The High Court Report

PART 1: SHOW NOTES

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-856.html | Argued: 04/28/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026

Overview: The Supreme Court ended corporate accountability under two federal human-rights statutes, ruling that courts carry no authority to create new Alien Tort Statute lawsuits and that the Torture Victim Protection Act reaches only direct perpetrators — not their corporate enablers.

Question Presented: Whether the ATS and TVPA authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company that allegedly helped a foreign government torture a religious minority.

Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

• Cisco (Petitioner):
• (1) Post-Sosa and Egbert precedents stripped courts of authority to create any new ATS cause of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress;
• (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory text;
• (3) TVPA's "subjects" covers command responsibility only — not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or physical control of victims.
• Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondents):
• (1) Aiding-and-abetting violations of the law of nations itself violated international law at the Founding — the First Congress built that liability into the ATS;
• (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both statutes support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis;
• (3) Congress chose the broad verb "subjects" over the narrower "commits" to reach secondary actors — legislative history confirms it.

Holding: Federal courts carry no authority to create new causes of action under the ATS, and the TVPA's "subjects" language does not reach those who aided and abetted torture. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Post-Sosa precedents — especially Egbert v. Boule (2022) — establish that creating causes of action belongs exclusively to Congress, eliminating courts' residual ATS common-law authority Sosa described as "slight";
• (2) Central Bank of Denver forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express congressional text, and neither the ATS nor the TVPA supplies it;
• (3) ATS cases categorically raise foreign policy and separation-of-powers concerns that always counsel deference to Congress — no judicial cause of action survives that constraint.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Jackson (concurring in judgment in part / dissenting in part, joined by Kagan): Agreed TVPA's "subjects" excludes aiding-and-abetting but rejected the majority's deployment of Central Bank as a magic-words test; dissented from the ATS holding alongside Justice Sotomayor.
• Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V): Accused the majority of covertly overruling Sosa without stare decisis analysis; argued "subjects" covers corporate complicity in torture; flagged the logical contradiction of preserving the Blackstone three while eliminating all other ATS implied claims.

Implications:

• (1) American companies now face near-zero civil exposure in U.S. courts for knowingly helping foreign governments commit human rights abuses;
• (2) Torture and atrocity victims must pursue accountability through Congress or the political branches — federal courts stepped out;
• (3) Congress must enact express aiding-and-abetting liability before courts reenter this territory.

The Fine Print:

• Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
• Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."

Primary Cases:

• Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain "narrow" authority to recognize new ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step specificity test — authority the majority now declares nonexistent.
• Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability under a federal statute requires Congress to expressly provide for it; statutory silence implies nothing.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioners (Cisco Systems): Kannon K. Shanmugam of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP
• Respondents (Doe I, et al.): Paul L. Hoffman of Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLP
• Amicus Curiae (United States): Curtis E. Gannon of the Department of Justice

Overview:

• Five opinions released June 23rd, 2026 — one day, across immigration, international human rights, foreign sovereign immunity, religious freedom, and property rights.
• Four of five decisions split 6–3: identical conservative majority, identical liberal dissent, four consecutive times.
• The fifth — a Michigan family's $2,241 tax bill and a home sold at auction for $76,008 — drew near-unanimous agreement across ideological lines.
• Every conservative Justice authored a majority; Chief Justice Roberts joined all five without writing one.
• Justice Jackson led all Justices in separate opinion output — three opinions across the five cases.
• This episode breaks down all five decisions: authors, vote splits, key holdings, separate opinions, and real-world consequences.

Blanche, Acting Attorney General versus Lau | No. 25–429

• Border officers need not hold clear and convincing evidence before treating a returning lawful permanent resident as an admission-seeker based on a crime involving moral turpitude.
• 6–3. Justice Thomas authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.
• Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan.
• Second Circuit vacated and remanded.

Cisco Systems, Inc. versus Doe | No. 24–856

• Courts may not create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute; the Torture Victim Protection Act does not cover aiding-and-abetting liability.
• 6–3. Justice Barrett authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.
• Justice Jackson concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Kagan.
• Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V.
• Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Exxon Mobil Corp. versus Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) | No. 24–699

• The Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs need not separately satisfy FSIA exceptions.
• 6–3. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett.
• Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson.
• D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded.

Landor versus Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety | No. 23–1197

• Individual state prison officers may not face personal liability under RLUIPA unless they voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer suits under the statute.
• 6–3. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.
• Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan.
• Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Pung versus Isabella County, Michigan | No. 25–95

• Just compensation following a tax sale equals the auction sale price, not the property's hypothetical fair market value; the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause claim fails.
• Near-unanimous. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, and by Thomas except as to Part II–B.
• Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Gorsuch and Jackson.
• Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Gorsuch except as to footnote 1.
• Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded.

