Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Case No. 24-935 | Argued: 3/25/26 | Decided: May 28, 2026 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that last-mile delivery workers who never cross state lines still qualify for the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption from mandatory arbitration if their intrastate routes form part of a continuous interstate journey.

Question Presented: Whether a worker qualifies for the FAA's Section 1 arbitration exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with interstate vehicles.

Posture: District court denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert.

Main Arguments:

• Flowers Foods (Petitioner): (1) Section 1 requires workers to cross state lines or interact with interstate vehicles; (2) Brock's purely intrastate route falls outside Congress's intended scope of the exemption; (3) Extending Section 1 to intrastate-only workers produces an unworkable, open-ended standard.
• Brock (Respondent): (1) Statutory text "engaged in interstate commerce" covers workers on intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys; (2) Historical Commerce Clause precedent confirms intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce; (3) The Court's own precedent in Saxon already rejected a crossing-state-lines requirement.

Holding: The Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption from compelled arbitration for workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce,” 9 U. S. C. §1, can apply to a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey and who does not cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. No concurrences. No dissents. Tenth Circuit judgment affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) The 1925-era plain meaning of "engaged in interstate commerce" encompasses intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys — nothing in the text requires crossing state lines or tagging interstate vehicles; (2) The Daniel Ball (1871) and a line of Commerce Clause cases confirm that purely intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce when moving goods within a continuous multi-state shipment; (3) Flowers Foods waived alternative arguments — including independent-contractor status and title transfer — by staking its entire case on the rejected cross-or-tag rule.

Separate Opinions: None.

Implications:

• Last-mile delivery drivers, food distributors, and local couriers whose routes remain within a single state now hold stronger claims to Section 1 protection — blocking companies from compelling arbitration and reopening access to class action litigation.
• Companies relying on arbitration clauses in franchisee and distributor agreements face exposure on wage claims.
• Two questions remain open: whether Section 1 covers workers operating through independently owned business entities, and whether taking title to goods defeats the exemption — issues currently splitting the circuits.

The Fine Print:

• Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"
• Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933) defining "interstate commerce": "[t]raffic, intercourse, or the transportation of persons or property between or among the several states of the Union, or from or between points in one state and points in another state"

Primary Cases:

• Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): An airline cargo loader who never flew or crossed state lines still qualified as a transportation worker "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.
• The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871): A steamer operating entirely within Michigan still "engaged in commerce between the States" because it transported goods destined for or arriving from other states — multiple intrastate actors can collectively form one interstate transaction.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Flowers Food): Traci L. Lovett of Jones Day
• For Respondent (Brock): Jennifer Bennett of Gupta Wessler

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Argued: 3/31/26 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: A Mississippi prosecutor struck four of five eligible Black jurors at a death penalty trial, a trial court skipped the required third step of the racial-discrimination inquiry, and the Mississippi Supreme Court then called it a waiver. The Supreme Court reverses.

Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.

Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Main Arguments:

• Pitchford (Petitioner): (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right; (2) The trial court blocked step three, making waiver impossible; (3) AEDPA deference does not shield an unreasonable factual determination that contradicts the trial record.
• Mississippi (Respondent): (1) Mississippi's long-standing preservation rule requires defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own trial attorney swore under oath she never preserved the pretext argument; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question, not the underlying Batson merits or form of relief.

Holding: In Pitchford’s direct appeal of a capital murder sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established precedents of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, to determine that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett. Reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) The trial court ended its Batson analysis at step two — it declared the prosecutor's reasons race-neutral and pivoted without giving defense counsel any opportunity to challenge them as pretextual;
• (2) Pitchford did not waive step three because the trial court affirmatively assured defense counsel that the Batson objection already sat on the record;
• (3) AEDPA deference does not mean abdication — the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver ruling amounted to an unreasonable application of Batson precedents and an unreasonable factual determination.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Gorsuch (dissenting, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Barrett): Mississippi exercised its lawful authority under Ford v. Georgia to craft preservation rules; defense counsel never made a step-three comparative juror argument; the record does not compel Pitchford's reading under § 2254(d)(2)'s demanding standard; both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit read the record reasonably.

