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In lecturing about the state of liberal democracy over the past couple of years, I have been frequently asked whether the authoritarian tide taking place around the world can be stopped, and whether American democracy is strong enough to hold up under the weight of Trumpian authoritarianism.
My answer has been yes, that democratic backsliding is not inevitable, and that American institutions in particular are holding up reasonably well. My degree of measured optimism may well prove wrong, but it is based on several recent events.
A democracy becomes a liberal democracy when popular choice is linked to institutions that prevent the concentration of power in the executive, through a rule of law and a system of institutional checks and balances. In the United States, several of these checks have been weakened under Trump: Congress, which is supposed to jealously guard its privileges, has largely rubber-stamped Trump’s agenda, and parts of the executive branch like the Justice Department have become instruments of the president’s will. Many civil society organizations like corporations, law firms, and universities have sought accommodation with the administration.
There are, however, two critical checking institutions that have remained effective.
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Dan Williams is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sussex. He writes the Conspicuous Cognition newsletter, which brings together philosophical insights and scientific research to examine the forces shaping contemporary society and politics.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Dan Williams discuss whether AI is a genuinely transformative technology or just another tool, how the temptation to outsource thinking to AI may be eroding the cognitive skills of young people, and why the political battles we are actually having about artificial intelligence are not the important ones.
This podcast was recorded at a live event in partnership with Halcyon International School.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Welcome to this live episode of The Good Fight Podcast, coming to you from the Halcyon International School in London. Dan, I think one of the interesting things about artificial intelligence is just that it’s going to transform so many different aspects of our society. As I was preparing for the conversation today, I was wondering what I should ask you about. Should I ask you about existential risk? Should I talk about the socioeconomic impact of this? Should I talk about the thing you’ve thought a lot about, its impact on the public sphere and on misinformation? How do you think about what aspect of artificial intelligence to write about in your work, and how should we prioritize between them, or do we just need to be thinking about all of these impacts all of the time?
Dan Williams: I think we need to be thinking about all of the impacts all of the time. I think we are in the early stages of a huge technological revolution, the magnitude of which will be at least that of the Industrial Revolution, happening in a much shorter timeframe. I think it’s going to impact, as you say, not just the economy, not just the culture, not just our psychologies, not just our educational institutions, but the information environment, our social relations, and also all of the interactions between these different things.
So I think as a subject, it doesn’t really lend itself to hyper-specialized inquiry where you try to bracket off everything else. If you’re looking at the economics of AI, you are inevitably going to start asking questions about the impact of AI on our political institutions, on our political culture, on public opinion. Likewise, if you’re thinking about how AI is going to impact the information environment, the way in which we try to make sense of society, you need to be thinking about the economics of AI and the business models of these frontier AI companies.
I don’t think this is unique to this moment. If you go back to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, precisely because it was this monumental technological revolution that changed every aspect of society in innumerable ways, it was this great era for polymaths, for people that looked not just at narrow, specialized fields, but huge questions straddling lots of different disciplines. I think that’s kind of how you have to approach AI today.
The flip side of that is precisely because these issues are so big and so complicated, and the technology is affecting so many different parts of society all at once, there is enormous uncertainty at almost every level. It’s very difficult, I think, to have any high degree of confidence about how this is going to unfold, which I think is one of the reasons why you see such spectacular levels of disagreement even about relatively basic things.
Mounk: The comparison to the Industrial Revolution is helpful and interesting. I’ve been thinking through that comparison in the context of a different set of work. But in 1800, should people have worried about the urban immiseration that might follow from the Industrial Revolution, at least in its initial stages, before helping the world get a lot richer, the kinds of things that Charles Dickens wrote about, David Copperfield, etc.? Or should they have worried about the possibility that it would revolutionize warfare and make possible the trenches of World War One? The answer is, well, we should have worried about both, and those two things end up being related in some really complicated but real ways.
So in a similar kind of way, you’re probably right that we shouldn’t choose between focusing on this or on that aspect of AI. We should be thinking about all of them at the same time. I do think, though, that there’s a kind of strange way in which some of the fights over AI feel to me like they’re not the most important ones.
The political issue that’s gotten the most traction is whether or not to build data centers. There’s a story to be told where perhaps you’re worried about existential risk, which is to say the possibility that AI might kill us all one day, and if there are fewer data centers, then it’s going to take longer to develop more capable AI models, and perhaps take longer to build robots that are actually capable of taking physical action. So opposing data centers might be a way of somehow lessening existential risk.
But I don’t think that’s what’s driving people. What’s driving people is: I don’t want this thing next to me in my community, which to me feels like it’s the one issue around AI that’s gotten any real political currency, because it can latch onto existing political fights, like whether or not to build housing. It’s just a way for NIMBYism, not-in-my-backyard-ism, to latch on to the issue of AI, and that’s why it’s the one AI issue that’s taken off. Do you share that sense, where the political battles we have about AI are not the important ones, or am I being insufficiently charitable here?
Williams: I completely agree with you. I would say, in some sense, it’s understandable. There is this huge data center build-out, and many people don’t fully understand what motivates it, and it’s led by tech companies that, to put it mildly, are not very popular in many cases. But I do agree with you that in some sense it’s not really grappling with just how significant the relevant changes are going to be.
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I also think it’s a little bit of a shame, in a way, that there’s this polarized conversation where, on the one hand, you’ve got people who think AI is just another technology, a normal technology in some respects, and so you can treat it just as you would any other technology. Then there’s this whole conversation, which we might get to, about AI and existential risk: is it the case that superintelligent, rogue, misaligned artificial intelligence might kill us all?
What I would say is those are not the only two frames. I think what the second frame gets right is it does grapple with just how powerful this technology is. We are in the process of building thinking, understanding, agentic machines that are going to radically transform the world. We shouldn’t be completely dismissive of the worries about misaligned, rogue, superintelligent AI killing us all. I think, for various reasons that we might get into, ultimately the arguments for that scenario are not very persuasive. But even if we avoid that specific scenario and we have aligned superintelligent AI systems, that is, AI systems that are more cognitively capable than human beings, at first disembodied AI systems and then autonomous robots, a world with that technology is going to be radically, radically different from the world as it exists today. There is nothing normal about it. In no respect can you think of that as just another technology. I completely agree with you that the politics of AI at the moment haven’t caught up with that situation.
Mounk: For a little bit of context, there’s a paper that has been very widely discussed in AI circles called AI as Normal Technology by Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor, where they argue that in order to understand how AI is going to roll out, you have to look at previous technologies. It turns out that many of the predictions of the leaders of the AI field, these two authors argue, are really naive, because they don’t understand real-world obstacles to the adoption of technology. You might think that the moment AI is in theory capable of translating any text, publishers are going to use AI to translate those texts. But in practice there are 17 million obstacles to that happening, and practically no publisher has started doing that yet. The same could be true in lots of different fields.
I have two points about that. The first is that there’s a great debate over this paper that was conducted recently via music videos, the song and the animation of which was produced by the new Claude Opus 5.5 model. So you have a great “paper” explaining why the robots are not going to roll out in the real world because of all of these obstacles, and then you have a great response to it called “Thus Spoke Compute,” arguing the opposite. It seems to me that the existence of those two videos is, in a way, proof that AI is not a fully normal technology.
But I take seriously some of the main themes in this paper. The other point I want to make is it doesn’t actually seem to me, if you read the paper carefully, that it’s necessarily at odds with those worries about existential risk. The main point of the paper is about how long it takes for a technology to diffuse into the economy, for existing firms and companies to change how they do their business. All of that might be true at the same time as there’s a real risk of us losing control over superintelligent AI.
I was hesitating a little bit in this conversation about whether we should go from immediate and comparatively small to distant and large, or the other way around. But since there were really interesting remarks by students, for the benefit of the podcast audience, explaining, for example, that they were concerned AI might be eroding their cognitive skills, that the temptation of going to AI whenever a problem gets hard may make it harder for them to really learn and develop the cognitive skills they’re invested in, perhaps let’s start with that. Do you share that worry, and what evidence do we have that AI may be undermining cognitive skills in that kind of way in the younger generation?
Williams: I absolutely share the worry. Before I address it, I’ll just double-click on one thing, which is that I have enormous admiration for Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor, the authors of that AI as Normal Technology paper. I agree with you there’s a lot going on in that general framework that they are outlining and defending, and you don’t have to accept all of it as a package deal. Certainly one of the aspects of it that I think is correct is that to understand how AI is going to affect society, politics, institutions, and so on, you can’t just focus on the raw capabilities of the AI systems. You have to think about how organizations, institutions, culture, incentives, and so on adjust to the technology. I think that’s highly relevant in the context of AI and education.
The cliché thing to say, which I think is true, is that AI is the best technology ever invented for learning and also for avoiding learning. Which of those two outcomes plays out in society won’t be determined just by the technology itself. It will be determined by the degree to which our educational institutions can adapt to this radically new technology. I think it’s fair to say that our educational institutions, whether schools or universities, were not designed, and they didn’t evolve culturally, in a world in which anyone has access to an incredibly smart, understanding, conversational machine. I think it’s completely understandable that our institutions are trying to adjust and think about how they can adapt in light of this new technology.
I think that’s a huge challenge. One of the real significant society-wide challenges with AI is that it’s so good at so many different things that we outsource so much of our cognition, our thinking, our decision-making to the AI systems that those skills really atrophy. I’m not really that worried about this when it comes to adults, because in a liberal society people can make their own choices. But when it comes to children, teenagers going through school, this is potentially a huge crisis. I think we really need to take this very seriously at all levels of society, as an enormous policy challenge.