United States v. Hemani | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/02/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026

Overview: A federal law strips gun rights from regular drug users without proof of danger. This case tests how far the Second Amendment's history-and-tradition standard limits Congress's power to disarm marijuana users.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States.
• For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to a marijuana user with no history of violence.

Posture: District court dismissed the indictment; Fifth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (United States): (1) Habitual drunkard laws from the founding era supply a historically analogous tradition for disarming regular drug users; (2) Vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted a similarly dangerous category of people; (3) Section 925(c) offers a constitutional safety valve through individualized relief.
• Respondent (Hemani): (1) The government's historical analogues fail the why-and-how test since habitual drunkard laws targeted only the incapacitated, not regular users; (2) No genuine circuit split warrants review; (3) Section 925(c)'s recent restoration cannot retroactively cure a violation that predates it.

Holding: The government's prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Kagan. Affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) The government's "habitual drunkard" historical analogues targeted only the incapacitated, not regular or even heavy users, undercutting the claimed "why"; (2) Those laws aimed to protect drunkards and the public from idleness or financial ruin, not categorically violent people, further undercutting the "why"; (3) Historical laws required pre-deprivation process, while Section 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with none, failing the "how."

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Thomas (concurring): Thomas joins the majority fully but argues Section 922(g) likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, since prosecutors need only show a firearm once crossed state lines, inviting a future challenge to the statute's constitutional foundation.
• Justice Jackson (concurring, joined by Justice Sotomayor): Jackson joins the majority fully but renews her call to replace the Bruen history-and-tradition test with means-end scrutiny, arguing the current framework cannot meaningfully assess whether a law's burden fits the government's stated justification.
• Justice Alito (concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan): Alito agrees Hemani wins but would rest the decision on narrower ground: the government never proved how much marijuana Hemani used or whether it affected his judgment, unlike incapacitated historical "habitual drunkards."

Implications: (1) Federal prosecutors need more than admitted regular drug use to bring a 922(g)(3) charge; (2) Marijuana users in legal-marijuana states gain real protection from automatic federal gun prosecution; (3) Defense attorneys gain a roadmap for similar challenges, while bans on addicts, intoxicated possessors, and felons stay untouched.

The Fine Print:

• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition."

Primary Cases:

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022): Gun laws must match the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, not just serve a strong government interest.
• United States v. Rahimi (2024): The government need not identify a historical "twin," only a law "relevantly similar" in why and how it operated.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:08] United States Opening Statement

[00:03:09] United States Free for All Questions

[00:26:14] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:00:32] Hemani Opening Statement

[01:02:37] Hemani Free for All Questions

[01:31:01] Hemani Round Robin Questions

[01:50:46] United States Rebuttal

Hunter v. United States | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/03/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026

Overview: A plea deal's appeal waiver collides with a forced-medication sentence, pushing the Supreme Court to decide when courts can void a waiver — reshaping appellate rights for the ninety-five percent of federal defendants who plead guilty.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter.
• For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.

Question Presented: Whether an appeal waiver remains enforceable when enforcing it would create a miscarriage of justice in sentencing.

Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter's appeal under the waiver; Court granted certiorari to resolve a split.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (Hunter): (1) Contract defenses like frustration of purpose render the waiver unenforceable for egregious sentencing errors; (2) the judge's on-record statement granting appeal rights, paired with the prosecutor's silence, voids the waiver; (3) courts must recognize a miscarriage-of-justice exception to prevent egregious, unconstitutional sentencing conditions from escaping all appellate review.
• Respondent (United States): (1) A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver binds the defendant according to its plain terms; (2) only two narrow exceptions ever excuse a waiver — ineffective assistance and an above-maximum sentence; (3) a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception floods appellate courts and undercuts the value of plea bargaining nationwide.

Holding: An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Alito and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) Hunter's claim that the judge's statement and prosecutor's silence voided the waiver fails, since the agreement requires written, signed modifications and the government's chance to enforce the waiver arises only after a notice of appeal; (2) courts retain independent authority over plea waivers, since judges must approve every agreement and appellate courts control enforcement; (3) a miscarriage-of-justice standard, requiring an obvious and egregious error, replaces both the government's absolute-enforcement rule and the Fifth Circuit's narrow two-exception rule.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Traces plea bargaining's coercive growth and catalogues a broader set of miscarriage-of-justice examples, including guideline-calculation errors, while questioning whether prospective appeal waivers can ever satisfy the Constitution's knowing-and-voluntary requirement.
• Justice Kavanaugh (concurring): Joins the majority in full but writes separately to argue Gorsuch's reading sets a lower bar than the majority opinion actually adopts.
• Justice Barrett (concurring): Grounds the new rule in "procedural common law" rather than the Court's disputed supervisory power, offering a doctrinal source distinct from the majority's framing.
• Justice Thomas (dissenting): Dissents alone, arguing the majority cites no genuine source of law for its rule and warns the new standard floods appellate courts with new claims.