Implications:

• Pitchford's case heads back to lower courts for the first full step-three Batson examination in over twenty years. Other death row defendants who faced similar procedural breakdowns — trial court skipped step three, state appellate court called it a waiver — gain a stronger federal habeas argument.
• Trial judges across the country receive a clear signal: Batson enforcement falls first on them, and shortcuts at step three carry constitutional consequences.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication...resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."
• U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Primary Cases:

• Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.
• Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's full history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials before the Court reversed.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips Black
• Respondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor General
• United States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:07] Oral Advocates

[00:01:21] Argument Begins

[00:01:29] Pitchford Opening Statement

[00:03:49] Pitchford Free for All Questions

[00:28:09] Pitchford Round Robin Questions

[00:54:35] Cain Opening Statement

[00:56:46] Cain Free for All Questions

[01:15:43] Cain Round Robin Questions

[01:34:48] United States Opening Statement

[01:35:51] United States Free for All Questions

[01:45:22] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:48:42] Pitchford Rebuttal

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Argued: 3/31/26 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: A Mississippi prosecutor struck four of five eligible Black jurors at a death penalty trial, a trial court skipped the required third step of the racial-discrimination inquiry, and the Mississippi Supreme Court then called it a waiver. The Supreme Court reverses.

Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.

Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Main Arguments:

• Pitchford (Petitioner): (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right; (2) The trial court blocked step three, making waiver impossible; (3) AEDPA deference does not shield an unreasonable factual determination that contradicts the trial record.
• Mississippi (Respondent): (1) Mississippi's long-standing preservation rule requires defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own trial attorney swore under oath she never preserved the pretext argument; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question, not the underlying Batson merits or form of relief.

Holding: In Pitchford’s direct appeal of a capital murder sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established precedents of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, to determine that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett. Reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) The trial court ended its Batson analysis at step two — it declared the prosecutor's reasons race-neutral and pivoted without giving defense counsel any opportunity to challenge them as pretextual;
• (2) Pitchford did not waive step three because the trial court affirmatively assured defense counsel that the Batson objection already sat on the record;
• (3) AEDPA deference does not mean abdication — the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver ruling amounted to an unreasonable application of Batson precedents and an unreasonable factual determination.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Gorsuch (dissenting, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Barrett): Mississippi exercised its lawful authority under Ford v. Georgia to craft preservation rules; defense counsel never made a step-three comparative juror argument; the record does not compel Pitchford's reading under § 2254(d)(2)'s demanding standard; both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit read the record reasonably.

Implications:

• Pitchford's case heads back to lower courts for the first full step-three Batson examination in over twenty years. Other death row defendants who faced similar procedural breakdowns — trial court skipped step three, state appellate court called it a waiver — gain a stronger federal habeas argument.
• Trial judges across the country receive a clear signal: Batson enforcement falls first on them, and shortcuts at step three carry constitutional consequences.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication...resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."
• U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Primary Cases:

• Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.
• Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's full history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials before the Court reversed.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips Black
• Respondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor General
• United States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Fernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: A federal prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence sought early release by arguing potential innocence — but the Supreme Court closed that door, ruling compassionate release cannot substitute for the strict habeas process Congress designed.

Question Presented: Whether a federal prisoner may use the compassionate release statute to challenge the validity of his conviction when habeas corpus procedures remain unavailable.

Posture: Second Circuit reversed compassionate release grant; seven-two circuit split prompted cert.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Fernandez): Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N.Y.
• For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Main Arguments:

• Fernandez (Petitioner):
• (1) "Extraordinary and compelling reasons" contains no categorical exclusions barring conviction-related evidence;
• (2) Congress's explicit rehabilitation exclusion implies no other categorical limits exist;
• (3) Section 3582 and Section 2255 offer distinct remedies — reduction versus vacatur — and neither forecloses the other.
• United States (Respondent):
• (1) Claims challenging conviction validity must travel through Section 2255's reticulated habeas framework, not compassionate release;
• (2) Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — age, illness, family — not legal-error correction;
• (3) Permitting conviction challenges under Section 3582 would let prisoners circumvent Section 2255's strict procedural requirements indefinitely.

