Determination" in § 1254a(b)(5)(A) covers every step in the TPS termination process — both the final decision and all procedures leading to it — barring all non-constitutional challenges; (2) the Secretary satisfied the consultation requirement by seeking State Department input before each termination; (3) terminating all thirteen TPS countries across racially diverse nations defeats any inference of racial animus against Haiti.

• TPS Holders (Respondent): (1) "Determination" covers only the Secretary's factual conclusion about country conditions, not the mandatory procedural steps Congress wrote specifically to constrain executive discretion; (2) the Secretary never consulted agencies about country conditions — the State Department email addressed "foreign policy concerns," not safety; (3) presidential statements about Haitians combined with the across-the-board termination pattern demonstrate racial animus as a motivating factor.

Holding: The TPS statute's judicial review bar blocks all non-constitutional challenges to TPS termination decisions, including claims the Secretary failed to follow mandatory procedural requirements; the Haitian TPS holders failed to demonstrate racial animus likely motivated Haiti's termination, making preliminary relief unavailable on their equal protection claim; both District Court orders reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion (all parts except Part III-A) joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett; Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh also joined Part III-A, making that section a four-Justice plurality only. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: • (1) "Determination" — under any ordinary meaning, individual decision or entire process leading to one — covers all non-constitutional TPS challenges, including procedural claims; (2) "with respect to" further broadens the bar to cover everything relating to the termination, citing Patel v. Garland (2022); (3) respondents' own argument that the Secretary terminated all thirteen racially diverse TPS countries supplies the race-neutral explanation defeating the equal protection claim.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Thomas (Concurring): Joined the majority in full; argued the judicial review bar also eliminates constitutional claims; further argued that aliens hold no equal protection rights against the federal government because Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) was wrongly decided. (35 words)

• Justice Kagan (Dissenting, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson): Argued "determination" refers only to the Secretary's country-conditions conclusions, not mandatory procedural steps preceding them; the State Department email exchange never constituted real consultation; and racial animus tainted Haiti's termination under Arlington Heights. (37 words)

Implications: • (1) Federal courts lose all power to enforce TPS mandatory procedures, leaving statutory compliance to political oversight alone; (2) employers of TPS workers from thirteen countries lose the litigation buffer that previously paused terminations; (3) Justice Thomas's concurrence targeting constitutional review creates significant uncertainty for future constitutional challenges to TPS decisions.

The Fine Print:

• 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) (TPS Judicial Review Bar): "There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state [under this subsection]."

• 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A) (Mandatory Consultation Requirement): "[A]t least 60 days before [the] end [of the initial period of designation]... the [Secretary], after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government, shall review the conditions in the foreign state... and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation under this subsection continue to be met."

Primary Cases:

• Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977): Government violates equal protection when racial discrimination forms "a motivating factor" in a decision — not the only factor or dominant factor, but any factor among many.

• Patel v. Garland (2022): The phrase "with respect to" in a judicial review bar "generally has a broadening effect," ensuring the bar covers not just the core subject but also matters relating to that subject.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioners (United States): D. John Sauer, United States’ Solicitor General
• Respondents (Doe): Ahilan T. Arulanantham of UCLA School of Law
• Respondents (Miot): Geoffrey M. Pipoly of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP

OVERVIEW

Three opinions released June 30th, 2026 — the final day of the October 2025 Term — spanning birthright citizenship, transgender athletes in school sports, and political party campaign spending.

Two decisions split 6-3 along identical lines — the same conservative majority, anchored by Kavanaugh — in West Virginia v. B.P.J. (Title IX and equal protection) and NRSC v. FEC (First Amendment). A third split 5-4 in Trump v. Barbara, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett crossing coalitions to strike down the President's birthright citizenship order alongside the Court's three liberal justices.

Justice Kavanaugh authored two majorities and a pivotal concurrence-in-judgment-and-dissent-in-part in the third — the day's most prolific author. Justice Gorsuch filed three separate writings across two cases — two dissents in Barbara (one joining Thomas, one solo) plus a concurrence in B.P.J. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in Barbara and a concurrence in B.P.J. The liberal bloc — Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson — voted together in all three cases, splitting only in B.P.J. where Sotomayor and Jackson each filed separate partial dissents.

Trump v. Barbara spans 194 pages — 30 more than another blockbuster this Term, the Trump Tariff Cases.

Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Argued: 04/01/2026 | Decided: 06/30/2026

Overview: President Trump's executive order strips birthright citizenship from children of unlawfully or temporarily present parents, triggering a constitutional fight over the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause.

Question Presented: Whether the Citizenship Clause guarantees citizenship to children born here to unlawfully or temporarily present parents.

Posture: District Court enjoined the order; Supreme Court granted cert before judgment.

Holding: Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present still fall "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States and thus qualify as citizens at birth under the Citizenship Clause.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, joined by Sotomayor as to the introduction and Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Gorsuch. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a separate dissenting opinion. Affirmed.

Majority Reasoning: (1) English common law granted citizenship by birth regardless of parents' momentary presence; (2) The Fourteenth Amendment and Wong Kim Ark (1898) codify that rule, rejecting Dred Scott; (3) Historical record shows scant evidence Congress intended a domicile requirement.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Jackson (concurring): Rebuts Thomas's narrower reading, framing the Amendment as a broad anticaste reset rather than a remedy solely for formerly enslaved people.
• Justice Kavanaugh (concurring in judgment, dissenting in part): Order violates a federal statute, not the Constitution; Congress could legislate new exceptions but hasn't.
• Justice Thomas (dissenting): Citizenship requires actual domicile, not mere birth; Amendment protected only those with "no other homeland."
• Justice Alito (dissenting): Citizenship requires sole allegiance; majority's rule extends citizenship to children of "birth tourists."
• Justice Gorsuch (dissenting): Advances a distinct "settler's view" tying citizenship to parents making America their permanent home.

Implications:

• (1) Executive orders alone cannot narrow birthright citizenship nationwide;
• (2) Congress gains a roadmap, via Kavanaugh's statutory theory, to legislate new exceptions;
• (3) Families with undocumented or temporary-status parents retain citizenship certainty for now.

The Fine Print:

• Fourteenth Amendment, Citizenship Clause: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."
• 8 U.S.C. §1401(a): Persons "born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" qualify as "nationals and citizens of the United States at birth."

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): Confirms the Fourteenth Amendment extends birthright citizenship broadly, with only narrow exceptions for diplomats and similar categories.
• Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): Denied citizenship based on ancestry; the Fourteenth Amendment overturns this ruling entirely.

West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 (consolidated with Little v. Hecox, No. 24-38) | Argued: 01/13/2026 | Decided: 06/30/2026

Overview: West Virginia and Idaho ban transgender girls from girls' school sports, prompting a Title IX and Equal Protection Clause challenge from two transgender athletes.

Question Presented: Whether Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause permit schools to limit girls' sports teams to biological females.

Posture: Fourth Circuit partially reversed; Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction against Idaho's law.

Holding: Schools may limit girls' and women's sports teams to biological females under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause without violating federal law or the Constitution.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kagan and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Title IX's own regulations expressly permit separate-sex teams, so separation doesn't constitute prohibited discrimination; (2) Safety and competitive fairness qualify as important interests satisfying intermediate scrutiny; (3) States need not conduct individualized athlete-by-athlete physical assessments.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Thomas (concurring): Argues transgender status doesn't qualify as a suspect class warranting heightened constitutional scrutiny.
• Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Title IX never "clearly and unambiguously" warned schools that single-sex teams violate funding conditions.
• Justice Sotomayor (dissenting in part): Majority resolves an unsettled factual dispute over athletic advantage prematurely, before required fact-finding completes.
• Justice Jackson (dissenting in part): Majority needlessly narrows Title IX's definition of "sex," risking broader transgender-student protections.

Implications:

• (1) States gain constitutional cover for laws restricting girls' sports to biological females;
• (2) Transgender athletes lose their strongest federal legal argument for inclusion;
• (3) Voluntary inclusion policies and male/co-ed team questions remain unresolved.

The Fine Print:

• Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a): "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in...any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
• 34 CFR §106.41(b): Schools may "sponsor separate teams for members of each sex" based on competitive skill or contact-sport status.

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Virginia (1996): Physical differences between men and women qualify as "enduring," justifying sex-based athletic classifications under intermediate scrutiny.
• Bostock v. Clayton County (2020): Firing someone for being transgender violates Title VII, but the ruling doesn't address single-sex facilities or sports teams.