Implications:

• (1) Defendants nationwide gain a new, though narrow, path to challenge sentencing errors despite signed appeal waivers;
• (2) defense attorneys and judges must now weigh whether unusual sentencing conditions risk surviving appellate review;
• (3) the Fifth Circuit must decide on remand whether Hunter's forced-medication condition clears the new bar.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment"
• Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A): "[T]he court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision"

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Some baseline of fair procedure survives no matter what a defendant agrees to waive in a plea deal.
• Santobello v. New York (1971): Plea agreements remain subject to judicial oversight and "sound judicial discretion," not just prosecutorial control.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:00] Oral Advocates

[00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:18] Hunter Opening Statement

[00:03:10] Hunter Free for All Questions

[00:27:27] Hunter Round Robin Questions

[00:45:07] United States Opening Statement

[00:46:54] Hunter Free for All Questions

[01:15:22] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:33:51] Hunter Rebuttal

United States v. Hemani | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/02/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026

Interview with Adeel Bashir: Here

Overview: A federal law strips gun rights from regular drug users without proof of danger. This case tests how far the Second Amendment's history-and-tradition standard limits Congress's power to disarm marijuana users.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to a marijuana user with no history of violence.

Posture: District court dismissed the indictment; Fifth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (United States): (1) Habitual drunkard laws from the founding era supply a historically analogous tradition for disarming regular drug users; (2) Vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted a similarly dangerous category of people; (3) Section 925(c) offers a constitutional safety valve through individualized relief.
• Respondent (Hemani): (1) The government's historical analogues fail the why-and-how test since habitual drunkard laws targeted only the incapacitated, not regular users; (2) No genuine circuit split warrants review; (3) Section 925(c)'s recent restoration cannot retroactively cure a violation that predates it.

Holding: The government's prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Kagan. Affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) The government's "habitual drunkard" historical analogues targeted only the incapacitated, not regular or even heavy users, undercutting the claimed "why"; (2) Those laws aimed to protect drunkards and the public from idleness or financial ruin, not categorically violent people, further undercutting the "why"; (3) Historical laws required pre-deprivation process, while Section 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with none, failing the "how."

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Thomas (concurring): Thomas joins the majority fully but argues Section 922(g) likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, since prosecutors need only show a firearm once crossed state lines, inviting a future challenge to the statute's constitutional foundation.
• Justice Jackson (concurring, joined by Justice Sotomayor): Jackson joins the majority fully but renews her call to replace the Bruen history-and-tradition test with means-end scrutiny, arguing the current framework cannot meaningfully assess whether a law's burden fits the government's stated justification.
• Justice Alito (concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan): Alito agrees Hemani wins but would rest the decision on narrower ground: the government never proved how much marijuana Hemani used or whether it affected his judgment, unlike incapacitated historical "habitual drunkards."

Implications: (1) Federal prosecutors need more than admitted regular drug use to bring a 922(g)(3) charge; (2) Marijuana users in legal-marijuana states gain real protection from automatic federal gun prosecution; (3) Defense attorneys gain a roadmap for similar challenges, while bans on addicts, intoxicated possessors, and felons stay untouched.

The Fine Print:

• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition."

Primary Cases:

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022): Gun laws must match the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, not just serve a strong government interest.
• United States v. Rahimi (2024): The government need not identify a historical "twin," only a law "relevantly similar" in why and how it operated.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States.
• For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.

Hunter v. United States | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/03/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026

Overview: A plea deal's appeal waiver collides with a forced-medication sentence, pushing the Supreme Court to decide when courts can void a waiver — reshaping appellate rights for the ninety-five percent of federal defendants who plead guilty.

Question Presented: Whether an appeal waiver remains enforceable when enforcing it would create a miscarriage of justice in sentencing.

Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter's appeal under the waiver; Court granted certiorari to resolve a split.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (Hunter): (1) Contract defenses like frustration of purpose render the waiver unenforceable for egregious sentencing errors; (2) the judge's on-record statement granting appeal rights, paired with the prosecutor's silence, voids the waiver; (3) courts must recognize a miscarriage-of-justice exception to prevent egregious, unconstitutional sentencing conditions from escaping all appellate review.
• Respondent (United States): (1) A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver binds the defendant according to its plain terms; (2) only two narrow exceptions ever excuse a waiver — ineffective assistance and an above-maximum sentence; (3) a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception floods appellate courts and undercuts the value of plea bargaining nationwide.