Holding: A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Second Circuit affirmed. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Under Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973) and Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005), courts must read Section 3582 in harmony with Section 2255 — claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the habeas statute, not around it;
• (2) The statute's title, structure, Bureau of Prisons gatekeeping role, and decades of Sentencing Commission guidance confirm Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — not legal-error correction;
• (3) The mismatch between Fernandez's argument (conviction unsound) and his requested remedy (sentence reduction) confirms Section 3582 cannot carry conviction challenges.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment only, joined by Kagan): Agreed reversal warranted, but rejected the majority's habeas-based rule as atextual and overbroad. Proposed a narrower ground: compassionate release requires post-sentencing changed circumstances, not re-litigation of arguments courts previously considered.
• Justice Jackson (dissenting): The majority grafted an atextual habeas-based limitation onto Section 3582's broad "extraordinary and compelling" language — a rule Congress never wrote, never signaled, and the statute's text and history cannot support. Would vacate and remand for the Second Circuit to evaluate the district court's finding without a categorical bar.

Implications:

• Federal prisoners who exhaust or lose under Section 2255 no longer hold compassionate release as an alternative path to raise conviction-related arguments.
• Courts must now distinguish "personal circumstances" claims (permissible under Section 3582) from "conviction-challenge" claims (channeled exclusively to Section 2255) — a line the majority left imprecisely drawn.
• Justice Sotomayor's concurrence signals the Court may remain open to post-sentencing new evidence of innocence under a changed-circumstances framework.
• The Court left unresolved whether freestanding actual innocence claims can succeed under Section 2255.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."
• 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a): "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."

Primary Cases:

• Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973): Claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the specific habeas statute — not broader civil statutes — or they impermissibly circumvent Congress's design.
• Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005): Prisoners may not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to re-argue denied habeas claims on the merits, as doing so circumvents the strict statutory limits on successive habeas petitions.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Overview

[00:00:48] Argument Begins

[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:10] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:28:08] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

[00:40:01] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:42:17] Respondent Free for All Questions

[01:10:17] Respondent Round Robin Questions

[01:19:07] Petitioner Rebuttal

Fernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: A federal prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence sought early release by arguing potential innocence — but the Supreme Court closed that door, ruling compassionate release cannot substitute for the strict habeas process Congress designed.

Question Presented: Whether a federal prisoner may use the compassionate release statute to challenge the validity of his conviction when habeas corpus procedures remain unavailable.

Posture: Second Circuit reversed compassionate release grant; seven-two circuit split prompted cert.

Main Arguments:

• Fernandez (Petitioner):
• (1) "Extraordinary and compelling reasons" contains no categorical exclusions barring conviction-related evidence;
• (2) Congress's explicit rehabilitation exclusion implies no other categorical limits exist;
• (3) Section 3582 and Section 2255 offer distinct remedies — reduction versus vacatur — and neither forecloses the other.
• United States (Respondent):
• (1) Claims challenging conviction validity must travel through Section 2255's reticulated habeas framework, not compassionate release;
• (2) Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — age, illness, family — not legal-error correction;
• (3) Permitting conviction challenges under Section 3582 would let prisoners circumvent Section 2255's strict procedural requirements indefinitely.

Holding: A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Second Circuit affirmed. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Under Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973) and Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005), courts must read Section 3582 in harmony with Section 2255 — claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the habeas statute, not around it;
• (2) The statute's title, structure, Bureau of Prisons gatekeeping role, and decades of Sentencing Commission guidance confirm Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — not legal-error correction;
• (3) The mismatch between Fernandez's argument (conviction unsound) and his requested remedy (sentence reduction) confirms Section 3582 cannot carry conviction challenges.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment only, joined by Kagan): Agreed reversal warranted, but rejected the majority's habeas-based rule as atextual and overbroad. Proposed a narrower ground: compassionate release requires post-sentencing changed circumstances, not re-litigation of arguments courts previously considered.
• Justice Jackson (dissenting): The majority grafted an atextual habeas-based limitation onto Section 3582's broad "extraordinary and compelling" language — a rule Congress never wrote, never signaled, and the statute's text and history cannot support. Would vacate and remand for the Second Circuit to evaluate the district court's finding without a categorical bar.

Implications:

• Federal prisoners who exhaust or lose under Section 2255 no longer hold compassionate release as an alternative path to raise conviction-related arguments.
• Courts must now distinguish "personal circumstances" claims (permissible under Section 3582) from "conviction-challenge" claims (channeled exclusively to Section 2255) — a line the majority left imprecisely drawn.
• Justice Sotomayor's concurrence signals the Court may remain open to post-sentencing new evidence of innocence under a changed-circumstances framework.
• The Court left unresolved whether freestanding actual innocence claims can succeed under Section 2255.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."
• 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a): "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."