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC | Case No. 24-621 | Argued: 12/09/2025 | Decided: 06/30/2026

Overview: Political committees challenge federal limits on party spending coordinated directly with candidates, asking the Court to overrule its own 2001 precedent upholding those caps.

Question Presented: Whether FECA's limits on political-party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment.

Posture: En banc Sixth Circuit upheld the limits, following Colorado II as binding precedent.

Holding: FECA's limits on political parties' coordinated expenditures with candidates violate the First Amendment, and Colorado II no longer retains vitality.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Coordination between parties and candidates forms the essence of the party system, with no documented historical corruption; (2) Modern precedent demands narrower tailoring than Colorado II applied; (3) Earmarking and disclosure rules already guard against circumvention concerns.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Kagan (dissenting): Coordinated spending lets donors circumvent base contribution limits entirely, recreating quid pro quo corruption risks Congress targeted after Watergate.

Implications:

• (1) Political parties may now spend unlimited sums coordinating directly with their own candidates;
• (2) Donors gain a new high-dollar channel to support specific candidates through party committees;
• (3) Outside-group coordination limits remain untouched, leaving that question open.

The Fine Print:

• First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech."
• 52 U.S.C. §30116(d): Caps the amount national party committees may spend in coordination with individual candidates.

Primary Cases:

• FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. (2001): Originally upheld party coordinated-expenditure limits; now overruled.
• McCutcheon v. FEC (2014): Requires campaign-finance restrictions to satisfy a narrowly tailored, necessary standard rather than looser scrutiny.

Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. v. Al Otro Lado, et al. | Case No. 25-5 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-5.html | Argued: March 24, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026

Overview: Border-access challenge determining whether federal immigration law requires officers to inspect and process asylum seekers at ports of entry before they cross into U.S. territory, or whether statutory duties attach only upon physical territorial entry.

Question Presented: Whether noncitizens blocked at the border before physically crossing "arrive in the United States," triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing duties under federal immigration law.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; district court declared metering policy unlawful; Supreme Court reversed.

Main Arguments:

• Government (Petitioner): (1) "Arrives in" carries its ordinary meaning — physical territorial entry; a running back stopped at the 1-yard line has not arrived in the end zone; (2) INA inspection and removal procedures presuppose U.S. presence — officers cannot enforce them against people standing in Mexico; (3) Sale v. Haitian Centers Council and the presumption against extraterritoriality confirm statutory duties apply only inside U.S. territory.
• Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in" covers noncitizens in the process of arriving at ports — otherwise the clause wholly duplicates "physically present," violating the surplusage canon; (2) Congress enacted §§1158 and 1225 to implement non-refoulement obligations barring return of refugees to persecution; (3) Federal regulations for 30 years defined "arriving alien" as anyone "attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry."

Holding: An alien standing in Mexico does not "arrive in the United States" by attempting and failing to cross the border. The INA neither entitles such an alien to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect them.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a separate dissenting opinion. Reversed and remanded. 138 F.4th 1102, reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: (1) "Arrives in" carries its ordinary meaning — entering within the limits of a place — not merely approaching its threshold; dictionary definitions and everyday analogies confirm physical entry controls; (2) Other INA provisions expressly cover those who "attempt to enter," but §§1158 and 1225 omit attempt language — Congress acted deliberately; (3) Presumption against extraterritoriality bars reading these statutes to reach people standing on Mexican soil.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Thomas — Concurring: Joined majority fully. Wrote separately to flag two future issues: §1252(f)(1) may bar class-wide declaratory relief in immigration cases; and compelling the President to admit specific aliens would raise serious constitutional questions about inherent executive exclusion authority.
• Justice Sotomayor — Dissenting (joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson): "Arrives in" covers noncitizens in the process of arriving at ports; federal regulations, the anti-surplusage canon, and the present-tense statutory language all demand inspection duties attach before physical crossing. Majority's ruling will cost lives.
• Justice Jackson — Dissenting: DHS rescinded metering in 2021 with no concrete reinstatement plans; the case approached mootness and the Court effectively issued an advisory opinion in a factual vacuum. Also joined Sotomayor dissent on the merits.

Implications: (1) Government can resume metering; asylum and inspection duties attach only after a noncitizen physically crosses the border; (2) Future APA challenges to specific metering policies — applied as subterfuge when ports retain capacity — remain live; (3) Thomas's concurrence signals future challenges to class-wide immigration court orders and expanded presidential exclusion authority.