Just one final thing: I think part of the issue is there’s still a lot of denialism about the technology itself. It’s still the case that lots of academics, lots of intellectuals, I’m sure to some extent it’s true of teachers and people who work in schools as well, aren’t familiar with, don’t understand just how impressive the technology can be.
Mounk: I was an undergrad at Cambridge, I live in Cambridge, and I was just reminded of an old joke about Cambridge: how many Cambridge fellows does it take to change a lightbulb? The answer is: change? That, of course, is not just true in Cambridge but in academia in general. It’s often the academics who most claim to want to change and revolutionize the world who are most resistant to any form of change in their own university or their own workplace. I’ve been astounded by how many professors make excuses to pretend that the assignments that have been assigned for their course for 27 years still work in the age of AI. They say, “AI could never do the assignment for my course. It’s too specific.” It’s like, of course it can.
But let me ask a brief preliminary question. In your teaching, have you found that the quality of students has changed? Are you seeing the signs of a great reading crisis? There are a lot of articles about this, and they all go viral, with people saying, “I used to be able to assign a whole book, and now my students can’t read two and a half pages anymore.” I will spike a football, as we say in the United States, by saying that in my teaching I haven’t found that. I’m very privileged to teach great kids at Johns Hopkins, a very selective university. I don’t find that they’re less capable of doing the reading or less engaged with the material today than they were five or ten years ago. But that’s one kind of anecdotal piece of evidence. Please give us a second one.
Williams: I’ve only been a full-time assistant professor doing lots of lecturing since 2023, which is when generative AI started being rolled out, and many universities still assign take-home essays. I remember saying in 2023, this is absolutely insane, because at the time AI systems were already able to produce relatively high-quality student essays. Now I think it’s the case that frontier AI systems can produce higher-quality academic papers than many actual academics, and we’re still doing take-home papers.
Mounk: Nowadays, the last time that I assigned take-home exams, I said I would never again. When I got a bad paper, I was sort of like, “Nice, the student actually did it themselves.”
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What do you think, how do you think we should redesign the university, and perhaps the school, since we’re in a school here? It strikes me that there are two competing things here. We obviously want to make sure that people are actually reading text. Disagree with me if you think I’m wrong, but we still want people to learn how to write, because even if you can outsource that to LLMs in the future, that to me seems like an absolutely crucial step in learning how to think and reason carefully. At the same time, we also now have available to us individualized one-on-one tutoring in a form that just wasn’t available to everybody in the past. Presumably we want to use that in some kind of way.
I speak pretty good French, but I don’t write French very much, and I realized I’d totally forgotten the rules about when to make a past participle agree with the subject. I recently asked Claude to re-explain the rules to me. The basic rule is quite simple: if it’s with the verb être, “to be,” then it starts to agree with the feminine speaker, for example; if it’s with the word avoir, then it doesn’t. But then there’s a bunch of specialized rules. It started with a simple test, a really simple rule, and then added the more complicated rules. It was just a super-efficient way to learn what I’d learned many years ago but had sort of forgotten.
Clearly that form of one-on-one tutoring is something that can be hugely impactful. But how do we make sure that that doesn’t just turn into “go off and play around with Claude” and we pretend that’s education?
Williams: I think the first step is having assessments, in-class assessments where you can’t use AI for the assessment itself, whether it’s a written exam, an oral exam, or whatever it might be, so that you are rewarding the student for being able to produce the work. Of course, if they want to use AI, as you say, for the process of learning, I think it can be an extraordinary tool for the acceleration of learning. That’s absolutely fine.
At the same time, it just is the case that AI is going to be increasingly embedded into every facet of society. One of the things we need to be thinking about as teachers and educators is how to prepare students to use AI as well as possible. I suspect there needs to be some kind of divide, where you’ve got assessments for core skills where, in the assessment itself, they can’t use AI, and assessments where you actively encourage as much and as savvy a use of AI as possible, something like that. But that’s really the best I can offer. I think it’s a huge question with lots of uncertainty.
Mounk: That’s pretty much what I hit on in my own teaching. Ideally I think that has to happen at the level of the university over the course of a degree. It doesn’t have to happen in every course. But since universities haven’t really adapted to that yet, I have one important element of assessment, a pen-and-paper exam in class, that I’ve never really done before in my teaching career, but that’s the only thing that ensures we’re not using AI to do it. Then I have another element where we either have to write a really ambitious paper for which we’re allowed to use AI, or produce a cool kind of resource. It’s a class on democracy and the rise of populism, and I said, look, you can use every AI tool you want to make a cool video about this, or to make a really informative website, or an app, or some kind of resource. You’re welcome to, and in fact encouraged to, use AI. You’re learning how to use AI tools to communicate some interesting set of ideas. But that’s only part of the grade. The other part is you’re sitting there with pen and paper, and you actually have to make an argument.
But I guess the question goes beyond that, which is: what should learning look like for a 15-year-old? What should learning look like for a 17-year-old? Is it that you have a lot of time, or some time, spent with something like an AI model for basically one-on-one tutoring, where you get really instant feedback, but then at the same time that means you can have a lot more time for really in-depth discussion? Is it project work? The one thing that seems pointless, and perhaps always has been pointless, is what ninety-eight percent of my schooling was like: a teacher standing up front and talking at you for forty-five minutes while you’re half asleep.
Williams: That’s always been difficult to justify as a practice. Speaking personally as a lecturer, it’s great if you’re the lecturer. I’m not so sure it’s so great for the students.
Mounk: The only skill in my life that I’m truly proud of is that I was able to sleep in high school, and teachers would get annoyed with me and say, “Yascha, did you fall asleep?” I’d say no, and they’d say, “What did I just say?” I was always able to repeat the last two sentences to them, verbatim, and it drove them crazy. So if you want to annoy your teachers, this is a skill I recommend developing.
Okay, so let’s go one level up from that. At the beginning there was high hopes about social media. If you go back to all of the writing about social media in the 2000s, and even in the early 2010s, it was all: it’s going to allow the opposition and young people to challenge these dictatorships in the Middle East and other parts of the world; it’s going to take on the rich and the powerful in the United States. Look at the Green Revolution in Iran, look at Occupy Wall Street. There was a lot of celebration of it. Then, obviously, our politics took a bit of a turn, and people started blaming social media for that. What explains the rise of Donald Trump? What explains Brexit? What explains all of these different developments? Well, it’s got to be social media.
So I feel like people are entering the conversation about artificial intelligence with the battle scars of the last set of fights and wars, and they’re assuming that just as social media turned out to be very bad for our public sphere, so too AI is likely to lead to the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation, and we’re going to get even more cynical about the world, and all the bad things are going to happen. You disagree. Why?
Williams: I think if you look at social media and its effect on politics, it’s had two distinctive characteristics. The first is that it’s been a profoundly democratizing technology, in the sense that its most distinctive characteristic is the complete obliteration of establishment gatekeepers. With the internet, and then with social media, anyone with an internet connection and strong opinions can get online and start posting, expressing their opinions, and getting involved in public debates.
You’re right that initially there was a lot of optimism about this. I think a lot of that optimism was, and remains in some way, warranted. This is a genuinely great feature of social media. It’s also had lots of really deleterious consequences, because establishment gatekeeping sounds bad, but it also means some minimal standards of quality control. Once you get rid of that gatekeeping altogether, you get a public sphere where you get the expression of views which have always been popular among the general public but were previously marginalized: highly conspiratorial views, extremely bigoted views, quack science, and so on. Now, as a consequence of the democratizing character of social media, that plays a much bigger role in our politics than it used to. I think that’s closely connected to populism.
The second is the role of engagement-maximizing algorithms. The way these social media platforms recommend content, and keep people scrolling and glued to their screens, is by recommending content that engages people, that grabs their attention, and that often means rewarding, amplifying, sensationalist, divisive, conflict-oriented, generally quite stupid content.
So it’s had these two characteristics: it’s a democratizing technology, for better and for worse, and I think it’s generally dumbed down the state of public discourse. Many people thought you could take that kind of model and just assume that many of the pathologies associated with it, as you mentioned, fake news and misinformation, would just generalize to generative AI and large language models, and it would just be those problems on steroids. I think nothing like that is true. In many ways you should think of large language models as the anti-social-media. Whereas social media has been democratizing, it’s shifted power towards the communication styles, the beliefs of ordinary people. Large language models generally give people accurate, evidence-based, expert-aligned information. Not perfect, there are still problems with hallucinations, and we can talk about bias, but compared to the realistic alternatives, generally much higher-quality, expert-aligned information. Whereas social media, because it has this engagement-maximizing character, tends to amplify this sensationalist, conflict-oriented style of communication, at least at the moment, Gemini, Claude, ChatGPT, even Grok, which is Elon Musk’s large language model, tends toward a pretty dry, respectful, accuracy-oriented style of communication.
At least initially, you might be quite optimistic about that, insofar as it looks like it will, to some degree, correct some of the pathologies associated with social media. In fact, I think what’s going to happen is it’s just going to create a whole new set of both beneficial consequences and dangers, just very different from those we’re used to with social media.
Mounk: I agree with a lot of what you just said. I think, in particular, the assumption that somehow this is a new technology and it’s going to play out in a very similar, parallel way to this older technology is very likely to prove wrong. I also agree with you that, certainly at the moment, if you ask the counterfactual question, what kind of information are you likely to come across on whatever AI chatbot you use, relative to what you’re likely to come across if you open X, or Instagram, or TikTok right now, the relative quality of information you get is going to be a lot better.
