This session happened during Ubucon Sintra 2019 - Sintra - Portugal

»RFC 1984 Or why you should start worrying about encryption backdoors and mass data collection«

RFC 1984 : What are RFCs and why do they matter? What is happening in the world now with mass surveillance? Also peacocks.

In 1996 Brian E. Carpenter of IAB and Fred Baker of IETF wrote a co-statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet. This RFC wasn't a request for a technical standard, it was a statement on their concerns about Governments trying to restrict or interfere with Cryptography. They felt that there was a need to offer "All Internet Users an adequate degree of privacy"

Since that time successive Governments around the world have sought to build backdoors into social media to access more citizen and visitor data. As of July 2019, the AG of the United States William Barr stated: “Some argue that, to achieve at best a slight incremental improvement in security, it is worth imposing a massive cost on society in the form of degraded safety,” i.e For security Americans should accept weakened encryption. The head of the FBI also claimed that weakened encryption wouldn't break it.

In Australia the metadata retention laws have been abused against journalists with 58 searches carried out by the AFP. In 2015 ACT police carried out 115 metadata searches. UK officials have a cavalier attitude to the EU SIS database which tracks undocumented migrants, missing people, stolen cars, or suspected criminals.

IETF Session 105 mentioned privacy and concerns with the mass collection of data. While the IAB and IESG were worried about US export controls on cryptography there is an argument for RFC 1984 to be updated to include the unnecessary mass collection of data and to use it as a term for IT professionals, privacy advocates and the public to rally behind.

I propose a brief history of Governments around the world wanting to weaken encryption as RFC 1984 warned us about.

We live in a time where citizens put data into commercial, healthcare and Government systems to access services, some services are only accessible online. From CCTV to Facebook people have little understanding of why mass collection of data is dangerous. There is little scrutiny of who can access that data, from Scotland to the US.

My fathers is an example of a private man who doesn't use social media because they wanted his cell phone number, but he doesn't mind the CCTV being put up in his street. I want to talk about how open Surveillance is only a small part of the picture when profiling citizens. It still counts as personal data, when combined with metadata and the actual data that people put into social media. Businesses who use CCTV have to put up signs to warn the public they are recording. So called anonymized data still contains identifiers that can tie to individuals.

Let's talk about Ovid and peacocks. Let's explore how to expand the RFC to cover recent developments in Surveillance Capitalism with Governments accessing that data, but not securing it. We need to make it clear weakened encryption, the mass collection and careless retention of data isn't acceptable. We need to update and implement RFC 1984.

Esther Payne

Having worked with all sizes of businesses and across various industries her interest has always been on how to make computing more accessible to the masses. She believes that no matter what your age you can use Linux and free software. She is extremely proud of her father who now runs Linux after she refused to support his windows system anymore. In fact her father regularly installs and manages his own Ubuntu Linux systems proving the accessibility of Linux for all ages. As a user of Kubuntu for 12 years she likes the freedom of Ubuntu and all of it's variant distributions.

She works with hosting and IT support companies as well as interesting Open Source projects. Having been in Open Source for over a decade she believes that anyone can contribute to a project as everyone has a different skill to bring to a project. The more the merrier.

https://twitter.com/onepict

Ubucon Europe 2019 was sponsored by:

Ubuntu - https://ubuntu.com/

ANSOL - https://ansol.org/

MySQL - https://www.mysql.com/

Câmara Municipal de Sintra - https://cm-sintra.pt/

Sunday, August 2, 2020: 10:00 EST. How do we slay the Hydra of mass surveillance?

Originally published on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vX2GXkPpLfI by channel 2600 https://www.youtube.com/@HackerVideo

We live in a time where citizens put data into commercial, health care, and government systems to access services. Some services are only accessible online. From CCTV to Facebook, people have little understanding of why mass collection of data is dangerous. So once we disquiet everyone about this, what do we do next?

In many ways, mass data collection and surveillance devices much like the Lernaean Hydra keep springing back. Public pressure on individuals who championed Google Glass only lasted for so long. We have similar issues with Amazon Ring and to some extent Facebook. How do we get people to consider not buying devices like Amazon Ring? While calling people glassholes was effective, times have changed along with presidents. The world is polarized and we need to reach across the divide to persuade.

How do we engage people outside our tech bubble and encourage them to engage with organizations like the ACLU and help us to put pressure on our elected representatives? How do we cauterize the head of rampant facial recognition technologies and then do the same for the heads of shadow profiles, DNA profiles etc.?

RFC 1984 was explicitly named to reference an Orwellian society that uses mass surveillance. This talk will seek to expand that beyond encryption to the mass collection of data and ask how do we limit this? How do we limit access to this data? How do we stop the nightmare?

While the founders of basecamp may choose to ban politics out of their work chats we can only see this as trying to shut down the conversation for comfort.

https://world.hey.com/jason/changes-at-basecamp-7f32afc5

Or why this will be the introduction to vlogs that aren't stories.

Some days I will rant about tech and people.

Update 28042021 : Open letter from a member of staff that gives more insight.

#consent, #internet, #terrypratchett, #privacy

Our Internet is paid for via surveillance capitalism. Where our consent is only loosely sought.

Our attention is auctioned off as ads using our browsing metadata and more.

As Granny Weatherwax says...