The Fine Print:

• 8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(1): "An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival...) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission."
• 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(1): "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival...), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title."

Primary Cases:

• Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993): Article 33 of the Refugee Convention cannot restrict U.S. actions toward aliens outside U.S. territory; statutory refugee protections apply only within the United States.
• Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. (2010): Courts presume federal statutes apply domestically unless Congress affirmatively and unmistakably directs extraterritorial reach.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioners (Noem, et al.): Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
• Respondents (Al Otro Lado): Kelsi B. Corkran of the the of Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protectio

OVERVIEW

Four opinions released June 29th, 2026 — one day, across digital privacy, presidential removal power at two federal agencies, and absentee ballot receipt deadlines.

Two decisions split 6-3 along identical lines — the same conservative majority, the same liberal dissent — in Chatrie (Fourth Amendment) and Slaughter (FTC removal). A third split 5-4 in Cook, with Roberts crossing coalitions to block the President's removal of a Federal Reserve governor. A fourth, Watson, drew Barrett alongside Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson to protect state absentee-ballot rules.

Chief Justice Roberts authored two majorities — opposite outcomes in two "Trump v." cases on the same day. Justice Alito dissented three times, authoring a majority only in Slaughter. Justice Gorsuch filed concurrences in two cases — challenging Katz in Chatrie, warning of executive power consolidation in Slaughter. The liberal bloc — Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson — voted together in all four.

The Court plans to release opinions tomorrow, June 30th — likely the final batch of the October 2025 Term.

Wolford v. Lopez | Case No. 24-1046 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: January 20, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026

Overview: After Bruen recognized the right to public carry, Hawaii required licensed gun carriers to obtain express permission before entering any private business open to the public — reversing the common-law presumption of open entry for anyone, including armed citizens.

Question Presented: Whether Hawaii may prohibit licensed carry permit holders from entering private commercial property while armed without the property owner's express permission.

Posture: District court enjoined the law; Ninth Circuit reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (Carry Permit Holders):
• (1) Hawaii's law burdens the daily exercise of Second Amendment rights by effectively banning carry on ninety-six percent of publicly accessible land;
• (2) No historical tradition justifies flipping the common-law default from implied permission to presumptive prohibition on property open to the public;
• (3) Hawaii's anti-poaching analogues targeted agricultural land and distinct hunting harms — not concealed carry in commercial establishments.
• Respondent (Hawaii):
• (1) The Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without consent — the form of that consent belongs to state property law;
• (2) Colonial anti-poaching laws and Reconstruction-era statutes support a tradition of requiring affirmative consent for armed carry onto private property;
• (3) Hawaii's law vindicates property owners' right to exclude by requiring armed visitors to seek express permission before entry.

Holding: Hawaii's law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner's express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Part II–B only. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Hawaii's law falls within the Second Amendment's plain text — permit holders sought to "bear" "Arms" in public, making the law presumptively unconstitutional;
• (2) Hawaii's colonial anti-poaching analogues targeted agricultural land and hunting-specific harms vastly different from restricting concealed carry in commercial establishments;
• (3) Hawaii's 1865 Louisiana Black Code analogue — enacted to disarm newly freed Black Americans — carries no probative value under the Bruen framework.

Separate Opinions:

• Barrett (concurring; Thomas and Gorsuch join as to Part II–B only): Property-law framing doesn't immunize Hawaii's law from Second Amendment scrutiny. States may not use property rules to evade constitutional limits. Anti-poaching laws and Black Codes both fail Bruen's "why" inquiry. Thomas and Gorsuch joined only the Black Code portion.
• Kagan (dissenting): Anti-poaching laws share sufficient "how" and "why" with Hawaii's rule — both required express consent for armed entry onto private property in response to harms posed by armed individuals on another's land. Kagan dissented solely on the historical analogue question.
• Jackson (dissenting; Sotomayor joins): This case never implicated the Second Amendment — the dispute concerns only the form of consent required for armed entry onto private property, a question state property law controls. Hawaii's historical analogues satisfy Bruen. The majority invites unconstrained judicial discretion.

Implications:

• (1) Carry permit holders may now enter commercial property in Hawaii, California, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York absent an owner's posted prohibition;
• (2) Business owners now bear the burden of posting signage to exclude armed visitors;
• (3) Courts must apply a stricter historical analogue standard to Second Amendment challenges.