At the same time, I guess I’m a little worried that the takes about the nature of social media that people had in 2005 or 2010 were the result of a more optimistic moment, but they’re also the result of what social media looked like at that time. Social media at that time was a lot less toxic than it became fifteen or twenty years later, and it may be that, in a similar way, the way we think about the standard use case of AI today is quite different from what it’s actually going to turn into being ten or fifteen years from now.
Let me start with the following question, to pressure-test it a bit: are people mostly going to get their information from AI chatbots, or are they mostly going to get it still from social media? To what extent are these AI bots actually rivals to social media? Secondarily, what use are some of the most divisive, toxic accounts on social media, what some people call conflict entrepreneurs, going to make of generative AI tools on those forms of social media?
If you assign me two worlds, one in which everybody gets most of their political information from chatting with Claude or ChatGPT, and one where everybody’s spending time on social media, I would agree with you that the first world is likely better. But if you say, no, perhaps sometimes we go to Claude or ChatGPT to ask about things we’re really motivated to find out, like what’s the best restaurant around here, but most people aren’t that interested in politics and don’t seek out political information in this proactive way, they get political information in this pretty passive, ambient way, then they’re still likely to get that on social media in the future. Except that, in the future, perhaps people who want to push force-narratives have much better tools available to them to produce persuasive content, and the ability of social media to hook us may be even bigger. To name one obvious example, not only does Instagram or TikTok now have an even better algorithm to serve you the most addictive possible video out of a universe of existing videos, they can create, on the spot, a new video designed to keep you hooked, in keeping with what kind of video you keep clicking on.
So when you think about how AI might displace social media, I think you’re right. But when you think about how AI may combine with existing social media, the impact may turn out to be a lot less positive.
Williams: You’re completely right that this more pessimistic scenario might unfold. I think the thing to remember is these things are not preordained. I think we have agency, both as individuals, more broadly as a culture, and then also in terms of policy, to try to address this, to maximize the positive consequences of the technology.
Clearly what’s going to happen is that they’re not complete rivals, in the sense that they’re not totally separate technologies. It’s already the case that on social media, LLMs are, to some degree, becoming embedded in different ways. One way is on the platform X, Elon Musk’s X, formerly Twitter: “Grok, is this true?” as a response to what people are saying or posting has become, to some extent, more normalized.
Mounk: As you said, despite some concerns about the nature of Grok, by and large the answers you then see from Grok are pretty well sourced, and they’re often a way of checking things that are exaggerated, untrue, etc. Somebody says, “Is it actually true?” and Grok says, “No, that’s not really true, that’s taken out of context.”
Williams: Exactly. You can think about more innovative ways of automating fact-checks with AIs. I also think, when we’re talking about potential threats of AI, it’s really important not just to focus on the negative use cases. You’re right, in a sense it can significantly automate the creation of propaganda, but it can also be used as a way of critically evaluating the kind of communication you’re coming across online. As that becomes normalized, provided these tools do give broadly reliable information, as I think they currently do, not perfect but compared to realistic alternatives, then content creators, even the very biased ones, will learn that they’re in a world where anyone can very quickly fire up their chatbot and critically evaluate or fact-check what they’re saying. So it creates this whole new set of incentives.
I think it’s also a very interesting question how trust in these chatbots is going to develop over time. You might hope, and many people have hoped, that ordinary people would place more trust in experts. This is obviously a huge political issue over the past ten or fifteen years, a very polarized one, with expertise itself becoming enmeshed in these broader political conflicts and culture wars. But expertise, up until about five minutes ago, has always existed in human form. Now we have these strange machine intelligences that seem at least capable of giving access to expert-aligned information, and that, at least in principle, needn’t have the kinds of biases and tribal identities that human beings tend to cling to.
Moreover, they’re not just going to be giving people information in the context of politics. People are using chatbots for all kinds of things: for medical advice, for fashion advice, to navigate bureaucracies, to get tips on how to cope with their relationships, and so on. To the extent that they’re building up trust in this source of information across all of these other domains, I think it will be quite natural to assume you can also trust them when it comes to politics as well. Provided the current situation continues into the future, and that’s a big if, that could be quite a positive, optimistic story.
Mounk: Let me push back on that a little bit. I’m trying to think through how that is going to look, and whether people really are going to be willing to outsource judgment in some ways to these AI models and perceive them as in some way neutral. In certain contexts I think that’s right: “is this true, Grok” is something that really does happen on social media, and I think by and large it has positive effects. But you might have two reasons why that might not be the case.
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One is that there are real fears, on both sides of the political spectrum, that AI bots are systematically going to be politically biased. In one of the first papers that really sounded the alarm about the impact of AI in various ways, a set of authors argued a number of things, including the idea that these are just “stochastic parrots” and not going to be very capable, an idea that has become a kind of meme in the discussion. They were also saying, look, the kind of texts these models are trained on are very Western, very male-dominated, perhaps politically aligned with capitalism, and so all these models are going to be discriminatory against minorities, against women, and so on. Interestingly, the best evidence we have so far, and you can expand on this, you know the literature as well as I do, perhaps better, seems to suggest that’s not the case.
For example, if you force virtually any AI model to make a choice in a pairwise comparison between two states of the world, you can say, imagine a world where one white person is killed, or imagine a world where two Asian people are killed, or whatever it is, or the other way around, or you say one each, there are different ways of setting up the comparison. The point is that it actually ends up favoring the non-white lives over the white lives. This is a very consistent finding across different kinds of models. You can also ask general political questions, what kind of policy response do you think is right to the debt crisis, or something like that, and it tends to give very consistently center-left answers. So you could have a world in which actually both sides of the political spectrum feel that the AIs are biased against them, even if that’s not true, which I think you often get in moments of censorship: everybody feels like my side is being censored but the other side isn’t, which I think is one of the problems with a regime of censorship.
But the other point is that there are, I think, real questions about where this political bias comes from. My assumption was that it tends to take center-left positions, roughly what my own set of positions happens to be, because when you want really high-quality text on which to train these models, a lot of it ends up having a slight center-left bias, because that’s the nature of a lot of journalism. There’s a reason why you’d want to train an AI model on the archive of The New York Times, but The New York Times happens to have a slight center-left lean.
Interestingly, I spoke to a very senior Silicon Valley figure a week ago who is adamant that he believes that’s not the case, that actually it’s all post-training. It’s not the selection of texts on which you train the AIs; it’s that once you’ve done all of that and you have a kind of raw version of the model, you have the AI give you a bunch of outputs, and you have a bunch of humans who rate the output. The reason for that is to make sure it doesn’t go off the rails and do immoral things, or swear at the user, or use terms that would be inappropriate. The problem is that all the people who’ve been recruited to do this are graduate students in the United States, they’re the smart people you can pay a relatively low sum of money to do this, and they, of course, are all left-leaning. Isn’t all of that going to get just as politicized as the old set of experts?
Williams: I think there remains a lot of uncertainty about exactly why it is that the outputs of large language models are as they are. I think there is expert disagreement about which aspects of the training process, whether it’s pre-training on specific kinds of datasets, whether it’s specific kinds of post-training for helpfulness and honesty, can be biased in the ways that you suggest. I think there’s still a lot of uncertainty about where to assign responsibility for different factors.
I also think this issue of bias is quite complicated. John Burn-Murdoch in the Financial Times did an analysis, and what it seemed to show is that ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude had something of a center-left bias, Grok had something of a center-right bias, but overall they’re producing expert, accuracy-oriented information that has a net depolarizing effect, whether it’s on the center-left or the center-right. I think it’s very difficult to know exactly how these things are going to evolve over time.
Where I agree is that this is going to become a huge issue. As it becomes clearer that large language models are having an effect on public opinion, albeit one that’s quite difficult to unambiguously detect in specific cases, then it’s going to become a big political issue exactly what kind of content these systems are producing. I have a suspicion that it’s much more difficult to make these models exhibit certain kinds of biases than people think. I think it’s strongly in the interests of these companies, at least at the moment, to train their models in such a way that they place a really strong, high value on honesty and accuracy. If you try, for example, for commercial reasons or for more propagandistic reasons, to bias their output and behavior in some domains without it spilling over into other domains, I think it’s going to be very, very hard, given the way these systems get trained.
To make that concrete, if you’re trying to create a system that’s incredibly useful and competent when it comes to natural scientific questions, medical advice, business advice, legal advice, but then carve out an exception when it comes to politics and make it systematically biased in that domain, I think given the way the technology is currently designed, that’s just technically very, very difficult. It’s precisely for that reason that I think otherwise very different companies are converging on systems that, broadly speaking, are pretty accurate.
I’ll also just say one final thing, which is that there’s a way in which a certain kind of bias might be regrettable but needn’t necessarily undermine trust among a diverse audience. In the United Kingdom, people are constantly aggrieved or angry with the BBC and the biases it allegedly exhibits. Of course, it’s a human institution dealing with very complex issues. I’m sure there are countless biases, and the left is often right to point out right-wing biases, and vice versa. Yet I think, in general, people across the ideological spectrum can often have quite a high degree of trust in the kind of narrow factual reporting the BBC does, especially when you compare it with fringe, hyperpartisan, conspiratorial content online. So I think when it comes to large language models, this question of the precise ideological valence they exhibit is interesting, and I think it will be politicized. But in terms of the immediate impact at the moment, just the fact that they do tend to provide accurate information is something really salient and worth remembering.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Dan discuss the meaning of intelligence in the age of AI, existential risk, and the impact of the Hugging Face incident. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
With the partial exception of the presidential campaigns that Eugene V. Debs and Norman Thomas waged in the early 20th century, socialism has been a marginal force in American politics. By the turn of the 21st century, the ideology seemed definitively dead, discredited by the failures of its totalitarian variant in the Soviet Union and its democratic one in postwar Britain.