In 1996 Brian E. Carpenter of IAB and Fred Baker of IETF wrote a co-statement on cryptographic technology and the internet. This RFC wasn't a request for a technical standard, it was a statement on their concerns about Governments trying to restrict or interfere with cryptography. They felt that there was a need to offer "All Internet Users an adequate degree of privacy" Since that time successive governments around the world have sought to build back doors into encrypted apps and services to access more citizen and visitor data. As of July 2019, the AG of the United States William Barr stated: “Some argue that, to achieve at best a slight incremental improvement in security, it is worth imposing a massive cost on society in the form of degraded safety,” i.e For security Americans should accept weakened encryption. The head of the FBI also claimed that weakened encryption wouldn't break it. In Australia the metadata retention laws have been abused against journalists with 58 searches carried out by the AFP. In 2015 ACT police carried out 115 metadata searches. UK officials have a cavalier attitude to the EU SIS database which tracks undocumented migrants, missing people, stolen cars, or suspected criminals. IETF Session 105 mentioned privacy and concerns with the mass collection of data. While the IAB and IESG were worried about US export controls on cryptography there is an argument for RFC 1984 to be updated to include the unnecessary mass collection of data and to use it as a term for IT professionals, privacy advocates and the public to rally behind. In this talk let's recount a brief history of governments around the world wanting to weaken encryption as RFC 1984 warned us about. We live in a time where citizens put data into commercial, healthcare and Government systems to access services, some services are only accessible online. From CCTV to Facebook people have little understanding of why mass collection of data is dangerous. There is little scrutiny of who can access that data, from Scotland to the US. Open Surveillance is only a small part of the picture when profiling citizens. It still counts as personal data, when combined with metadata and the actual data that people put into social media and services like ancestor DNA test kits. Businesses who use CCTV have to put up signs to warn the public they are recording. So called anonymized data still contains identifiers that can tie to individuals. Let's talk about Ovid and peacocks. Let's explore how to expand the RFC to cover recent developments in surveillance capitalism with governments accessing that data, but not securing it. We need to make it clear weakened encryption, the mass collection and careless retention of data isn't acceptable. We need to update and implement RFC 1984.

FOSSASIA Summit 2020 - Track: Internet, Society, Community

Speaker: Esther Payne, Librecast Project

Esther Payne

https://lca2020.linux.org.au/schedule/presentation/59/

In 1996 Brian E. Carpenter of IAB and Fred Baker of IETF wrote a co-statement on cryptographic technology and the internet. This RFC wasn't a request for a technical standard, it was a statement on their concerns about Governments trying to restrict or interfere with cryptography. They felt that there was a need to offer "All Internet Users an adequate degree of privacy"

Since that time successive governments around the world have sought to build back doors into encrypted apps and services to access more citizen and visitor data. As of July 2019, the AG of the United States William Barr stated: “Some argue that, to achieve at best a slight incremental improvement in security, it is worth imposing a massive cost on society in the form of degraded safety,” i.e For security Americans should accept weakened encryption. The head of the FBI also claimed that weakened encryption wouldn't break it.

In Australia the metadata retention laws have been abused against journalists with 58 searches carried out by the AFP. In 2015 ACT police carried out 115 metadata searches. UK officials have a cavalier attitude to the EU SIS database which tracks undocumented migrants, missing people, stolen cars, or suspected criminals.

IETF Session 105 mentioned privacy and concerns with the mass collection of data. While the IAB and IESG were worried about US export controls on cryptography there is an argument for RFC 1984 to be updated to include the unnecessary mass collection of data and to use it as a term for IT professionals, privacy advocates and the public to rally behind.

In this talk let's recount a brief history of governments around the world wanting to weaken encryption as RFC 1984 warned us about.

We live in a time where citizens put data into commercial, healthcare and Government systems to access services, some services are only accessible online. From CCTV to Facebook people have little understanding of why mass collection of data is dangerous. There is little scrutiny of who can access that data, from Scotland to the US.

Open Surveillance is only a small part of the picture when profiling citizens. It still counts as personal data, when combined with metadata and the actual data that people put into social media and services like ancestor DNA test kits. Businesses who use CCTV have to put up signs to warn the public they are recording. So called anonymized data still contains identifiers that can tie to individuals.

Let's talk about Ovid and peacocks. Let's explore how to expand the RFC to cover recent developments in surveillance capitalism with governments accessing that data, but not securing it. We need to make it clear weakened encryption, the mass collection and careless retention of data isn't acceptable. We need to update and implement RFC 1984.

linux.conf.au is a conference about the Linux operating system, and all aspects of the thriving ecosystem of Free and Open Source Software that has grown up around it. Run since 1999, in a different Australian or New Zealand city each year, by a team of local volunteers, LCA invites more than 500 people to learn from the people who shape the future of Open Source. For more information on the conference see https://linux.conf.au/

Produced by NDV: https://youtube.com/channel/UCQ7dFBzZGlBvtU2hCecsBBg?sub_confirmation=1

#linux.conf.au #linux #foss #opensource

Fri Jan 17 11:40:00 2020 at Room 5

Social Steganography shows the online harms attack on end to end encryption is pointless.

In her research and book: It's Complicated :the social lives of Networked teens; Danah Boyd mentions Social Steganography.

With the online harms Bill aiming to protect children on-line social Steganography indicates that the proposed changes won't protect vulnerable children. In fact it will reduce their privacy in violation of their humans rights.

Specifically Article 21:

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/08/23/social-steganography-learning-to-hide-in-plain-sight.html

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/15/tweeting-teens-twitter-public-privacy

I don't think it's appropriate for the emergency services to promote the use of W3W to the general public. Nor do I think it's appropriate for them to advertise it. It's also inappropriate for critical applications at the moment.

The initial blog explaining the risks of emergency services using W3W

Article about the legal threats against Aaron Toponce a security researcher.

Public Money Public Code campaign.

Further Reading.

App used by emergency services under scrutiny:

What3Words submitting takedown requests against Tweets:

Post by Terence Eden about What 3 words in 2019