Primary Cases:

• Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973): Claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the specific habeas statute — not broader civil statutes — or they impermissibly circumvent Congress's design.
• Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005): Prisoners may not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to re-argue denied habeas claims on the merits, as doing so circumvents the strict statutory limits on successive habeas petitions.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Fernandez): Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N.Y.
• For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Date Decided: 5/28/26 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here)

Overview: Two prisoners serving decades-long gun-crime sentences sought early release after Congress reduced those sentences for future offenders but deliberately left them behind. The Court resolved whether that deliberate legislative gap qualified as a reason for compassionate release.

Question Presented: Whether a sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive change to mandatory gun-crime penalties qualifies as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for compassionate release.

Posture: Third Circuit affirmed denial of compassionate release in both cases; Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed.

Main Arguments:

• Rutherford & Carter (Petitioners):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" invites a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry that permits courts to consider nonretroactive sentencing changes alongside other factors;
• (2) Congress's silence — beyond banning rehabilitation alone — left courts free to consider all other relevant information, including sentencing disparities;
• (3) The Sentencing Commission exercised valid delegated authority when it authorized courts to consider unusually long sentences and gross disparities.
• United States (Respondent):(1) Nonretroactive sentencing changes represent ordinary congressional practice, not extraordinary circumstances warranting judicial override;
• (2) Permitting courts to treat such changes as compelling reasons would undermine Congress's deliberate choice to leave prior sentences intact;
• (3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement exceeded its statutory authority by conflicting with the governing statute's plain meaning.

Holding: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Voting Breakdown: 6–3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Third Circuit judgments affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) "Extraordinary and compelling" requires reasons that are especially unusual and convincing — nonretroactive sentencing changes represent the norm, not an exception, making them neither extraordinary nor compelling;
• (2) Courts must clear a threshold gatekeeping requirement — extraordinary and compelling eligibility — before broad sentencing discretion applies;
• (3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy statement conflicted with the statute and fell as invalid.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson): Congress expressly delegated authority to the Sentencing Commission to define "extraordinary and compelling." The Commission acted reasonably within that delegation; the majority improperly substituted its own statutory reading for the Commission's judgment and conjured categorical limits that neither Congress nor the Commission imposed.

Implications: Thousands of federal prisoners serving pre–First Step Act stacked gun-crime sentences now face a closed door on compassionate release arguments based on the sentencing gap Congress created in 2018. The ruling also strikes down the Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy category, removing it from district courts nationwide. The Court left open the precise outer boundaries of "extraordinary and compelling" and signaled that only Congress — through retroactivity legislation or a new relief mechanism — can deliver the remedy these prisoners sought. Future litigation will test the Commission's remaining authority and what post-sentencing legal developments beyond personal circumstances can clear the extraordinary-and-compelling bar.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court…may reduce the term of imprisonment…after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that…extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction…and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
• 28 U.S.C. § 994(t): "The Commission…shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples. Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason."

Primary Cases:

• Concepcion v. United States (2022): Courts enjoy broad discretion to consider all relevant information when modifying sentences under provisions lacking limiting language — but eligibility for relief must first satisfy any gatekeeping requirement the statute imposes.
• Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024): When Congress expressly delegates authority to an agency to give meaning to a statutory term, courts must ensure the agency acts within reasonable bounds of that delegation rather than substituting their own interpretation.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Rutherford): David Frederick, Washington, D.C.
• For Petitioner (Carter): David O'Neil, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here)

Overview: Two prisoners serving decades-long gun-crime sentences sought early release after Congress reduced those sentences for future offenders but deliberately left them behind. The Court resolved whether that deliberate legislative gap qualified as a reason for compassionate release.

Question Presented: Whether a sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive change to mandatory gun-crime penalties qualifies as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for compassionate release.

Posture: Third Circuit affirmed denial of compassionate release in both cases; Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed.