Yet, now, socialism is resurgent. Last month, a Gallup poll showed that 43 percent of American voters see socialism favorably—an all-time high. Among 18–34-year-olds, the figure is 57 percent. Seven candidates backed by the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) won congressional primaries and are highly likely to win election as Democrats on November 3. Two others finished in the top two spots under California’s nonpartisan primary system and face moderate Democratic incumbents in the general election. Zohran Mamdani, of course, was elected mayor of New York last year, and could be joined by Janeese Lewis George in Washington, D.C. and Nithya Raman in Los Angeles.
Why is socialism having a moment in the United States? And why now?
Some answers can be found—paradoxically enough—in a book titled Why is There No Socialism In the United States?, first published in Germany in 1906. The author, German political economist Werner Sombart, gave a nuanced account of why America’s version of democratic capitalism enjoyed far more public support than socialism. And a Sombart-style analysis, applied to today’s situation, can also help explain why socialism is starting to turn the tables.
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Sombart was not trying to understand why there was no socialist system in the United States; that would have been absurd since in his era no country yet claimed to be socialist. Rather, the issue for him was the United States’ lack of a substantial socialist party like Germany’s Social Democrats and the other European members of the Second International.
Strongly influenced by Marxism, Sombart found this anomalous. According to Marx, class conflict should intensify as capitalism advanced, producing a proletarian socialist movement. But this hadn’t happened in the United States, even though “nowhere on earth have the economic system and the essence of capitalism reached as full a development as in the United States.” Ergo, he acknowledged, “The doctrine of the inevitable socialist future is refuted by the facts.”
Sombart’s search for the truth led him to study American political culture and social mores, somewhat in the manner of Alexis de Tocqueville. Sombart was also a colleague of Max Weber, whose work on the Protestant “spirit of capitalism” he contested but admired. The two professors made extensive tours of the United States in 1904. Sombart conducted a sophisticated examination of the U.S. political system and an exhaustive comparative analysis of working-class living standards in the United States and Germany.
What struck him first and foremost was American workers’ generally favorable attitude toward markets and money-making, based on their origins as self-selected, fortune-seeking immigrants. They were indeed infused with a capitalist spirit. And, to a degree that truly impressed Sombart, this attitude had a basis in reality. With statistical data that covered page after page of his book, he showed that the American proletariat was better fed, housed, and clothed than the German one. “All socialist utopias come to nothing on roast beef and apple pie,” he observed.
Like Tocqueville, Sombart took note of the relative social equality among the classes in America. Despite income inequality, he wrote, the worker “carries his head high.” Social mobility was also much greater than in Europe, enhanced by the option of seeking a better life in a new town or in the still thinly-populated West.
Perhaps most important of all, workers had had the franchise (for white men) since the Jacksonian era. Elections for a myriad of local, state, and federal offices occupied their time and attention, with political participation channeled through the two parties, each of which operated as a “machine” for choosing candidates, gathering votes, and distributing patronage. A two-party system created disincentives for workers to start or join a new socialist party—especially since, as Sombart put it, both Democrats and Republicans “have a strongly populist streak in their characters.”
The upshot was that American workers felt no class consciousness as Marx had predicted, but rather a sense of inclusion and, indeed, patriotism. In their eyes, the political and economic system seemed legitimate. And while a legitimate system can always be reformed, it does not call for a radical overhaul such as the one socialists propose. “Among American workers one finds none of the opposition to the state that is to be found in continental European socialism,” Sombart wrote.
Sombart’s analysis has its problems. His generalizations about working-class life in the United States were sweeping and idealized. He underestimated such episodes of intense class conflict as the Pullman Strike of 1894. Jim Crow and white supremacy created obvious obstacles to working-class solidarity in America, but Sombart paid little attention to them. At a time when mostly black sharecroppers toiled across the rural South, he wrote that “there is no half or wholly feudal peasantry.” Indeed, his only mention of race was to rebut the argument that America had no socialism because “the so-called Anglo-Saxon race” was “by nature” resistant to it.
Nevertheless, Sombart deserves credit for rejecting economic determinism in light of contrary evidence. His broad argument—that radical ideologies cannot flourish in a society whose political and economic institutions enjoy wide public acceptance—seems both true and applicable to our time.
The America Sombart visited was still a new nation, upbeat and unburdened by the history that weighed upon Europe and bred dissatisfaction with its venerable monarchies and parliaments. Today, however, the U.S. political-economic model is 120 years older and showing its age. Buffeted by a series of crises and shocks—the Iraq War, the 2008-2009 Great Recession, the pandemic, Black Lives Matter protests, inflation, a border crisis—Americans are losing faith in established political and economic institutions, and entertaining formerly taboo ideas of all stripes.
The percentage of Americans who trust the federal government to do what is right all or most of the time has fallen from 77 percent in 1964 to 17 percent in 2025. The figure has not exceeded 30 percent in two decades. Meanwhile, 70 percent of those who responded to a YouGov poll on the “American Dream” earlier this year said that it’s harder to achieve today than it was for their parents.
What about the patriotism that so impressed Sombart? An NBC poll recently found that 33 percent of Americans feel “extremely proud,” down from 55 percent a quarter century ago—and a record low.
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Against this backdrop, socialism’s rise on the left is of a piece with the rise of Donald Trump and the MAGA movement on the right. Trump’s hostile takeover of the Republican Party showed that the two parties no longer perform the gatekeeping function over ideas and candidates that Sombart had identified as a key source of America’s political stability. The GOP and the Democrats are anything but the tightly-controlled “machines” Sombart observed. It’s still true that third parties are unlikely to prosper—but like MAGA before it, the DSA is attempting to capture the Democrats from within by winning primary elections, an alternative route to establishing a socialist party that Sombart did not envision.
Notably, the ideologues, candidates, and voters executing this maneuver are generally not from the working class. Rather, they tend to be recent college graduates, journalists, professionals, artists, or teachers. Los Angeles mayoral candidate Nithya Raman has degrees from Harvard and MIT and worked for social justice-oriented nonprofits before winning a seat on the city council. Melat Kiros, the Democratic nominee for the House in Colorado’s 1st congressional district, is 29 years old and has spent most of her adulthood pursuing a law degree and a doctorate in public affairs.
Indeed, Sombart’s greatest error might have been to assume that a socialist party would emerge from proletarian ranks at all. He should have known better, since some founders of Germany’s Social Democratic Party came from the middle class and intelligentsia. If anything, the working class in the United States favors Trump’s brand of right-wing populism.
After the publication of Why is There No Socialism In the United States? Sombart became increasingly disenchanted with Marxist theory, lost his belief in the proletariat’s revolutionary potential and—unfortunately—moved steadily toward the nationalist and anti-Semitic right. Though he never joined the Nazi Party, Sombart sympathized with the Hitler regime and cooperated with it until his death in 1941. This may explain why his books are no longer widely read.
Nevertheless, Sombart’s book bears revisiting in our current moment. In a cryptic passage on its last page, Sombart predicted that the conditions that had inhibited socialism in the United States were “about to disappear or to be converted into their opposite.” This, he said, would trigger socialism’s “greatest possible expansion” in the next generation. He promised to explain why in a forthcoming “thorough analysis of the whole state of American political and social life.”
Sombart never actually produced such a book, leaving us with the task of understanding why his prophecy might be coming true, albeit somewhat later than he expected.
Charles Lane, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
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Less than three weeks ago, I set out five scenarios for Israel’s election and argued that the most likely outcome was a stalemate between the pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs.
Well, it’s a stalemate all right, but one with a twist. With practically all of the ballots now counted, the pro-Bibi camp has 53 Knesset seats—down 15 seats from the current Netanyahu coalition government, and eight short of an outright majority—whereas the Jewish anti-Netanyahu “Change Bloc” managed only an anemic 48. The remaining 19 seats were swept up by the two majority-Arab parties—the Joint List, with 11, and Ra’am, with eight. A substantial third bloc, an Arab Israeli bloc, is perhaps the most significant development to have emerged from the election.
To the credit of Israeli democracy, Tuesday’s election went ahead without significant disruption—the fruit of months of careful planning by the country’s independent Central Elections Committee. Nationally, voter turnout was 78%, the highest in an Israeli election since 1999. The unprecedented surge of Arab-Israeli voter participation (a historic 80% turnout) is especially significant given pre-election fears of attempted voter suppression. This degree of democratic engagement on the part of Israel’s Arab minority represents an unequivocal desire for, and expectation of, inclusion in government that the rest of Israeli society would be wise to listen to and would ignore at its peril.
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The election—the first after the four most traumatic years in the country’s modern history—was essentially a referendum on Israel’s core identity, foundational values, and basic functionality as a state. The robustness of its process notwithstanding, its results revealed a broadly troubling picture: The Jewish State is torn, divided against itself, and seemingly unable to come together even in the face of grievous threats to its very existence; threats that Israelis, cocooned in their respective echo chambers, can no longer collectively identify, let alone unite against.
The self-mutilation of Israel’s checks and balances; deteriorating governance; the worst security debacle in eight decades of independent statehood; the refusal to establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate that debacle; unresolved wars on multiple fronts; suspicions that Netanyahu’s closest aides received thousands from Qatar; soaring cost of living and criminality; mounting international isolation; and the clear and present danger of crippling sanctions—nothing moved the needle. Each tribe voted its identity regardless of government performance.
Given the failure of the Change Bloc to win, it would be tempting to view its leader, the 66-year-old Gadi Eizenkot, as yet another hit-and-run victim twitching on the roadside of the Bibi Autobahn. This would be a mistake—or at least premature. Because it is Eizenkot and his partners’ conduct that will determine Israel’s political path over the coming weeks.