The Fine Print:

• Second Amendment, U.S. Const. Amdt. 2: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
• Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-9.5(a) (2023): "A [licensed] person carrying a firearm [may not] intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly enter or remain on private property of another person while carrying a loaded or unloaded firearm, whether the firearm is operable or not, and whether the firearm is concealed or unconcealed, unless the person has been given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property."

Primary Cases:

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Established the two-step framework for Second Amendment challenges — requiring States to justify gun regulations through history and tradition, rejecting interest-balancing tests.
• District of Columbia v. Heller (2008): Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, with self-defense as the core purpose; history governs the right's scope.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Wolford): Alan A. Beck, San Diego, California.
• For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues.
• For Respondent (Lopez): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.

Blanche, Acting Attorney General v. Muk Choi Lau | Case No. 25-429 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 22, 2026 | Decided: June 23, 2026

Overview: The Court addressed whether border officers must possess clear and convincing evidence that a green card holder committed a crime before stripping that person of already-admitted status and treating the holder as an applicant for admission.

Question Presented: Whether the INA requires border officers to possess clear and convincing evidence of a crime before treating a green card holder as seeking admission.

Posture: Second Circuit vacated removal order; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (Government):

• (1) The INA imposes no evidentiary burden on border officers making on-the-spot classification decisions;
• (2) the two-step framework requires crime commission at step one and conviction at step two, both satisfied here;
• (3) the government met the clear-and-convincing standard at the removal hearing through Lau's guilty plea.

• Respondent (Lau):

• (1) The INA's "shall not" command required the government to determine whether an exception applied before treating a returning green card holder as seeking admission;
• (2) the statute's present-perfect tense confirms border officers must make that determination at the moment of reentry, not later;
• (3) a conviction entered after the parole decision cannot retroactively justify the border officer's classification call.

Holding: The INA does not require a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating the resident as an applicant for admission.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. Second Circuit judgment vacated and remanded.

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) requires only crime commission — not conviction — at step one to trigger "seeking admission" status; conviction or admission of guilt at step two establishes inadmissibility;
• (2) the INA nowhere imposes a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on border officers making on-the-spot classification calls;
• (3) the BIA's clear-and-convincing standard applies at removal hearings — not at the border — and the government satisfied it through Lau's guilty plea.

Separate Opinions: • Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan): The INA's "shall not" command required the government to determine whether an exception applied before reclassifying a returning green card holder as seeking admission. The majority permits post hoc justification, gutting the statutory protection Congress built for green card holders.

Implications:

• (1) Green card holders face possible parole at any border crossing if a pending criminal charge appears in federal databases — no evidentiary floor required at the moment of the call;
• (2) courts must still resolve what standard — if any — governs border officers' parole decisions;
• (3) the Second Circuit must decide on remand whether Lau's conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Fine Print:

• 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v): "An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien . . . has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title"
• 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I): "convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude"

Primary Cases:

• Barton v. Barr (2020): Established the two-step framework for removing returning lawful permanent residents — crime commission at step one triggers "seeking admission" status; conviction at step two establishes inadmissibility.
• Matter of Valenzuela-Felix (BIA 2012): The Board of Immigration Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to removal hearings only, not the border — the distinction the majority adopted and the Second Circuit ignored.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (United States): Sopan Joshi of the Department of Justice
• Respondent (Muk Choi Lau): Shay Dvoretzky of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

Pung v. Isabella County | Case No. 25-95 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 02/25/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026

Overview: A Michigan family lost their $194,400 home at a tax auction for $76,008 over a disputed $2,241.93 debt. The Court decided whether just compensation under the Takings Clause demands fair market value or only the auction surplus.

Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause requires the government to pay fair market value — not just the auction surplus — after a tax foreclosure sale.

Posture: District Court awarded surplus only; Sixth Circuit affirmed on circuit precedent; Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (Pung Family):
• (1) Just compensation under the Fifth Amendment requires fair market value, not the artificially depressed auction sale price;
• (2) No court in 250 years held surplus proceeds automatically satisfy just compensation for a home sold far below assessed value;
• (3) The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause bars the government from consuming the vast majority of a homeowner's equity over a small tax debt.
• Respondent (Isabella County):
• (1) Centuries of English and American law establish that surplus auction proceeds satisfy just compensation in tax foreclosure sales;
• (2) Adopting fair market value as the constitutional baseline would render tax foreclosure sales financially infeasible for governments nationwide;
• (3) The Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to fairly conducted tax sales with deep historical roots.