Main Arguments:

• Rutherford & Carter (Petitioners):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" invites a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry that permits courts to consider nonretroactive sentencing changes alongside other factors;
• (2) Congress's silence — beyond banning rehabilitation alone — left courts free to consider all other relevant information, including sentencing disparities;
• (3) The Sentencing Commission exercised valid delegated authority when it authorized courts to consider unusually long sentences and gross disparities.
• United States (Respondent):(1) Nonretroactive sentencing changes represent ordinary congressional practice, not extraordinary circumstances warranting judicial override;
• (2) Permitting courts to treat such changes as compelling reasons would undermine Congress's deliberate choice to leave prior sentences intact;
• (3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement exceeded its statutory authority by conflicting with the governing statute's plain meaning.

Holding: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Voting Breakdown: 6–3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Third Circuit judgments affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) "Extraordinary and compelling" requires reasons that are especially unusual and convincing — nonretroactive sentencing changes represent the norm, not an exception, making them neither extraordinary nor compelling;
• (2) Courts must clear a threshold gatekeeping requirement — extraordinary and compelling eligibility — before broad sentencing discretion applies;
• (3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy statement conflicted with the statute and fell as invalid.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson): Congress expressly delegated authority to the Sentencing Commission to define "extraordinary and compelling." The Commission acted reasonably within that delegation; the majority improperly substituted its own statutory reading for the Commission's judgment and conjured categorical limits that neither Congress nor the Commission imposed.

Implications: Thousands of federal prisoners serving pre–First Step Act stacked gun-crime sentences now face a closed door on compassionate release arguments based on the sentencing gap Congress created in 2018. The ruling also strikes down the Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy category, removing it from district courts nationwide. The Court left open the precise outer boundaries of "extraordinary and compelling" and signaled that only Congress — through retroactivity legislation or a new relief mechanism — can deliver the remedy these prisoners sought. Future litigation will test the Commission's remaining authority and what post-sentencing legal developments beyond personal circumstances can clear the extraordinary-and-compelling bar.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court…may reduce the term of imprisonment…after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that…extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction…and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
• 28 U.S.C. § 994(t): "The Commission…shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples. Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason."

Primary Cases:

• Concepcion v. United States (2022): Courts enjoy broad discretion to consider all relevant information when modifying sentences under provisions lacking limiting language — but eligibility for relief must first satisfy any gatekeeping requirement the statute imposes.
• Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024): When Congress expressly delegates authority to an agency to give meaning to a statutory term, courts must ensure the agency acts within reasonable bounds of that delegation rather than substituting their own interpretation.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Rutherford): David Frederick, Washington, D.C.
• For Petitioner (Carter): David O'Neil, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:05] Argument Begins

[00:01:13] Petitioner (Rutherford) Opening Statement

[00:02:54] Petitioner (Rutherford) Free for All Questions

[00:14:00] Petitioner (Rutherford) Round Robin Questions

[00:30:04] Petitioner (Carter) Opening Statement

[00:33:35] Petitioner (Carter) Free for All Questions

[00:40:36] Petitioner (Carter) Round Robin Questions

[00:47:52] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:50:12] Respondent Free for All Questions

[01:19:10] Respondent Round Robin Questions

[01:19:24] Petitioner (Rutherford) Rebuttal

Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Date Decided: 5/28/26 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here)

Overview: Two prisoners serving decades-long gun-crime sentences sought early release after Congress reduced those sentences for future offenders but deliberately left them behind. The Court resolved whether that deliberate legislative gap qualified as a reason for compassionate release.

Question Presented: Whether a sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive change to mandatory gun-crime penalties qualifies as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for compassionate release.

Posture: Third Circuit affirmed denial of compassionate release in both cases; Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed.

Main Arguments:

• Rutherford & Carter (Petitioners):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" invites a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry that permits courts to consider nonretroactive sentencing changes alongside other factors;
• (2) Congress's silence — beyond banning rehabilitation alone — left courts free to consider all other relevant information, including sentencing disparities;
• (3) The Sentencing Commission exercised valid delegated authority when it authorized courts to consider unusually long sentences and gross disparities.
• United States (Respondent):(1) Nonretroactive sentencing changes represent ordinary congressional practice, not extraordinary circumstances warranting judicial override;
• (2) Permitting courts to treat such changes as compelling reasons would undermine Congress's deliberate choice to leave prior sentences intact;
• (3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement exceeded its statutory authority by conflicting with the governing statute's plain meaning.