The press will spend the next few days doing what Netanyahu wants most right now, which is to shine the spotlight—adoringly or in seething hatred, it makes no real difference—on Netanyahu himself. Bibi is the most consequential Israeli politician of his generation, but he’s also, for now, the least interesting. The outcome of this election remains wide open and, unlike Eizenkot’s, Netanyahu’s options are crystal clear.
For Netanyahu, stalemate is as good an outcome as he could have realistically hoped for—a win on points in which he remains in the prime minister’s seat and controls the security (and therefore the political) agenda. Netanyahu’s plan is simple: to deny his opponents a functioning government until conditions are ripe to drag Israel to another election. Although he avoided losing Tuesday’s ballot and secured his party, Likud, as the largest single party, Netanyahu knows he will fall short next week, when Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, summons the leaders of all the parties that made it into the Knesset and asks whom they recommend he should task with trying to form a new government.
Netanyahu will therefore focus on perpetuating the deadlock, preventing defections from his camp, and delegitimizing his opponents. He will try to make it impossible for Eizenkot to rely on Arab Israeli support, while seeking to poach any party or individual politician he can to his own camp. Concurrently, Netanyahu is actively seeking to generate another Trump-backed showdown with Iran that he believes will reshuffle the political deck in his favor by either toppling (or at least further destabilizing) the Iranian regime—or, if things get hairy, forcing one or more parties in Eizenkot’s camp to jump ship in the face of a security emergency and in the name of national unity.
So what will the anti-Netanyahu camp do next? Eizenkot could choose to get ahead of Netanyahu and set the agenda of the coalition negotiations that will now open in Jerusalem. He can do that by calling upon President Trump to bang heads together and compel Bibi to join a broad centrist government that would exclude hardline right-wingers from the ultra-Orthodox and ultranationalist parties.
The electoral arithmetic would support this pathway: national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s party gained only seven Knesset seats, and finance minister Bezalel Smotrich’s gained only six. The two ultra-Orthodox parties, meanwhile, obtained only six and seven seats. President Trump wants a government without Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, whom his circle rightly sees as the drivers of the settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. Having actively solicited Trump’s involvement in the campaign, Netanyahu wouldn’t dare tell Trump not to interfere in Israel’s internal affairs if the U.S. president insists on excluding these figures.
But a pathway to building a new Israeli center wouldn’t have to rely on Netanyahu at all. It is the one Netanyahu believes is unthinkable and has devoted his campaign to making impossible precisely because he fears it so much. The Eizenkot bloc is smaller than Netanyahu’s only if it insists on refusing to accept Arab Israelis as legitimate political interlocutors. Once that barrier is removed, the parties that oppose Netanyahu command 67 Knesset seats—a clear and substantial majority.
In line with the Alice in Wonderland ambience of contemporary Israeli politics, we are now in a reality in which Netanyahu’s bloc is larger but does not have the majority needed to command the legislature or form a government, while Eizenkot’s camp is smaller but can command the legislature and even form a minority government. How can that be? Because the unprecedented surge in Arab voter turnout in Tuesday’s election means that, with the Arab parties, the incoming Knesset has an anti-Netanyahu majority that can begin to legislate immediately, even before a government is formed.
The leaders of the country’s Arab-majority parties will do everything in their (now substantial) power to deny Netanyahu a majority. Mansour Abbas, who leads the Ra’am party, has declared his desire to join a Change Bloc government. The more intransigent Yousef Jabareen, leader of the Joint List alliance of three smaller parties, says he is only prepared to offer conditional outside support. One option for Eizenkot is to have Ra’am join the Change Bloc coalition government and the Joint List support it from outside. Such a minority government would be inherently fragile, and likely short-lived, but it would still be able to take critical steps to roll back Netanyahu’s agenda.
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A minority government could, for example, replace the Speaker of the Knesset and the chairs of powerful Knesset committees, and legislate a number of crucial bills—including one to establish a State Commission of Inquiry into the October 7 debacle, one to impose term limits on future prime ministers, and one to prevent politicians under criminal indictment from serving in public office.
Arab Israelis constitute 21% of Israel’s population, their youth is increasingly demanding full membership in a shared Israeliness, and their level of engagement in this election means that, unless the Jews put aside their differences, neither bloc has the numbers to form a viable government without the Arabs.
Netanyahu has built his electoral strategy on convincing Jewish Israelis that their fellow Israeli Arab citizens are a permanent threat to be excluded from the polity they share and are integral to. He has tried to paint Arab Israelis as “anti-Zionists” while coddling ultra-Orthodox Jews who spurn military service and disavow the laws of the Knesset.
But building a shared society for all Israelis is a Zionist endeavor par excellence. On election night Eizenkot declared that “the era of us and them is over.” Over the next few weeks—in the face of tremendous political pressures and a possible war with Iran—Eizenkot will have to decide whether his message of unity was for Jews alone, or for all of Israel.
Amichai Magen is the founding director of the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.
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On Friday, September 4, her 1,413th day at Palazzo Chigi, Giorgia Meloni became Italy’s longest consecutively serving prime minister since 1946. Given the habits of Italian politics, this is a remarkable achievement in its own right—and all the more surprising given how Meloni came to power. Her vision for Italy rested on disruptive, unworkable proposals that could have jeopardized Italy’s continued membership in the EU and the Euro. Everything suggested that the government she formed in October 2022 would prove as fragile and short-lived as so many before it. Instead, Meloni is celebrating her record with pomp and circumstance, and, with the parliament’s approval of a new electoral law nicknamed the Melonellum, her hold on power could extend even further.
Two years ago, when Meloni voted against Ursula von der Leyen’s reelection as president of the European Commission, the question was whether her carefully crafted image of a pragmatic leader would yield to that of a stubborn Euroskeptic doing the far right’s bidding for a lesser EU. The answer, four years into her premiership, is stranger and rather more deflating than either possibility. Meloni has remade neither Europe nor Italy. Instead, she has just lasted.
Several factors explain this outcome. First, due to a mix of political ineptitude, muddled thinking, and personal rivalries, Italy’s center-left political parties went into the 2022 election split three ways: the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico), the Greens and Left Alliance, and +Europa on one side; the “Third Pole” alliance between centrists led by Matteo Renzi and Carlo Calenda on the other; while the Five Star Movement ran on its own. Meloni won 26 percent of the vote for Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), and just around 44 percent of the right-wing coalition. The fragmentation of the center-left, however, allowed her to make the most of the electoral law’s rules and maximize her success in terms of parliamentary seats.
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The numbers behind the electoral results cannot be overstated, especially given the longevity of the Meloni government. Italy’s governments rise and fall depending on whether the legislature gives or withdraws its confidence in the government. However, to change a government, or even just to threaten its stability, there has to be a plausible alternative majority to the one in office. Since October 2022, there has not been one in Italy for two reasons. On the one hand, the electoral performance of Fratelli d’Italia, and of the right more generally, had been so sweeping that even imagining a different parliamentary configuration remained out of the question. On the other hand, over the last four years the center-left has not managed to present itself as a credible governing alternative. Fragmented, quarrelsome, and lacking a shared platform, the left wing parties have not offered a solid prospect at the national level, despite some important victories at the local level.
Meloni has also been skillful at keeping disagreements within her coalition from boiling over, granting Deputy Prime Ministers Matteo Salvini and Antonio Tajani small victories here and there, and mediating whenever tensions between them ran too high. She has also benefitted from the fact that neither Salvini nor Tajani could afford to challenge her leadership due to the need to manage their respective parties’ growing troubles and weaknesses. Nor could they attempt risky moves that would have toppled Meloni’s government, as the parliamentary arithmetic did not allow it. An ideal situation for any Italian prime minister.
Equally relevant, Meloni abandoned her long-held conviction that leaving the EU and the Euro would be beneficial for Italy. The idea of leaving the Euro was disavowed almost immediately after Meloni became prime minister, while her previous belligerent pronouncements against the EU were replaced by a subtle effort to build a working relationship with Ursula von der Leyen. Her hostility to austerity and compliance with EU budget constraints has also quietly dissipated, meaning that the very principles Meloni had bitterly and relentlessly opposed for years have become the cornerstone of her government’s economic policy. As a result, Italy’s fiscal credibility has improved as budget restraint brought the deficit to roughly 3.1 percent. This is in spite of the public debt-to-GDP ratio remaining among the highest in the EU, projected at 138.5% to 138.9% by the end of 2026.
Likewise, Meloni’s openly stated sympathies for Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship in Syria and Vladimir Putin’s Russia gave way to a gregarious cooperation with the United States, even during the Biden administration.
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An earnest review of the performance of the Meloni government suggests that its historical longevity is a matter of survival rather than accomplishment. Or, in the words of Tito Boeri: “This government has primarily sought to survive by doing as little as possible.”
Growth and investment is where the Meloni government has nothing to show. ISTAT data show that between 2023 and 2026, industrial production declined and, according to the OECD and the International Monetary Fund, Italy’s growth, forecasted at 0.9 percent for 2026, remains one of the weakest in the EU. Further, between 2021 and 2026, Italy received the lion’s share of the EU Recovery and Resilience funds, yet the Meloni government did not succeed in leveraging them to stimulate long-term growth beyond limited success in controlling Italy’s debt. Opposition leaders have highlighted Meloni’s decision to settle for small reforms rather than tackling structural economic issues.