Holding: An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Alito and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) Hunter's claim that the judge's statement and prosecutor's silence voided the waiver fails, since the agreement requires written, signed modifications and the government's chance to enforce the waiver arises only after a notice of appeal; (2) courts retain independent authority over plea waivers, since judges must approve every agreement and appellate courts control enforcement; (3) a miscarriage-of-justice standard, requiring an obvious and egregious error, replaces both the government's absolute-enforcement rule and the Fifth Circuit's narrow two-exception rule.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Traces plea bargaining's coercive growth and catalogues a broader set of miscarriage-of-justice examples, including guideline-calculation errors, while questioning whether prospective appeal waivers can ever satisfy the Constitution's knowing-and-voluntary requirement.
• Justice Kavanaugh (concurring): Joins the majority in full but writes separately to argue Gorsuch's reading sets a lower bar than the majority opinion actually adopts.
• Justice Barrett (concurring): Grounds the new rule in "procedural common law" rather than the Court's disputed supervisory power, offering a doctrinal source distinct from the majority's framing.
• Justice Thomas (dissenting): Dissents alone, arguing the majority cites no genuine source of law for its rule and warns the new standard floods appellate courts with new claims.

Implications:

• (1) Defendants nationwide gain a new, though narrow, path to challenge sentencing errors despite signed appeal waivers;
• (2) defense attorneys and judges must now weigh whether unusual sentencing conditions risk surviving appellate review;
• (3) the Fifth Circuit must decide on remand whether Hunter's forced-medication condition clears the new bar.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment"
• Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A): "[T]he court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision"

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Some baseline of fair procedure survives no matter what a defendant agrees to waive in a plea deal.
• Santobello v. New York (1971): Plea agreements remain subject to judicial oversight and "sound judicial discretion," not just prosecutorial control.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter.
• For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 18, 2026

Overview: A Maryland woman signed a state-court consent order to secure release from involuntary psychiatric commitment, then challenged that order in federal district court while her state-court appeal remained pending — pushing the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits challenging state-court judgments that remain subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed District Court's dismissal of T.M.'s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of jurisdiction.

Main Arguments:

T.M. (Petitioner):

• (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil's confinement to the procedural circumstances of Rooker and Feldman;
• (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending the doctrine to non-final state-court judgments;
• (3) preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without imposing a blunt jurisdictional bar.

UMD Medical System (Respondent):

• (1) Exxon Mobil's four-element test contains no finality requirement; district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to void state-court judgments regardless of pending state review;
• (2) T.M. satisfies every Rooker-Feldman element — she asked a federal court to declare void a consent order entered ten days before she filed;
• (3) T.M.'s rule spawns parallel duplicative litigation, gamesmanship, and federalism harm that abstention and preclusion fail to prevent.

Holding: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking federal review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) T.M.'s finality theory contradicts precedent — Rooker (1923), Feldman (1983), and Exxon Mobil (2005) all rest on a functional distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction, not on section 1257's finality requirement;
• (2) T.M.'s rule produces arbitrary results and invites gamesmanship — identical plaintiffs with different filing timing reach opposite outcomes;
• (3) abstention and preclusion doctrines don't substitute where a plaintiff directly attacks a state-court judgment as the source of injury.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Thomas concurred in full, writing separately to ground Rooker in constitutional text and Founding history — the power to revise another court's judgment always constituted appellate jurisdiction, and Congress never granted district courts that revising power over state civil judgments.
• Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. The dissent argued Exxon Mobil confined the doctrine to cases filed "after the state proceedings ended," and the majority expanded a doctrinally shaky rule beyond Exxon's mandate.

Implications:

• (1) State-court losers cannot access federal district court while state appeals remain open — they must exhaust state remedies first;
• (2) The core Rooker-Feldman ambiguity — distinguishing judgment attacks from independent federal claims — survives and drives future litigation;
• (3) T.M. retains a stayed Maryland state appeal and may yet petition the Supreme Court if constitutional questions survive.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."
• 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

Primary Cases:

• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman doctrine "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claimed as support.
• Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments — such relief constitutes an exercise of appellate jurisdiction that Congress vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:15] Oral Advocates

[00:01:27] Argument Begins

[00:01:35] T.M. Opening Statement

[00:03:51] T.M. Free for All Questions

[00:27:56] T.M. Round Robin Questions

[00:42:13] UMD Medical Opening Statement

[00:44:01] UMD Medical Free for All Questions

[00:59:41] UMD Medical Round Robin Questions

[00:59:50] T.M. Rebuttal

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 18, 2026

Overview: A Maryland woman signed a state-court consent order to secure release from involuntary psychiatric commitment, then challenged that order in federal district court while her state-court appeal remained pending — pushing the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits challenging state-court judgments that remain subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed District Court's dismissal of T.M.'s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of jurisdiction.