Holding: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Voting Breakdown: 6–3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Third Circuit judgments affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) "Extraordinary and compelling" requires reasons that are especially unusual and convincing — nonretroactive sentencing changes represent the norm, not an exception, making them neither extraordinary nor compelling;
• (2) Courts must clear a threshold gatekeeping requirement — extraordinary and compelling eligibility — before broad sentencing discretion applies;
• (3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy statement conflicted with the statute and fell as invalid.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson): Congress expressly delegated authority to the Sentencing Commission to define "extraordinary and compelling." The Commission acted reasonably within that delegation; the majority improperly substituted its own statutory reading for the Commission's judgment and conjured categorical limits that neither Congress nor the Commission imposed.

Implications: Thousands of federal prisoners serving pre–First Step Act stacked gun-crime sentences now face a closed door on compassionate release arguments based on the sentencing gap Congress created in 2018. The ruling also strikes down the Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy category, removing it from district courts nationwide. The Court left open the precise outer boundaries of "extraordinary and compelling" and signaled that only Congress — through retroactivity legislation or a new relief mechanism — can deliver the remedy these prisoners sought. Future litigation will test the Commission's remaining authority and what post-sentencing legal developments beyond personal circumstances can clear the extraordinary-and-compelling bar.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court…may reduce the term of imprisonment…after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that…extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction…and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
• 28 U.S.C. § 994(t): "The Commission…shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples. Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason."

Primary Cases:

• Concepcion v. United States (2022): Courts enjoy broad discretion to consider all relevant information when modifying sentences under provisions lacking limiting language — but eligibility for relief must first satisfy any gatekeeping requirement the statute imposes.
• Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024): When Congress expressly delegates authority to an agency to give meaning to a statutory term, courts must ensure the agency acts within reasonable bounds of that delegation rather than substituting their own interpretation.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Rutherford): David Frederick, Washington, D.C.
• For Petitioner (Carter): David O'Neil, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872 | Oral Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: When someone takes multiple IQ tests to prove intellectual disability in a capital case, do courts look at all the scores together, or can one low score alone save their life?

The Supreme Court will decide whether courts must evaluate multiple IQ scores collectively or whether a single qualifying score triggers constitutional protection in death penalty cases. This decision affects hundreds of current death row inmates and reshapes capital litigation nationwide.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Hamm): Robert M. Overing, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Montgomery, Alabama argued for Petitioner Hamm.
• United States as Amicus Curaie in Support of Petitioner: Harry Graver, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
• For Respondent (Smith): Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D.C.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:28] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:43] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:58] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:20:43] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

[00:44:36] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

[00:45:47] United States Free for All Questions

[00:55:27] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:21:13] Respondent Opening Statement

[01:24:00] Respondent Free for All Questions

[01:51:28] Respondent Round Robin Questions

[02:01:18] Petitioner Rebuttal

Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872 | Decided: May 21, 2026 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: Death penalty case examining how courts evaluate multiple IQ scores when determining intellectual disability under Atkins. Court dismissed writ as improvidently granted after oral argument revealed parties never litigated the question below.

Question Presented: Whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in assessing Atkins claims.

Posture: Eleventh Circuit affirmed District Court finding Smith intellectually disabled using holistic approach.

Main Arguments:

• Alabama (Petitioner): (1) Courts must combine multiple IQ scores using statistical methods to determine whether defendant proves IQ of 70 or below by preponderance; (2) Standard error of measurement applies equally in both directions, preventing reliance solely on lowest score's error range; (3) Holistic approaches that consider adaptive functioning alongside IQ scores improperly expand Atkins protection beyond intellectual functioning threshold.
• Smith (Respondent): (1) Courts must assess multiple scores holistically, considering measurement error, expert testimony, and other evidence of intellectual functioning together; (2) Hall requires courts to account for standard error when scores fall near the threshold; (3) Professional standards recommend clinical judgment considering all available evidence rather than mechanical statistical formulas.

Holding: Per curiam opinion dismissed writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice Sotomayor wrote concurring opinion joined by Justice Jackson. Justice Thomas dissented. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justice Thomas, with Justice Gorsuch joining Parts I–III. No substantive ruling on merits.

Majority Reasoning: Per curiam provided no reasoning. Two sentences: "The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered." Dismissal leaves Eleventh Circuit decision protecting Smith from execution intact without Supreme Court guidance on evaluating multiple IQ scores.