The government’s ambitious institutional reform agenda fared no better, either having stalled or failed. The premierato, Meloni’s flagship reform for the direct election of the prime minister, was abandoned after its first approval in the Senate. While Meloni did not offer any explanation for this choice, the opposition has suggested that seeking approval of the parliament’s lower chamber would have been an expensive political gamble. The Autonomia Differenziata reform, which would have allowed regions to negotiate greater administrative and legislative powers from the central government in policy areas such as infrastructure, environment, health, and education, was also dropped after the Constitutional Court largely gutted the original proposal. Finally, 53 percent of voters rejected the reforms separating the career tracks for judges and prosecutors in last March’s confirmatory referendum.
Notably, Meloni accepted these defeats and stated that the government would keep working on the issues. In doing so, she avoided repeating her predecessor Matteo Renzi’s mistake. In 2016, he staked his premiership on a constitutional referendum for his own institutional reforms. When 59 percent of the voters rejected them, the defeat became his own; he had no choice but to resign. Meloni, meanwhile, kept her office separate from the fate of her reforms, thus ensuring that any failure would remain a political setback rather than a personal one.
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Migration is one of the areas where Meloni’s record is contested. While, between 2022 and 2025, illegal migrants’ arrivals fell 29 percent and repatriations rose 52 percent, agreements with Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, as well as the Italy-Albania migration protocol, have proven operationally disappointing and, to date, remain tangled in court without a clear timeline for final resolution. Meloni claims that her government’s migration policies have moved the EU closer to what Italy’s political right wants. However, while the EU’s “New Pact on Migration and Asylum” took effect on June 12, 2026, the legislative process began in September 2020, long before Meloni was in a position to influence the process in any significant way. In fact, by the time Meloni became prime minister, the negotiations were already going in a direction she could accept. When it comes to migration policies, Meloni’s most durable accomplishment may lie elsewhere at the EU level, specifically in von der Leyen’s endorsement of the Italy-Albania model and support for return hubs outside the EU, as well as the fact that Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands are beginning to explore similar arrangements.
Civil liberties are where the Meloni government faces the sharpest criticism. In the Reporters Without Borders Index, Italy fell from 45th to 49th place in 2025, and from 49th to 56th in 2026, a particularly poor rating considering that the majority of EU countries rank in the top thirty. RWB points to loss of journalistic independence, unprecedented political pressure against journalists and media outlets, and censorship at RAI, Italy’s national public broadcaster. These are combined with strategic lawsuits against public participation—often filed by Meloni herself to counter or silence criticism against her government—and deliberate efforts to block the distribution of media content by local and national authorities. Further, for the second year in a row, a Liberties report has included Italy in the notorious group of rule of law dismantlers—“governments that consistently and intentionally weaken the rule of law across most areas.” Meloni’s supporters dismiss such criticism on the basis of the traditional dynamics of Italian majoritarian politics as well as lottizzazione, a historically established practice where control of RAI and other agencies is divided among political parties as spoils.
In April 2025, the Meloni government approved Executive Decree Law 48/2025, a criminal justice reform package almost identical to an earlier judicial reform bill the government had watched languish in parliament, which was also heavily criticized by legal experts, magistrates, and representatives of the police. Then, in February 2026, Executive Decree 54/2026 followed to introduce additional measures to strengthen public order and security. While Meloni presented the reform package as a necessary step to protect Italians, her decision to bypass a parliamentary debate and adequate consultations has been heavily criticized domestically and internationally. Democratic Party senator Francesco Boccia told reporters, “We challenge a government that wants to imprison children, students who strike and protesters outside factories.” Likewise, Michael O’Flaherty, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, asked the Italian Parliament not to approve the criminal justice reform package and said: “The rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, are a cornerstone of democratic society. The bill, if adopted, would not only violate such fundamental freedoms, but would be contrary to the principles of the rule of law.”
Four years ago, the question was whether Meloni could be trusted at home as much as she seemed to be trusted abroad. Her governing record suggests a negative answer. The longevity of her government has been achieved by giving up most of what she was elected for. Her agenda of Faith, Family, and Nation survives in the content of her legislative agenda, especially the security decrees, her off-the-cuff remarks, which betray the fact that she never stopped seeing herself as leader of the Italian right rather than the prime minister of Italy, and the political acrobatics she performs to avoid dissent internal to her coalition from boiling over. In July 2025, to convey the challenges of governing Italy, Meloni stated that “every day for me is a parachute jump.” Undoubtedly, she hopes to be rewarded for the effort and energy she puts in navigating such challenges, as she has already announced that she is ready to run again.
What remains to be seen is what she would do with her longevity, should a second term ever free her from merely lasting.
Giovanna Maria Dora Dore is an Associate Professor with the Krieger School of Arts and Sciences of the Johns Hopkins University.
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In 2016, as an undergraduate, I had the opportunity to leave my native Kentucky and serve for two or so months as an intern with the Canadian Parliament. My internship coincided with the early years of Justin Trudeau’s government—when the young, handsome prime minister still charmed the whole world. While in Canada, I developed an immense respect for the many dedicated public servants I encountered, but I became increasingly wary of Trudeau himself. Though he remains the most charming man I have ever met, he also represented the exact sort of vapid, thoughtless, reflexive progressivism that many have come to associate with liberalism writ large. Ultimately, Trudeau’s charisma proved unable to stand against the tide of populism and his government sank under the weight of scandal and a sharply worsening economic situation.
What happened next is not how this story is supposed to go. For the last ten years, carefully poll-tested liberal leaders around the world have fallen prey to right-wing nationalist movements. If Canada followed this trend, Trudeau should have been swept from office and replaced with a politer, more Canadian version of Donald Trump. At first, it seemed that this was precisely what would happen. The Liberal Party tapped Mark Carney—an economist and former banker who had never held elective office before—to face off against a popular young Conservative opponent.
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Yet Carney proved a more skilled politician than anyone could have anticipated. More than this, he has displayed a remarkable ability to reframe the liberal project in substantive moral terms that help to rally people behind an ideology that seems at serious risk of extinction among voters in many countries. With his unique mix of competence and moral clarity, Carney has become the most popular prime minister in Canadian history and seems on the cusp of becoming the de facto leader of the free world. Liberals across the globe would do well to study the secret formula that has made Carney such a success—as well as his potential blind spots.
If asked to formulate in a lab the ideal politician to provide a compelling moral argument for liberalism, you would likely end up with a resume quite different from Mark Carney’s. After receiving a doctorate in economics from Oxford University, Carney went on to have a successful career in banking. So successful, in fact, that in 2008 he was appointed Governor of the Bank of Canada—a post from which he led his nation’s chief financial institution through the 2008 economic crisis. In 2013, he was tapped to be the first non-British citizen to lead the Bank of England, ultimately being the one to shepherd the UK economy through Brexit.
But though an undoubted financial wizard, nothing in his previous life portended Carney’s greatest talent as a liberal. In an age where liberals struggle to move beyond wonky policy explanations for their positions, Carney has proven capable of providing a robust defense of liberalism on economic, political, and moral grounds.
From the printing press to the radio, from television to social media, communication technologies affect politics and broader society by shaping two things: who speaks and what they say.
In the first case, different technologies vary in the extent to which they favor elite gatekeepers. Most famously, the printing press destroyed the informational monopoly enjoyed by European monarchs and the Catholic Church, enabling the Reformation. Much later, radio and television partly restored centralized control. Because they were initially expensive to produce and tightly regulated, they tended to concentrate ideological power in the hands of wealthy, well-connected elites.
Of course, who speaks influences what gets said, but the medium also shapes the message in other ways. Print permits careful, detailed argumentation. Television favors confident sound bites. Social media often rewards division, conflict, and negativity.
Large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and Claude are the latest communication technology to reshape public opinion, and their effects could be just as profound. Social media decentralized the information environment and weakened the influence of expert opinion. LLMs are likely to have the opposite effects.
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Messengers and Messages in the Social Media AgeSocial media has been a radically democratizing technology. It allows anyone with opinions and an internet connection to bypass traditional gatekeepers, a development that has dramatically expanded the range of voices and viewpoints that can be expressed.
It has also reshaped how media influence works. Because the algorithms that recommend content are optimized to capture audience engagement, they often amplify sensationalist, alarming, and divisive messages. Meanwhile, rapid audience feedback through likes, reposts, and comments has made political punditry much more performative and vulnerable to audience capture.
Unsurprisingly, the decline of elite gatekeepers has increased the influence of popular ideas marginalized by elites, another term for which is “populism.” Social media benefits populism not by brainwashing the masses with viral fake news, but by exposing voters to widespread non-elite perspectives and making it easier to mobilize around them. In Western liberal democracies, that means perspectives that conflict with the liberal establishment’s technocratic progressivism, including xenophobia, conspiracy theories, and quack science.
At the same time, the performative, engagement-maximizing character of social media has made much of political discourse more stupid and sensationalist. It has also given the world Candace Owens and Andrew Tate. It is probably no coincidence that the social media era has been an era of populism.
The Revenge of Expert KnowledgeConsider a topic: climate change, vaccines, immigration, crime, tariffs, wealth inequality, the Epstein Files, whatever happens to be in the news. Fire up one of the leading LLMs—ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, even Grok—and ask for information about it. Now compare the response with the information you can find about the topic by scrolling on a major social media platform.
I suspect it will quickly become clear that the LLM’s responses are generally much more evidence-based and in line with expert consensus than what you get from most social media posts. And when there is no expert consensus, you will typically get a good survey of the range of informed opinion on the topic.
Is this merely a hunch? In many ways, yes, but it aligns with several bodies of evidence suggesting that LLMs are becoming increasingly effective at producing broadly accurate information on politically relevant topics, especially when augmented with search tools. In recent experiments involving thousands of participants, for example, using chatbots to research political claims increased belief in true information whilst reducing belief in misinformation as effectively as internet search.