Holding: The proper baseline for just compensation after a tax foreclosure sale is the auction price — the surplus above the tax debt — not the property's hypothetical fair market value, at least when the sale proceeds fairly in light of the nation's history of tax sales. The Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does not require more than the surplus proceeds.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson; Justice Thomas joined except as to Part II-B. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Gorsuch and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Gorsuch except as to footnote 1. Vacated and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Centuries of English and American law — codified in founding-era statutes and confirmed in Court precedent — established surplus auction proceeds as the measure of just compensation in tax foreclosure sales;
• (2) Owners can generally avoid tax foreclosure by refinancing or selling voluntarily, distinguishing tax sales from traditional eminent domain;
• (3) A fair-market-value rule would render tax sales financially infeasible, forcing governments to pay delinquent taxpayers more than the auction ever generates.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Gorsuch and Jackson): Agreed with the result but wrote separately to clarify that the majority's "fairly conducted" language does not define the constitutional floor for a valid tax auction — leaving that standard open for the lower courts on remand.
• Justice Thomas (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Gorsuch except footnote 1): Declined to join Part II-B; argued historical tax-sale tradition imposed strict limits the County violated — including exhausting personal property before seizing the home and selling only as much as necessary — and called the County's conduct likely unconstitutional.

Implications:

• (1) Homeowners facing tax foreclosure cannot demand fair market value as a constitutional right — only the auction surplus;
• (2) Governments may conduct tax sales without paying more than the surplus, preserving the system nationwide as a viable debt-collection tool;
• (3) Lower courts must now define what a "fairly conducted" auction requires, inviting future constitutional challenges on procedural grounds.

The Fine Print:

• Fifth Amendment, Takings Clause: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"
• Eighth Amendment, Excessive Fines Clause: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"

Primary Cases:

• Tyler v. Hennepin County (2023): The government must return surplus proceeds from a tax foreclosure sale to the former owner; retaining the surplus violates the Takings Clause.
• BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1994): A foreclosure sale price reflects the actual market for foreclosed property; the former owner does not recover fair market value through foreclosure.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Pung): Philip L. Ellison of Outside Legal Counsel PLC.
• United States as Amicus Curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.
• For Respondent (Isabella County, Michigan): Matthew Nelson of Warner Norcross and Judd.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. | Case No. 24-699 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 02/23/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026

Overview: Cuba's Communist government confiscated Exxon's oil refinery and service stations in 1960. Congress created a legal remedy in 1996 via the Helms-Burton Act. The Court decided whether that law itself strips Cuban government companies of their immunity shield.

Question Presented: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban government agencies and instrumentalities, excusing plaintiffs from satisfying the FSIA's separate exceptions.

Posture: District court and divided D.C. Circuit sided with Cuban defendants; Supreme Court granted cert.

Main Arguments:

Petitioner (Exxon Mobil):

• (1) Helms-Burton's express cause of action against foreign instrumentalities abrogates sovereign immunity under Court precedent without a separate waiver provision;
• (2) Applying the FSIA guts the cause of action because the simultaneous embargo bars the commercial nexus those exceptions require;
• (3) The Act routes suits through §1331 — not §1330 — and grants the President exclusive gatekeeping power, confirming FSIA displacement.

Respondents (CIMEX/CUPET):

• (1) Helms-Burton's text never addresses sovereign immunity, failing the unmistakably-clear abrogation standard;
• (2) Congress considered adding an express FSIA exception and deliberately dropped it after DOJ objected;
• (3) The FSIA and Helms-Burton can coexist because some suits satisfy FSIA exceptions through lawful Cuba-U.S. commercial activity.

Holding: The Helms-Burton Act abrogates the foreign sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs who sue Cuban agencies or instrumentalities under the Act need not separately satisfy an FSIA exception.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) The Act's cause of action expressly applies against foreign instrumentalities, which under Kirtz (2024) abrogates immunity without a separate waiver provision;
• (2) Applying the FSIA guts the cause of action — the simultaneous Cuba embargo bars the commercial nexus the FSIA's exceptions require, creating an inescapable trap Congress never intended;
• (3) The Act routes suits through §1331 not §1330, grants the President exclusive immunity-gatekeeping authority mirroring the pre-FSIA regime, and expressly contemplates judgments against Cuban entities — all confirming FSIA displacement.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Kagan — Dissenting (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson): Helms-Burton's text never addresses immunity; Congress dropped a draft FSIA amendment after DOJ objection; the cause of action retains meaningful work against private defendants without any abrogation.