Opinion: Here

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Jackson): Case presented poor vehicle because parties never litigated proposed methodologies below; Alabama's own expert used holistic approach Alabama now attacks; no state follows Alabama's proposed rule.
• Justice Thomas (dissenting): Would overrule Atkins entirely as improper judicial lawmaking lacking foundation in Eighth Amendment text or original understanding.
• Justice Alito (dissenting, joined by Thomas, with Gorsuch joining Parts I–III): Court should have provided guidance on recurring question; lower courts need direction on evaluating multiple scores; dismissal exacerbates confusion in Atkins doctrine.

Implications: Smith remains protected from execution. Courts nationwide lack Supreme Court guidance on multiple IQ scores beyond Hall and Moore principles. Holistic approach validated below remains permissible. Deep division among Justices signals potential vulnerability in Atkins doctrine. Defense attorneys gain validation for flexible methodologies; prosecutors cannot rely on rigid numerical cutoffs.

The Fine Print:

• Eighth Amendment: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
• Alabama Intellectual Disability Standard (Ex parte Perkins, 2002): Defendant must prove by preponderance: "(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 70 or below); (2) significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior; (3) manifestation during the developmental period (before age 18)."

Primary Cases:

• Atkins v. Virginia (2002): Eighth Amendment categorically bars executing intellectually disabled individuals; states develop appropriate enforcement standards while Supreme Court establishes constitutional floors.
• Hall v. Florida (2014): Courts must consider standard error of measurement when evaluating IQ scores near 70 threshold; rigid cutoffs ignoring measurement error violate Eighth Amendment protections.

M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of The IAM Pension Fund | Argument Date: 1/20/26 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.
• For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Question Presented: Can pension plans charge higher prices using future prices, or must they stick with the original prices?

Overview: Four companies' pension withdrawal liability tripled from timing of actuarial assumption changes, creating circuit split over whether "as of" December 31st calculations require December 31st assumptions or permit retrospective professional judgment.

Posture: Arbitrators favored companies; D.C. District Court and Circuit reversed, permitting post-measurement assumption adoption with restrictions.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioners: (1) "As of" language creates statutory deadline requiring pre-measurement assumption adoption; (2) Legislative framework expected annual assumption reviews before measurement dates; (3) Anti-manipulation principles from Section 1394 should apply to actuarial assumptions
• Respondents: (1) "As of" establishes reference date, not completion deadline for retrospective valuations; (2) "Best estimate" requirement mandates current professional judgment over stale assumptions; (3) Standard actuarial practice permits and encourages post-measurement selection

Holding: The ERISA provisions governing the calculation of withdrawal liability from an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan do not require that actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation be selected on or before the statutory measurement date.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Affirmed D.C. Circuit.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) Section 1391's "as of" language assigns hard data to measurement date but permits calculation performance afterward using tools including assumptions; (2) Section 1393 imposes no deadline for assumption selection and Congress's omission from parallel provisions signals intentional choice; (3) "Best estimate" requirement necessitates access to most current data potentially unavailable before measurement date.

Implications: Pension plans gain flexibility to select actuarial assumptions after measurement dates using current market data and professional judgment. Employers lose timing-based challenges but retain substantive reasonableness challenges through arbitration. Actuaries avoid artificial deadlines while maintaining accountability through reasonableness requirements. Court leaves open whether assumptions must reflect only information available as of measurement date.

The Fine Print:

• 29 U.S.C. § 1391: "The amount of an employer's withdrawal liability...shall be computed...as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs"
• 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): "actuarial assumptions and methods which...offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"

Primary Cases:

• National Retirement Fund v. Metz Culinary Management (2020): Second Circuit held actuarial assumptions for withdrawal liability must exist by measurement date; automatic rollover applies absent timely changes
• Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust (1993): Withdrawal liability creates "fixed and certain debt"; actuarial determinations receive presumption of correctness due to professional constraints and statutory requirements

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:30] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:41] M & K Opening Statement

[00:03:33] M & K Free for All Questions

[00:26:54] M & K Round Robin Questions

[00:31:47] IAM Opening Statement

[00:34:23] IAM Free for All Questions

[00:47:28] IAM Round Robin Questions

[00:47:31] United States Opening Statement

[00:48:39] United States Free for All Questions

[00:53:44] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:53:50] M & K Rebuttal