Why is this? The short answer is that the major AI companies are competing to build the most intelligent, impressive, and useful systems possible for a vast and diverse user base, including businesses that depend on reliable and factual information. This goal—reaping huge profits by putting “expert-level intelligence in everyone’s hands”—cuts against producing systems that deliver highly partisan, ideological, or misinformative content. So do the reputational and legal risks that arise if those systems produce dangerous or demonstrably false information.
There is endless popular and academic hand-wringing about bias, hallucinations, deepfakes, AI-based disinformation, AI psychosis, and other threats. These are all important issues, but a discourse restricted to such issues is missing the forest for the trees. When we consider the large-scale impact of this technology on public opinion, its most consequential feature is simple: it greatly improves people’s access to accurate, evidence-based information.
From Democratization to TechnocratizationWhereas social media has been a democratizing technology, LLMs are a technocratizing force. They shift influence back towards expert opinion.
Over a century ago, Walter Lippmann argued that, because the modern world is too vast and complex for anybody to understand through first-hand experience, we’re forced to rely on intermediaries to become informed. For Lippmann, the only intermediaries who can reliably perform this function are experts in the broadest sense: trained professionals who adhere to rigorous epistemic norms and methods. He therefore advocated for institutionalized “intelligence bureaus” that would assemble and explain the actual facts for both politicians and the public.
In many ways, the development of Western democracies after the Second World War followed Lippmann’s vision. Of course, this “expert knowledge” was mixed with elite bias, blind spots, and the occasional catastrophic fuck-up, from the Vietnam War to the 2008 financial crisis. Nevertheless, when it came to the kind of information that guided policy and circulated through the most influential media channels, the pendulum had swung a long way towards technocracy.
Social media is one of several forces that have disrupted this situation. LLMs push in the opposite direction. They are a kind of anti-social media, producing information heavily skewed towards expert opinion and delivered in a nuanced, measured voice. And there are reasons to think they will be more effective than all-too-human technocrats at shaping public opinion.
First, they can rapidly deploy encyclopedic knowledge to answer people’s idiosyncratic questions, and their responses can be probed and questioned without their ever getting tired or frustrated. They won’t just tell you that there is no persuasive evidence for a link between vaccines and autism. They can carefully walk you through the evidence and address your specific sources of skepticism.
This partly explains why they can be highly persuasive, even in correcting conspiratorial beliefs that many assumed were beyond the reach of rational persuasion. For example, one study published in Science found that talking with GPT-4 Turbo reduced participants’ confidence in their own chosen conspiracy theories by roughly 20% on average, an effect that was still present two months later.
Second, LLMs typically share information politely and respectfully. Being human, experts are often biased, partisan, and simply annoying, and when they seek to “educate” the public, it can be perceived—and is sometimes intended—as condescending and rude. LLMs can deliver expert opinion without such status threats.
As Dylan Matthews argues, this technocratizing character also makes LLMs an epistemically converging technology, pushing “people’s senses of reality closer together in a sort of mirror image of the way social media has fractured them.”
For these reasons, I speculate that, at least in liberal democracies where governments don’t exert significant control over LLMs, their most consequential impact on public opinion will involve technocratization: shifting people’s beliefs towards expert opinion. For example, a Financial Times analysis by John Burn-Murdoch, which tests LLM responses using simulated conversations, finds that the most widely used chatbots steer conversations towards moderate, expert-aligned positions. Drawing on tens of thousands of political survey responses, he estimates that ChatGPT, Gemini, and the Chinese model DeepSeek nudge users towards a center-left worldview and away from fringe left-wing positions, while Grok guides conversations about politics towards the center-right and away from hardline right-wing positions. Compared to social media, where conspiracy theories about rigged elections and links between vaccines and autism are overrepresented among posters relative to the general population, the chatbots almost never endorse them. And, importantly, these effects hold even after accounting for partisan differences in chatbot usage and their sycophantic tendencies.
In many cases, this shift will occur when people consult LLMs directly, but it might also be mediated by the growing deployment of LLMs as fact-checking tools on social media platforms themselves, and by writers, journalists, and other content creators who use them for feedback, brainstorming, and editing.
The impact of this shift on society and politics could be very large. As with social media, whose effects on political discourse and public opinion have been gradual and cumulative, LLMs need not transform everyone’s worldview and intellectual habits overnight to have profound long-term consequences for the health of media and public debate. That provides some reasons for optimism about the prospects for a more informed, rational style of politics.
ObjectionsMany find this optimism preposterous. To them, it sounds more like Big Tech propaganda than responsible analysis. So, let’s consider the most common objections.
Hallucinations
One common worry is that LLMs frequently “hallucinate,” generating content that is false or fabricated. But the rate of hallucinations has been falling fast, and the main question to ask about their reliability is: compared to what? Compared to the alternative sources of information most people are likely to draw on, especially social media, it is plausible that LLMs typically provide more accurate and evidence-based information.
Sycophancy
A more serious objection concerns sycophancy. LLMs often flatter the self-image and prejudices of those who use them, partly because people prefer warm, agreeable models. This can lead them to generate false and misleading information when users have mistaken beliefs, and even to reinforce and radicalize those beliefs, as seems to have happened in rare cases of “AI psychosis.” Increasing personalization creates similar risks. To the extent that models reinforce users’ individual beliefs, they will be an epistemically diverging technology.
Nevertheless, I doubt that these forces will be strong enough to undermine LLMs’ disposition to generate accurate, evidence-based information.
First, many people use LLMs for simple information requests where these problems don’t arise. For example, a recent study finds that people frequently ask Grok to fact-check posts on X, including posts from politicians and pundits on their own side (“@Grok, is this true?”). Another study found that researching political claims with a chatbot raised belief in true information and lowered belief in misinformation.
Second, we shouldn’t overestimate the extent to which people prefer reinforcement of their own errors over accurate information. Motivated reasoning is a powerful force, but so is the desire to discover what’s true.
Third, AI companies can more easily be held accountable—reputationally and, in some contexts, legally—for what their LLMs say than social media platforms can for the viewpoints expressed on them. I suspect this is one major reason why leading AI companies seem to be taking measures to reduce the sycophancy of their models.
Manipulation
Another concern is that the outputs of LLMs might be manipulated by powerful elites. The incentives to engage in such manipulation exist, and there are no obvious technical barriers to it.
Some argue that we are already seeing this with the “woke” LLMs produced by OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google. However, although the leading LLMs do appear to exhibit a center-left political bias, it is relatively subtle and doesn’t seem to undermine their tendency to spread broadly reliable information, including when that information goes against dominant progressive narratives. In fact, Claude, ChatGPT, and Gemini can be much less woke than pretty much everyone in my social and professional network.
A clearer example concerns Elon Musk’s efforts to create an “anti-woke” AI, Grok. This has produced genuinely worrying outcomes, not least in the notorious “MechaHitler” debacle, in which an update intended to make Grok less politically correct led it to spew extremist, antisemitic content on X until xAI rolled back the changes and apologized.
Many treat episodes like this as a harbinger of things to come. I’m skeptical. Setting aside that short-lived episode, Grok’s outputs seem to broadly align with the kind of accurate, evidence-based information one gets from the other major LLMs. For example, a recent study found that Grok’s fact-checking evaluations roughly correspond to those of professional fact-checkers when it is augmented with search.
The incentives that govern social media are radically different from those underlying LLMs. On social media, someone like Musk can pump out an extraordinary amount of dumb, easily falsified misinformation to his hyper-partisan admirers without suffering any obvious reputational costs. But how many people would want to use an LLM that is similarly unreliable? It’s simply difficult to build systems that generate reliable, trustworthy information across a vast range of topics whilst simultaneously spreading conspiracy theories and quack science.
This doesn’t rule out an ecosystem in which different LLMs possess different ideological personalities. Republicans are already much more inclined to use and trust Grok than Democrats. But there is nothing in principle wrong with this. In fact, a plurality of leading LLMs with different ideological valences would be healthy in a democratic society, helping to guard against the risk that LLMs reduce epistemic diversity.
Disinformation
Generative AI undoubtedly remains a powerful tool for creating disinformation and propaganda that could reach audiences via channels distinct from ordinary chatbot use, from fabricated recordings to “swarms” of coordinated propaganda bots.
Once again, however, I’m skeptical that this will counteract the technocratizing effects I have described. It is very difficult to manipulate public opinion top down. People have sophisticated cognitive defenses against manipulation and deception, and the reputational risks of spreading AI-based falsehoods discourage most influential figures and media outlets from doing so. And to the extent that LLMs provide unprecedentedly easy access to accurate information, they can greatly improve people’s defenses against misinformation.
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Final ThoughtsIf my speculations here are correct—and to be clear, speculations are all they are—then LLMs are a kind of anti-social media. Whereas social media has been democratizing, epistemically diverging, engagement-optimized, and performative, LLMs are technocratizing, epistemically converging, accuracy-optimized, and polite.
To many people, that probably makes LLMs sound like a surprising force for good. I suspect that part of the strong resistance I have received to this thesis is rooted in this assessment. If I’m right, LLMs are a force for good, but everyone knows that LLMs are not a force for good, so I must be wrong.
That objection represents an unsophisticated way of thinking. There is much to worry about when it comes to modern AI, including its effects on the labor market, possible benefits to authoritarian regimes, and the gradual disempowerment of humanity. The major AI companies are profit-seeking firms led by figures with their own self-serving agendas, who should be held to account for producing harmful products. Nevertheless, holding them to account requires developing accurate models of the world, and too much of the AI discourse is driven by an unreflective, omnicausal anti-AI sentiment with very little concern for veracity or proportion.