Implications:

• (1) American claimants with Cuba-confiscated property can now sue Cuban government entities under Helms-Burton, bypassing FSIA exceptions entirely;
• (2) Dozens of pending suits involving Cuban hotels, ports, and airports advance to the merits;
• (3) The Court reserved whether the ruling extends to non-Cuban foreign instrumentalities, guaranteeing future litigation.

The Fine Print:

• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A) (Helms-Burton Act / Title III): "any person that...traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"
• 28 U.S.C. §1604 (FSIA): "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter"

Primary Cases:

• Dep't of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Congressional creation of a cause of action expressly applying against government agencies or instrumentalities abrogates sovereign immunity without a separate waiver provision.
• Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo (2023): Congress does not "authorize a suit against a sovereign with one hand, only to bar it with the other" — statutory schemes must afford meaningful remedies to identified defendants.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Exxon Mobil): Morgan Ratner of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP argues for Petitioner Exxon Mobil.
• United States as Amicus Curiae: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.
• For Respondents (Corporación Cimex): Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Overview:

• Four opinions released June 25th, 2026 — one day, across environmental tort preemption, immigration enforcement, executive authority over humanitarian protections, and Second Amendment rights.
• Three of four decisions split 6–3: identical conservative majority, identical liberal dissent, three consecutive times.
• The fourth — a Roundup cancer lawsuit and a $1 million-plus Missouri jury verdict — fractured the usual alliances, drawing Sotomayor and Kagan into a 7–2 conservative coalition while pushing Gorsuch into dissent alongside Jackson.
• Justice Alito authored three majority opinions; Justice Kavanaugh authored one; Chief Justice Roberts joined all four without writing separately.
• Justice Thomas wrote or joined a separate concurrence in all four cases — each one planting seeds for future constitutional challenges to the administrative state, executive immigration power, and federal equal protection doctrine.
• Justice Jackson dissented in all four cases — twice as the author — making her the most prolific dissenter of the opinion day.
• This episode breaks down all four decisions: authors, vote splits, key holdings, Thomas's concurrence roadmap, and real-world consequences.

Monsanto Co. versus Durnell | No. 24–1068

• Federal preemption law (FIFRA) blocks state failure-to-warn tort claims requiring cancer warnings on Roundup's label beyond what the EPA approved.
• 7–2. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett.
• Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion flagging three structural concerns: FIFRA likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority; EPA's labeling power raises non-delegation problems; and agency regulations may lack Supremacy Clause status to preempt state law.
• Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Gorsuch.
• Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. versus Al Otro Lado et al. | No. 25–5

• An alien standing in Mexico does not "arrive in the United States" within the meaning of the INA; inspection and asylum obligations don't attach before physical border crossing.
• 6–3. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.
• Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing lower courts evaded §1252(f)(1)'s classwide injunction bar through declaratory-relief labeling, and that statutes compelling the President to admit aliens would infringe inherent executive exclusion authority.
• Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Kagan and Jackson.
• Justice Jackson filed a separate dissenting opinion.
• Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. versus Doe et al. | Nos. 25–1083 & 25–1084

• The TPS statute bars judicial review of termination decisions; the equal protection race claim challenging Haiti's TPS termination unlikely to succeed on the merits.
• Justice Alito announced the judgment and delivered the Court's opinion, joined in full by Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh, and except for Part III–A by Gorsuch and Barrett.
• Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars even constitutional claims, that Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) deserves overruling, and that non-citizen immigrants hold no constitutional equal protection rights against federal immigration decisions.
• Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson.
• Second and D.C. Circuits reversed and remanded.

Wolford et al. versus Lopez, Attorney General of Hawaii | No. 24–1046

• Hawaii's law prohibiting licensed carry-permit holders from carrying firearms on private property open to the public without the owner's express consent violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
• 6–3. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.
• Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion — joined by Thomas and Gorsuch as to Part II–B — rejecting Hawaii's property-law framing and disqualifying both the anti-poaching and Black Code historical analogues as invalid historical support under Bruen.
• Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.
• Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Sotomayor.
• Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.