Main Arguments:

T.M. (Petitioner):

• (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil's confinement to the procedural circumstances of Rooker and Feldman;
• (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending the doctrine to non-final state-court judgments;
• (3) preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without imposing a blunt jurisdictional bar.

UMD Medical System (Respondent):

• (1) Exxon Mobil's four-element test contains no finality requirement; district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to void state-court judgments regardless of pending state review;
• (2) T.M. satisfies every Rooker-Feldman element — she asked a federal court to declare void a consent order entered ten days before she filed;
• (3) T.M.'s rule spawns parallel duplicative litigation, gamesmanship, and federalism harm that abstention and preclusion fail to prevent.

Holding: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking federal review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) T.M.'s finality theory contradicts precedent — Rooker (1923), Feldman (1983), and Exxon Mobil (2005) all rest on a functional distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction, not on section 1257's finality requirement;
• (2) T.M.'s rule produces arbitrary results and invites gamesmanship — identical plaintiffs with different filing timing reach opposite outcomes;
• (3) abstention and preclusion doctrines don't substitute where a plaintiff directly attacks a state-court judgment as the source of injury.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Thomas concurred in full, writing separately to ground Rooker in constitutional text and Founding history — the power to revise another court's judgment always constituted appellate jurisdiction, and Congress never granted district courts that revising power over state civil judgments.
• Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. The dissent argued Exxon Mobil confined the doctrine to cases filed "after the state proceedings ended," and the majority expanded a doctrinally shaky rule beyond Exxon's mandate.

Implications:

• (1) State-court losers cannot access federal district court while state appeals remain open — they must exhaust state remedies first;
• (2) The core Rooker-Feldman ambiguity — distinguishing judgment attacks from independent federal claims — survives and drives future litigation;
• (3) T.M. retains a stayed Maryland state appeal and may yet petition the Supreme Court if constitutional questions survive.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."
• 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

Primary Cases:

• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman doctrine "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claimed as support.
• Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments — such relief constitutes an exercise of appellate jurisdiction that Congress vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (T.M.): Elizabeth B. Prelogar of Cooley LLP
• Respondents (University of Maryland Medical System Corporation): Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026

Overview: The Investment Company Act case addresses whether Section 47(b) grants private parties the right to sue for contract rescission, testing the limits of implied private rights of ac

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Abouammo): Tobias Loss-Eaton of Sidley Austin
• Respondent (United States): Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission.

Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (the Funds):
• (1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval;
• (2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;
• (3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right.
• Respondent (Saba):
• (1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties;
• (2) TAMA's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right;
• (3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA.

Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Kagan joining Parts I and II. Reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval;
• (2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;
• (3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports.
• Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA.

Implications:

• (1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer;
• (2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation;
• (3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval's framework further into securities law.

The Fine Print:

• Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter."
• Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock."

Primary Cases:

• Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short.
• Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:12] Argument Begins

[00:01:21] Abouammo Opening Statement

[00:03:30] Abouammo Free for All Questions

[00:26:27] Abouammo Round Robin Questions

[00:33:40] United States Opening Statement

[00:35:54] United States Free for All Questions

[01:04:34] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:13:58] Abouammo Rebuttal

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026

Overview: The Investment Company Act case addresses whether Section 47(b) grants private parties the right to sue for contract rescission, testing the limits of implied private rights of action against a comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (FS Credit) and Respondents (BlackRock): Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
• For United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of FS Credit and BlackRock: Max E. Schulman, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
• For Respondent (Saba): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, VA

Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission.

Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (the Funds):
• (1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval;
• (2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;
• (3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right.
• Respondent (Saba):
• (1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties;
• (2) TAMA's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right;
• (3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA.

Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Kagan joining Parts I and II. Reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval;
• (2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;
• (3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports.
• Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA.

Implications:

• (1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer;
• (2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation;
• (3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval's framework further into securities law.

The Fine Print:

• Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter."
• Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock."

Primary Cases:

• Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short.
• Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:23] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:40] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:19:29] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

[00:30:53] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

[00:32:17] United States Free for All Questions

[00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:46:27] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:48:55] Respondent Free for All Questions

[01:16:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions

[01:16:58] Petitioner Rebuttal