At the same time, even the technocratizing tendency of LLMs is not wholly benign. There is a significant risk that LLMs might deliver accurate information to individuals whilst reducing epistemic diversity in broader society. Lippmann’s vision of “intelligence bureaus” dispensing expert knowledge to the masses is being realized in a form he could never have imagined, but the classic problems with that vision—the flaws of expert opinion, and the benefits of democratic diversity and debate—remain. However, we can only face up to these problems if we recognize LLMs for what they are: not a continuation of social media, but a powerful corrective to it.
Dan Williams is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Sussex. He works on issues at the intersection of science, politics, and technology. He blogs at www.conspicuouscognition.com and is a contributing writer to Persuasion.
A version of this essay originally appeared in Conspicuous Cognition.
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After the piece below had been drafted, news came in of a third development that was perhaps even more consequential than the two described, the victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula, in the second round of the Brazilian presidential election. His defeat of the right-wing populist Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, was unexpected after a first round in which the latter ended up with the largest plurality of votes. Lula’s victory broke a string of seven consecutive right-wing victories in Latin American presidential elections. Flávio Bolsonaro has called for the election to be annulled, and it is at this point uncertain what his followers will do in reaction to Lula’s victory. Nonetheless, given Brazil’s size and importance on the world stage, this is a stunning and hopeful development that may signal, together with the developments in Venezuela and Serbia and the upcoming U.S. midterm elections, a major reversal of the wave of authoritarian-populist victories around the world.
—Frank
Sunday October 25 saw two very hopeful events from different parts of the world. They give us some optimism that democratic backsliding is not inevitable, and that it is possible to fight back against the rising tide of authoritarianism.
The first was the return of María Corina Machado to Venezuela. Machado should rightfully be president of Venezuela today. She sought to run against Nicolás Maduro during the July 2024 presidential election, and attracted huge enthusiastic crowds all over Venezuela during her primary campaign. Because of the threat she posed, she was disqualified by the regime; her stand-in, Edmundo Gonzalez, went on to win the election by a huge margin.
We know this because the democratic opposition kept voter records from each polling place in the country, and published them before the regime could declare its own falsified results naming Maduro the winner. Machado had to then go into exile to accept her Nobel Peace Prize, and has been living out of the country until this past weekend. Her return was marked by the same rapturous crowds cheering her that had come out during her election campaign two and a half years earlier.
The current situation in Venezuela following the Trump administration’s arrest of Maduro in early January is completely unsustainable and unjust. Trump made a deal with Delcy Rodríguez Maduro’s, vice president and member of his inner circle, to stabilize the country as the United States sought to take control of the country’s oil assets. Venezuela since then has been run by the same authoritarian clique that existed previously, with a pliable Rodríguez substituting for a resistant Maduro. Trump made no pretense that any of this was being done for the benefit of the Venezuelan people, bragging instead that he had put the United States in control of the country’s oil. As he told the UN General Assembly in September, “to the victors go the spoils.” Worse than that, there has been no transparency regarding where any of the oil revenues were going, or even how large they were. The administration revealed that it was working with Alejandro Betancourt, a businessman notorious all over Venezuela for his corruption.
In the meantime, Trump sidelined Machado, claiming that “she doesn’t have respect within the country.” To the contrary, she was by far Venezuela’s most popular politician. The State Department claimed that there would eventually be democratic elections, but without specifying a timetable, and held talks with various opposition groups that excluded Machado. Neither the regime nor the United States permitted her to go back to her country, and at the present moment we don’t know how she managed to return.
Her return puts both the Rodríguez regime and the Trump administration in a difficult position. Much as they might like to, neither can afford to arrest or otherwise silence the most popular politician in the country, certainly not in the face of the rapturous crowds greeting her. Machado has spent the time since January trying to placate Trump, giving him her Nobel Prize and refraining from public criticism of the United States.
But this kind of appeasement has never worked with this president, who has no interest in Venezuelan democracy. There is growing anger at the United States among ordinary Venezuelans, who naturally would like to know where money from their oil patrimony is going. Delcy could buy temporary peace, but as time goes on, the corrupt deal she struck with Trump is going to be a huge liability. Machado needs to get behind what would amount to an anti-corruption protest. It is likely that anti-American (and anti-Delcy) protests will gain momentum, and it is only at that moment that people in Washington may realize that a legitimate election is the only route to long-term stability.
Trump thinks that he is in control of the situation, but he is not; only the Venezuelan people have the right and ultimately the power to create a legitimate government.
The second rather miraculous event occurring Sunday was the victory of the Student List over the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Serbia’s parliamentary election, and strongman Alexander Vučić’s concession. Most informed observers fervently wished for Vučić’s defeat, but believed that in the end he and his party had enough levers to intimidate voters and manipulate the process. Vučić had been in power in one capacity or another—he recently resigned as president so he could become prime minister under an SNS-led government—such that many young Serbs had known no other leader than him.
The roots of the Student List victory lay in the student movement that emerged following the lethal collapse of the roof of a train station in the city of Novi Sad in November 2024. The station, a Chinese project, was riddled with corruption linked to the regime, and students across the country started mobilizing in protest.
There had been many protest movements previously in Serbia, including the one that brought down Slobodan Milošević back in October 2000. This movement, however, was deliberately organized in a way that minimized the measures that the regime could take against it. It had no leaders and no evident hierarchy. There were no immediate political demands except for an end to corruption; the movement was able to organize gigantic protests in Belgrade and other Serbian cities on this basis. In 2025, the students began marching across the country, stopping in villages and towns where they were frequently greeted by rural sympathizers. In organizing ahead of Sunday’s election, they deliberately did not include prominent politicians or existing opposition parties in the Student List. A large number of the Student List’s members are in fact academics. The movement did not say who would be likely to emerge as the prime minister under if they won the election.
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In response to this broad mobilization, the Vučić regime employed all of the tools that have by now become commonplace among rising authoritarians. There was massive manipulation of the electoral process itself, and the disqualification of many popular personalities. A huge number of Serbs, many of whom were sympathetic to the Student List, live outside the country; the government made it very difficult for them to vote. The state controlled most of the legacy media in Serbia, putting newspapers and TV channels in the hands of friendly oligarchs and making it hard for the opposition to get its message out.
Nonetheless, the students evidently benefited from the generational shift that was taking place in media consumption all over the world. Young people got most of their information online from sources beyond the regime’s control, and made an art of leaderless mobilization in the two years of protesting.
Now that the Student List has won the parliamentary election, however, the very tactics that allowed them to achieve this victory will become a major liability. The new parliamentary majority will now actually be responsible for governing the country. This cannot be done without a leadership hierarchy or a concrete policy program.
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The Student List was able to attract a broad coalition of followers by not being specific about its intentions, but there will clearly be tensions among the groups supporting it. The electoral practice of avoiding existing politicians and members of other parties means that no one on the list has actual experience running a government. Other movements built around civil society organizations, like those in Ukraine in 2004 or Egypt in 2011, ultimately failed because of their inability to make the transition to the responsibilities of governance.
These obvious challenges make me wonder whether Vučić was being clever in conceding defeat so quickly. Had he tried to hang on through the usual tactics of intimidation and fraud, he would have faced continuing protests. He may have calculated that the Student List was like the proverbial dog finally catching the car it was chasing and not knowing what to do with it. A failed transition might then create the conditions for him and the SNS to return to power.
Let’s hope that this is not the case. At this point, Serbia’s outside friends need to give it every possible form of support, and focus especially on building the Student List’s ability to govern. While its victory and Machado’s return to Venezuela are hopeful developments, there are a huge number of things that need to happen in both countries in the coming weeks and months to turn either of them into a sustainable victory for democracy.
In the meantime, however, we can enjoy the fact that the spirit of democracy is still alive in different parts of the world. The most important election of all will occur in the United States, where American voters will have the opportunity of rejecting a Republican Party that has been dominated by a right-wing authoritarian, Donald Trump. If this happens we will have clear evidence that democracy, far from being a dying doctrine, has strength and vitality in many different parts of the world.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is In The Realm of the Last Man. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
Between mid-September and its recent apex on October 17th, tens of thousands of high school students—joined by far-left activists from presidential candidate Jean-Luc Melenchon’s La France Insoumise (LFI) party, radical black blocs, and young people from the “banlieues”—have engaged in intensely violent and destructive riots in France’s major cities.
The number of demonstrators has reached hundreds of thousands and 10,000 arrests have been made. Thousands of rioters and police—though mostly the latter—have been injured, sometimes seriously. About the same number of public buildings, including schools, universities, police stations, city halls, and prefectures were ransacked or burned down. Three thousand small businesses, luxury stores, and supermarkets were vandalized or looted. In Marseilles, 30,000 looters destroyed and emptied hundreds of stores in one day alone. After a wave of “shock and awe,” most of the French have turned to anger against the rioters as well as the government, and feel humiliated by the scenes that made headlines around the world.
While street demonstrations and uprisings have been part of the French political landscape since before the Revolution, their frequency and violence have intensified since Emmanuel Macron’s first election as president ten years ago. First came the spontaneous, leaderless, and non-partisan “Yellow Vests” movement that lasted for over a year in 2018 and 2019, mobilizing mostly impoverished workers and retirees from rural France. Then, in early 2023, a social demonstration by labor unions opposed the rise of the retirement age from 62 to 64.
That summer, the killing of a youngster of immigrant origin as he tried to drive away from the police triggered massive destruction of public buildings in the banlieues of large cities. Ultra-left groups such as the black blocs have violently challenged the police and caused destruction on the fringes of labor or Yellow Vests demonstrations and even at international soccer events. Young looters coming mostly from the banlieues have taken advantage of the disorder created by the black blocs.
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